纵向关联市场间的价格传递

本文运用均衡移动模型研究农业生产者与食品零售商之间的纵向价格传递关系。模型建立在如下假设之上：即农产品（食品）营销企业在零售环节拥有寡占卖方力量、在农产品收购环节拥有寡占买方力量、营销企业所需要的农产品投入与其他营销投入之间存在一定替代关系并拥有规模报酬可变的技术。结果表明，市场力量和规模报酬对价格传递的影响十分复杂，一方面取决于农产品供给函数和食品需求函数的具体形式，另一方面还取决于外生冲击作用下农产品收购环节与食品零售环节市场力量变化的相对幅度。     

农业产业链条价格传递机制的实证分析

本文利用2006年1月至2008年12月的农业生产资料价格指数、农产品价格指数、食品类工业品出厂价格指数、居民食品消费价格指数等的月度数据,运用VAR模型对农业产业链条价格传递机制进行了实证分析。研究结果表明:农业产业链条的价格传递以"需求拉动"为主,以"供给推动"为辅,食品加工企业发挥了"稳定器"的作用;居民食品消费价格对上游各环节的价格均在10%的置信度下有显著的直接影响,其中对农产品价格的最大解释力度为74.2%,对农业生产资料价格的最大解释力度为39.8%;农业生产资料价格对下游各环节的价格均没有显著的直接影响,其中对农产品价格的最大解释力度为74.2%,对居民食品消费价格的最大解释力度为61.7%;农产品价格对其他环节价格预测误差的解释力度均较小,大多在10%以下。     

中国农产品价格链传导机制实证研究——基于协整和向量自回归模型的分析

选取2002年1月至2014年12月农产品的生产价格指数和农业生产资料价格指数、农产品零售价格指数等月度的数据,运用VAR向量自回归模型及脉冲响应函数对我国农产品价格链导机制进行实证分析,结果表明农产品价格链传导以需求拉动为主,我国农产品产业链上价格的传导机制在短期内三者间的传导路径都较为顺畅,假如农产品产业链任意一个环节受到外界的冲击时,就会传递到产业链上其它的环节。农产品生产价格波动对农业生产资料价格影响较大,农产品零售价格对农业生产资料价格的影响较小。农业生产资料价格指数、农产品零售价格指数均与农产品生产价格指数互为因果的双向引导关系。三个价格指数对自身的冲击会迅速做出响应,同时也会对农产品产业链上其他环节影响会有不同程度的响应。此外,农产品产业链也会受到社会、经济、法律、政策、市场调控等等因素的影响,是造成产业链上的不同环节、不同价格等传导效率差异性的主要原因。     

国际农产品价格波动对国内农产品价格的影响分析

本文基于2002年1月—2010年12月的月度数据,利用协整分析、格兰杰因果关系检验、误差修正模型及脉冲响应函数等方法对国际农产品价格(以棉花、玉米、大豆、小麦为代表)和国内农产品价格之间的关系进行了实证分析。结果表明,国际国内农产品价格间存在长期均衡关系;国际农产品价格向国内价格传导的过程中具有由短期波动到长期均衡的调整过程。国际国内农产品市场反向因果关系并不成立,国内农产品价格对国际农产品价格的影响有限。脉冲响应函数分析表明,国际农产品价格冲击对国内农产品价格有正向影响。     

农产品市场价格关系研究进展

从市场整合和市场边际两个方面评述了国内外农产品市场价格关系研究。首先介绍了空间分离市场均衡理论以及农产品市场价格关系研究的分析框架,然后评述了国内外市场整合和市场边际研究的进程,重点介绍了计量模型的发展与应用,指出供应链体系的市场整合和非对称性价格传递是现阶段的研究热点。最后提出要注意模型选择与数据可获得性等问题对研究结论的影响。     

随机市场下企业并购的动态模型及在管理层收购定价中的应用

假设竞争的并购企业之间、成功的并购者和目标企业之间关于协同效应与战略关系的信息不完美,管理者自大,利用实物期权博弈论方法,研究生产函数为Cobb-Douglas函数情形企业并购的时间和条件。研究表明,目标企业的产业价格增长性越好、波动性越大,目标企业的生产规模经济参数越高,产出价格弹性越大,目标企业的保留保证金越高,最优并购价格越高,因此实现并购的时间越长。目标企业的生产经营成本也会提高并购触发价格。而并购企业的期望协同效应与剥离期权价值的存在将加速并购。模型应用于管理层收购(MBO)的定价表明:国有企业产权转让是可以定价的,只有通过公开市场拍卖,才能有效防止国有资产流失。     

风险厌恶与国有寡占市场的资源配置效率——以我国成品油市场为例

作为传统寡占理论与我国国情相结合的产物,国有寡占市场受到越来越多的关注。本文以风险厌恶倾向为切入点,从缺少职业经理人市场、优越的生存环境和目标多重性三方面分析了国有寡占企业风险厌恶倾向的成因,并构建理论模型分析这种风险厌恶倾向对国有寡占市场资源配置效率的影响。结果表明,风险厌恶倾向使国有寡占企业面对成本风险时,价格和产量相对利润最大化值分别升高和降低,面对需求风险时,价格和产量同时低于利润最大化值,两种情况都使国有寡占市场资源配置效率降低,而固定成本的升高会进一步加大资源配置效率的损失。本文最后以我国石化行业成品油市场为案例,验证理论模型的结论,并提出了政策建议。     

重构新型国有工业品批发商业

<正> 批发商业是专门在商品流通领域中媒介生产企业与零售企业之间商品交换活动的行业。 我国的国有批发商业是在计划经济中形成和发展起来的,原来是行政性产品分配渠道,是在生产企业基本上没有直接销售权和零售企业基本上没有进货选择权的前提下,连接生产与零售的唯一桥梁。在建国以后的几十年间,国有批发商业是社会主义商品市场的主体之一,它在繁荣市场、促进生产、发展经济、提供积累、安排人民生活等方面作出了巨大贡献,是社会再生产过程中一支重要的经济力量。改革开放以前,无锡市的地产日用工业品的80％由国营的百货、五金、交电、化工、纺织等国有批发店收购。所以,批发站的商品收购直接关系到工业企业的生产与发展。而另一方面,全市所有零售商店供应的日用消费品有80％是国有批发站提供的,对消费品市场有着举足轻重的影响。此外,这些批发站为国家提供的积累亦占财政收入的相当比重。     

我国农业产业链中价格波动的传导与调控机制研究

本文应用约翰森模型、VEC模型等来研究农业产业链上中下游产品价格之间的长期协整关系和短期内的变动关系,并进行了格兰杰因果关系检验。研究表明:玉米、油菜籽、蛋鸡等产业链上下游环节的长期协整关系不存在,市场连接不畅。籼稻、粳稻、小麦、大豆、活猪、肉鸡等产业链各环节的价格存在长期协整关系,但短期内恢复协整的速度较慢。农产品受到上下游价格波动挤压,其价格可以传导到上下游,但反之,则不成立。据此,笔者提出了双层市场流通格局、价格应急机制等政策建议。     

对企业规模扩张问题的探究

改革开放以来,随着我国经济的不断发展,企业平均规模在逐年扩大,产业集中度也相对提高,但在企业规模扩张中还存在一些问题有待分析和解决。　　一、企业规模扩张的途径目前,我国有两股力量在推动着企业之间的兼并和收购。一是政府部门,包括中央政府部门和地方政府部门;二是企业。那么推动企业规模扩张的也必须是这两股力量。其中政府推动企业规模扩张的目标函数是实现国家与地区的国内生产总值最大化,从而增加国家与地区的税收和政绩;而企业推动规模扩张的目标函数就是企业的利润最大化。这两股不同的推动力导致了企业扩张的两条不…     

零售企业顾客投诉问题研究——基于数据挖掘技术

随着零售业的飞速发展,国外大型零售企业大举进入中国市场.国内零售业竞争日趋激烈,消费者的行为模式和购物心理也随之发生巨大的变化.如何更好地满足顾客的需求,与顾客建立密切的联系,增强顾客满意、顾客忠诚,减少关键客户的流失已经成为零售企业生死存亡的关键.作为现代营销管理理念与信息技术相结合的产物,客户关系管理建设对企业有效了解、满足客户的需求,给客户更多的让渡价值,从而使客户满意、提升忠诚度,增加企业的客户价值有重要的作用.本文应用Clementine作为数据挖掘软件,对零售企业投诉数据进行数据挖掘.通过对各类商品投诉原因、投诉处理方法、投诉处理后再次满意度等的分析,来实现对其投诉数据内在结构特征的理解和预测,同时提高零售业管理人员的工作效率和管理水平.     

Buying power and strategic interactions

Abstract.  This paper shows that buying power at the retail level can lead to a rise in wholesale price. As a result, retailers without buying power may increase their retail price. Nevertheless, total surplus is non‐decreasing in the degree of buying power possessed by the 'dominant' retailer. JEL classification: L13     

Short-term jobs and long-term job loss of large supermarket entry

This paper examines the effects of emerging supermarkets on local employment at the city level. Using a panel dataset for the period between 2000 and 2006, we find that entry of supermarkets largely increases employment in the wholesale and retail sector and other related sectors in the year of entry, but the positive effect on employment on the wholesale and retail sector only persists for a short period of time. It reverses two years later, due possibly to exits or contracting of small retailers. Further evidence from another dataset at the community level supports this explanation.     

The foreclosure argument for exclusive dealing: The case of differentiated retailers

I analyze a cooperative characteristic-form game between two differentiated producers and a downstream retail sector. When there is a single downstream retailer, the game always has a nonempty Core, involving the retailer being a common dealer. Each producer can at most earn his increment to the collusive industry profit. This result is similar to what is obtained in the literature in an extensive-form noncooperative formulation of the game. When there are two differentiated downstream retailers, the Core is empty when products and retailers are too homogeneous. For sufficient product and retailer differentiation, the Core is nonempty. In these cases the retailers are always common dealers for both products.     

Retailer power: recent developments and policy implications

It is common, but incorrect, to view retailing as a highly competitive activity. Unlike manufacturing, retailing has displayed a trend towards much higher concentration, reinforced by actions of retailers themselves, such as emphasis on own-label brands. This may introduce distortions arising from exercise of market power or may create countervailing power to that already enjoyed by manufacturers. Acknowledging increased market power within retailing raises new issues for competition authorities. We develop a consistent framework of analysis and use it to examine two issues: attitudes to retail mergers and exclusivity arrangements between retailers and their suppliers.     

Effects of horizontal consolidation under bilateral imperfect competition between processors and retailers

This article considers bilateral imperfect competition between processors and retailers to estimate the trade off between market power and cost efficiency. The model is based on pricing rules from a firm's profit maximization and nests both oligopoly and oligopsony models. An empirical analysis for US beef processors and retailers suggests that processors tend to exercise oligopsony market power in procuring cattle, but they are unlikely to exercise market power on retailers. When retailers and processors are considered as one integrated sector, efficiency effects from the increased concentration in the US beef packing industry are slightly larger than market power effects. When processors’ market power is considered separately from retailers’ market power, the difference between cost saving and market power effects becomes greater. The cost elasticity estimate, 0.99, indicates that a further merger would result in little economies of scale in the future. Therefore, although we find that efficiency effects are currently larger than market power effects, a further increase in concentration in the US beef processing industry could narrow the gap between the two effects.     

Trade shocks,industrial growth,and electrification in early 20th-century China

How does demand from the industrial sector promote the diffusion of electricity? Using newly digitized data on Chinese power plants from 1912 to 1935, we examine the impact of a trade shock, which protected the domestic manufacturing sector from import competition, on the adoption of electricity. To establish a causal relationship, we exploit time variations in imported manufactured goods caused by China's unexpected recovery of tariff autonomy in 1929 and cross-sectional variations in local access to treaty ports. We find that the reduction in manufactured imports resulted from the tariff shock led to the expansion of the local electricity sector. Further analysis suggests that the booming domestic industrial sector rather than population agglomeration was the key channel for the effect.     

Firm Dynamics in Retail Trade: The Response of Canadian Retailers to Exchange Rate Shocks

We use comprehensive firm‐level data to estimate the responses of heterogeneous Canadian retail firms to real exchange rate movements. Our analysis focuses on a period characterized by large fluctuations in the Canadian dollar, providing an opportunity to quantify both intensive and extensive margin responses in retail industries to real exchange rate shocks and to examine how those responses differ across firms, locations, and sub‐industries. Our results indicate that a real Canadian currency appreciation significantly reduces a retailer's sales, employment, and profits. The strength of this negative effect is decreasing in the distance of a retailer from the US‐Canada border. We do not find evidence of a strong relationship between real exchange rate movements and the number of operating firms nor the probability of firm survival. These findings are consistent with the view that a real Canadian dollar appreciation increases cross‐border shopping by Canadians, resulting in a negative demand shock for Canadian retailers, and the dominant response by firms to such a shock is through the intensive margin.     

企业经营创新、动态能力与竞争优势关系研究

伴随企业外部经营环境的变化,企业开展经营创新以提升竞争优势显得更为迫切。以陕西省商业企业为例,对企业经营过程中创新活动与企业竞争优势关系进行探讨,得出如下结论：企业经营创新可划分为业态组合和业态整合,二者对企业竞争优势培育具有显著正向影响,且业态整合的影响作用更强;企业动态能力正向调节企业经营创新对竞争优势的影响;机会识别能力对业态组合与企业竞争优势关系的作用更突出,而整合重构能力对业态整合与企业竞争优势关系的作用更突出,服务柔性能力和组织柔性能力对业态经营与企业竞争优势均有显著正向调节作用。据此,提出相关对策建议。     

Local monopsony and free riders

In an industry with upstream economies of scale in the distribution of differentiated products to retailers which have monopoly power within separate local market areas, the retailers have an incentive to exert monopsony power due to the divergence between average and marginal costs in the distribution of those inputs. The retailers increase their ability to exert monopsony power by forming coalitions (that is, chains) across local markets. Sufficiently large retail chains may force input price below the seller's average cost, thus ‘free riding’ on the level of product variety supported by other retailers. Vertical integration, cartels, or other cooperative behavior, however, can be means to control the level of product variety, and may increase both industry profits and economic welfare. Policy applications to the cable television, motion picture, and pharmaceutical industries are discussed.