WHO SUPPORTS REDISTRIBUTION?*

Using an original data set, we investigated the determinants of individual preferences over income redistribution in Japan. Although income level is negatively correlated with support for redistribution, it does not explain much; there are other important factors that relate to dynamics and uncertainty, such as income risk. Even after controlling for income, both risk‐averse individuals and those who expect to be unemployed in the future favour greater redistribution. Interaction of ageing and mobility prove important. The relatively poor elderly, who presumably have few prospects of upward mobility, strongly support greater redistribution, whereas younger people are less sympathetic to such a policy.     

Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities

This paper explores how individual preferences for redistribution depend on future income prospects. In addition to estimating the impact of individuals' socioeconomic background and of their subjective perceptions of future mobility, we employ panel data to construct ‘objective’ measures of expected gains and losses from redistribution for different categories of individuals. We find that such measures have considerable explanatory power and perform better than ‘general mobility’ indexes. We also find that preferences for redistribution respond to individual beliefs on what determines one's position in the social ladder. Ceteris paribus, people who believe that the American society offers 'equal opportunities are more averse to redistribution.     

Don't shoot yourself in the foot! A (real-effort task) experiment on income redistribution and voting

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment that investigates the Meltzer–Richard model of equilibrium tax rates in which individuals are either low or high skilled workers and face a real-effort task that includes leisure at the work place. We find that a large proportion of low-skilled workers vote for the lowest tax rate (the one that gives them the lowest payoff), especially when the alternative tax rate is very high. However, this proportion is significantly reduced in treatments in which the subjects are given extra information about how the tax operates in redistributing income. This result suggests that the lack of information about the role of taxes in income redistribution may be an important factor in explaining the counter-intuitive voting behavior of low-income voters over income redistribution. We also find some support that the prospect of upward mobility and the belief in the negative effect of taxes on productivity make low-income voters support low tax rates, especially when the alternative tax rate is very high.     

A note on the POUM effect with heterogeneous social mobility

We study the determinants of the (steady-state) POUM effect in a model where the individuals evaluate their expected future income using both their current income and observable characteristics such as education, race or gender.     

The effects of the intensity,timing and persistence of personal history of mobility on support for redistribution in transition countries

This paper examines the effect of the intensity, timing and persistence of personal history of mobility on individual support for redistribution. Using both rounds of the Life in Transition Survey, we build measures of downward mobility for about 57,000 individuals from 27 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. We find that more intensive, recent and persistent downward mobility increases support for redistribution. Accounting for systematic bias in perceived mobility experience and omitted variable bias and considering alternative definitions of redistributive preferences do not alter the basic results.     

Preferences for redistribution and exposure to tax-benefit schemes in Europe

This paper provides evidence that attitudes towards redistribution are associated with the extent of generosity of the redistributive context experienced by the individual, as measured by the likelihood of receiving positive benefit transfers net of fiscal contribution. We estimate reduced form tax-benefit equations with the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), and match the implied parameters to the respondents of the European Social Survey (ESS) on the basis of their characteristics. The period of analysis is 2008–2016. For identification, we exploit exogenous cross-country and time variation in tax rules and market income to disentangle implications of exposure to tax-benefit rules on preferences for redistribution from the effects of changes in income inequality. We find that exposure to positive net benefits increases support for redistribution by 1.4%–3% on baseline models, the effect being robust across a variety of specifications.     

Voting for Redistribution under Desert‐Sensitive Altruism*

We endow individuals who differ in skills and tastes for working, with altruistic preferences for redistribution in a voting model where a unidimensional redistributive parameter is chosen by majority voting in a direct democracy. When altruistic preferences are desert‐sensitive (i.e., when there is a reluctance to redistribute from the hard‐working to the lazy), we show that lower levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium. We provide empirical evidence that preferences for redistribution are not purely selfish, and that desert‐sensitive motivations play a significant role. We estimate that preferences for redistribution are significantly more desert‐sensitive in the US than in Europe.     

Consumption smoothing and income redistribution

We show theoretically that income redistribution benefits borrowing-constrained individuals more than is implied by standard relative-income and uninsurable-risk considerations. Empirically, we find in international opinion-survey data that younger and lower-income individuals express stronger support for government redistribution in countries where consumer credit is less easily available. This evidence supports our theoretical perspective if such individuals are more strongly affected by tighter credit supply, in that expectations of higher incomes in the future increase their propensity to borrow.     

A second chance at success: A political economy perspective

This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following concerning the cost of a second chance. First, when the cost is low, the economy is characterized by high levels of upward mobility and inequality, and a low tax burden supported by the poor with prospects for upward mobility. Second, when the cost is high, there are multiple equilibria with various patterns of upward mobility, inequality and redistribution. Numerical examples show that the shift from a high-cost economy to a low-cost economy may reduce social welfare.     

Is money where the fun ends? Material interests and individuals’ preference for direct democracy

Are people’s attitudes towards referendums as a decision-making procedure predominantly driven by their material self-interest, or do individuals also value direct democracy as such, regardless of the material payoffs associated with anticipated policy outcomes? To answer this question, we use a survey data set that offers information on respondents’ support for referendums as a procedure to decide on tax policy, their income levels, socio-economic characteristics, and, most importantly, their expectation about the majority’s support for higher taxes. We find that the support of low-income individuals for referendums increases substantially if they expect a clear population majority in favor of more redistribution. Conversely, individuals with a high income who expect a majority in favor of higher taxes do not reject referendums more strongly than individuals with an average income who share these expectations.     

A Political Economy Model of Earnings Mobility and Redistribution Policy

This paper presents a politico‐economic model that includes a mutual link between life cycle earnings mobility and redistributive politics. The model demonstrates that when an economy features a high opportunity of upward mobility and high risk of downward mobility, it attains a unique equilibrium where unskilled, low‐income agents support a low redistribution because of the hope of upward mobility in future. In contrast, the economy attains multiple equilibria when mobility opportunity and risk are low: one is an unskilled‐majority equilibrium defined by low mobility and the other is a skilled‐majority equilibrium defined by high mobility. The paper gives a comparison between the political equilibrium and the social planner's allocation in terms of mobility, and shows that the skilled‐majority equilibrium realizes mobility close to the optimal one.     

Economic integration and fiscal devolution

In this paper we investigate how economic integration influences the political decision of integration and separation of jurisdictions. In a model with (imperfect) capital mobility, we consider that, not only the redistributive policy itself, but also the level of policy centralization is decided by a majority vote. We find that the net benefit from integration is not monotonic with the level of world capital market integration and present a case where integration of two regions occurs only for intermediate levels of mobility. This conclusion relies on the comparison of the regional majorities’ utility under the various regimes. The benefits from integration arise from the elimination of tax competition across jurisdictions, which allows for more income redistribution, whereas the costs are linked to the diversity of preferences across regions, namely that of the decisive voters. We also show that a federal regime is better than complete centralization in keeping a nation united.     

Fairness in tax compliance: A political competition model

This paper analyzes the political economy of income redistribution when voters are concerned about fairness in tax compliance. We consider a two‐stage model where there is a two‐party competition over the tax rate and over the intensity of the tax enforcement policy in the first stage, and voters decide about their level of tax compliance in the second stage. We find that if the concern about fairness in tax compliance is high enough, a liberal middle‐income majority of voters may block any income redistribution policy. Alternatively, we find an equilibrium in which the preferences of the median voter are ignored in favor of a coalition formed by a group of relatively poor voters and the richest voters. In this equilibrium income redistribution prevails with no tax enforcement.     

Income Taxation and the Diversity of Consumer Goods: A Political Economy Approach*

After‐tax income inequality has risen since the mid‐1990s, as increases in market income inequality have not been offset by greater fiscal redistribution. We argue that the substantial increase in the diversity of consumer goods has mitigated mounting political pressures for redistribution. Within a probabilistic voting framework, we demonstrate that if the share of diversified goods in the consumption bundle increases sufficiently with income, then an increase in goods diversity can reduce the political equilibrium tax rate. Focusing on OECD countries, we find empirical support for both the model's micro‐political foundations and the implied relation between goods diversity and fiscal policy outcomes.     

Positional concern and low demand for redistribution of the poor

The two observations that (1) some low-income citizens demand low redistribution and (2) as income inequality becomes more severe a larger proportion of citizens make less demand for redistribution (Kelly and Enns (2010)) are counter-intuitive because people oppose redistribution that could be beneficial to them. Understanding the main driving factor that leads to the economic conservatism of the poor is crucial: it guides how policymakers should design redistribution. I show that positional concern can be one of these main factors. When citizens care about their relative position on consumption and their labor productivity is slightly perturbed when a new tax policy is implemented, only middle-income citizens may vote for redistribution. Compared with the prospect of upward mobility hypothesis, I provide a testable prediction for the relationship between economic inequality and the economic conservatism of the poor. If positional concern is the main driving factor, policymakers should focus on increasing the low-income citizens’ standard of living to the middle class; and if the prospect of upward mobility is the main factor then they should focus on minimizing income gaps.     

Why do (some) ordinary Americans support tax cuts for the rich? Evidence from a randomised survey experiment

Why do (some) ordinary citizens support tax cuts for the rich? We test four prominent explanations – unenlightened self-interest, fairness considerations, prospect of upward mobility, and trickle-down beliefs – using a randomised, online information provision experiment, embedded in a representative survey of around 3000 US Americans. The results show that preferences for taxing the rich are fundamentally affected by information that shifts citizens’ core fairness beliefs, as well as information on the past trajectory of top tax rates. In contrast, we find no evidence in support of the unenlightened self-interest or prospect of upward mobility explanations. Overall, our results align with theories of tax policy preferences that emphasise the importance of fairness perceptions and reference points.     

Redistributive choices and increasing income inequality: experimental evidence for income as a signal of deservingness

We explore the relation between redistribution choices, source of income, and pre-redistribution inequality. Previous studies find that when income is earned through work there is less support for redistribution than when income is determined by luck. Using a lab experiment, we vary both the income-generating process (luck vs. performance) and the level of inequality (low vs. high). We find that an increase in inequality has less impact on redistribution choices when income is earned through performance than when income results from luck. This result is likely explained by individuals using income differences as a heuristic to infer relative deservingness. If people believe income inequality increases as a result of performance rather than luck, then they are likely to believe the poor deserve to stay poor and the rich deserve to stay rich.     

Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution

Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.     

Parental Wealth and the Black–White Mobility Gap in the U.S.

Utilizing longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), this paper examines the relationship between parental wealth and intergenerational income mobility for black and white families. I find that total parental wealth is positively associated with upward mobility for low‐income white families, but is not associated with reduced likelihood of downward mobility for white families from the top half of the income distribution. Conversely, I find that total parental wealth does not have the same positive association for low‐income black families, while home ownership may have negative associations with the likelihood of upward mobility for these families. However, for black families from the top half of the income distribution, home equity is associated with a decreased likelihood of downward mobility, suggesting a heterogeneous relationship between home ownership and mobility for black families.     

Do Institutions Affect Social Preferences? Evidence from Divided Korea

The division of Korea is a historic social experiment that randomly assigned ex ante identical individuals into two different economic and political institutions. About 70 years after the division, we sample Koreans who were born and raised in the two different parts of Korea to study whether institutions affect social preferences. We find that those from North Korea behave in a less self-interested manner and support the market economy and democracy less than those from South Korea. A follow-up study shows that social preferences did not change considerably in two years. We check robustness against sample selection and potential confounding factors such as income differences. Our findings indicate that preferences are rooted in institutions.