Unemployment Durations in West Germany Before and After the Reform of the Unemployment Compensation System during the 1980s

Abstract. This paper analyzes empirically the distribution of unemployment durations in West Germany during the 1980s and 1990s. It therefore covers periods before and after the changes during the mid‐1980s in the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment benefits for older unemployed. The analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample containing administrative data for about 500,000 individuals. Since these data only partly reveal the unemployment duration in an economic sense, we use a narrow and a wide proxy for unemployment. Our empirical analysis finds significant changes in the distribution of non‐employment durations for older unemployed. At the same time, the distribution of unemployment durations between jobs remained unchanged after the reforms. Our findings clearly show that many firms and workers used the more beneficial laws as a part of early retirement packages. Surprisingly, for those workers who found and accepted a new job, we do not observe a prolongation of their search periods to a sizeable extent.     

Wage bargaining and turnover costs with heterogenous labor and perfect history screening

We study effects of mobility costs in a model of (Nash) wage bargaining between workers and firms, with instantaneous matching, heterogeneous workers, identical firms and free firm entry, and where firms can screen workers perfectly according to their previous work history but not their actual productivity. We derive the employment level and the minimum worker quality standard, in the market solution, and in the efficient solution established by a social planner. When workers have positive bargaining power, there is always some inefficient unemployment among desired workers in the market solution. The lowest hiring standard chosen by firms is higher than the planner's standard when firing costs are high relative to hiring costs, but may be lower in the opposite case. We show that any higher established hiring standard corresponds to a market equilibrium. The model explains a tendency for a high initial unemployment rate to remain high, particularly for low-skilled workers.     

Optimal Workfare with Voluntary and Involuntary Unemployment*

This paper addresses the welfare implications of introducing workfare into unemployment benefit policy. We consider a population composed of employed and unemployed workers and of individuals who do not seek employment. Job search behavior is unobservable, which means that voluntarily unemployed individuals can claim unemployment insurance (UI) benefits intended for unemployed workers. As a consequence, pecuniary benefit schemes underinsure workers against unemployment. We show that requiring unproductive activities (workfare) in exchange for UI benefits may generate a Pareto improvement by facilitating better unemployment insurance for workers, and we characterize the situations where this is the case.     

Duration dependent unemployment benefits in trade union theory

The basic trade union model is generalized to allow for an unemployment benefit system consisting of two benefit levels, one for short-term and one for long-term unemployed, and a rule determining whether an unemployed is short- or long-term. Under relatively mild conditions we show that benefit systems with no or positive duration dependence are dominated by a system with negative duration dependence in the sense that all union members achieve higher utility, unemployment is lower, and benefit expenditures are smaller.     

Potential duration of unemployment benefits and labor market outcomes for older workers with health impairments in Germany

This research note estimates the causal effects of a cut in the potential duration of regular unemployment benefits for older workers in Germany on the labor market outcomes of individuals with health impairments. The analyzed reform is a natural experiment that allows a difference-in-differences strategy with treatment intensity. The results provide evidence for a significant decrease in the number of days in regular unemployment benefits and an increase in the number of days in employment. However, the results also suggest a significant increase in the number of days in unemployment (social) assistance, which are granted upon exhaustion of regular unemployment benefits.     

Job displacement and the transitions to re-employment and early retirement for non-employed older workers

Despite the relatively higher frequency of job displacement among older workers in Europe, little is known about its effect on the work-retirement decision. Employing individual data from the European Community Household Panel for a number of countries with differences in their institutional environments, the effect of job displacement for non-employed workers is identified separately for the transitions into re-employment and retirement. The findings suggest that in countries with relatively more generous unemployment insurance provisions for the older unemployed, which offer a pathway to early retirement, older displaced workers exhibit lower re-employment and higher retirement rates compared to the non-displaced. These results are robust to dynamic selection due to unobserved heterogeneity and to the endogeneity of displacement.     

Unobserved Heterogeneity,Exit Rates,and Re‐Employment Wages

Exit rates from unemployment and re‐employment wages decline over a period of unemployment, after controlling for worker observable characteristics. We study the role of unobserved heterogeneity in an economy with asymmetric information and directed search. We show that the unique equilibrium is separating and that skilled workers have more job opportunities and higher wages. The composition of the unemployed varies with the duration of unemployment, so average exit rates and wages fall with time. The separating equilibrium relies on performance‐related pay schemes and the ability of firms to commit to renting an input that is complementary to worker skills.     

Does the public employment service affect search effort and outcomes?

In this paper, we examine the disincentive effects of the public employment service on the search effort of unemployed workers and on their exit rate from unemployment. For that purpose, we specify a structural search model with fixed and variable costs of search in which unemployed workers select their optimal search intensity given the exogenous arrival rate of job contacts coming from the public employment agency. Because the theoretical effect of an increase in this exogenous job contact arrival rate on the structural exit rate from unemployment is ambiguous, we estimate this model using individual unemployment duration data. Our results show that the exit rate from unemployment increases with the arrival rate of job contacts obtained by the public employment service, especially for low-educated and low-skilled workers. They also show that the search effort is more costly for low-educated women and low-skilled adult unemployed workers. This last result suggests that a public employment agency that matches searchers and employers is beneficial, in the sense that it saves searchers in terms of search costs they would otherwise bear.     

Skill Loss, Ranking of Job Applicants and the Dynamics of Unemployment

Abstract. This paper investigates the consequences of skill loss as a result of unemployment in an efficiency wage model with turnover costs and on-the-job search. Firms are unable to differentiate wages and therefore prefer to hire employed searchers or unemployed workers who have not lost human capital. It is shown that if some fundamental factor in the economy changes, this will result in a lengthy adjustment process with substantial long-run unemployment effects. Moreover, the model is capable of generating persistence, but the amount depends on the duration of the shock itself.     

Unemployment duration and workers' wage aspirations in Spain

This paper examines unemployed workers' declared willingness to work for wages lower than the one adequate for their qualification. We analyze which personal and economic characteristics determine this willingness and how it changes along the individuals' unemployment spells. The main results are: (i) Young workers, less educated and those living in regions or times of high unemployment are more willing to accept reduced wages while married women with a working husband are much less willing to do so; (ii) Once the individual fixed effect is controlled for, the willingness to work for reduced wages increases with the duration of unemployment; (iii) Not having access to unemployment benefits increases the probability that initially unwilling workers become willing to accept reduced wages.     

Re-employment probabilities of unemployment benefit recipients

This article studies transitions out of unemployment for benefit recipients in Spain. We analyse the duration of unemployment, distinguishing between spells that end in recall (workers returning to the previous employer) and spells that end in exit to a new job. This distinction allows us to find that the recall hazard rate increases around the time of exhaustion of benefits. However, this happens only for workers receiving Unemployment Insurance (UI). Because we are unable to replicate this result for workers receiving Unemployment Assistance (UA), we believe the finding lends support to the hypothesis that in Spain firms and workers make a strategic use of UI.     

Fixing the Leak: Unemployment Incidence before and after a Major Reform of Unemployment Benefits in Germany

We present first empirical results on the effects of a large scale reduction in unemployment benefit entitlement lengths on unemployment inflows in Germany. We show that this highly disputed element of the Hartz‐Reforms in 2006 induced a rush of workers and firms to take advantage of the previous legislation in its last days. Furthermore, we find a considerable decline in transitions to unemployment and an increase in employment rates among older workers after the reform. Our results provide new evidence for the importance of changes in unemployment inflows for the analysis of changes in unemployment outflows.     

Equilibrium unemployment with outsourcing and wage solidarity under labour market imperfections

We evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and equilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market, where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union. We find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the high- and low-skilled workers. When the labour union adopts a solidaristic wage policy, it will dampen this tendency. Further, higher outsourcing will increase equilibrium unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it will reduce it among the low-skilled workers. Overall, outsourcing will reduce economy-wide equilibrium unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high-skilled workers is sufficiently low.     

Unemployment duration and economic incentives—a quasi random-assignment approach

We investigate how economic incentives and spell duration affect hazard rates out of insured unemployment. We take into account that insured unemployment not always ends in employment, but also in disability, training programs, or benefit sanctions. Our empirical basis is Norwegian register data containing variation in economic incentives and spell duration similar to that of random-assignment experiments. We find that the employment and benefit-sanction hazards are negatively affected by the unemployment insurance replacement ratio, but that the effects vary considerably among individuals. There is negative duration dependence in the employment hazard and positive duration dependence in the disability hazard.     

The economics of ‘new blood’

We construct a dynamic general-equilibrium model of search and matching where public knowledge grows through time and workers accumulate a fraction of this knowledge through education/retraining. Due to search delays, the unemployment pool is populated by vintages of workers of differing productivities. Through intergenerational rivalry, the human capital of older generations is rendered obsolete relative to that of the new blood. Higher knowledge growth exacerbates intergenerational competition, thereby lowering education and growth while raising unemployment and inequality. These findings help explain wage compression/expansion and the hump-shaped wage-tenure profile across cohorts.     

The beneficial effects of generous unemployment benefits on profits and employment

Theories of the labor market generally predict that high unemployment benefits put upward pressure on wages, thus diminishing the profitability of employing labor and exacerbating unemployment. It remains to be explained why firms agree to contribute to generous schemes (replacement rates for general schemes in Europe and US are in the range 50–85%) that they are often willing to supplement (with sector- or firm-specific schemes that may involve even 100% replacement and long benefit duration). An answer can be found by including in the shirking–efficiency wage model, the hypotheses that workers are risk-averse and that those discharged for misconduct are not eligible to benefits. It is then optimal for risk-neutral firms (and for employment) to introduce an insurance scheme with full income coverage and with a duration limited only by the workers' participation constraint (there is no trade-off between level and duration of benefits). The more difficult it is to detect and fire shirkers, the higher is the rent workers enjoy above the competitive wage and the longer is the benefit duration consistent with the participation constraint. This result can be interpreted as a complementarity between the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) and the duration of benefits, which seems to conform with broad patterns observed in primary vs. secondary employment and in continental Europe vs. Anglo-Saxon countries.     

How Changes in Financial Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment

This paper studies how changes in the two key parameters of unemployment insurance—the benefit replacement rate (RR) and the potential benefit duration (PBD)—affect the duration of unemployment. To identify such an effect we exploit a policy change introduced in 1989 by the Austrian government, which affected various unemployed workers differently: a first group experienced an increase in RR; a second group experienced an extension of PBD; a third group experienced both a higher RR and a longer PBD; and a fourth group experienced no change in the policy parameters. We find that unemployed workers react to the disincentives by an increase in unemployment duration, and our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of job search theory. We use our parameter estimates to split up the total costs to unemployment insurance funds into costs due to changes in the unemployment insurance system with unchanged behaviour and costs due to behavioural responses of unemployed workers. Our results indicate that costs due to behavioural responses are substantial.     

Incidence and Duration of Unemployment Spells: Implications on the Wage Differentials of Part-Time and Full-Time Workers

This article analyzes the extent to which incidence of unemployment and duration of unemployment spells affect the wage differentials between full-time and part-time workers. The estimation results of a sample selectivity bias–adjusted wage equation reveal that high incidences of unemployment are associated with low wages for both full-time and part-time workers. However, the reduction in wages due to incidence of unemployment is larger for full-time workers in high-paid jobs than for their part-time counterparts. Duration of unemployment spells affects full-time and part-time workers differently. In general, longer unemployment spells tend to increase the wages of full-time workers but tend to depress the wages of part-time workers. Although the probability of unemployment is not a factor in explaining the wage differential, the duration of unemployment accounts for a substantial portion (about 66.6% in full sample) of the wage differential that exists between full-time and part-time workers.     

Stick,Carrot and Skill Acquisition*

We evaluate the impact of specially designed youth unemployment programmes (YUPs), intended to provide young unemployed unskilled workers with skills. If unemployment among skilled workers is lower than among unskilled workers, YUPs imply that unemployment falls. However, YUPs potentially crowd out ordinary training. We set up an equilibrium matching model with endogenous skill choice and examine the impact of an increase in programme participation. We derive a condition for crowding out of ordinary training, as well as a condition for an increase in the skilled labour force and thereby reduced unemployment. The impact of YUPs on welfare and wage dispersion is also considered.     

Do your brains help you out of unemployment?

This study examines the relationship between individuals’ cognitive abilities, unemployment propensity and unemployment entry or exit. Cognitive skills only weakly affect unemployment propensity and contribute little to individual heterogeneity. They, however, help employed males to stay out of unemployment.