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1.
对当前普遍存在的企业排污费管制的低效问题,本文利用混合策略理论,构建了排污企业与环境管制部门之间的静态博弈模型,通过对影响混合策略均衡形成的关键变量的研究,剖析了排污费管制效率生成的内部作用机制.研究发现:排污费额度、监管机构尽职收益、失职成本、企业外部损失、上级环境管制部门的监督力度、环境监管成本等变量的变动调整,以及相互作用决定了排污管制效率状况.  相似文献   

2.
阻碍燃煤电厂烟气脱硫的症结及出路   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
燃煤电厂基本是高架源排放二氧化硫污染物,对本地区的污染贡献率不大,地方政府对其治理缺乏积极性;由于其脱硫成本远高于我国二氧化硫排污费征收标准,导致排污企业宁愿交纳排污费而不愿治理污染。因此控制燃煤电厂二氧化硫排污放应主要发挥中央政府的作用,尤其应重视采取阶梯式征收排污费等经济措施,以激发排污电厂脱硫的积极性。  相似文献   

3.
程华  樊沁怡  龚强 《经济科学》2023,(5):183-198
本文利用新颖的企业排污和媒体报道数据研究地方政府环境关注度如何影响企业减排绩效,以揭示国有企业在执行政府环境政策中的独特作用。研究发现,相比非国有企业,地方政府环境关注度与国有企业排污量呈现更强的负相关关系;地方政府环境关注度可以影响国有企业排污量,最终降低这些企业的生产利润,这部分解释了地方政府和国有金融机构为何给它们提供经济支持。政府环境关注度增强时,成立年份较早、上年污染较多、总资产规模较大的国有企业减排量更大。媒体监督是影响企业排污行为的一个渠道。  相似文献   

4.
排污费是政府为保护环境、维护社会利益而制定的重要控制措施,但是很多企业通过建立政治关联降低上缴排污费。基于企业寻租理论及可持续发展理论,通过对我国重点环境监控的上市公司有关政治关联背景的高管人员的研究发现,政治关联会对企业获得政府环境优惠政策产生影响,并且与排污费成负向相关关系。监管部门应建立健全环境监管机制,限制有政治关联背景人员的行为,在选定政策免征时制定完善的规则。  相似文献   

5.
排污费是政府为保护环境、维护社会利益而制定的重要控制措施,但是很多企业通过建立政治关联降低上缴排污费。基于企业寻租理论及可持续发展理论,通过对我国重点环境监控的上市公司有关政治关联背景的高管人员的研究发现,政治关联会对企业获得政府环境优惠政策产生影响,并且与排污费成负向相关关系。监管部门应建立健全环境监管机制,限制有政治关联背景人员的行为,在选定政策免征时制定完善的规则。  相似文献   

6.
正2014年9月,国家发展改革委、财政部和环境保护部联合印发《关于调整排污费征收标准等有关问题的通知》,要求各省(区、市)结合实际,调整污水、废气主要污染物排污费征收标准,实行差别化排污收费政策,建立有效的约束和激励机制,促使企业主动治污减排,保护生态环境。实际上,自1982年国务院颁布《征收排污费暂行办法》以来,中国的排污收费制度几经变换:从"超标排放才缴费"到"凡排污者都需付费",  相似文献   

7.
文章利用1998-2006年面板数据分析了中国省级税收竞争与环境污染之间的关系,实证结果表明:(1)地方政府在税收竞争中对污染治理采取了骑跷跷板策略,并存在趋劣竞争现象;(2)增加地方政府可支配财力有利于外部性不大的污染物的治理;(3)排污费制度对工业固体废弃物和工业废水的排放强度有一定的抑制作用,但对工业二氧化硫排放强度并未起到应有的缩减功能;(4)中央政府颁布的环境标准对促进地方环境质量改善效果甚微。  相似文献   

8.
农村生态环境呈现多重污染复合交织的形态,严重制约了农村可持续发展。针对农村生态环境治理问题,文章构建村镇企业、地方政府和农户三方主体协同治理的演化博弈模型,分析各博弈主体行为策略选择和演化稳定性条件。结果表明,降低地方政府引导成本且给予净化企业和监督举报的农户经济激励、降低农户参与成本且做好对受损农户的补偿、降低村镇企业净化成本并加大对排污企业的监督强度和惩罚力度,将有利于推进三方互动,实现对农村生态环境的有效治理。  相似文献   

9.
从政府的角度出发,以排污企业作为研究对象,合理改进累计前景理论的价值函数,建立村民参与监督下政府和排污企业的农村环境治理决策行为演化博弈模型,进而得到使排污企业积极治理农村环境的约束条件。在综合考虑双方前景价值感知的基础上引入环境治理补贴,构建环境补贴对排污企业价值感知与环境治理决策行为的影响模型,最后运用系统动力学分析村民参与下政府和排污企业环境治理前景价值感知与治理决策行为。解决了传统博弈论完全理性假设和均衡分析方法的局限性,考虑政府和排污企业前景价值感知与环境治理补贴下积极参与农村环境治理的行为特征与规律,以及村民参与监督对政府和排污企业环境治理决策行为的影响,为构建我国农村环境多主体治理机制提供决策参考。  相似文献   

10.
本文运用经济学原理及古诺博弈模型对电力市场的排污收费制度进行研究,分析排污收费前后电力市场均衡的变化,推导出了古诺博弈均衡的通用解,分析了企业排污系数(βi)、企业边际生产成本(bi)和政府施行的排污收费税率(r)对均衡结果的影响,分析了征收排污费过程中发电企业的行为选择过程,认为电力企业从自身利益出发,会根据排污收费税率(r)来调整其排污量。最后提出了政府如何制定排污税率的建议。  相似文献   

11.
User fee for healthcare continues to be used in many countries despite the extensive documentation on the impoverishing effect on households. The literature has also analyzed the effect of user fee on the quality of care for both rich and poor. The purpose of this study is to find the factors affecting the physician’s behavior, under a user fee payment mechanism with an exemption program for the poor, when choosing treatment for poor and non-poor patients. The factors examined were treatment effort input, the fine, cost of investigation, costliness of government, severity of illness for the non-poor and for the poor, and the proportion of non-poor patients. The results showed that regulated user fee cannot be effectively implemented without government investigation or monitoring of the health provider’s treatment choice. The possibility of investigation provides incentive for the provider to choose the proper treatment quality when the poor are likely to be high risk than the non-poor. An important result is that regulated user fee can deteriorate the quality of care received by the rich, through excessive treatment, especially in developing economies where there is a small proportion of the rich. Improvement in innovative technologies that reduce the cost of investigation, government revenue collection, and treatment effort input is likely to improve the quality of care provided to patients regardless of income status.  相似文献   

12.
城市生活垃圾收费方式比较   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
城市生活垃圾收费是促进垃圾处理产业化、解决城市生活垃圾问题的重要出路。计量用户收费和定额用户收费是两种基本的收费方式,它们有不同的优势。定额用户收费适合于垃圾收费的初始阶段,而在垃圾收费发展到一定水平时,计量用户收费可以用较低的政策成本实现较高的收益。  相似文献   

13.
On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling   总被引:6,自引:1,他引:5  
This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.  相似文献   

14.
This paper demonstrates that a cost disadvantaged innovator increasingly relies on licensing with a fixed fee as its public ownership share grows. Moreover, when the innovation is drastic, a cost disadvantaged innovator frequently licenses by fixed fee when it has a public share even as a fully private firm will never use a fixed fee. As the fixed fee improves welfare, these results suggest that the licensing method of a partial public firm helps correct the market failure of imperfect competition.  相似文献   

15.
The focus of this paper is on labour arrangements characterized by indenture, bondage, or slavery, and the design of credit market policies to free these labourers. We examine bonded or indentured labourers that pay a fee to their patrons or employers for freedom from bondage in a multi-period game between the patron, labourers, and other lenders, where a labourer borrows the fee from a third party lender. Labourers are heterogeneous: they differ in their cost of committing strategic default in repaying the loan. The patron’s determination of the fee, and the possibility of strategic default by the labourer, are two key features that drive our results. Productivity gains are greatest when labourers with both high and low default costs pay the fee. However, there also exists a less socially optimal outcome where only the low default cost labourer participates. Importantly, we also develop a theory of the existence and persistence of bondage.  相似文献   

16.
伴随着我国基金行业的爆炸式增长,2010年末市场上已经有超过六十家基金管理公司,但基金行业的管理费却是投资者收益的六倍之多,成为了基金行业的一种异常现象.本文将基金投资者并非是完全理性纳入模型,把投资者分为成熟和幼稚两种类型,对基金管理者能力与基金费率之间的关系进行了探讨.结论表明,当幼稚型投资者比重超过一定程度后,基金管理者能力与基金费率成反比.而且,随着幼稚型投资者比重的增大,基金管理者获取的投资收益比例越大,基金投资者获得的收益比例越低.2010年我国基金行业管理者的收益是基金投资者收益的六倍,反映了我国基金市场上幼稚型投资者比例很高.  相似文献   

17.
We study a problem involving a team of agents each associated with a node in a chain. Each agent makes a decision that influences only his own cost and those of adjacent agents. Prior to making his decision, each agent observes only the cost structure associated with nodes that can be reached by traversing no more than r arcs. Decisions are selected without any coordination, with the common objective of minimizing average cost among agents. We consider such decisions decentralized since agents act based on different information. Cost incurred by an optimal centralized strategy, in which a single decision-maker has access to all information and dictates all decisions, is employed as a performance benchmark. We show that, to maintain a certain level of performance relative to optimal centralized strategies, decentralized deterministic strategies require r to be proportional to the number of agents. This means that the amount of information accessible to any agent should be proportional to the total number of agents. Stochastic strategies, on the other hand, decentralize more gracefully—the amount of information required by each agent is independent of the total number of agents.  相似文献   

18.
This paper examines how wage bargaining within each firm influences the relationship between an equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred ownership structure from the viewpoint of social welfare, in a unionized oligopoly of asymmetric firms with respect to productivity of capital. We consider the merger incentive of each firm’s owner when the wage level is determined through bargaining between the firm’s owner and union. We derive a condition for both the degree of cost asymmetry among existing firms and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner to her/his union such that each ownership structure can be observed in equilibrium. We also show that although the two types of ownership structures with the merger involving the least efficient firm can be equilibria and socially optimal, these structures are observed only when both the degree of cost asymmetry and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner are moderate. Finally, we analyse the relationship among the cooperative game approach employed in this paper and two non‐cooperative merger formation approaches, and examine the robustness of the results obtained in this paper against the change in the assumption regarding each firm’s cost function.  相似文献   

19.
This study examines how the timing of waste disposal fee collection affects the producer’s choice of built-in product durability and social welfare in a durable-goods monopoly model. We categorize the waste disposal fee policies into two: advance disposal fee (ADF) policy and disposal fee (DF) policy. We show that a DF policy has two opposing effects on durability. Firstly, a DF policy gives the producer an incentive to increase durability in order to delay the households’ waste disposal and to discount future payments of the disposal fee (the payment-discounting effect). Secondly, a DF policy creates an incentive for consumers to dump waste illegally in order to mitigate the payment of the disposal fee, and gives the producer an incentive to reduce durability in order to avoid market saturation and the associated future price cuts (the illegal-dumping effect). When the disposal fee is low, the payment-discounting effect dominates the illegal-dumping effect under a DF policy, leading to the enhancement of durability. In this case, from a social welfare viewpoint, a DF policy may be more desirable than an ADF policy if the environmental damage associated with illegal dumping is not serious. However, when the disposal fee is high, a DF policy induces more illegal dumping, reduces durability, and inflicts more environmental damage. Therefore, an ADF policy is more socially desirable than a DF policy when the disposal fee is high. Moreover, we consider an oligopoly case and find that an ADF policy is more socially desirable in an industry with smaller market power.  相似文献   

20.
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