Transnational Depoliticisation and Industrial Policy: The European Commission and French Steel (1980–1984)

ABSTRACT

Following the 2008 financial crash, voices have called governments to re-embrace industrial policy and promote industrial development. Such calls presuppose that the past decades witnessed a relative retreat of activist industrial policies. Within international political economy the latter is explained by the limits posed by the structure of global economic governance and globalisation on the state’s interventionist capacities. This article argues that these constraints have enabled states to pursue the transnational depoliticisation of industrial policy and transfer decision-making responsibilities to spheres lying beyond the governmental arena such as transnational institutions. By appealing to supranational economic rules, governments can disclose their own preferences for certain industrial policies and resist pressures to assist declining activities. To substantiate these claims the article proposes an archival investigation of the French government’s management of the steel industry between 1980 and 1984 and its support for a European Commission-led management of restructuring. The findings suggest that the pressures of the Commission played a crucial role in strengthening the government’s effort to implement socially unpopular but economically vital industrial choices.     

The Rise of Populist Movements in Europe: A Response to European Ordoliberalism?

This article aims to explain the contemporary emergence of populism in the European Union. According to Polanyi’s double movement framework, the emergence of these political forces can be understood as the result of protective responses from societies weakened by difficult market adjustments. Since the Single Act treaty (1986), the European economy took a path that intended to create a supranational self-adjusting markets economy based on the ordoliberal philosophy. However, by detaching the economic sphere from the reach of politics, the European Single Market has injured some important social institutions. The rise and the diversity of populisms in the European Union can therefore be explained by an attempt to preserve some national institutions that were diversely impacted by the market forces.     

An Alternative Approach to the Institutional Economics of the Eurozone Crisis

I argue that the Eurozone crisis is neither a crisis of European sovereigns in the sense of governmental over-borrowing, nor a crisis of sovereign debt market over-lending. Rather, it is a function of the “sovereign debt market” institution itself. Crisis, I argue, is not an occurrence, but an element fulfilling a precise technical function within this institution. It ensures the possibility of designating — in the market’s day-to-day mechanisms rather than analytical hindsight — normal (tranquil, undisturbed) market functioning. To show this, I propose an alternative view on the institutional economics of sovereign debt markets. First, I engage literature on the emergent qualities of the institutions “market” and “firm” in product markets, concluding that the point of coalescence for markets is the approximation of an optimal observation of consumer tastes. I then examine the specific institution “financial markets,” where the optimal observation of economic fundamentals is decisive. For the specific sub-institution “sovereign debt market,” I conclude that the fundamentals in question — country fundamentals — oscillate between a status of observable fundamentals outside of markets and operationalized fundamentals influenced by market movements. This, in turn, allows me to argue that the specific case of the Eurozone crisis is due to neither of the two causes mentioned above. Rather, the notion of “crisis” takes on a technical sense within the market structure, guaranteeing the separation of herd behavior and isomorphic behavior on European sovereign debt markets. By the same token, the so-called Eurozone crisis ceases to be a crisis in the conventional sense.     

New European Banking Governance and Crisis of Democracy: Bank Restructuring and Privatization in Slovenia

ABSTRACT

The paper makes three contributions to the understanding of the post-crisis European banking governance. First, it offers a more comprehensive approach to banking governance, beyond the Banking Union, through its concept of ‘New European Banking Governance’ (NEBG) that incorporates EU state aid rules and fiscal regulations. Second, it considers the impact of NEBG on democratic institutions and processes in EU member states, an under-researched topic in the literature on European banking governance. Finally, through its in-depth case study of Slovenia it considers the NEBG in relation to peripheral Eurozone states. It argues that the post-crisis banking governance framework of the EU not only severely constrained the Slovenian state in its policy choices but rearranged its policy-making institutions in a way that restricted and continues to restrict democratic banking policy formation.     

Money and the ‘Level Playing Field’: The Epistemic Problem of European Financial Market Integration

ABSTRACT

Financial market integration processes in the European Union (EU) are characterised by an epistemic problem of economic theory. This problem encompasses what ‘the market’ is, how it is to be ‘integrated’, and the nature and role of ‘money’ as infrastructure of the fully integrated market. The EU’s legal framework has imported this epistemic problem along with the competitive conception of the market as described in economic theory – as a ‘level playing field’ for private exchange, under free, fair and ideally unrestrained competition. It manifests itself in European financial market integration processes, as exemplified in the article, via two otherwise disconnected areas of European Central Bank (ECB) activity: (a) the provision of central bank credit for the purpose of financial transaction settlement in the Eurozone; and (b) the conduct of ordinary monetary policy in the Eurozone. While the problem can be stabilised through legal, technical and other means, it remains latent, and may manifest itself again in unexpected ways, as happened in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Thus, contrary to ideologies that are widely understood as more or less coherent systems of doctrines, epistemic problems are characterised by specific tensions, contradictions and conceptual uncertainties.     

The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone

When entering a monetary union, member countries change the nature of their sovereign debt in a fundamental way; that is, they cease to have control over the currency in which their debt is issued. As a result, financial markets can force these countries’ sovereigns into defaulting. This makes the monetary union fragile and vulnerable to changing market sentiments. It also makes it possible that self‐fulfilling multiple equilibria arise. I analyse the implications of this fragility for the governance of the Eurozone. I argue that the role of the European Central Bank as a lender of last resort is crucial in reducing the fragility of the Eurozone. In addition, steps towards a budgetary union are key in structurally strengthening the union.     

Crusoe,Friday and the Raced Market Frame of Orthodox Economics Textbooks

ABSTRACT

‘Crusoe’ and ‘Friday’ signifiers necessarily evoke a world of racialised hierarchies. Economics textbooks are perhaps the sole remaining medium to simply wish away their resulting relations of power. These are the teaching aids that inspire students analytically to think of markets as pristine economic institutions and persuade them politically that they should want to will such institutions into being. Yet they all-too-often rely on the pedagogical device of the so-called Robinson Crusoe Economy, where the main characters from Defoe’s most famous novel are required to instinctively recognise their equality within voluntary contracting agreements so that each can act as the neoclassical homo economicus. In other words, economists’ Crusoe and Friday figures must behave antithetically to what has historically been implied by the ‘Crusoe’ and ‘Friday’ signifiers. But how can this be so, given how commonplace it was when Defoe’s characters were first introduced into economic theory in the 1850s to justify white settler colonialism on the grounds that ‘savage’ societies lacked the capacity to be self-governing? The raced market frame that emerged in practice from this assumption continues to be reproduced uncritically today by Crusoe’s and Friday’s presence in the textbook explanation of the most basic model of market exchange.     

Better Than the Euro? The European Monetary System (1979–1998)

ABSTRACT

The euro crisis has provoked a debate on the pros and cons of adjustable exchange rate regimes that enable their participants to negotiate nominal de- and revaluations. To evaluate the functioning of such regimes, we revisit the EMU’s predecessor, the European Monetary System (EMS). We show that in the EMS, devaluations did indeed help more than revaluations did hurt. Assuming that the political-economic heterogeneity of the Eurozone will not vanish in the foreseeable future, the move to a more flexible exchange rate regime might therefore be economically advantageous. However, a purely economic view ignores the huge political ‘maintenance costs’ of negotiable realignments, costs that the EMS members aimed at overcoming when they opted for the euro. The re-politicization of nominal exchange rate policy in today’s Eurozone would therefore not end transnational political conflicts in the Eurozone but fuel new ones.     

The Role of Foreign Bond Issuance: The Case of Australia

We examined the recent development of the foreign bond—termed Kangaroo bond—market in Australia. Overwhelmingly, issuers in this market are of high credit quality and comprise sovereign, supranational and major international financial institutions. Local institutional investors have a preference for simple, fixed‐rate pricing structures, with foreign issuers reliant upon converting their Australian dollar‐denominated bond proceeds into the currency and coupon type of choice using cross‐currency swaps. The Kangaroo bond issuers provide a natural counterparty to Australian residents issuing in foreign currency in offshore markets, where cross‐currency swaps allow them to easily convert their proceeds into Australian dollars.     

The impact of political institutions on U.S. state bond yields during crises: evidence from the 2008 credit market seizure

This study examines how political institutions mediate bond market reactions to severe economic crisis, based on U.S. states’ experience of the 2008 credit market seizure. Following severe fiscal shocks, political institutions assume greater importance in assessing risk characteristics of state bonds. The bond market reacts most strongly to two factors: public sector union strength in a state and the proportion of Democrats in the state legislature. We suggest that the identity of political institutions becomes increasingly important, during periods of economic crises, when credit markets might expect that political systems can no longer delay stabilisations and must deliver policy.     

The effectiveness of fiscal institutions: International financial flogging or domestic constraint?

Many have argued that financial markets are crucial in ensuring that governments maintain sustainable fiscal balances - the so called ‘market discipline hypothesis’. A recent version of this theory holds that both fiscal rules and fiscal transparency are necessary to enable markets to discipline overspending governments. I argue, however, that while these fiscal institutions are effective at improving governments fiscal balances, financial markets are likely not the causal mechanism which discipline governments’ fiscal policies. Instead, I propose that fiscal rules and transparency promote better budget balances because domestic political actors use fiscal institutions to constrain executive policymaking. I test these competing hypotheses of why these fiscal institutions are effective – financial markets vs political competition – and find that country budget balances are increased not as a consequence of financial markets, but when the level of political competition and civil society engagement is sufficiently high. These results are robust to accounting for the possible selection bias of who adopts fiscal institutions.     

A Keynesian explanation of Indian government bond yields

Abstract

John Maynard Keynes held that the central bank’s actions mainly determine long-term interest rates through short-term interest rates and various monetary policy measures. His conjectures about the determinants of long-term interest rates were made in the context of advanced capitalist economies and were based on his views on liquidity preference, ontological uncertainty, and the formation of investors’ expectations. Is Keynes’s conjecture that the central bank’s action is the main driver of long-term interest rates valid in emerging markets, such as India? This paper empirically investigates the determinants of changes in Indian government bonds’ nominal yields. Changes in short-term interest rates, after controlling for other crucial variables, such as changes in the rate of inflation and the rate of economic activity, take a lead role in driving the changes of the nominal yields of Indian government bonds. This suggests that Keynes’s views on long-term interest rates can also be applicable to emerging markets. The empirical findings reveal that higher fiscal deficits do not appear to exert upward pressures on government bond yields in India.     

Transnational Economists in the Eurozone Crisis: Professional Structures,Networks and Ideas

ABSTRACT

In recent years IPE and EU studies scholars have examined how actors in international organisations and EU institutions shape policy ideas. This article explores the professional structure of economists affiliated to two Brussels-based think tanks, Bruegel and CEPS, who, in the context of the Eurozone crisis, sought to contribute to the production of policy solutions to douse the flames of the crisis and put forward long term recommendations for the EMU’s stability. Through the analysis of more than 300 CVs and by drawing on network and sequence analysis, the article shows that in their search for solutions, Brussels-based think tanks bring together economists from different EU member states, whose authority draws on academic qualifications, experience, and seniority. They are ‘multiple insiders’ connected to a wide range of institutions and professional networks, who move back and forth between professional and organisational networks and serve as bridges between revisionist, orthodox, and mixed economic ideas.     

Effects of US interest rates and news on the daily interest rates of a highly indebted emerging economy: evidence from Turkey

It has been widely demonstrated that asset prices react sensitively to macroeconomic news releases both in the industrialized countries and emerging markets. However, there are contradicting results on the effects of changes in interest rates of industrialized countries on asset prices of emerging markets. In heavily indebted economies, in addition to these factors, political news and announcements from international institutions that may increase or decrease concerns about debt sustainability can affect asset prices as well. This potential notwithstanding, there has been relatively limited empirical work on the effects of such variables. The objective of this study is to quantify the impact of all of these factors on interest rates of a highly indebted emerging economy. Using daily post-crisis data of the Turkish economy we show that both good and bad political news, International Monetary Fund announcements, and European Union related news significantly affected secondary market government securities yields, whereas volatility of yields was affected mainly by bad news releases. Changes in US Treasury bond rates and ‘appetite’ for risk of foreign investors did not affect government securities yields in the period analysed.     

寻求更有效的财政政策——中国宏观经济分析

宏观财政政策是一种公共物品 ,其有效性的标准是 ,在实现政府利益的同时 ,能够增进社会的福利。面临通货紧缩 ,政府将继续实施以财政政策为主导的扩张性宏观政策 ,在财政支出空间有限的情况下 ,就要选择能够作大投资乘数 ,提高市场效率的措施 ;同时要考虑调整税制结构 ,改变对投资征高税的税制 ,逐步变生产型增值税为收入型增值税和消费型增值税 ,并通过把内资企业税负降至外资企业的水平 ,一方面提高企业的利润预期 ,另一方面 ,消除税负不公 ,提高社会经济效率和减少资本外流 ;在运用国债政策时 ,既要重视国债的发行和使用 ,更要重视国债的交易和流通 ,推进我国金融市场的发育和功能的发挥以及促进公用事业的企业化 ,转换资源配置方式 ,从政府配置转向市场配置 ,从集中配置转向分散配置。总之 ,在体制转轨时期 ,推行一种与市场化改革相结合的财政政策 ,把短期的政策操作和长期的制度调整结合起来 ,实现政策和体制联动。     

经济转轨进程中的政府治理:几个理论视角

制度之间具有互补性,市场化改革要求政府治理进行相应的改革.本文总结了几个决定政府治理性质的理论视角:政治经济纵向一体化的视角、公共选择理论的视角和市场结构理论的视角,更根本地,我们可以从人力资源配置的视角来看待一个社会政府治理的性质及其变革.对人力资本的重视是关于政府治理变迁理论的最新进展.     

National Labor Market Institutions and the EU Integration Process

This paper outlines theoretical insights regarding the motivationand effects of labor market institutions, and reviews empiricalstudies of relevant evidence from European and other countries'historical experience. Institutional interference with laissezfaire labor market outcomes has both economic and distributionalimplications, which depend on the structure of markets and onthe details of policy implementation. The resulting conceptualframework is brought to bear on a discussion of possible reformsof European labor markets in the context of the Economic andMonetary Union process. (JEL F02, J00)     

Mispricing of Risk in Sovereign Bond Markets with Asymmetric Information

The likelihood that a government will repay its sovereign debt depends both on the amount of debt it issues and on the government's future ability to repay. Whilst the former is publicly observable, the government may have more information about the latter than investors. This paper shows that this asymmetric information problem impairs the market's ability to differentiate economies according to their fiscal sustainability, and can lead to a disconnect between bond prices and default risk. The model can help rationalise the behaviour of Eurozone bond prices prior to the recent European sovereign debt crisis.     

Sovereign Debt Management and the Transformation from Keynesian to Neoliberal Monetary Governance in Britain

ABSTRACT

Private financial markets are central to the implementation of monetary governance. This necessary integration of public and private finance means the way states govern must evolve with developments in financial markets. This article examines how the rise of liability management underpinned a shift to market-based banking and transformed the operation of monetary policy in Britain. It assesses the period of reform between 1967 and 1981 and what this meant for monetary governance. Political economy literature depicts this period as a shift to depoliticised, deregulated governance with public authority giving way to market power. This paper challenges this perspective on the grounds that it misconstrues the problem policymakers faced. The shift from Keynesian to neoliberal monetary governance came in response to the change in banking practice with the rise of liability management and a parallel money market. This underpinned an explosion of credit creation that the old system of monetary policy, organised around the Base Rate and ‘primary’ discount market could not fix. As a result, the monetary authorities had to render this new financial environment governable. The period should therefore be reassessed in terms of the capacities the state attempted to construct to conduct monetary governance.     

司马迁的因俗以治思想及其现实镜鉴?

作为一种非正式制度,习俗在国家的社会经济发展和治理中起着非常重要的作用,在我国的古代社会尤其如此。司马迁较早注意到了俗与治的内在关联,但学术界忽视了其在司马迁经济思想中的重要地位。文章对司马迁的经济思想谱系中“俗”与“治”两大重要范畴进行了关联阐述,介绍了司马迁“因俗以治”治道思想的源流和主张,并结合现代经济学理论对其进行延伸与扩展,探讨其现实意义。研究发现：(1)司马迁的治道思想兼容了道家与儒家的无为而治思想的不同侧面,而其“善因论”的要义正在于“俗之所欲,因而予之”。(2)因俗以治的核心是因循人“生有欲”和“皆为利”的本性及民间习俗来因地制宜、因时制宜地立俗施事,以达至“事少而功多”的理想治理效果。(3)由于司马迁的经济思想带有浓厚的经验色彩和朴素性质,而且中国古代社会缺乏良好的市场环境,因此其在近代以前始终未得到重视和采纳。(4)司马迁“因俗以治”思想给现代国家治理带来了众多启示：一是要尊重风俗习惯并加以因势利导;二是要注重习俗等非正式制度与正式制度的兼容;三是要让好的习俗成为一种稳态均衡而固定下来并延续下去。文章不仅是对司马迁经济思想研究的丰富和拓展,而且对中国国家治理能力的提升也提供了有益的历史借鉴。