The effect of political factors on sovereign default

This aricle examines the effect of political factors on sovereign default. Using a theoretical model, we find that political instability increases the likelihood of default. To test this theoretical implication, we use a panel logit model to estimate the effect of long- and short-run political factors, along with other macroeconomic variables, on the probability of default. Data from 68 developed and developing countries between 1970 and 2010 is used to conduct the study. Our findings suggest that a country is more likely to default when (i) it has a relatively younger political regime in place; (ii) it faces a higher chance of political turnover; and (iii) it has a less democratic political system. Economic factors are also vital; a country with stronger growth and less external debt is less likely to experience sovereign default. Robustness tests using alternative measures of political risk, trade balance and EMBI sovereign bond spreads also support the baseline findings.     

The effects of prudential policies on bank leverage and insolvency risk in Central and Eastern Europe

This paper analyses the effects of prudential policies on leverage and insolvency risk in eleven Central and Eastern Europe banking systems in the 2005–2014 period. It explores the relationship between leverage, insolvency risk and regulation variables, and the temporal patterns of this relationship. It also examines whether the effects of prudential policies on leverage and insolvency risk are influenced by bank ownership structure and financial cycle. The paper finds a consistent link between prudential regulation and leverage, which varies over the sample period. Conversely, the insolvency risk shows a stronger relationship with macroprudential policies. The estimates reveal that prudential policies work better on leverage and z-score for foreign banks. Both leverage and insolvency risk are better mitigated over booms. Finally, prudential policies have similar effects on both domestic and foreign banks' stability in normal times, while the effects are opposite during turbulences. These dissimilarities are raising challenges to the conduct of prudential policies.     

Country Default Risk: An Empirical Assessment

We provide benchmarks to evaluate what is an optimal foreign debt and a maximal foreign debt ( debt-max ), when risk is explicitly considered. When the actual debt exceeds debt-max , then the economy will default when a 'bad shock' occurs. This paper is an application of the stochastic optimal controls models of Fleming and Stein (2001), which gives empirical content to the question of how one should measure 'vulnerability' to shocks, when there is uncertainty concerning the productivity of capital. We consider two sets of high-risk countries during the period 1978–99: a subset of 21 countries that defaulted on the debt, and another set of 13 countries that did not default. Default is a situation where the firms or government of a country reschedule the interest/principal payments on the external debt. We thereby explain how our analysis can anticipate default risk, and add another dimension to the literature of early warning signals of default/credit risk.     

Industry equilibrium with random exit or default

An industry consisting of a large number of small price taking firms subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks is considered. At the moment of entry, a firm takes on debt. We show that in a competitive equilibrium, some firms exit and pay out their debt while others choose to default. The outcome depends on the realization of firm‐specific shocks. The paper demonstrates that if the firms self‐select between exit with debt repayment and default, then the default region is disconnected from the exit region. The methodological contribution of the paper is the analytical characterization of the long‐run equilibrium for two scenarios of the initial distribution of productivity shocks. We consider two public policy mechanisms—contract enforcement and creditor protection. Our policy recommendation is that regulators need to reduce the contract enforcement if they want to decrease the long‐run default rate.     

Persistent gaps and default traps

We show how vicious circles in countries' credit histories arise in a model where output persistence is coupled with asymmetric information about output shocks. In such an environment, default signals the borrower's vulnerability to adverse shocks and creates a pessimistic growth outlook. This translates into higher interest spreads and debt servicing costs relative to income, raising the cost of future repayments, thereby creating “default traps”. We build a long and broad cross-country dataset to show the existence of a history-dependent “default premium” and of significant effects of output persistence on sovereign creditworthiness, consistent with the model's predictions.     

Local linkages: The interdependence of foreign and domestic firms in Ireland

This paper contributes to the literature on backward linkages—the degree of localization in input usage, focusing on the potential interdependence between foreign and domestic producer firms. Drawing on Irish sectoral data during 2000–2013, our main objective is to empirically examine how foreign and domestic producer firms' backward linkages might dynamically influence each other, and the extent to which they respond to export intensity and productivity levels from the two groups of firms. We find an interesting asymmetric interdependence pattern: (1) domestic firms' backward linkages are not impacted by the backward linkages of foreign firms; (2) more robust backward linkages of domestic firms can potentially induce more backward linkages from foreign firms; and (3) domestic firms' productivity shocks could generate a dynamic crossover impact on foreign firms' backward linkage status, but similar shocks originating from foreign firms generate little crossover impact on domestic firms’ backward linkage status. Our result on interdependent local linkages points to a potentially important role for domestic-to-domestic backward linkage formation in promoting foreign-to-domestic backward linkages.     

Evaluating sovereign risk spillovers on domestic banks during the European debt crisis

Using a Markov-switching model with time-varying probabilities, spillovers from sovereign to domestic bank CDS spreads during the European debt crisis for a set of 14 European countries and 30 European banks are investigated. Our model is able to capture how the increased sovereign risk observed between 2010 and 2013 throughout Europe has impacted i) the probability that banks fall into a crisis regime and ii) the probability that banks stay in the crisis regime. The latter state is characterized by a high volatility and large positive returns of CDS spreads. Different regime-dependent indicators have been computed to assess heterogeneity within the region. The evidence indicates that the intensification of sovereign risk observed during the European debt crisis has positively and significantly driven the regime shifts in volatility of the bank CDS spreads due to increased risk aversion. The results show that the increase in sovereign credit risk seems to have generated second-round effects for some banks that have experienced a deterioration in their funding conditions due to a rise in the domestic sovereign default risk. Overall, our results suggest that sovereign CDS spreads can be considered good forewarning indicators for predicting the evolution of bank CDS spreads. We also find that the effects differ depending on the country and the financial institution. This result suggests that banks are heterogeneously exposed to sovereign credit risk within the same country. One argument relates to the size of these financial institutions and the domestic exposure to sovereign debt.     

Financing R&D in Chinese private firms: Business associations or political connection?

Using a new and unique dataset of Chinese private firms, this paper explores how private firms access bank loans to finance innovative activities. The results reveal that political connection, rather than membership in a government-controlled business association, largely determines private firms' innovations by providing access to bank loans. Furthermore, the “grease-the-wheels” mechanism of political connection is stronger if the firms are more constrained financially, located in regions with low levels of financial development, or located in regions with relatively under-developed institutional environments. Finally, cash flow, used to measure internal financing, and trade credit, used to measure informal financing, are important alternative financing channels and support firms' R&D investments. Our paper implies that China's government needs to continue fostering a good financing environment and supporting innovation activities.     

The perils of debt deflation in the Euro area: a multi regime model

Academic research and policy makers in the Euro area are currently concerned with the threat of debt deflation and secular stagnation in Europe. Empirical evidence seems to suggest that secular stagnation and debt deflation in the Euro area may be rather slowly developing. Yet what appears as major peril is that debt deflation with a lack of economic growth, rising real interest rates and further rising debt may trigger household defaults, defaults of firms and banks, rise of risk premia, and default risk of certain sectors of the economy or sovereign defaults. It is this rising default and financial risk that may lead to a regime change to a slowly moving debt crisis with high financial risk and high financial stress. In order to explore those issues, a macro policy model of Svensson type is introduced, exhibiting a regime of low and high financial stress. Then, a four dimensional multi-regime VAR is employed to an Euro area data set to support the theoretical model and the claim that in particular Southern Euro area countries are affected by debt deflation and financial market stress.     

Monetary Policy Shocks and Heterogeneous Finance Decisions: A Model of Hidden Effort Choice and Financial Intermediation

Abstract. The paper investigates how monetary policy shocks influence the composition of firms' external finance given that firms are heterogeneous. Heterogeneity stems from differences in the availability of internal funds and in the monitoring costs associated with bank finance. These costs are determined by the intensity of the lending relationship. By using a delegated monitoring approach it is found that bank loans serve as a substitute for internal funds if the lending relationship is sufficiently close. Moreover, banks with strong credit ties to their customers are not only able to protect borrowers from liquidity constraints following a monetary tightening but are even able to extend their business lending.     

Debt and Currency Crises—Complements or Substitutes?*

Debt and currency crises are closely interlinked through the government's intertemporal budget constraint. The default tax and the inflation/devaluation tax can be considered as alternative means of financing. Our empirical analysis finds that high‐debt countries choose default rather than inflation/devaluation for financing, while a high money stock reduces the probability of debt crises. Further, we find strong evidence that debt and currency crises share common fundamental causes. Finally, there is a Granger causality running from debt crises to currency crises, but only weakly in the other direction.     

Bank loan supply shocks and leverage adjustment

We investigate the effect of bank loan supply shocks on firms’ leverage adjustment. We show that the impact of bank shocks is larger for firms with greater dependence on financially troubled banks. We measure firms’ pre-crisis loan dependence on troubled banks by using matched firm–bank loan data. Using the boom-bust cycle from 1987 to 2014 in Japan as a quasi-experiment, we find that financially constrained firms adjust their leverage slower during credit-crunch periods than during other periods. During credit-crunch periods following banking crisis, firms associated with failing banks or with banks that have a limited capacity to supply loans show a slower adjustment than other firms. Bank shocks have significant effects on small firms’ adjustment but not on that of large firms. These results are robust when we consider demand-side effects and perform other robustness tests. Our results imply that bank shocks have a persistent effect on borrowers’ leverage.     

Default and liquidity regimes in the bond market during the 2002–2012 period

Using a real‐time random regime shift technique, we identify and discuss two different regimes in the dynamics of credit spreads during 2002–2012: a liquidity regime and a default regime. Both regimes contribute to the patterns observed in credit spreads. The liquidity regime seems to explain the predictive power of credit risk on the 2007–2009 NBER recession, whereas the default regime drives the persistence of credit spreads over the same recession. Our results complement the recent dynamic structural models as well as monetary and credit supply effects models by empirically supporting two important patterns in credit spreads: the persistence and the predictive ability toward economic downturns.     

Debt and corporate governance in emerging economiesEvidence from India1

We analyze the role of debt in corporate governance with respect to a large emerging economy, India, where debt has been an important source of external finance. Using cross‐sectional data on listed manufacturing firms we estimate, simultaneously, the relation between Tobin's Q and leverage for three years, 1996, 2000 and 2003. Our analysis indicates that while in the early years of institutional change, debt did not have any disciplinary effect on either standalone or group affiliated firms, the disciplinary effect appeared in the later years as institutions became more market oriented. We also find limited evidence of debt being used as an expropriation mechanism in group firms that are more vulnerable to such expropriation. In general, our results highlight the role of ownership structures and institutions in debt governance.     

Financial Frictions and Risky Corporate Debt

We offer clarifications on Cooley and Quadrini (2001) regarding financial frictions and risky corporate debt pricing. Even in a frictionless world, the promised rate on corporate debt is not identical across firms and across capital structures and it is not equal to the risk-free rate. Frictions are unnecessary for credit spreads to arise. Only if the macroeconomy is in actuality risk free or risk neutral do interest rates on corporate debt reflect default probabilities. To the extent that the firm's entire financial structure is traded, a bias in credit spreads introduces an exploitable arbitrage opportunity. Re-establishing no-arbitrage, firm dynamics move in the opposite direction to Cooley and Quadrini's.     

Debt overhang in a business cycle model

We study the macroeconomic implications of the debt overhang distortion on firms׳ investment and labor decisions. We show that the distortion arises when the levels of investment and labor are non-contractible and chosen after the signing of the debt contract. The financial friction manifests itself as investment and labor wedges that move counter-cyclically, increasing during recessions when the risk of default is high. Their dynamics amplify and propagate the effects of shocks to productivity, government spending, volatility, and funding costs. Both the size and the persistence of these effects are quantitatively important.     

Fundamentals and Sovereign Risk of Emerging Markets

We empirically assess the relative importance of various economic fundamentals in accounting for the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads of emerging markets during 2004–2012, which encompasses the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. Inflation, state fragility, external debt and commodity terms of trade volatility were positively associated, while trade openness and a more favourable fiscal balance/GDP ratio were negatively associated with sovereign CDS spreads. Yet the relative importance of economic fundamentals in the pricing of sovereign risk varies over time. The key factors are trade openness and state fragility in the pre‐crisis period, the external debt/GDP ratio and inflation in the crisis period, and inflation and the public debt/GDP ratio in the post‐crisis period. Asian countries enjoy lower sovereign spreads than Latin American countries, and this gap widened during and after the crisis. Trade openness was the biggest factor behind Asia's lower sovereign spreads before the crisis, and inflation during and after the crisis. The results imply that external factors were paramount in pricing sovereign risk prior to the crisis, but internal factors associated with the capacity to adjust to adverse shocks gained prominence during and after the crisis.     

An unlikely Phoenix: The recovery of Argentina’s monetary and financial system from its ashes in the 2000s and its lessons

The study discusses the recovery of the Argentine financial system after the crisis of the so called convertibility regime of the 1990s. The Argentine macroeconomic regime established in 1991 and based on the hard peg of the peso to the dollar at a 1 to 1 parity ended in a multiple crisis in 2001–2. Beyond the default on the public debt, the crisis also involved the breakdown of the domestic financial system, and an almost complete isolation of the country from the international financial markets as a consequence of the default. Under such a deep crisis and the consequent uncertainty, the recovery of the solvency of the financial institutions was an almost insurmountable enterprise. However, with a gradualist approach (contrary to the advice of the International Monetary Fund) and a degree of “regulatory forbearance,” the financial and monetary authorities were able to recover the health of the financial system, which became much more resilient to shocks, even if its development has been very slow and, as a consequence, the contribution of domestic credit to the economic expansion of the 2000s can be considered almost negligible.     

Risk sharing and export performance with firm heterogeneity

We investigate how market uncertainty affects the export performance of a firm through financial frictions. We first extend Melitz's (2003) heterogeneous firm trade model by incorporating demand shocks, linking the demand uncertainties to the financing costs of firms. In this extension, the default probability is endogenously determined by a firm's productivity and demand uncertainty. Hence, firms with higher productivity or lower market uncertainty are offered lower interest rates and thus show better export performance. As an application, we also show that a risk-sharing mechanism, that pools default risk for a certain group of firms, lowers the default risk. This mechanism allows banks to charge lower interest rates to the member firms and therefore ultimately improves their export performance in both extensive and intensive margins. We find a real-world example of such a mechanism from business groups in Korea. Using Korean firm-level data, we show that the more diversified the business group, the greater the likelihood that its member firms export and the bigger their export revenues. We also show that our results are robust to alternative explanations for Korean business groups’ export competitiveness.     

Financial Instability under a Flexible Exchange Rate*

Many governments in developing countries contemplate the possibility of increasing the flexibility of their exchange rates despite having accumulated substantial dollar‐denominated debt. Using a model of corporate dollar debt in which the future exchange rate is uncertain, this paper studies the financial risks that might arise as a consequence of increased exchange rate flexibility. Since a firm may default on its debt either because its dollar income is too low or because investors refuse to roll over its debt, the measure of the overall risk of default should take into account both factors, as well as their interaction. Solving the model for the no‐default rational expectations equilibrium, we find that a small risk of insolvency may bring about a substantial risk of illiquidity.