反腐败、市场建设与经济增长

在市场不完善的情况下，有一部分腐败活动虽然有损于社会公平和正义，而且造成了社会资源的损耗，但对经济资源的配置也有着一定的作用。本文通过一个经济增长模型讨论了代表社会利益的政府如何规划反腐败路径，并保证经济的增长。分析结果表明。政府是可能在反腐败的同时实现经济增长的。一旦政府开始加大反腐败力度，则社会的腐败程度将持续下降。随着市场的完善，经济资源可以更好地借助于市场机制进行配置，这时社会可以加大打击腐败的力度。如果腐败的路径依赖性更强，政府也将加强对腐败的打击。     

我国反腐败法律体系现状和缺陷

腐败问题是目前全球广泛关注的热点问题之一,也是中国面临的最大社会污染和重大政治挑战。目前我国腐败现象之所以蔓延,纵然有其社会、经济、文化等各种致因,但从制度建构层面上分析,我国反腐败法律体系的不完善应是其最重要原因之一。从我国反腐败法律体系的建设现状出发,梳理近几年来我国出台的有关反腐败方面的法律法规,可见加强我国反腐败法律体系建设,完善各项法律制度,加大对腐败分子的打击、惩处力度,建立有效的监督体系,是预防和遏制腐败的最佳途径。     

腐败的经济学分析

目前反腐败的讨论主要集中在改善政治体制、提高道德水平、完善干部选拔、教育和监督制度以及打击惩罚力度等非经济因素方面。本文试图对腐败活动中的经济因素进行分析 ,揭示腐败参与人的经济行为规律。本文的分析发现 ,与发达的市场经济体制相比 ,目前中国的腐败泛滥问题主要是因为中国经济制度存在更多的腐败供给源和对腐败更强的需求。本文的结论是 :给定中国非经济领域体制的现状 ,改革公有企业所有制和降低政府干预程度可以大幅度缩小腐败的活动范围 ,大大降低腐败的供给 ,有力地扼制腐败活动的内在冲动 ,是遏制腐败事半功倍的得力措施。如不能根除腐败赖以泛滥的经济根源 ,反腐败的非经济手段所需的巨大成本是无法承受的 ,也不可能有效。     

试论腐败问题及其治理对策

腐败是一个社会毒瘤，它侵害了党的机体，破坏了政府的形象，损害了公众的利益，危害了社会的安定，我们必须采取加强思想教育，完善监督机制，建立反腐败的社会环境，加大惩处力度等措施，予以彻底整治。     

反腐促进经济可持续稳定增长的理论机制

本文不直接讨论腐败与经济增长的关系,而是讨论腐败、反腐败与经济增长之间的三角关系。这一崭新的分析方法,从实证中得出非常有现实意义的结论。我们以中国的反腐斗争作为具体的分析案例,首先构建一个反腐如何促进经济增长的理论框架,然后利用各省市自治区在2000—2014年间的面板数据,实证分析本文的理论假设以及量化腐败、反腐败与经济增长的关系。我们把中国各省地方党报在样本期间所出现的"腐败"关键词作为政府反腐的力度,把各省查获腐败官员数量分解为反腐力度和腐败程度两个要素,并把它们及其交叉项植入一个内生经济增长条件收敛模型,运用动态面板数据差分GMM估计方法,对反腐如何减少腐败程度,进而对经济增长产生长期的积极影响进行实证研究。我们发现反腐与经济增长之间的关系受到腐败程度的影响,持续性反腐可以降低总体腐败程度,从而提高国内外投资者的信心,保证国家长期发展的驱动力,从而有利于经济社会可持续稳定发展。     

由“百官共廉”引发的思考

改革开放以来，我们党和国家高度重视反腐败斗争，把反腐败斗争看作事关党的生死存亡的重大问题，根据情况的新变化推出了一系列针对产生腐败和惩治腐败的制度、措施、法律、法规，不断加大对腐败分子的打击力度，反腐败斗争取得了巨大的成果。但是，在治理腐败这一世界性的难题中，我们有没有标本兼治行之有效的治理良方呢?     

《联合国反腐败公约》与中国的刑事立法

腐败行为使许多国家的经济社会发展、政府形象蒙受损害，其中发展中国家所遭受的经济损失最为严重。《联合国反腐败公约》的签署反映了世界各国通力打击腐败犯罪的决心。目前，中国的相关立法与《联合国反腐败公约》以及国外一些先进国家的立法相比，还存在一定的差距。结合《联合国反腐败公约》的有关规定，对中国腐败犯罪的刑事立法进行多角度、多层次的比较研究，不仅是中国履行国际义务的需要，也是完善中国刑事立法，充分发挥刑事法律预防和打击腐败犯罪的需要。     

关于国家审计跟踪问责制度的思考

完善国家审计跟踪问责制度是构建不敢腐社会的应有举措.从国家审计视角出发,分析了国家审计的基本功能和国家审计跟踪现状,试图针对审计跟踪问责制度欠缺的问题,构建预防腐败的有效路径.国家审计和政府跟踪问责制度关系密切,国家审计是政府实施问责程序之前不可或缺的关键步骤,可以为政府实施问责程序出具必须的线索和证据,同时,跟踪问责制度是国家审计功能的纵向延伸,有利于增强国家审计对腐败行为的打击程度,又能加强国家审计的震慑力.主张:加强和完善跟踪制度和问责制度建立,这将有利于国家审计发挥腐败治理的作用.     

加强反腐败的文化构建

影响社会和谐的因素虽然很多,但腐败乃是社会中最不和谐的因素.在和谐社会建设中反腐败,是一个庞大的系统工程,其艰巨性同腐败产生的社会文化基础直接相关.当前,我国反腐败斗争中存在的一个突出难题是,反腐倡廉的社会文化资源相对短缺.因此,加强和谐文化和政治文明建设,将反腐败的经济角度提到反腐败文化的高度,是构建和谐社会的一个重大的基础性课题.     

浅析村干部腐败行为的原因与对策

村干部作为治理我国农村事宜的重要人员,在农村社会主义建设中发挥着很大的作用。但是在一些地方也存在侵占公共财产、贪污、受贿、挪用公款、私分集体土地、拉拢、贿选买官、私分公款等腐败行为。导致这些腐败行为的原因中不仅包括村干部自身的原因,也包括经济、政治、社会、法律等方面的因素。因此,应从以下几个途径来治理村干部腐败:在总体格局上加大对腐败行为的斗争力度;在乡镇层面加大腐败预防和制度防腐的力度;在村两委层面上完善反腐防腐体制机制;同时充分利用社会资源,消除腐败等。只有这样,才能使村干部作为执行国家颁发的有关农村政策的主要主体,作为国家发展农村基层建设的依靠力量,使我国社会主义建设新农村建设稳步发展。     

奖章与陷阱:渐进转轨中的腐败

中国在1970年代后期开始推进以市场化为导向的改革战略，国民经济和社会福利得到迅速的改善和提高，但腐败现象也比较严重；同时，市场化的推进并未能遏制住腐败的扩散，市场化程度较高的地区反而面临着更为严重的腐败现象。通过分析中国的经济转轨过程，本文对此作出了解释。与其他处于经济转轨过程中的经济体相比，中国经济发展所具有的特殊的制度安排既促成了经济的迅速成长，也引发了普遍的腐败问题。它们包括：经济决策的地方分权、双轨制市场化和集体所有的产权形式，这些要素既提高了官员推动经济增长的激励，也促使许多官员以腐败的形式分享经济增长的红利，而以“关系”为基础的社会文化背景、中央政治权威的稳定性有助于减少官员在抽租过程中对经济增长可能产生的负面影响。另外，我们认为，市场化改革对腐败可能产生两方面效应，一方面，市场化通过培育新型的企业家阶层促使大量资源由市场配置，这有助于减少腐败发生的可能性；另一方面．市场化进程通过促进经济增长提高了经济中的租金总量，这成为诱发寻租行为的因素。最终的净效应取决于政府部门的改革。发生在中国的现象可以归结为政府改革的不彻底性。     

Are electronic government innovations helpful to deter corruption? Evidence from across the world

Electronic government innovations have been a critical development in public administration in recent years. Many countries have implemented e-government policies to enhance efficiency and transparency and combat corruption. This paper examines the impact of e-government on corruption using longitudinal data for more than 170 countries from 2002 to 2020. The empirical results suggest that e-government serves as a deterrent to corrupt activities. We analyse which e-government domains affect corruption, which types of corruption are more affected by e-government and the circumstances under which e-government is more effective in reducing corruption. The empirical results suggest that online service completion and e-participation are important features of e-government as an anticorruption tool. Evidence suggests that e-participation reduces corrupt legislature activities, public sector theft, executive bribery, and corrupt exchanges. The potential of e-government to deter corruption is higher in countries where corruption is moderate or high and economic development is lower. Higher levels of GDP per capita, foreign direct investment, and political rights are also associated with lower levels of corruption.     

Can corruption encourage clean technology transfer?

We study the impact of environmental regulation on the transfer of a clean technology where bureaucrats are needed for government intervention. In the absence of corruption, when environmental taxes are low, a technology transfer always takes place and it increases total outputs, but may lead to higher pollution levels. However, when corruption is possible, a firm with a dirty technology may choose to bribe a corruptible bureaucrat who will underreport the actual level of emissions, thereby hindering the transfer of clean technology. We show that a less strict anticorruption policy may lead to more bribing, but encourage technology transfers. Moreover, an environment-oriented government would set a deterrent environmental tax to reduce pollution, while an output-oriented government would set a minimum tax rate to eliminate corruption and induce technology transfers. However, a balanced government would tolerate corruption when the cost of bribing is low and the clean technology is sufficiently efficient.     

腐败、经济增长与环境污染的 库兹涅茨效应:以二氧化硫排放数据为例

目前，国内文献关于腐败、经济增长与环境污染相互关系的研究还不充分，将三者置于同一整体框架下的研究能为理解和验证腐败与环境之间的关系提供直接的证据。本文在传统的EKC模型中考虑腐败因素，利用1995-2011年的中国省级面板数据研究腐败、经济增长与环境污染三者之间的关系，验证了腐败对经济增长以及腐败和经济增长对环境的影响。结果表明：(1)腐败阻碍了经济增长；(2)经济增长与环境污染之间呈倒“U”型关系，我国仍处于经济增长越快，环境污染越严重阶段；(3) 腐败能够在一定程度上通过弱化经济增长从而对环境污染有负向作用，但这并不意味着腐败是解决环境污染的手段，政府不能通过阻碍经济增长来解决环境污染问题。     

Anticorruption reforms,tax evasion,and the role of harassment

We examine the impact of anticorruption reforms on tax evasion when corruption and potentially harassment are endemic among tax auditors. We find that the threat of harassment may counterintuitively boost the impact of such anticorruption reforms on tax evasion and also eliminate corruption. Specifically, a moderate anticorruption policy can discontinuously reduce tax evasion to a level even below that under no corruption. Further strengthening of such policy can nonetheless prove counterproductive and increase tax evasion. On the contrary, in the absence of harassment, a moderate anticorruption reform induces higher tax evasion and sustenance of bribery. In this case, only a large reform can reduce tax evasion and eliminate corruption.     

Corruption and growth: The role of governance,public spending,and economic development

This paper analyses how the quality of governance, the size of public spending, and economic development affect the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and economic growth. The analysis shows that the interaction between corruption and governance shapes the efficiency of public spending, which in turn, determines the growth effects of corruption. Specifically, corruption improves economic efficiency only when the actual government size is above the optimal level. It implies that a growth-maximising level of corruption is possible. This paper also finds that the incidence of corruption declines with economic development. This is because with economic development the wage rate rises and makes private rent seeking costs higher, thereby, discouraging corruption. The main policy implication is that targeting tax evaders instead of bureaucrats is more effective in terms of both reducing corruption and improving the growth potential of an economy.     

Wages and Other Determinants of Corruption

Raising wages has commonly been viewed as an anticorruption policy by policymakers from both governments and multilateral development organizations. Conventional wisdom and recent theoretical work suggest that low wages encourage corruption. Nevertheless, the empirical studies done on the wage– corruption tradeoff are econometric estimates that find no conclusive support for the effectiveness of increasing wages as an anticorruption measure. The unique contributions of this paper are the application of an expected utility model to explain the emergence of corruption, and the use of comparative static results that are consistent with the empirical evidence and useful for the design of anticorruption policies. The most important result from the expected utility model is that anticorruption policies designed to increase the net income of potentially corrupt agents not only may be ineffective but may actually encourage corruption.     

THE TWO‐WAY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND CORRUPTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

The existing empirical evidence suggests that in low‐income economies, an increase in government spending leads to a reduction of growth. This article aims to explain this empirical fact by considering a growth model that incorporates a two‐way relationship between corruption and government spending. That is, government spending gives rise to corruption and rent seeking, which feeds back by distorting the structure and size of government spending. In addition, the cost of corruption depends on the wage rate. Therefore, in low‐income economies, increases in government spending tend to generate larger social losses caused by a higher level of rent dissipation and a concomitant rise in corruption and government inefficiency. Consequently, in such economies, an increase in government spending is more likely to result in a decline of economic growth. (JEL H3, O11, O41)     

Corruption and growth in Africa

A major concern in the development of African economies is the impact of corruption on economic growth and while there is general agreement on its detrimental effects, there is considerable debate over its nature and importance. In particular there is little work on the interaction between corruption, government expenditures and how this influences economic growth in countries in the region. This paper takes an endogenous growth model, extends it to include different categories of government spending and then introduces the possibility of corruption, which is allowed to have different effects on each of the categories. The results confirm the negative effect of corruption and military spending, but also show that corruption interacts with military burden, through indirect and complementary effects, to further increase its negative effect. The policy implications are that the effects of corruption on economic growth are worse than was thought in countries which have high military burdens.