基于质量安全的生猪产业链纵向契约关系分析

分别运用混合战略模型和重复博弈模型分析了生猪产业链中市场契约和生产契约的履行情况。分析结果表明:市场契约的履行与关系租金正相关,与抽检成本、遵守契约所付出的额外成本负相关;生产契约的履行与关系租金、专用性资产投资和贴现率正相关,与遵守契约所付出的额外成本负相关。提出建议:政府应扶持猪肉产品品牌建设,促使优质猪肉产品在市场上实现优质优价;政府应增加对屠宰加工企业的抽检补贴;屠宰加工企业在进行专用性资产投资的同时也应要求养殖场户进行专用性资产投资。     

不完全契约、专用性投资与纵向一体化

笔者探讨了不完全契约情形下市场交易、长期契约和纵向一体化的专用性投资水平.基于博弈结构,我们将市场交易和长期契约分别视为鲁宾斯坦和纳什谈判方式.结论表明,纵向一体化能达到最优的专用性投资水平,并且,在长期契约中下游企业的专用性投资水平要高于市场交易.进一步表明,为了消除市场交易情况下专用性投资的不足,可取的办法不仅仅是纵向一体化,长期契约也是可行的办法,但它的投资激励不如一体化.     

基于不完全契约的专用性人力资本投资激励

不完全契约理论是分析和解决专用性投资不足的有力工具。在阐述不完全契约分析框架之后,分别从个人和企业层面探讨了专用性人力资本投资的不足,最后,基于不完全契约理论探讨了专用性人力资本投资的激励措施。     

契约执行效率与地区出口绩效差异——基于行业特征的经验分析

生产率差异是比较优势的重要来源,而契约执行效率又是决定行业生产率的制度因素之一。本文利用中国省区28个行业数据检验了契约执行效率对出口贸易的影响。实证结果显示,契约执行效率高的地区更倾向于专业化生产和出口契约密集度较高、物质资产专用性较强和人力资产专用性较弱的产品。在控制比较优势的其他影响因素及变量内生性之后,上述结论依然稳健。本文进一步指出,企业的一体化程度差异是解释上述结论的关键因素。     

契约执行效率与地区出口绩效差异-基于行业特征的经验分析

生产率差异是比较优势的重要来源,而契约执行效率又是决定行业生产率的制度因素之一.本文利用中国省区28个行业数据检验了契约执行效率对出口贸易的影响.实证结果显示,契约执行效率高的地区更倾向于专业化生产和出口契约密集度较高、物质资产专用性较强和人力资产专用性较弱的产品.在控制比较优势的其他影响因素及变量内生性之后,上述结论依然稳健.本文进一步指出,企业的一体化程度差异是解释上述结论的关键因素.     

农业产业化经营中商品契约稳定性研究

在农业契约中 ,农户的专用性投资少 ,企业的专用性投资 ,特别是利他性专用投资的存在 ,增加了农户事后的机会主义行为 ,进一步降低了履约率。所以 ,有关增加专用性投资、提高农户信誉、加强法律约束的建议 ,都不能增加农业契约的履约率。本文认为 ,在农业契约稳定中 ,关键是风险分担机制的设计。农户的联合和企业的保险作用应该是解决农业契约履约率过低的基本方向     

论资产专用性与纵向一体化

资产专用性通过影响企业的治理成本和生产成本来影响纵向一体化决策,资本专用性越强,企业就越倾向于实行纵向一体化。而纵向一体化过程反过来又对资产专用性产生影响,企业实行纵向一体化的过程会使资产专用性增强。     

外部选择与关系专用性投资激励——基于GHM模型的研究

现实中的契约总是不完全的,当自然状态被参与人观察到之后,为了保证交易有效率,通常会对事前契约进行再谈判.首先,论文研究了事后再谈判时参与人的外部选择对事后合作租金的分配影响及事前关系专用性投资激励问题;其次,根据外部选择是否具有约束力,将外部选择区分为威胁点和现状点.研究结果显示:当外部选择为现状点时,不完全契约会导致事前关系专用性投资不足;而如果事后外部选择为威胁点时,投资方会作出有效率投资或投资过度     

竞争优势、互补性与企业边界——一个基于美、日汽车产业的比较分析

企业边界的真实含义与资产专用性分析所作的概括有本质区别。它是指＂企业＂这一有计划的生产协调机制作用的规模与范围,而不是同一所有权下的资产集。纵向一体化取决于企业所拥有的竞争优势和生产的互补程度,而不是资产专用性这个表面指标。据此,笔者对美、日汽车企业与零部件企业的双边关系重新进行了考察,指出专用性资产租借关系比分包制更接近市场契约,而不是相反。美、日汽车产业发展路径的歧异正在于应对互补性时采取了不同的制度安排。     

专用性资产投资、 企业竞争优势与风险治理——兼论国有企业分类改革

在新古典经济学理论体系中,产品市场和生产要素市场都处于完全竞争条件下,由于没有考虑专用性资产投资,所以企业没有竞争优势,只要依靠价格信号就可以实现资源优化配置.然而,专用性资产投资不仅导致生产要素无法充分流动,而且还造成企业的成本不对称和形成企业持续的竞争优势,为企业获取超额利润或者效率租金提供一种理论框架.因此,本文基于专用性资产投资,借助不完全产品市场结构研究企业竞争优势,这并不意味着低效率.在此基础上,根据垄断租金和效率租金的来源,较为全面地认识国有企业效率及其分类改革问题,同时也为企业风险治理提供了指导原则.在市场配置资源起决定性作用的前提下,加强专用性资产投资管理和风险治理,对于经济新常态下全面深化国有企业改革具有重要意义.     

结合交易费用与核心竞争力理论对外包行为的分析

本文结合了管理学的企业理论中的两大研究框架--交易费用理论与核心竞争力理论.对企业的外包行为及其涉及到的合约性质进行了分析.有关的分析把交易费用理论中所独有的专用性的概念,从单一的资产专用性扩展为三种专用性:核心专用性、交易专用性和关系专用性;并研究了这三种专用性以及环境的不确定性对外包合约的复杂性的影响.     

On contract duration of royalty licensing contracts

This paper explores how the choice of royalties and contract duration can be a device to mitigate opportunistic behavior in the presence of asymmetric information. It presents a model where an upstream patent holder with no production capabilities licenses a product innovation, by means of royalty-only contracts, to several downstream firms that produce and market the new product. In a two-period signaling model, the profitability of short-term and long-term contracts is compared, given that the licensees’ costs may be inferred by observation of their output levels. For a sufficiently large difference in production costs, the patentee introduces a series of short-term contracts, rather than a long-term contract for the entire expected lifetime of the innovation. In such a sequence of contracts, both high- and low-cost firms pay the same royalty rate (which is not higher than that of long-term contracts) and reveal their costs in the first licensing period. Thereafter, royalties are smaller (than in the first period) for high-cost firms but larger for low-cost producers so as to increase expected total output and licensing income. Overall, royalties are not time-decreasing, in expected terms, as information evolves from incomplete to complete. This strategy is typically welfare-improving.     

A GAME THEORETIC FOUNDATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH ADVERSE SELECTION

We construct an extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection. It allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts, so that cross‐subsidization is not ruled out. Moreover, firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed. We show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists. In fact, when withdrawal is costless, the set of equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts. We then focus on robust equilibria that continue to exist for small withdrawal costs. We show that the Miyazaki–Wilson contracts are the unique robust equilibrium outcome.     

Vertical integration and transaction-specific sunk costs

The purpose of this paper is to analyze vertical integration, long-term contracts and spot markets as institutional alternatives when transaction-specific investments are involved. Firm activities are divided into two periods. In the first period (the ex ante world), decisions on the amount of transaction-specific sunk costs are made, whereas after realization of a random state of the world, short-run production decisions are made (in the ex post world). The problem analyzed is to determine what form of organizations and/or contracts will emerge between upstream and downstream firms in the ex ante world to regulate their ex ante transaction-specific investments, if any, as well as their ex post production decisions and the distribution of resulting profits.     

Firm Location and the Creation and Utilization of Human Capital

This paper presents a theory of location choice that draws on insights from the incomplete contracts and investment flexibility (real option) literatures. Our analysis indicates that the choice of locating within rather than away from industry clusters is influenced by the extent to which training costs are borne by firms versus employees. In addition, the uncertainty about future productivity shocks and the ability of firms to modify the scale of their operations also influence location choice. In particular, we show that locating in clusters is preferred when training costs are borne by workers and when firm-specific productivity shocks can potentially be large. However, there is an incentive for firms to choose isolated locations when significant training costs are borne by firms.     

Switching costs and implicit contracts

When firms can discriminate between old and new customers and when multiperiod binding commitments are too costly, the effects of switching costs may be mitigated thanks to implicit contracts offered (competitively) by firms in equilibrium and backed by reputation.     

Relationships and Hybrid Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Choice in Information Technology

Selecting the type of contract is an important aspect of governinginterfirm transactions. The purpose of this article is to examinethe use of fixed-fee and time-and-materials (T&M, or cost-plus)contracts and a hybrid contract that consists of a T&M contractwith a cap. In addition to uncertainty and measurement factors,we also address a relatively unexplored aspect of contracting—howthe prior relationship between the firms influences the typeof contract the firms select. Using data on 394 contracts fromthe information technology (IT) services industry, we show thatT&M contracts are preferred when the cost of measuring qualityex post is high and when it is difficult to estimate costs exante. We also find site-specific measures of relationship leadto a preference for low-powered T&M contracts.     

Renegotiation on incomplete procurement contracts

This article examines the impact of incomplete contracts on procurement costs in road construction auctions. Ex ante contracts in these auctions often fail to specify all of the potential construction contingencies, and consequently, changes in scope are necessary after construction begins. Using Vermont road construction contract data, this study finds evidence that there is a statistically significant difference in costs of firms between auctions with and without extra work adjustments. Substantial adaptation costs are responsible for the higher procurement outlays in incomplete contract. I also find that bidders inflate their bids to incorporate risk premiums in incomplete contracts; however, my estimates suggest that this bidding behaviour does not affect their profit margins.     

The propensity to hedge using futures contracts: the case of potato futures contracts

This paper studies why UK non-financial firms hedge with potato futures contracts. It is found that the financial characteristics of firms in the sample play an important role in influencing the propensity to hedge. For example, it is found that firms that hedge are on average larger than firms that do not hedge. Firms that hedge also have more volatile earnings. Furthermore, firms that do hedge appear to want to smooth earnings to reduce the costs of financial distress and avoid entering the highest tax threshold.     

Vertical integration, market foreclosure and quality investment

We study incentives to vertically integrate in an industry with vertically differentiated downstream firms. Vertical integration by one of the firms increases production costs for the rival. Increased production costs negatively affects quality investment both by the integrated firm and the unintegrated rival. Quality investment by both firms decreases under any (vertical integration) scenario. The decrease in quality invesment by both firms softens competition among downstream firms. By integrating first, a firm always produces the high quality good and earns higher profits. A fully integrated industry, with increased product differentiation, is observed in equilibrium. Due to increase in firm profits, social welfare under this structure is greater than under no integration.