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1.
In this paper, we test for, and find evidence of, referee bias in favor of home teams in European football using minute‐by‐minute analysis to control for within‐game events. The context for the analysis is Spain's Primera Liga and the Union of European Football Association (UEFA) Champions League. We find that the award of sanctions by Spanish referees in the Champions League are not significantly different to those of the referees from other countries and as such are subject to the same sources of bias. In Primera Liga matches where the crowd is separated from the pitch by running tracks, we find that the probability of the award of a yellow card to the home team is higher and that of the away team is lower compared to matches played at stadia without running tracks. Similar results are found in the Champions League, where efforts are made to hire “neutral” referees. Referee behavior is also influenced by the size of the crowd in attendance. (JEL D8, J2) 相似文献
2.
Using a principal-agent setting, we introduce honesty that requires pre-commitment. The principal offers a menu of mechanisms to screen ethics. Agents may misrepresent ethics. Dishonest agents may misrepresent the match with the assigned task (good or bad), while honest agents reveal the match honestly if they have pre-committed. Ethics-screening, that allows for match-screening with dishonest agents while leaving a lower rent to honest agents, is optimal if both honesty and a good match are likely. Otherwise the optimal mechanism is the standard second-best or the first-best (where dishonest agents misrepresent the match), if dishonesty is likely or unlikely respectively.An earlier version of this paper was entitled “Honest Agents and Equilibrium Lies.” We are grateful to seminar participants at MIT, Université de Caen, University of St Andrews, University of Virginia, and ESEM 99, and two anonymous referees for useful comments. 相似文献
3.
Ulrich Witt 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2003,13(2):77-94
Economic policy making is discussed from three different angles: the political economy of actual policy making (“what policy
does do”), the analysis of policy instruments for given ends (“what policy could do”), and the debate on policy goals and
their legitimization (“what policy ought to do”). Center stage in the evolutionary perspective is new, positive and normative
knowledge which is unfolding during the policy making process and in its aftermath. It is argued that this implies regularities
and constraints which extend and modify the comparative-static interpretations of public choice theory, economic policy making
theory, and social philosophy.
RID="*"
ID="*" The author should like to thank three anonymous referees of this journal and the editor for helpful comments on an
earlier version of the paper. 相似文献
4.
This paper suggests a class of stochastic collective learning processes exhibiting very irregular behavior. In particular,
there are multimodal long run distributions. Some of these modes may vanish as the population size increases. This may be
thought of as “bubbles” persistent for a finite range of population sizes but disappearing in the limit. The limit distribution
proves to be a discontinuous function of parameters determining the learning process. This gives rise to another type of “bubbles”:
limit outcomes corresponding to small perturbations of parameters are different. Since an agent's decision rule involves imitation
of the majority choice in a random sample of other members of the population, the resulting collective dynamics exhibit “herding”
or “epidemic” features.
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to two anonymous referees for the comments and suggestions.
Correspondence to: L. Gaio 相似文献
5.
Multilateral subsidy games 总被引:3,自引:1,他引:2
This paper examines the rationale for multilateral agreements to limit investment subsidies. The welfare ranking of symmetric
multilateral subsidy games is shown to depend on whether or not investment levels are “friendly”, raising rival profits in
total, and/or strategic complements, raising rival profits at the margin. In both Cournot and Bertrand competition, when spillovers
are low and competition is intense (because goods are close substitutes), national-welfare-maximizing governments over-subsidize
investment, and banning subsidies would improve welfare. When spillovers are high, national governments under-subsidize from
a global welfare perspective, but the subsidy game is welfare superior to non-intervention.
For helpful comments we are grateful to two referees, to Arijit Mukherjee, and to participants in seminars at Prague and UCD,
at the EEA Conference in Lausanne and at the GEP Conference on “New Directions in International Trade Theory” at the University
of Nottingham, June 2007. Dermot Leahy acknowledges the support of the Science Foundation Ireland Research Frontiers Programme
(Grant MAT 017). 相似文献
6.
Emerging from the Hobbesian jungle: Might takes and makes rights 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Bruce L. Benson 《Constitutional Political Economy》1994,5(2):129-158
The conflict over scarce resources in the Hobbesian jungle may be avoided if rules of obligation delineating property rights
develop along with institutions of governance. One possibility is a “duress contract” as the strongest individual threatens
others who agree to enslavement. Thus, “might takes rights.” Alternatively, individuals with similar capacities for violence
may enter a “consent contract” establishing rules of obligation and then voluntarily participating in governance. They will
not agree to a rights assignment that produces less wealth than they expect through violence, however, so “might makes rights.”
A might-takes-and-makes-rights analysis is outlined to explain the continuum of legal institutions and property rights allocations
that can evolve between these two extremes of duress and consent. Increasingly finely delineated private property rights tend
to evolve under institutions produced by consent contracts, while common pool problems tend to arise near the duress contract
end of the spectrum.
This paper draws from a larger project on “The Evolution of Law” which has been supported by the Earhart Foundation. Discussions
with and comments by Randy Holcombe, Kevin Reffit, and two anonymous referees led to significant improvements in the development
and presentation of the arguments, as did discussant comments on a related paper made by Douglas Ginsburg and participants
in the Friedrich August von Hayek Symposium on “Competition Among Institutions” in Freiburg, Germany, June 1–4, 1994, sponsored
by the International Institute at George Mason University and the Walter Eucken Institute, Freiburg. 相似文献
7.
Commitment to a strategy of uniform pricing in a two-period duopoly with switching costs 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper studies decisions by firms of whether to attempt “behavior-based” price discrimination in markets with switching
costs by using a two-period duopoly model. When both firms commit themselves to a pricing policy and consumers are “sophisticated”
and have rational expectations, there is a dominant strategy equilibrium with both firms engaging in uniform pricing. Both
firms are better off in the uniform pricing equilibrium, compared with the discriminatory equilibrium.
相似文献
8.
Schumpeter and the revival of evolutionary economics: an appraisal of the literature 总被引:5,自引:1,他引:4
Jan Fagerberg 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2003,13(2):125-159
During the last two decades we have seen a revival of interest in the works of Joseph Schumpeter and “evolutionary” ideas
in economics more generally. A professional society honouring Schumpeter's name has been founded, and linked to it we have
had for more than fifteen years now a professional journal devoted to this stream of thought. However, it has been argued
that, despite these developments, the link between Schumpeter's own work and the more recent contributions to evolutionary
economics is in fact rather weak. This paper considers this claim. Based on an analysis of Schumpeter's contribution to economics
the paper presents an overview and assessment of the more recent literature in this area. It is argued that although there
are important differences between Schumpeter's work and some of the more recent contributions, there nevertheless remains
a strong common core that clearly distinguishes the evolutionary stream from other approaches (such as, for instance, so-called
“new growth theory”).
RID="*"
ID="*" Many people have contributed to this paper in various ways. Jon Hekland at the Norwegian Research Council started it
all by asking me to make an overview of the contribution from “evolutionary economics” to our understanding of contemporary
economies. Several people helped me on the way by supplying written material, comments and suggestions, and I am indebted
to all of them. Brian Arthur, Stan Metcalfe, Keith Pavitt, Erik Reinert, Paolo Saviotti and Bart Verspagen may be particularly
mentioned. A preliminary version was presented at the conference “Industrial R&D and Innovation Policy Learning – Evolutionary
Perspectives and New Methods for Impact Assessment” organised by the Norwegian Research Council (“SAKI”) at Leangkollen, Asker,
April 18–19.2002. I wish to thank the discussant, Tor Jakob Klette, and the participants at the conference for useful feedback.
Moreover I have benefited from comments and suggestions from the editors and referees of this journal. The final responsibility
is mine, however. Economic support from the Norwegian Research Council (“SAKI”) is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
9.
The literature on the tragedy of the anticommons typically suggests that producers of complementary goods should integrate
themselves. Recent decisions by the antitrust authorities seem however to indicate that there exists a tradeoff between the
“tragedy” and the lack of competition characterizing an integrated market structure. In this paper we analyze such tradeoff
in oligopolistic complementary markets when products are vertically differentiated. We show that quality leadership plays
a crucial role. When there is a quality leader, forcing divestitures or prohibiting mergers, thus increasing competition,
lowers prices and enhances consumer surplus. However, when quality leadership is shared, “disintegrating” firms may lead to
higher prices. In this case, concerns about the tragedy of the anticommons are well posed in antitrust decisions. 相似文献
10.
Ken-Ichi Akao 《Economic Theory》2008,35(1):155-174
This paper evaluates tax schemes in a class of differential games. The results indicate that there are many tax schemes that
support efficient resource usage, but each may fail to implement the targeted resource because of the multiplicity of equilibria.
Since all of the equilibria are subgame perfect, it is difficult to predict which specific one arises. Care must then be taken
in using a tax scheme as a remedy for the “tragedy of the commons.” The advantages of other policy instruments (including
command-and-control regulation and a tradable permit system) are also discussed.
I am indebted to Gerhard Sorger, Koji Shimomura, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. The detailed suggestions
of one of the referees in particular have markedly improved the paper. Any remaining errors are mine. Partial financial support
from MEXT KAKENHI(11730017, 18078004) is also gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献