中国资本账户开放、利率市场化和汇率制度弹性化

开放经济下,资本流动、利率和汇率三者相互联动、相互协调、自动平衡。利率市场化是资本账户开放和汇率制度弹性化的前提条件;资本控制程度影响利率市场化和汇率制度弹性化;利率和汇率相互作用、相互传导。一国宏观经济调控政策的效果不仅仅取决于资本控制程度和利率或汇率水平的变动,更取决于资本控制、利率和汇率三者的联动效应。中国金融自由化改革进程中,必须正确处理好资本账户开放、利率市场化和汇率制度弹性化之间的关系,发挥三者联动协同效应,实现内外均衡。     

The Renminbi Exchange Rate Reform and the Rebalancing of China's Growth Model

This paper posits that a proper way to estimate the Renminbi(RMB) exchange rate is to base the evaluation on the Balassa-Samuelson effect, and that the optimal way to facilitate China's growth model transformation is gradual RMB internationalization and capital account liberalization. Regression estimates show that the gross domestic product per capita growth rate, or the productivity growth rate, has strong explanatory validity when estimating the RMB exchange rate. The findings further assert that, as the growth of gross fixed capital formation slows, and the growth of household consumption speeds up, China's economic growth will be sustained. The RMB exchange rate regime is one in which gradual reforms must yield to interest rates levels and hence should only be revalued conditionally.     

放弃成本、政府偏好与资本控制:一个审慎的机会主义汇率制度选择模型

本文在Obstfeld(1 996)第二代货币危机模型的基础上 ,建立了一个考虑经济结构、供给冲击以及金融风险的多因素汇率制度选择模型 ,以成本分析为工具解释了资本控制、各类成本和政府偏好对均衡的影响以及对汇率制度选择的影响。研究表明 :(1 )资本控制可以通过多种途径对均衡产生影响 ,在一定条件下可以利用资本控制措施使经济避免多重均衡 ;(2 )放弃成本对汇率制度选择发挥关键作用 ;(3 )较大的政府偏好促使政府选择固定汇率制度 ,在放弃成本不足够大的条件下 ,决策者也可以通过提高政府偏好或者实施资本控制措施来保护本国固定汇率制度 ;(4)对人民币现行汇率制度的放弃成本的估计表明 ,当前人民币汇率制度放弃成本正处于中间水平 ,因此有必要增大政府对固定汇率制度的偏好并且对资本帐户实施适度管理以保持人民币汇率的稳定 ,防范金融风险。至于未来人民币汇率波动幅度的扩大、资本项目自由化的进程以及人民币汇率制度何时回归真正的“管理浮动” ,应主要取决于人民币汇率制度放弃成本的有效降低     

Does Capital Account Liberalization Discipline Budget Deficit?

The paper investigates whether free capital mobility leads a government to tighten its budget deficit for fear of being penalized from the international capital market. The author tests the hypothesis using three‐stage least squares (3SLS), which can control for the endogenous nature of capital account liberalization. Even the conservative measure shows that, if capital account liberalization were exogenously imposed, ceteris paribus, government budget deficit would be reduced by 2.275% of GDP. Furthermore, 3SLS results show that this disciplinary effect is stronger for countries under a fixed exchange rate regime or for countries with weak central bank independence. The disciplinary effect is also found to be stronger in more recent periods—the 1990s—during which capital market integration has been most prevalent.     

A Welfare Analysis of Capital Account Liberalization*

We develop a model of a small open economy with credit market frictions to analyze the consequences of capital account liberalization. We show that financial opening facilitates the inflows of cheap foreign funds and improves production efficiency. However, capital account liberalization has important distributional consequences. Specifically, it may be impossible to use public transfers to fully compensate the loss of those who are negatively affected by capital account liberalization. This explains why financial opening often meets fierce opposition even though it leads to efficiency gains for the economy as a whole. From a practical perspective, capital controls should be lifted gradually for a smooth transition.     

CONTAGIOUS POLICIES: AN ANALYSIS OF SPATIAL INTERACTIONS AMONG COUNTRIES' CAPITAL ACCOUNT POLICIES

Countries' capital account policies might be contagious in the sense that domestic policies are driven by other countries' policies. A model of strategic interactions is developed to show that countries' best response to policy changes elsewhere consists in imitating this policy. Using a spatial econometric model, the hypothesis of policy interactions is tested in a large panel data set. The evidence shows that capital account policies are contemporaneously correlated across countries. Concerning fundamentals, the move to a fixed exchange rate regime and an increase in real world interest rates are correlated with the imposition of capital account restrictions.     

An Endogenous Growth Model of a Financially Repressed Small Open Economy

The paper develops a monetary endogenous growth model of a financially repressed small open economy, characterized by curb markets, capital mobility, transaction costs in domestic and foreign capital markets, and a flexible exchange rate system, to analyze the impact of financial liberalization – interest rate deregulation and lower multiple reserve requirements – on growth and inflation. When the model is calibrated to match world figures, we find that interest rate deregulation enhances growth and reduces inflation in steady-state. For relatively smaller transaction costs in the curb market, the above result is, however, reversed. Under such circumstances, lowering the transaction costs in the foreign capital market tends to restore the growth-enhancing (inflation-reducing) capabilities of interest rate deregulation. Lower reserve requirements, though, always ensures lower (higher) steady-state inflation (growth).     

Macroeconomic Effects of Capital Account Liberalization: the Case of Korea

The macroeconomic effects of capital account liberalization in Korea are examined. Simple data analysis suggests that capital account liberalization substantially changed the nature and composition of capital flows. Based on the VAR model, the authors find the following stylized facts. First, after capital market liberalization, capital flows become less driven by current account imbalances and therefore become more autonomous. Second, capital account liberalization significantly changes the effects of capital flows on macroeconomic variables. Third, capital account liberalization is highly related to consumption and investment booms, and subsequent appreciation of nominal and real exchange rates, which leads to the current account worsening. Finally, there is strong evidence of sterilized foreign exchange market intervention in response to capital inflows.     

资本账户、法定汇率制度与事实汇率制度

文章对资本账户开放程度以及法定与事实汇率制度之差异的共同决定过程进行了研究。文章以世界各国自布雷顿森林体系崩溃以来的相关数据为基础,利用离散变量联立方程模型进行计量经济学分析。经验分析的结果表明,资本账户的开放程度,对于法定与事实汇率制度的差异有显著影响,但后者对前者的影响并不显著。此外,无论是资本账户的开放程度,还是法定与事实汇率制度的差异,都存在显著的状态依赖性。     

Capital Inflows,Dutch Disease Effects,and Monetary Policy in a Small Open Economy

This paper studies the role of monetary policy in a small open economy that experiences Dutch disease effects as a result of capital inflows, and examines the issue of whether such a policy should seek to address these effects from a welfare perspective. I find that Dutch disease effects occur under a fixed nominal exchange rate regime. However, a monetary policy regime characterized by generalized Taylor interest rate rules featuring either the real exchange rate or the nominal exchange rate avert Dutch disease effects. Welfare results reveal that the optimal rule is a generalized Taylor rule consistent with nominal exchange rate flexibility.     

汇率-资本流动性的制度安排和财政-货币政策的有效性研究

笔者通过拓广的蒙代尔-弗莱明模型,并突破了传统的"三元冲突"汇率制度安排理论的研究路径,考虑引入资本流动性相对强度系数的概念,又在固定汇率制下引入"冲销"干预政策因素,提出了一个在固定和浮动汇率及不同资本流动性制度安排下财政-货币政策有效性指数曲线的新假说,对汇率-资本流动性制度安排对于宏观经济政策(财政-货币政策)综合有效性的影响问题做了一些较为深入的探讨.笔者认为,我国作为一个经济大国应尽可能地拥有宏观经济政策的自主权,考虑到我国当前金融市场体系尚不够完善,货币政策传导机制还存在严重障碍,所以在近期财政政策的权重应大于货币政策,从而在我国汇率制度改革过程中,为保留宏观经济政策的自主权,在加快放宽人民币汇率弹性的同时必须加强相应的资本管制.     

Capital inflows, fiscal discretion, and exchange rate policy

Many writers have argued for the benefits of a credible fixed exchange rate (a hard peg) as a commitment device in an open economy. But historically, fixed exchange rates have often been associated with large current account deficits and episodes of ‘over-borrowing’. This paper develops a model of capital inflows that are linked to the exchange rate regime because of endogenous fiscal policy. The key message of the paper is that a hard peg is undesirable in the absence of commitment in fiscal policy. In face of a credible fixed exchange rate, the fiscal authority subsidizes capital inflows. The economy will engage in inefficiently high international borrowing, and in welfare terms may end up worse off than under capital market autarky. To eliminate the incentive to subsidize borrowing, the monetary authority must follow a flexible exchange rate rule in which capital inflows lead to exchange rate appreciation. If fiscal policy must be financed by money creation rather than direct taxation, then a fixed exchange rate rule may cause both over-borrowing and a subsequent exchange rate crisis.     

资本账户开放与国际金融冲击的传导*——基于DSGE模型的分析

本文在动态随机一般均衡的框架下，建立了一个包括贸易部门和非贸易部门的小型开放经济模型，系统研究和比较资本管制与资本账户开放两种情况下，国外金融冲击、出口需求冲击对中国经济的不同影响和传导机制，并检验资本账户开放情形下应对国际冲击时不同货币政策规则的有效性。结果发现：当资本账户开放时，一国受到国外冲击的波动幅度远大于资本管制的情况；资本管制和资本账户开放对国际金融冲击传导机制的关键差异在于贸易部门与非贸易部门的互动关系，具体表现为劳动力转移的差异；在资本账户开放后，面对不同形式的国际冲击，货币数量型规则和混合型规则均能有效熨平经济波动。     

国际资本流动对中国货币政策影响的实证研究

在开放经济的"三元冲突"中,中国选择了固定汇率,较严格的资本管制和较大的货币政策独立性,即用少量货币政策独立性的丧失换取有限度的资本流动.但在这种组合下,随着我国资本流动规模的扩大,货币政策独立性也将进一步丧失.对于中国,货币政策的自主权至关重要,除非有能力继续维持更严格的资本管制,我国必须逐步扩大汇率的浮动区间.     

Even more on monetary policy in a small open economy

It is well known that in a small open economy with full capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate, monetary policy is ineffective in influencing real output (e.g. the works of Fleming [Int. Monetary Fund Staff Pap. 9 (1962) 369.] and Mundell [Can. J. Econ. Polit. Sci. 29 (1963) 475.]). However, Wu [Int. Rev. Econ. Finance 8 (1999) 223.] finds that when the credit channel is added to this model, monetary policy can have real effects under a fixed exchange rate system. This conclusion hinges on the assumption that open market operations have no effect on foreign exchange reserves of the central bank when evaluating how a change in monetary policy affects the loan market. This assumption is incorrect because under a fixed exchange rate regime, the quantity of foreign reserves becomes endogenous in the model. It is shown that when this assumption is relaxed, monetary policy is still ineffective in influencing output under a fixed exchange regime, even with an operative credit channel.     

The illusive quest: Do international capital controls contribute to currency stability?

We investigate the effectiveness of capital controls in insulating economies from currency crises, focusing in particular on both direct and indirect effects of capital controls and how these relationships may have changed over time in response to global financial liberalization and the greater mobility of international capital. We predict the likelihood of currency crises using standard macroeconomic variables and a probit equation estimation methodology with random effects. We employ a comprehensive panel data set comprised of 69 emerging market and developing economies over 1975–2004. Both standard and duration-adjusted measures of capital control intensity (allowing controls to “depreciate” over time) suggest that capital controls have not effectively insulated economies from currency crises at any time during our sample period. Maintaining real GDP growth and limiting real overvaluation are critical factors preventing currency crises, not capital controls. However, the presence of capital controls greatly increases the sensitivity of currency crises to changes in real GDP growth and real exchange rate overvaluation, making countries more vulnerable to changes in fundamentals. Our model suggests that emerging markets weathered the 2007–2008 crisis relatively well because of strong output growth and exchange rate flexibility that limited overvaluation of their currencies.     

International Financial Liberalization, Corruption, and Economic Growth

This paper examines the effects of capital account liberalization on the long-run growth of a developing economy. A general-equilibrium, endogenous growth model is constructed in which corruption forms an integral part of the governance system of the country. By undermining the profitability of innovations, corruption lowers the rate of return to capital and reduces the rate of technological change. The impact of international financial liberalization on long-run growth in this model can be either positive or negative. A drop in growth is obtained when the level of corruption is high enough to cause domestic rates of return to capital before liberalization to drop below those in the rest of the world. In this case, liberalization generates capital outflows, which act as a constraining force on innovation, reducing the rate of technological change and lowering output growth. On the other hand, if the level of corruption is sufficiently low, the capital account liberalization will serve as a boost to the country's technical change and growth.     

美联储量化宽松政策对全球资产价格的非平衡溢出效应

本文采用全局向量自回归模型分析了美联储QE对采用不同货币政策框架、汇率制度和资本流动管理制度国家和地区的不同影响。“货币政策钉住货币供应量+宽松钉住汇率制度+资本账户可兑换”的国家其货币政策应兼顾本国物价水平稳定，同时加强宏观审慎政策对资产价格的逆周期调节，避免出现实体经济紧缩而金融繁荣的现象。“货币政策钉住通货膨胀+浮动汇率+资本账户可兑换”的国家应强化宏观审慎政策对资产价格的调节以应对金融资产泡沫。     

The role of location choice in strategic export promotion policy: capital liberalization incentives of exporting countries

We study an international capital liberalization game where exporting countries choose either to open the domestic market for capital inflow or not. We clarify that if the cost difference is large enough, the less productive country is indifferent between closing or opening for inward direct investment, and the more productive country never has an incentive to open. International coordination to open markets is not always necessary in our capital liberalization game since it may deteriorate the welfare of the more productive country and will make world welfare worse off. The earlier version of this paper is Kiyono and Wei (2002).     

资本管制决定因素的一般理论与实证分析

全球金融经济危机以来,资本管制和资本项目自由化问题引起了各国政府和经济学界的高度关注。本文对资本管制进行了基础性理论研究,研究表明：（1）一国放开资本管制实现资本项目自由化必须满足其前提条件,即总财富大于总支出,当该条件不满足时则应实施资本管制,而一些重要因素决定总财富与总支出的关系。（2）当一国公共支出的目标是社会福利最大化时,中等财富水平的国家更易实现资本项目自由化。（3）资本管制的实施应是逆周期的：经济越繁荣时资本项目有自由化倾向,此时应加强资本管制,抑制热钱流入,控制经济过热;相反,当经济进入衰退时有抑制资本项目自由化的倾向,此时在防止资本外逃的基础上,应适当放松资本管制,鼓励资本流入。本文采用61个发展中国家1980-2011年的数据对上述结论进行了实证检验。