The political economy of the impossible trinity

This paper reconsiders the policy trilemma in an open economy by incorporating political economy concerns. We argue that the impact of government ideology on monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and capital flow restrictions should be analyzed in the broader context of restrictions imposed by the impossible trinity instead of the usual single-dimensional constraints. Employing a de facto measurement of these restrictions for a sample of 111 countries from 1980 to 2010, we show that the impact of government ideology on a country's position in this trilemma is highly context dependent: we find that its impact on exchange rate stability and monetary independence varies between developed and developing countries. We also show that the impact of government ideology on these two trilemma components is contingent on the stance of the respective economy's business cycle. Left-leaning governments seem to favor exchange rate stability over monetary independence in case of a negative output gap; suggesting a reversal of their commonly assumed partisan preferences in economically tight times.     

Government size,government debt and globalization

This article empirically investigates the effect of globalization on government size and debt. Using panel heterogeneous cointegration techniques to a panel of developing and developed countries, it finds that globalization reduces government size and debt. In terms of components of globalization, government size is found to increase with trade openness but decreases with financial, social and political globalization. On the other hand, government debt increases with financial and trade openness but decreases with social and political globalization. The evidence is robust to different estimation methods and different samples. Our data also indicate unidirectional causality running from globalization measures to government size and debt.     

The effect of remittances on democratic institutions

Do remittances promote stronger democratic institutions in developing countries? We study the effect of workers’ remittances on the quality of democracy in developing countries, and examine how government spending mediates the effect of workers’ remittances on the quality of democratic institutions. Using a dynamic panel estimator on data from 133 developing countries over 1972–2012, we find that workers’ remittances improve the quality of democratic institutions. We also find that workers’ remittances are more effective in promoting democratic institutions in developing countries with low government spending.     

发展战略与汇率制度选择

一般而言,一国汇率制度的选择会受该国经济和政治因素的影响,而发展中国家在选择汇率制度时还会受到其发展战略的影响.本文考察了发展战略与汇率制度选择之间的关系,发现实施赶超战略和进口替代战略的国家会选择固定汇率制度并高估本币币值,甚至采用多元汇率制度;实施出口导向战略的国家会选择固定汇率或者钉住汇率制度,一般钉住美元且波幅很小,并低估本币币值;而只有真正实施比较优势战略的国家才选择浮动汇率制度,政府很少干预汇率的变化.现阶段,我国要坚定地实施有管理的浮动汇率.并适当控制人民币的升值速度.     

Exchange Rate Regimes and Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Developing Countries

Drawing on recent advances in exchange rate regime classifications, the paper examines empirically the effect of exchange rate regimes on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing countries. Using system generalized methods of moments estimation on a panel of 70 developing countries for the period 1985–2004, we find that developing countries adopting de facto fixed or intermediate regimes significantly outperform those opting for a flexible exchange rate system in attracting FDI flows. No statistically significant differences in the FDI‐inducing properties of fixes, intermediates and floats are found using the International Monetary Fund official classification.     

Crises and exchange rate regimes: time to break down the bipolar view?

We revisit the link between crises and exchange rate regimes (ERR). Using a wide panel of 90 developed and developing countries over the period 1980–2009, we find that corner ERR are not more prone to crises compared to intermediate ERR. This finding holds for different types of crises (banking, currency and debt), and is robust to a wide set of alternative specifications. Consequently, we clearly break down the traditional bipolar view: countries that aim at preventing crisis episodes should focus less on the choice of the ERR, and instead implement sound structural macroeconomic policies.     

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS,GOVERNANCE, AND CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

This article aims at identifying the determinants of government expenditures of developing countries by placing emphasis on the political institutions and governance variables, which have not been addressed so much in the previous literature. Using a panel data analysis for 97 developing countries from the period 1984 to 2004, this study finds evidence that controlling for economic, social, and demographical factors, political institutional and governance variables significantly influence the consumption expenditure in developing countries. Political institutional variables such as the type of political ruling and political power in the parliament positively influence consumption expenditure; on the contrary, governance variables such as corruption influence negatively. Furthermore, we find that autocratic governments with military ruling are not particularly accommodative toward consumption expenditures as the public spending significantly shrinks under military dictatorship compared with other forms of governance. In order to check consistency of our findings, we ran alternative specifications as well as conducted extreme bound tests. Our results largely survived these tests showing robustness of our findings. (JEL E01, E02, E61, E62, H2, H4, H5, H6, O11, O5)     

Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?

This paper uses a large panel data set to examine the relation between elections and fiscal policy. We find evidence of political budget cycles: on average, government fiscal deficit increases by almost 1% of GDP in election years. Moreover, these political budget cycles are significantly larger, and statistically more robust, in developing than in developed countries. We propose a moral hazard model of electoral competition to explain this difference. In the model, the size of the electoral budget cycles depends on politicians' rents of remaining in power and the share of informed voters in the electorate. Using suitable proxies, we show that these institutional features explain a large part of the difference in electoral budget cycles between developed and developing countries.     

The impacts of economic sanctions on exchange rate volatility

This research empirically analyzes the impact of various instruments of economic sanctions on official exchange rate volatility by employing data from a panel of 23 target countries covering the period 1996–2015 and using the Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected (LSDVC) model. Our findings suggest that economic sanctions do significantly influence the target countries’ exchange rate volatility. Specifically, we are able to see different sanction present its different effects on exchange rate volatility. Furthermore, the robustness evidence of the eliminating country as Iran, eliminating variable of political ideology, intercepting time period, cross-sectional regression analysis, using real exchange rate volatility as proxy variable and a new sanctions database, are basically consistent with the previous finding. Overall, our empirical findings offer implications for those sanctioned countries about how to stabilize their exchange rate when facing sanctions.     

Current account sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does the exchange rate regime matter?

This paper aims at studying the sustainability of current accounts in Sub-Saharan Africa and determining whether this sustainability depends on the exchange rate regime. Relying on a formal theoretical framework and recent panel cointegration techniques, our findings show that current accounts have been globally sustainable in Sub-Saharan Africa countries over the 1980–2011 period. However, this sustainability has been lower for countries operating a fixed exchange rate regime or belonging to a monetary union. We also find that the difference in the level of sustainability could be explained by a higher persistence in the current account adjustment of countries operating under rigid exchange rate regimes.     

Exchange rate regime,real misalignment and currency crises

Based on 69 sample countries, this paper examines the effect of macroeconomic fundamentals on real effective exchange rates (REER) in these sample countries. Using the misalignment of actual REER from its equilibrium level, we have estimated the factors explaining the extent of currency over- or under-valuation. Overall, we find that the higher the flexibility of the currency regime, the lower is the misalignment. The estimates are robust to different sub-samples of countries. We then explore the impact of such misalignment on the probability of a currency crisis in the next period, indicating the extent to which misalignment could be used as a leading indicator of a potential crisis. This paper thus makes a new contribution to the debate on the choice of exchange rate regime by bringing together real exchange rate misalignment and currency crisis literature.     

汇率制度选择:基于随机效应多元排序probit模型的分析

选用13个影响汇率制度选择的典型变量,采用随机效应多元排序选择模型对147个国家的汇率制度选择进行分析,发现经济发展水平、美元化程度、货币错配程度越高,实际资本开放程度越大,政府越强,具有高经济增长和长期通货膨胀历史的国家有较高采用相对固定汇率制度的概率;而经济规模、贸易开放度越大以及外债债务比率越高将会促使一国选择灵活性较高的汇率制度。     

Reexamining the relationship between inflation and growth: Do institutions matter in developing countries?

Using a large panel of countries during the period 1950–2009, we estimate the inflation thresholds above which its association with economic growth is expected to be negative, taking into account differences in institutions across countries. First, in line with previous literature, we find that the estimated threshold is substantially higher for developing countries compared to that of developed countries. However, we further show that the inflation threshold in developing economies falls when we consider reduced groups that exceed certain levels of institutional quality. We also find that the cost of inflation increases with the quality of institutions.     

Do Capital Controls Enhance Monetary Independence?

International monetary policy trilemma—the tradeoff among exchange rate stability, monetary independence, and unrestricted capital mobility—is an important constraint for policy makers in an open economy. This paper investigates an aspect of the hypothesis that has received relatively less attention: whether a decrease in capital mobility through imposition of capital controls, while holding the degree of exchange rate stability constant, will enhance monetary independence. Using a panel dataset covering 88 countries for the 1995–2010 period and the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation, we find that: (1) capital controls help improve a country's monetary independence; (2) the effectiveness of capital controls depends on the types of assets and the direction of flows that are imposed; and (3) the choice of exchange rate regime has an important impact on the effectiveness of capital controls on monetary independence.     

The importance of composition of fiscal policy: evidence from different exchange rate regimes

We study the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policies in an open economy. We emphasize two transmission mechanisms: the cost channel, by which wage government spending and labor taxes raise the real wage firms must pay, and the exchange rate channel, by which the nominal exchange rate shifts induced by fiscal policy have real effects if (some) prices and wages are sticky. The latter channel implies that changes in wage government spending or in labor taxation should have different effects under flexible than under fixed exchange rates. In a 1964–93 panel of OECD countries we find significant evidence for both channels. Moreover, we find that the real product wage and profitability are more responsive than quantities (employment and output) to fiscal policy innovations.     

监管模式、政治体制与矿难——基于跨国数据的证据*

煤矿安全生产问题不仅是中国面临的严峻问题,也是一个世界性的难题。本文首次利用1982-2014年九个产煤大国的跨国面板数据,从经济学的角度检验了煤矿监管模式和政治体制对矿难的影响。结果表明：（1）煤炭安全生产的集权监管有利于减少矿难死亡率。一个国家的煤矿安全监管模式由分权改成集权,可以减少近一半的死亡率。（2）一个国家的政治体制不会直接影响矿难的死亡率。这说明煤矿安全生产问题主要是一个监管体制问题,而不是一个政治体制问题。（3）在发展中国家,集权监管模式对降低矿难死亡率的效果更明显。（4）在转型国家,监管集权和改进政府问责都能降低矿难死亡率。本文的结果对于矿难的跨国比较分析以及遏制矿难具有重要的政策含义。     

The effect of political factors on sovereign default

This aricle examines the effect of political factors on sovereign default. Using a theoretical model, we find that political instability increases the likelihood of default. To test this theoretical implication, we use a panel logit model to estimate the effect of long- and short-run political factors, along with other macroeconomic variables, on the probability of default. Data from 68 developed and developing countries between 1970 and 2010 is used to conduct the study. Our findings suggest that a country is more likely to default when (i) it has a relatively younger political regime in place; (ii) it faces a higher chance of political turnover; and (iii) it has a less democratic political system. Economic factors are also vital; a country with stronger growth and less external debt is less likely to experience sovereign default. Robustness tests using alternative measures of political risk, trade balance and EMBI sovereign bond spreads also support the baseline findings.     

Government ideology and international migration*

We provide the first empirical evidence that government ideology affects the choice of migration destinations. As ruling political parties differ in their discourse, policies, and positions on migration, the ideology differential between the host and home country governments can shape the relative generosity of the welfare system, the degree of tolerance towards out-groups, and the restrictiveness of migration policies, all acting as important drivers of international migration. Using data on bilateral migration and government ideology for OECD countries between 1990 and 2016, we show that migration flows increase when the government at the destination becomes more left-wing relative to the government at the origin, particularly when both countries are members of the European Economic Area.     

The real exchange rate and the black market exchange rate in developing countries

This article tests for the validity of the Purchasing power parity (PPP) theory using both the black market and the official exchange rates for panels with cross sectional dependency. The test is conducted using a newly developed, nonlinear IV panel unit root test that properly handles cross-sectional dependency for thirty-seven developing countries. We find that the null of joint unit root hypothesis is rejected for the whole panel, using the black market exchange rate, and for sub-panels of African and high inflation countries, using either exchange rate. The black market-based real exchange rates are, therefore, shown to provide stronger evidence for the purchasing power parity theory than do the official rates. This finding is consistent with the observation that black market exchange rates better represent market forces and thus are more relevant when testing for the validity of the PPP theory in developing countries.     

Hidden patterns in exchange rate regime choice

There have been a number of empirical attempts to account for variation in exchange rate regime choice, but these attempts point in several directions and are not made sense of easily. One reason for the differences among studies is that standard statistical techniques are unable to identify the nonlinear and contingent relationships among the factors that influence the choice of exchange rate regime. This article utilizes a statistical technique that reveals complex nonlinear interactions among variables. The analysis reveals that the influence of past inflation acts to condition the influence of labor market rigidity and that political stability plays a key role for both high and low inflation countries.