Trade,Transboundary Pollution,and Foreign Lobbying

In this paper, we explore the use of trade policy in addressing transboundary stock pollution problems such as acid rain and water pollution. We show that a tariff determined by the current level of accumulated pollution can induce the time path of emissions optimal for the downstream (polluted) country. But if the upstream (polluting) country can lobby the downstream government to impose lower tariffs, distortions brought by corruption and foreign lobbying lead to a rise in the upstream country’s social welfare, and to a decrease in social welfare in the downstream country. Thus, the usefulness of trade policy as a tool for encouraging cooperation and internalizing transboundary externalities depends critically on the degree of governments’ susceptibility to foreign political influence.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Environmental Taxes

Abstract. This paper studies the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policy stringency in a two-country model with trade costs, where FDI could be unilateral and bilateral and both governments address local pollution through environmental taxes. We show that FDI does not give rise to ecological dumping because the host country has an incentive to shift rents away from the source country toward the host country. Environmental policy strategies and welfare effects are studied under the assumption that parameter values support FDI to be profitable.     

Allocation of emission permits with leakage through capital markets

This paper analyses how tradable emission permits should be allocated to firms when capital is internationally mobile. When international environmental problems are attempted solved through uncoordinated policies between countries, it might be desirable for the home country to issue free emission permits in proportion to the use of capital in order to prevent leakage through international capital movements. The desirability of free emission permits will however be reduced if capital also can be employed in a domestic non-polluting sector. In this case, it may even be optimal to tax the use of capital in the polluting sector. It is also shown that it is always optimal to subsidise the use of capital in the polluting sector if the use of labour is taxed at an optimal rate. Finally, leakage does not affect the optimal domestic emission limit as long as appropriate capital subsidies and labour taxes are implementeed.     

Dumping,antidumping duties,and price undertakings

This paper examines which types of firms, from a developed country (DC) or a less developed country (LDC), tend to practice dumping, using a two-market equilibrium analysis of trade in similar products. Specifically, we present a vertical product differentiation model of duopolistic competition between a DC firm and an LDC firm under free trade to show that the DC firm sells a higher-quality product without dumping. In contrast, the LDC firm sells a lower-quality product and practices dumping in the DC market by charging a price lower than the product's price in the LDC's local market. In response to the LDC dumping, the DC government's use of an optimal antidumping duty increases its domestic welfare. The LDC's social welfare may increase if its exporting firm accepts price undertaking rather than dumping. From the perspective of world welfare, defined by aggregating the welfare of the trading countries (DC and LDC), the trade damage measure through imposing antidumping fines on LDC dumping is Pareto-improving compared to free trade (under which dumping takes place) and price undertakings.     

Supplementing Domestic Mitigation and Adaptation with Emissions Reduction Abroad to Face Climate Change

In this paper we focus on a long-term dynamic analysis of the optimal adaptation/mitigation mix in the presence of a pollution threshold above which adaptation is no longer efficient. We account for accumulation in abatement capital, greenhouse gases, and adaptation capital in order to better capture the arbitrage between abatement and adaptation investments. Pollution damages arise from the emissions due to the country consumption but also from the emissions of the rest of the world (ROW). A pollution threshold is then introduced, above which adaptation is no longer efficient. We obtain that if this threshold is lower than the steady-state level of pollution, there is no way for the modelled economy to avoid it. In particular, such a situation will appear if the ROW’s emissions are high. We then show that CDM may be a means to avoid a pollution threshold above which adaptation becomes of no use.     

Undiscounted optimal growth with consumable capital and labor-intensive consumption goods

This paper presents a complete characterization of the optimal policy in a two sector undiscounted growth model. The model is an extension of the Leontief two sector model, which analyzes the optimal allocation of capital and labor to a consumption good sector and an investment good sector. The paper extends this framework to include consumable capital. Thus, the planner has preferences over the consumption good and the consumable capital. Future welfare levels are treated equally as current ones. Geometric techniques are applied to characterize the optimal policy if the consumption good is labor-intensive. The results suggest that if the initial capital stock is above a threshold level, that depends upon the consumption of capital, every optimal program is monotonic, converges to the golden rule stock in a finite number of periods, and undergoes either unemployment or excess capacity of capital.     

Reforms of Environmental Policies in the Presence of Cross‐border Pollution and Public–Private Clean‐up*

We construct a two‐country model where pollution from production is transmitted across borders. Pollution abatement is undertaken by both private producers and the public sector. We characterize Nash optimal levels of the policy instruments in the two countries: emission taxes and funds allocated for public abatement activities. We examine the implications of a number of multilateral policy reforms. One of our findings is that the magnitude of the beneficial effect of a reform depends on the scope of the reform; if it is restricted to a subset of policy instruments, then the efficacy of environmental policy reform can be greatly undermined.     

Capital control reconsidered: financialisation and economic policy

We consider capital controls and their impact on selected countries, providing a critique of IMF policy. We show how the warning signs of the 1970s were ignored and the consequences became apparent during the ensuing period of neoliberal hegemony. We contend that promoting increased capital mobility is counterproductive as it reduces macroeconomic ‘policy space’. We introduce a development of the international policy ‘trilemma’ in the form of a variant of the idea of the ‘quadrilemma’. We suggest that, in most cases, the key policy driving economic growth is fiscal policy but it may be that its unconstrained use (and that of monetary policy) is not possible either under fixed exchange rates or when free capital mobility exists; a nation may face a ‘demi-quadrilemma’. We contend that, in practice, a country can only adopt ‘two from four’; if it chooses to retain free use of monetary and fiscal policy, it must sacrifice both fixed exchange rates and capital mobility. We advocate the rejection of fixed exchange rates and free capital mobility allowing the retention of requisite monetary and fiscal policy space, and that a multinational approach to the capital control policy would effectively contribute to a growth and development strategy.     

Foreign investment and environmental regulations in LDCs

This paper examines the welfare and policy issues of pollution taxes and foreign-investment quotas for a small, developing economy. We consider each policy in isolation and joint optimum of them. We find that, for a country with capital inflows, an active environmental policy along with a liberal policy on foreign capital is optimal.     

Asymmetric Tax Policy Responses in Large Economies With Cross-Border Pollution

We build a model of cross-border pollution between two large open economies, one importing the polluting good and the other exporting it, and derive their non-cooperative trade and environmental tax policies. We show among other things, that (1) in response to a bilateral reduction in trade taxes by both countries, the former country’s optimal policy is to lower its Nash emissions tax while the latter’s is to raise it, and (2) in response to an increase in emissions tax rates by both countries, the former country’s optimal reaction is to raise its Nash import tariff, while the latter’s is to reduce its Nash export tax. That is, in the present context, freer trade leads the exporting country to adopt stricter while the importing country laxer environmental tax policies.     

京津冀大气治理生态补偿支付原则研究

生态补偿是跨界大气污染治理的重要政策工具。迄今为止,京津冀大气治理生态补偿机制仍未出台,严重制约着京津冀生态环保协同发展做深做实,创新思维方式、构建非传统领域生态补偿理论体系是当务之急。厘清了传统生态补偿认识误区,创新性地提出了生态补偿支付原则统一框架,将"污染者付费原则"(PPP)和"受益者付费原则"(BPP)统一在"改变者付费原则"(CPP)分析框架中,为京津冀大气治理生态补偿机制设计提供了思想前提和理论基础;通过构建京津冀大气治理CGE模型具体测算了特定大气质量控制目标下河北应获得的生态补偿额。这对于加快补齐京津冀生态文明建设制度短板、有效弥补河北大气治理资金需要、强化京津冀生态环境联建联防联治具有重要意义,对于全国和其他重点区域大气治理具有普遍启示意义。     

Environmental control,wage inequality and national welfare in a tourism economy

This paper examines the effects of stricter environmental regulation on income distribution and welfare for an open economy with inbound tourism. The pollution input is considered as a mobile factor between sectors, and a decrease in it lowers wages of skilled labor in the traded sector but can increase the wages of unskilled labor in the non-traded sector. A stricter policy on environmental controls can narrow wage inequality and increase welfare if the tourism terms-of-trade effect dominates. These results are confirmed by simulations.     

Ecological dumping under foreign investment quotas

In this paper, we examine the discrimination of emission taxes between the export and nontradable sectors in a small open economy. A few articles indicate that there should be no differentiation of environmental policies between sectors in the economy if the government uses indirect instruments such as emission taxes. However, we show that discrimination of emission taxes may occur in an economy that imposes foreign investment quotas. In particular, the possibility that ecological dumping occurs is higher if export goods are more labor intensive than import goods (as in developing countries). Moreover, in the case where import goods are the most capital intensive, both emission tax rates may be lower than the marginal environmental damage, and ecological dumping may occur. It is also shown that easing foreign capital quotas may deteriorate the country’s welfare.     

The cost of capital,asset prices,and the effects of monetary policy

The primary objective of this paper is to study the interaction between monetary policy, asset prices, and the cost of capital. In particular, we explore this issue in a setting where individuals face idiosyncratic risk. Incomplete information also provides a transactions role for money so that monetary policy can be studied. In contrast to standard monetary growth models which focus on the transmission of monetary policy to the demand for capital goods, we incorporate a separate capital goods sector so that the supply response to monetary policy is taken into account. Consequently, in contrast to the standard monetary growth model, monetary policy plays an important role in investment activity through the relative price of capital goods. Moreover, different sources of productivity can affect the degree of risk sharing. Although the optimal money growth rate falls in response to an increase in productivity in either sector of the economy, monetary policy should react more aggressively to the level of productivity in the capital sector.     

REAL EXCHANGE RATE,MERCANTILISM AND THE LEARNING BY DOING EXTERNALITY

This paper examines the degree to which the learning by doing (LBD) externality calls for an undervalued exchange rate. We obtain mixed results. For an economy where the LBD externality operates in the traded sector, real exchange rate undervaluation may be used to internalize this externality, if the LBD calls for subsidizing employment in the traded sector. If the LBD externality is embodied in aggregate investment, the optimal policy calls for subsidizing the cost of capital in the traded sector, and there is no room for undervalued exchange rate policy.     

International capital flows,liquidity risk,and monetary policy

In recent years, there has been a large amount of lending coming from the public sector of many developing countries. At the same time, the financial sectors in many advanced countries have issued a large share of portfolio debt to other countries. What are the implications of these events for the global financial system and overall economic activity? Do they have an impact on the transmission channels of monetary policy across countries at different stages of economic development? We investigate these important issues using a micro-founded model of money and banking so that the effects of monetary policy across countries can be meaningfully studied. Notably, the increase in capital outflows to the advanced economy renders monetary policy in developing countries to be less effective, while the effects of monetary policy in advanced economies are more pronounced. Yet, our results indicate that it can indeed be optimal for lower income countries to lend to the advanced world. Importantly, we find that the optimal amount of lending to advanced countries critically depends on the degree of liquidity risk — if it is sufficiently high, then public sector lending to advanced economies is not warranted. Consequently, our results indicate that governments in developing countries should carefully consider how much capital they send abroad to foreign countries.     

Optimal Pollution Standard in an Open Economy: Characterizing Environmental Diversity

The paper examines the optimal pollution standard for a large open economy. Using a two-country partial-equilibrium framework, the optimal standards are charaterized for autarky, free trade, and free trade together with cooperation among countries in setting standards. If pollution is local, at the free-trade equilibrium, the exporting country imposes a stricter standard than does the importing country. The ranking may be reversed if pollution is transnational. A surpriising implication is that if pollution is local, cooperation may imply a less stringent standard for both the exporting country and the importing country.     

Optimal Tax Policy, Market Imperfections, and Environmental Externalities in a Dynamic Optimizing Macro Model

This paper develops a dynamic real business cycle model that highlights pollution externalities (on welfare and production) and market imperfections and uses it to determine the socially optimal tax policy that encompasses labor income, capital income, and emission taxes. We show that the optimal tax on capital and labor income only addresses the production inefficiency (and is time-invariant), while the tax on the environmental externalities affects both the production inefficiency and the environmental spillovers (and is time-varying). More interestingly, the socially optimal emission tax will be characterized by a Keynesian-like stabilizer that is designed to mitigate business cycle fluctuations, i.e., that will stimulate the economy with a lower emission tax during recessions. In a positive analysis, we show that the beneficial effects arising from pollution taxation will become larger the greater is the degree of the firms' monopoly power. In addition, a triple dividend in terms of improving environmental quality and increasing employment and firms' profit can be simultaneously realized if the environmental production externality is more significant and if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is relatively small.     

Efficient risk sharing,non-marketable labor income and fixed-wage contracts

This paper seeks to explain fixed-wage labor contracts. The traditional rationale that fixed wages represent an implicit sale of ‘wage insurance’ by risk-neutral firms to risk-averse workers is rejected as being incompatible with the fact that firms are owned by risk-averse investors. Instead, it is shown that fixed-wage contracts might arise from the non-marketability of labor income. When human capital is not marketable, it becomes optimal to shift all the risk in production onto the firm, since trading in equity markets enables efficient allocation of the uncertainty. The fixed-wage contract shifts the risk to equity owners and in fact replicates the first-best equilibrium that would emerge if individuals were paid their realized marginal product and allowed to trade shares in human capital.     

Environmental Quality,Public Debt and Economic Development

This article analyzes the consequences on capital accumulation and environmental quality of environmental policies financed by public debt. A public sector of pollution abatement is financed by a tax or by public debt. We show that if the initial capital stock is high enough, the economy monotonically converges to a long-run steady state. On the contrary, when the initial capital stock is low, the economy is relegated to an environmental poverty trap. We also explore the implications of public policies on the trap and on the long-run stable steady state. In particular, we find that government should decrease debt and increase pollution abatement to promote capital accumulation and environmental quality at the stable long-run steady state. Finally, a welfare analysis shows that there exists a level of public debt that allows a long run steady state to be optimal.