Licensing policies for a new product

This paper studies licensing policies for the owner of a new product and addresses their welfare impact in the assessment of market failures. We show that the best licensing policy for the patent holder is fixed fee licensing with an exclusive territory clause. Consumers are also better off with fixed fees but do not prefer the exclusive territory clause. Social welfare is higher under exclusive territories when fixed costs are not too large. As for efficiency, the number of licences in the private market equilibrium falls short of the socially optimal solution. Our analysis discloses that (i) any policy measures aimed at enhancing the diffusion of technology, in terms of the number of licences, would be welcomed and, (ii) the permissive treatment received by licensing agreements with exclusive territories is justified.     

(Un)Conventional monetary policy and bank risk-taking: A nonlinear relationship

This paper investigates the effect of monetary policy - especially unconventional monetary policy - on bank risk-taking behavior in Europe over the period 2000–2015. Using a dynamic panel model with a threshold effect, we estimate this effect on two measures of bank risk: the Distance to Default, which reflects the market perception of risk, and the asymmetric Z-score, which corresponds to an accounting-based measure of the risk. We find that loosening monetary policy (via low interest rates and increasing central banks' liquidity) has a harmful effect on banks’ risk, confirming the existence of the risk-taking channel. Moreover, we show that this relationship is nonlinear, i.e., with the sustainable implementation of unconventional monetary policies, the effects are stronger below a certain threshold.     

Is central bank conservatism desirable under learning?

In a New Keynesian model, we consider the delegation problem of the government when the central bank optimally sets discretionary monetary policy taking account of private expectations formed through adaptive learning. Learning gives rise to an incentive for the central bank to accommodate less the effect of inflation expectations and cost-push shocks on inflation and induces thus a deviation from rational expectations equilibrium. However, discretionary monetary policy under learning suffers from an excessively low stabilization bias. To improve the social welfare, the government should appoint a liberal central banker, i.e., set a negative optimal inflation penalty that decreases with the value of learning coefficient. The main conclusions are valid under both constant- and decreasing-gain learning.     

WTO Exceptions as Insurance

The paper formalizes the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. The authors use a general‐equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents cannot contract insurance. It is shown that sector‐specific contingent protection measures are superior to uniform contingent tariffs as an insurance mechanism. A tax‐cum‐subsidy policy (i.e., taxing all sectors in order to subsidize the shocked sector) also improves welfare and is superior to contingent protection.     

Alternative Monetary Targets,Instruments and Future Monetary Policy Frameworks

ABSTRACT

This article expands on the debate of whether merely controlling inflation can be considered a good outcome in terms of monetary policy, discussing proposals for adopting alternative monetary targets (e.g., price level, nominal GDP), alternative instruments (e.g., monetary finance, central bank digital currencies), for enlarging central banks' mandates (e.g., incorporating employment, wages, inequality, environmental objectives) and for the design of future monetary policy frameworks.

We argue that in the coming years, central banks should not simply maintain their pre-2008 standards by de-implementing unconventional monetary policies. Instead, they must take advantage of their past and recent experiences in order to improve, under an evolutionary perspective, future monetary policy and financial stability frameworks. Based on this, measures implemented since the 2008 crisis would have three possible treatments in new frameworks: i) be discarded, due to their predominantly adverse effects; ii) not be regularly implemented, but be used as backstop mechanisms if needed; iii) be incorporated as regular measures of monetary policy/financial stability frameworks. Accordingly, monetary and financial stability authorities will increasingly need to evolve and engage in a continuously adaptive and innovative process in order to face challenges posed by financial markets that are becoming more dynamic, innovative, complex, interconnected and globalised.     

Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets

This article studies a two-period game between the public and a central bank about whose ability to commit to an announced target the public is uncertain. The central bank chooses between announcing a target for an intermediate variable (money growth) and its goal variable, inflation. Prior to setting its instrument, the central bank receives private, noisy information about the link between money growth and inflation. Monetary targeting facilitates communication of the central bank's type, in that the probability of separation is always higher than under inflation targeting. This advantage of monetary targets from a dependable central bank's perspective is outweighed for most parameter values by the advantage of inflation targeting in terms of inflation control. If the regime choice is treated as a strategic decision, over a large range of parameter values both central banks choose the regime that a dependable central bank would prefer.     

Exchange Market Pressure and Monetary Policy in Emerging Market Economies: New Evidence from Treatment‐effect Estimations

The way central banks react to exchange market pressure is likely to affect the subsequent economic development and the associated economic costs. In a situation of currency pressure the central bank can in principle decide to let the currency float freely, to maintain the peg or to implement a managed float policy, i.e. a mix of depreciation and intervention. As the central bank's choices are subject to self selection and endogeneity, we use propensity score matching to adequately cope with these methodical challenges. We find that monetary authorities have two options to keep down the economic costs in terms of output, namely stabilizing the exchange rate or letting the currency float freely. In contrast, a managed float under currency pressure is accompanied by the worst possible outcome with an average loss of gross domestic product (GDP) between 5% and 6%.     

The role of liquidity in monetary policy transmission: Evidence from Indian banks1

The role of bank liquidity in monetary policy transmission has received insufficient attention in the literature. Faced with monetary tightening, banks with more liquidity can sell off securities and protect their loan portfolios. We test this proposition using panel data for Indian banks during 2005–2020. Employing dynamic threshold panel regressions with liquid assets as the threshold variable, we show that bank lending declines with monetary policy tightening in low liquidity regimes, but not in high liquidity regimes. We also find evidence for different portfolio reallocation behaviour by banks in high versus low liquidity regimes in response to monetary policy changes.     

INTERACTION BETWEEN MONETARY AND FISCAL AUTHORITIES UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

This paper analyzes the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities under incomplete information. The inflation goal of the central bank is assumed to be unknown to the fiscal authority and the public. The central bank signals the goal by choosing the first‐period monetary policy before the fiscal authority joins the policy‐making game. If the central bank would like the fiscal authority and the public to believe that it is wet (dry), the central bank would distort the money supply upward (downward) in order to reveal its actual type.     

Monetary targeting in the Netherlands: an application of co-integration tests

There are two criteria to choose an intermediate variable for monetary targeting. First, the money demand function needs to be stable and second, the monetary authorities should be able to control the target variable given the available instruments. In this paper we examine whether M1 and M2 in the Netherlands fulfil the first requirement, i.e. we investigate whether a stable relationship exists between these monetary variables and key macroeconomic variables. Co-integration techniques are used which are very well suited for this purpose. Monetary policy in the Netherlands has been directed towards the growth rate of broad money (M2). The present findings do not suport the choice of M2 as an intermediate target for monetary policy in the Netherlands. A stable long-term relationship between M2 and real NNP and Long-and short-term interest rates does not exist. The results for M1 are considerbly better, though not favourable at all scores. The estimated moeny demand function for M1 is a good indicator for monetary policy, since the Dutch central bank probably cannot control the growth rate of M1.     

Identifying monetary policy shocks with changes in open market operations

In this paper, we reexamine the effects of monetary policy shocks by exploiting the information contained in open market operations. A sticky price model is developed where money is the counterpart of securities deposited at the central bank. The model's solution reveals that a rise in central bank holdings of open market securities can be interpreted as a monetary expansion. Estimates of vector autoregressions for US data are further provided showing that reactions to an unanticipated rise in open market securities are consistent with common priors about a monetary expansion, i.e., a decline in the federal funds rate, a rise in output, and inertia in price responses. Compared to federal funds rate shocks, prices do not exhibit a puzzling behavior and a larger fraction of the GDP forecast error variance can be attributed to open market shocks. However, the explanatory power of the latter has decreased since federal funds rate targets have been announced.     

Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability Through Independence?

This paper examines some problems which arise when monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank and where the central bank's preferences are unknown. Two key conclusions emerge from the paper. First, even with optimal targets or contracts, central bank independence may not always be desirable because central banks may have distorted preferences relative to society. Second, if the delegation solution is preferable, and the independent central bank responds to information about supply shocks, the central bank may be made more accountable by allowing it to set its own inflation targets, i.e. by making it goal-independent     

Teaching Inflation Targeting: An Analysis for Intermediate Macro

Over the last decade, many central banks have adopted policies known as inflation targeting. If intermediate-level macroeconomics students are to be prepared to think about current policy issues, it is important to provide them with an introduction to the macroeconomic implications of inflation targeting. Unfortunately, the standard aggregate demand-aggregate supply frameworks commonly used to teach intermediate macroeconomics are not well suited for this task because they are expressed in terms of output and the price level and because they fail to make explicit the policy objectives of the central bank. The author provides a simple graphical device involving the output gap and the inflation rate that overcomes these problems and that can be used to teach intermediate macroeconomics students about inflation targeting.     

Central bank instruments, fiscal policy regimes, and the requirements for equilibrium determinacy

This paper examines the role of the monetary instrument choice for local equilibrium determinacy under sticky prices and different fiscal policy regimes. Corresponding to Benhabib et al.'s results for interest rate feedback rules [Benhabib, J., Schmitt-Grohé, S., Uribe, M., 2001. Monetary policy and multiple equilibria. American Economic Review 91, 167–185], the money growth rate should not rise by more than one for one with inflation when the primary surplus is raised with public debt. Under an exogenous primary surplus, money supply should be accommodating—such that real balances grow with inflation—to ensure local equilibrium determinacy. When the central bank links the supply of money to government bonds by controlling the bond-to-money ratio, an inflation stabilizing policy can be implemented for both fiscal policy regimes. Local determinacy is then ensured when the bond-to-money ratio is not extremely sensitive to inflation, or when interest payments on public debt are entirely tax financed, i.e., the budget is balanced.     

Nonlinear monetary policy reaction functions in large emerging economies: the case of Brazil and China

This article estimates monetary policy rules for two key emerging market economies: Brazil and China. It analyses whether the monetary authority reacts to changes in economic activity, financial markets, monetary conditions, the foreign exchange market and the commodity price. We assess the importance of nonlinearity using a smooth transition regression (STR) model. Using quarterly data over the time period 1990:1 to 2008:4, we find that considerations about the output gap and the real effective exchange rate (in the case of Brazil), and the inflation rate (for China) explain the nonlinear adjustment of the central bank rate. Moreover, the results suggest that central banks pursue a target range for the threshold variable rather than a specific point target. In the case of China, the McCallum rule shows that the GDP growth, the interest rate and the commodity price drive the response of the growth rate of the relevant monetary aggregate.     

Unconventional optimal open market purchases

We build a model in which verifiability of private debt and a timing mismatch in debt settlements can lead to a liquidity problem in the financial market. The central bank can respond to the liquidity problem by adopting an unconventional monetary policy that purchases private debts in the open market. This policy is effective if the timing mismatch is nominal (i.e., a settlement participation risk). It is ineffective if the limited participation is driven by a real shock (i.e., preference shock).     

Are bygones not bygones? Modeling price-level targeting with an escape clause and lessons from the gold standard

Like the gold standard, price-level targeting (PT) involves not letting past deviations of inflation be bygones; both regimes return the price level (or price of gold) to its target. The experience of suspension of the gold standard in World War I and resumption in the 1920s (for some countries at a different parity) is reviewed. It suggests that, in practice, PT might operate with an escape clause that would allow rebasing of the price target in the face of large shocks. Using a calibrated general equilibrium model, we show that such an escape clause can produce multiple equilibria. For some parameterizations, there is a low credibility equilibrium (with high expectation of a reset) associated with high output volatility and frequent resets. These problems reduce, or reverse, the expectational advantage PT has over inflation targeting.     

China's regime-switching monetary policy

To understand Chinese monetary policy, we estimate a forward-looking Taylor-type monetary policy reaction function. The novelty of our paper lies in two aspects. The first is to use a composite overall indicator (the Sun-MP index) to tackle the measurement uncertainty and hence the model selection problem (i.e., a Taylor versus McCallum rule). The second is to capture nonlinearities in the PBC's policy responses with the multiple-regime threshold regression model. We find strong evidence that the PBC's policy reaction function is asymmetric during the post-2000 period and switches across three different regimes. When expecting high inflation, the PBC tightens by adjusting various policy tools; while facing an expected economic slowdown, it eases. However, it is tolerant to low inflation and economic overheating; it barely reacts to them. These findings highlight the importance of allowing for regime switches in modelling the policy response function of a “young” and fast evolving central bank in emerging countries like China.     

Impact of asset price fluctuation on China’s monetary policy: An empirical analysis based on quarterly data, 1994–2006

The strenuous fluctuation in global asset price in recent years has had a profound impact on the economic and social development of every country. An empirical analysis indicates that asset prices (the stock price index and real estate prices) are important endogenous variables affecting the interest rate reaction function of central bank monetary policy. With expected inflation as a given, each one percentage point rise in output gap will cause a 0.79 percentage point reduction in interest rates by the central bank and each one percentage point rise in real estate price will result in a 2.2 percentage point rise in interest rates. The stock price index does have an influence on the trends in monetary policy, but it is less salient than the impact of housing prices. We also show that monetary policy that employs asset price as an endogenous variable increases the central bank’s control in seeking to attain its objectives. Therefore we suggest that the central bank should make asset price fluctuation an endogenous variable and incorporate it into its forward-looking interest rate rule, in order to facilitate the healthy development of China’s markets for real estate, stocks and derivatives, energy and bulk commodities and maintain rapid, smooth, sustainable and harmonious economic development.