供需双方信息不完全、交易费用差异与火车票市场扭曲——对“倒票”行为的交易费用分析

本文不认为供求不均衡是“黄牛”倒票现象存在的根本原因。本文针对火车票市场套利行为屡禁不止的热点问题构造动态博弈模型，论证了交易费用与套利行为之间的关系。模型通过对需求方购票的交易费用进行比较，逐层深入地分析了增加产品供给、增加购买渠道和差别定价等途径的效果，发现此类举措并不能有效遏制“黄牛”行为，反而还损害了低收入消费者的福利。研究表明，即使在供需均衡的情况下，供需双方信息的不完全，尤其是需求群体内部的信息不完全程度存在差异，会造成需求群体交易费用的差异，进而导致需求群体内部的资源配置被扭曲，而这才是“黄牛”群体长期顽固存在的根本原因。本文选取2002—2016年火车票贩票情况的真实数据进行了实证分析，印证了博弈模型的结论。而降低这种扭曲程度的同时降低需求方交易费用之间的差距，才是解决此类产品市场上资源配置无效率问题最有效的办法。     

存在套利收益情况下的衍生产品定价

通过剖析无套利假设的运行机制,分析市场中的价格操纵者和套利者的博弈发现,市场上存在套利收益的可能,而且这种套利机会和其他的一般风险一样,可以在市场上长期存在,并且需要获得相应的风险溢价补偿。为了探寻存在套利收益情况下的衍生产品定价问题,新的模型仍在随机过程和套利定价理论的框架下,运用一个新的随机过程描述套利收益的运动情况,对这种新的风险,给予相应的收益补偿,并融入到衍生产品的定价中去。尽管这一创新的模型存在不足,但它对中国金融市场衍生产品的定价仍有借鉴意义。     

"倒票现象"的经济学分析与治理对策

票源总体短缺、“车票效用”和支付能力的差异、特殊定价机制及“租”的存在等因素的共同作用是“倒票市场”存在和发展的主要原因。随着“倒票活动”的蔓延，产生了一系列的负面效应。治理“倒票现象”，一要减少对“票贩子”的票源供给，二要减少对“票贩子”手中车票的需求，三要增加“倒票”的风险。     

沪深300股指期货期现套利研究

依据持有成本法和高频数据研究发现,沪深300股指期货上市后,期现货价格偏差度和期货定价偏离度越来越小,正向套利机会和反向套利机会从初期频繁出现演变为偶然出现。单次套利平均收益越来越小,套利持续时间也越来越短。沪深300股指期货逐渐进入成熟期,为推出上证50指数期货、股指期权等其它衍生品奠定了坚实的基础。     

论指数期货套利流程

股票指数期货以股票价格指数作为金融期货合约的标的物,通过这种可交易的期货合约对所有股票进行套利保值,可以规避证券市场的系统风险.我们应对指数期货套利过程进行深入研究,建立指数期货正向套利操作流程和反向套利操作流程的数学模型,通过方法的探讨和可行性的分析,推导出正向套利和反向套利在考虑市场限制区间下定价模型的上限和下限,只有合约价格在大于上限和小于下限时,存在套利机会.投资者在实际进行股票指数期货套利操作时需要注意保证金追加风险、融券风险、流动性风险、股利发放不确定性风险和市场冲击成本等多项风险.     

可转债投资对股票投资的绝对占优:中国可转债市场效率的一个反例

可转换债券是公司债券的一种,其持有人有权利在一定期间将债券转换成相应公司的股票,因此可转换债券价格与股票价格之间应该具有一定的相关性;如果市场价格与这种相关性不相符,投资者就可能获得无风险套利的机会。在价格有效的证券市场上,这种无风险套利的机会是不存在的;但在中国证券市场上,经常会出现可转债投资对股票投资的绝对占优机会。     

运用沪深300股指期货进行期现套利

本文就股票市场与股指期货市场之间的套利机会与套利利润进行了研究,运用持有成本模型对股指期货进行定价,根据股指期货合约的理论价值与市场交易成本,测算无套利区间。本文完整地展现和实证了利用沪深300股指期货和ETF组合进行期现套利的全过程,发现目前模拟的股指期货合约走势基本运行在无套利区间之外,套利利润空间巨大。     

中国资本管制的有效性问题——基于跨境资本套利和套汇活动的研究

本文通过构建人民币货币市场和外汇市场在岸和离岸间的价差指标,采用滚动自回归模型和多机制平滑转换模型(MSTAR)对其进行非线性检验.结果表明,资本管制使得套利、套汇活动在不同阶段存在显著不同的中性区间,区间内外的系数不同表明资本管制的有效性存在差异.2005-2008年间,套利和套汇的管制强度和有效性均逐渐增加.2009-2012年间,套利和套汇的管制强度和有效性出现不同程度的降低.2013年,套利活动管制有效性进一步降低,套汇活动管制有效性则有所增加.2014-2015年间,套利和套汇活动的管制强度和有效性逐步增强,但套利资本管制波动较大.     

价格管制与IPO时机选择

本文研究价格管制导致的IPO时机选择现象.A股市场中IP0的发行价格受到管制,给公司带来不小的融资成本,研究发现,公司为了减少管制所带来的融资成本,会针对这种管制定价方式选择IPO时机,表现为:当公司的成长性较高时,将不愿意进行IPO,而会选择推迟上市,待其成长性实现后,当前盈利更高时才在A股市场IPO.海外资本市场不存在价格管制,公司去海外上市不需要根据其成长性进行IPO的时机选择,这使得海外资本市场上中国IPO公司的成长性要高于A股市场IPO公司.交叉上市的公司也多选择先海外上市,后回归A股市场.中国特殊的IPO定价制度使得A股市场成为一个低成长性市场.     

股指期货套利交易研究

股指期货是一种重要的金融衍生产品,其具有价格发现、套期保值的基本功能,同时还具有投机、套利等资产配置功能。其中,利用股指期货进行套利交易不仅有利于股指期货功能的发挥,也是投资者运用股指期货进行套期保值、规避风险的前提条件。作为股指期货最重要的运用方式之一的期现货套利方法成为投资者极为关注的热点。实现套利对股指期货的定价就显得尤为重要,分析无套利条件下股指期货的定价,提出股指期货套利交易的策略。     

Arbitrage and equilibrium in strategic security markets

Summary. In view of the fundamental price taking hypothesis, arbitrage is never compatible with equilibrium in Walrasian markets because the existence of an arbitrage opportunity in a competitive situation always leads to unbounded arbitrage activity. In strategic markets however, the mere effort of individuals to profit alters market clearing prices and thus distorts arbitrage opportunities as well. This observation suggests a different relationship between arbitrage and equilibrium, than in the competitive model. Indeed, we show that in such markets a spread between the cost of a portfolio and its returns is compatible with equilibrium. We provide an example of an equilibrium where a resourceless individual holds a portfolio with zero cost and positive return in every state. We further demonstrate via an asymptotic result, that no arbitrage is intimately related to price taking behaviour.Received: 8 September 2001, Revised: 6 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: G12, D4, D5, D52. Correspondence to: Leonidas C. Koutsougeras     

Time,Arbitrage, and the Law of One Price: The Case for a Paradigm Shift

Consider a Competitive, Efficient, and Frictionless Economy (CEFE) where resources are scarce at any date, and hence money as a valid claim against scarce resources is also scarce. In this economy, there is always price competition, which can at any date generate an unlimited number of arbitrage opportunities. For example, at any date, opportunities can exist to buy and sell each one of the contracts for delivery of the same good or asset at multiple prices currently as well as on an infinite number of future dates. I prove all arbitrage transactions, including “spot” transactions, tie up arbitrageurs’ capital representing money, good or asset such that this capital cannot be used for any other purpose for a non-zero quantity of time. This makes it impossible to exploit all arbitrage opportunities with the scarce capital available at any date and leads to an infinite number of unexploited opportunities and a non-negligible opportunity cost of the capital tied-up in arbitrage transactions, represented by each arbitrageur’s best missed arbitrage opportunity, if no better opportunity exits, hence the breakdown of the law of one price in its standard sense. This helps construct a new paradigm of CEFE which resolves long-standing theoretical, empirical, and experimental puzzles.     

Fan welfare maximization as a club objective in a professional sports league

Motivated by aspects of European soccer club governance (members' clubs supporters' trusts), a first formal analysis of fan welfare maximization as a club objective in a sports league is provided, with comparisons to objectives studied previously (profit and win maximization). Positive comparisons focus on team qualities, ticket prices, attendances and the impact of capacity crowds; empirically observed ticket black markets and inelastic pricing are consistent only with fan welfare maximization. Normatively, social welfare (aggregate league surplus) is well-served by a league of fan welfare maximizers, or sometimes win maximizers, but not profit maximizers; leagues should not normally make profits.     

Transferable Licenses Versus Nontransferable Licenses: What is the Difference?

This paper questions the presumption that transferable licenses are worth more and result in higher welfare. We show that the price of a transferable license may be lower than that of its nontransferable counterpart if the underlying quota is not very severe. However, transferability is preferable to nontransferability if consumer surplus and license revenue have equal weight in the welfare function. We also examine whether licenses will be monopolized by domestic producers with market power. The models have implications for several issues, including the design of pollution permits and how to maximize revenue from ticket sales.     

International Pricing with Costly Consumer Arbitrage

Consumer arbitrage affects international pricing in several ways. If all consumers face the same arbitrage costs, a monopolist's profit increases with arbitrage costs, and world welfare declines with them (if output does not rise). If arbitrage costs differ across consumers, a monopolist may sell in a second country even if there is no local demand—it can use the second country to discriminate across consumers in the first country. Again, world welfare typically falls with arbitrage costs. When there is also local demand in the second country, world welfare may be increasing in arbitrage costs, even if output falls.     

A NOTE ON MARKET COVERAGE IN VERTICAL DIFFERENTIATION MODELS WITH FIXED COSTS

With fixed costs of quality improvement, we find that a covered market outcome with an interior solution in the price stage is not a Nash equilibrium. When the degree of consumer heterogeneity is high (low) enough, an uncovered market outcome (a covered market outcome with a corner solution in the price stage) is the only Nash equilibrium. When the degree of consumer heterogeneity is moderate, both of the two market outcomes are Nash equilibria, but an uncovered market outcome yields higher social welfare than a covered market outcome with a corner solution in the price stage.     

Are Co-integrated Stock Prices Consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis?

This paper responds to the unsatisfactory argument that there is no correspondence between co-integration and the efficient market hypothesis. A law of one co-integrating vector of prices is proposed for the exchange rate and domestic and overseas stock prices. Markets must therefore be efficient in long-run equilibrium because no arbitrage opportunities exist. However, arbitrage activity via the disequilibrium error correction allows above-average (risk-adjusted) returns to be earned in the short run. The elimination of these arbitrage opportunities means that stock market inefficiency in the short run ensures stock market efficiency in the long run.     

International tax arbitrage and residence vs. source-based capital income taxation

Using a two-country general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents and uncertainty, we examine how countries' adoption of different fundamental approaches to taxing international capital income will affect portfolio choices and pricing relationships in international bond and foreign exchange markets. We characterize an equilibrium where (tax-)arbitrageurs in the country applying the source principle may exploit the resulting tax arbitrage opportunities up to some individual bound, normal investors in either country refrain, or are restrained, from constructing such (tax-)arbitrage portfolios, while arbitrageurs in the country using the residence principle do not share in any tax arbitrage profits.     

UNIVERSAL ACCESS,PARALLEL TRADE AND INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE

Governments often subsidize poorer groups in society to ensure their access to new drugs. We analyse the optimal income‐based price subsidies in a strategic environment. We show that universal access is less likely to arise when price arbitrage prevents international price discrimination. When this is not the case, under some income ranges, bilateral universal coverage can be supported by equilibrium subsidies together with bilateral partial provision. In such a case, international health policy coordination becomes relevant. We also show that asymmetric universal access to medicines across countries can arise, even when countries are ex ante symmetric, when international price discrimination is possible and governments cannot design subsidies proportional to either income or quality.