Punishment paths and cartel size

Using a ‘Dominant-group-fringe’ model, we show that the choice of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) punishment path in the event that unilateral defection occurs depends upon the common discount parameter, and that when the discount parameter is given the punishment path may depend upon the size of the dominant group. The choice of punishment path is thus endogenous. A striking result is that only for sufficiently small dominant groups in sufficiently small industries are there cases where costs affect these choices. Consequently, costs are irrelevant to the choice of punishment in industries with a large number of firms.     

Cost Uncertainty and Unilateral Abatement

Unilateral abatement is sometimes advocated in order to set a good example that will make other countries follow. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether existence of correlated cost uncertainty provides an incentive for a country to undertake unilateral abatement. The theoretical model is driven by two main mechanisms; first, a learning effect, as the follower country might reduce its risk premium as it can observe the cost level in the leader country. Second, there is the public good effect, i.e., the marginal benefit of abatement declines when abatement is a public good and other countries contribute to pollution reductions. Results shows that unilateral abatement would be efficient in reducing uncertainty about the unit costs of abatement if a country with low cost uncertainty would undertake abatement first, while a country with initially high cost uncertainty would follow. However, countries may prefer to act simultaneously because of the larger uncertainties that are inherent in a sequential game.      

Trade liberalization, heterogeneous firms and the soft budget constraint

We analyze the interaction between the soft budget constraint (SBC) and international trade by placing Segal’s (1998) SBC model within Melitz’s (2003) framework of international trade with heterogeneous monopolistically competitive firms. As in Segal’s model, SBC may result in moral hazard. The opening to international trade adds another sort of inefficiency. Some firms that would have become exporters in the absence of SBC choose to apply low effort and not export in order to extract a subsidy from the government. This effect takes place when the trade costs are sufficiently low. Overall, however, trade liberalization reduces inefficiencies generated by SBC. The number of firms subject to moral hazard SBC decreases, aggregate effort level increases and aggregate profits lost due to SBC-induced sub-optimal effort decline as trade costs decrease.     

The impact of speculation on house prices in the United Kingdom

When house prices are expected to rise, the representative house mover has an incentive to secure his purchase price (i.e. exchange contracts) on the ‘new’ house before exchanging contracts on the sale price on his ‘old’ house. If all house-movers adopt this stance, the imbalance between buyers and sellers causes a self-fulfilling speculative price bubble. Transactions costs do not represent a barrier to such speculation in the house market, as such costs can be considered as being sunk costs for first-time buyers and owner-occupiers intending to move for non-speculative reasons. This idea is formalised and empirical evidence is presented which suggests that speculation is a significant determinant of house prices in the United Kingdom.     

Asynchronized multiperiod commitments and cycles

We consider a game where agents can synchronize or stagger their decisions. We compare the outcomes of both timing patterns, and show that spillovers and strategic interactions are crucial for such a comparison. A typology used in industrial organization, distinguishing four cases (‘Fat-Cat’, ‘Top Dog’, Lean and Hungry’, ‘Puppy Dog’), allows us to compare the actions taken in the staggered variant and in the synchronized one. The staggered variant exhibits cycles and players are both better-off when there are strategic complementarities between them. A timing game is then set-up so as to endogenize the choice between the two variants we study.Two examples are developed: (i) Bertrand competition and (ii) a wage setting game when there are two monopoly unions in two interrelated firms. We show that the staggering of price decisions generates counter-cyclical mark-ups in the first example, and the staggering of wage decisions generates cycling output in the industry in the second example.     

Waste, recycling, and “Design for Environment”: Roles for markets and policy instruments

Households sometimes have two recycling options. Curbside recycling collections are convenient, but do not provide payment. Alternatively, payment might be available from ‘reverse vending machines’ or drop-off centers, but some transaction costs would be incurred. We examine policies to encourage efficient product design and recycling in a setting with these two recycling options plus the option of putting recyclables in the trash. We find value in having two parallel recycling options. Constrained optimal outcomes can be attained by combining a ‘deposit–refund’ with a modest disposal fee. Furthermore, producers should not be permitted to keep deposits, that are not claimed by consumers.     

Preemptive collusion among corruptible law enforcers

This paper considers collusion between a supervisor and an agent within a Principal–Supervisor–Agent model. Other papers consider the possibility of collusion after the supervisor has exerted costly effort to obtain hard (“verifiable”) evidence regarding the agent’s actions, information which, if reported would result in the agent being fined with a certain probability. That is, collusion occurs because the supervisor may accept a bribe in exchange for hiding the information he has obtained. This paper allows the supervisor and the agent to enter into a collusive contract either before or after the supervisor has exerted effort to find verifiable information regarding the agent’s actions. The former type of collusion, which occurs after the supervisor has exerted effort, entails ex-post corruption, while the latter, which occurs before the supervisor has exerted effort, entails preemptive corruption. This paper shows that although raising the supervisor’s reward discourages ex-post corruption, it can simultaneously encourage preemptive corruption. Hence, raising the supervisor’s reward will not always discourage collusion. This result further implies that though privatizing law enforcement can always be used to eliminate ex-post corruption, it cannot be used to eliminate preemptive corruption. Furthermore, when compared to ex-post collusion, an equilibrium without corruption is always socially preferred. However, when compared to preemptive collusion, an equilibrium without corruption may not always be socially preferred.     

Copy-protection policies and profitability

This paper examines the publisher's optimal copy-protection policies. Even if copying is more cost-efficient than producing an original, private copying harms the publisher for two reasons. First, the copy users’ contribution to the original's price is too small, and second, there is a time lag between providing the original and distributing copies. If and only if both production costs of copies and institutional costs of the distribution of copies are sufficiently small; does controlling the number of copies benefit the publisher. However, the publisher's optimal number of copies is too low from a social welfare perspective.     

Regulatory Entry Barriers,Rent Shifting and the Home Market Effect

This paper introduces regulatory entry barriers in a model of the home market effect. The entry barriers generate local rents that have unexpected but significant implications. First, the home market effect is magnified. Second, when countries are sufficiently unequal in size and rents are sufficiently large, symmetric reductions in trade costs reduce welfare in the small country. Third, entry barriers increase the large country's market size and, surprisingly, can increase its welfare. Fourth, a unilateral increase in trade protection shifts foreign rents to the home country. This rent‐shifting effect amplifies the standard production relocation motive for trade policy intervention.     

The supply of education quality in a spatial model with asymmetric moving costs

The paper analyses the characteristics of the supply of higher education in different geographical macroareas using a strategic interaction framework. It focuses on universities operating in centralised funding system that autonomously set the quality of education showing that in equilibrium it is inversely related to students’ moving costs across areas. We show that in the presence of asymmetric information about workers’ ability and asymmetric costs of moving, the only PBE consistent with forward induction involves that only high ability workers acquire education and the quality of education is lower in macroareas where the moving costs are higher. Our model predicts that in economies with centralised university funding, educational policies must be regulated according to the specific socioeconomic characteristics of the area. Direct subsidies to universities may be ineffective in improving the quality of education in the less developed areas. When regional disparities are not too big, efficiency gains may be obtained by reducing moving costs.     

Regulation of Stock Externalities with Correlated Abatement Costs

We study a dynamic regulation model where firms’ actions contribute to a stock externality. The regulator and firms have asymmetric information about serially correlated abatement costs. With price-based policies such as taxes, or if firms trade quotas efficiently, the regulator learns about the evolution of both the stock and costs. This ability to learn about costs is important in determining the ranking of taxes and quotas, and in determining the value of a feedback rather than an open-loop policy. For a range of parameter values commonly used in global warming studies, taxes dominate quotas, regardless of whether the regulator uses an open-loop or a feedback policy, and regardless of the extent of cost correlation.Early versions of this paper were presented at the Fifth California Workshop on Environmental and Resource Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, May 5–6, 2000, and at the annual meeting of the Canadian Agricultural Economics Society, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada, June 1–3, 2000. We thank these conference participants, and two anonymous referees of this journal for their comments, without implicating them in any remaining errors. The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Asian Development Bank.     

Happiness, freedom and control

How do people value freedom of choice? Drawing on economics and psychology the paper provides an hypothesis and empirical evidence on how individuals may value freedom of choice and derive utility from it. It is argued that the degree of perceived control that individuals have over choice – a construct known as the locus of control in psychology – regulates how we value freedom of choice. People who believe that the outcome of their actions depends on internal factors such as effort and skills (the ‘internals’) have a greater appreciation of freedom of choice than people who believe that the outcome of their actions depends on external factors such as fate or destiny (the ‘externals’). We find some evidence in support of this hypothesis using a combination of all rounds of the World and European Values Surveys. A variable that measures freedom of choice and the locus of control is found to predict life satisfaction better than any other known factor such as health, employment, income, marriage or religion, across countries and within countries. We show that this variable is not a proxy of happiness and measures well both freedom of choice and the locus of control. ‘Internals’ are found to appreciate freedom of choice more than ‘externals’ and to be happier. These findings have important implications for individual utility, social welfare and public policies.     

THE SCOPE FOR NON‐PROFIT OBJECTIVES IN A MIXED OLIGOPOLY UNDER INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

We ask how the scope for non‐profit objectives in a state‐owned enterprise (SOE) in a mixed oligopoly changes because of competition from firms in another country. There is no change if costs and demand are given, unless the trade partner is a low‐cost country. However, the scope for non‐profit objectives is limited by the country's relative size if wages are market‐clearing and if workers and firms are stationary, because of reduced competitiveness caused by higher real wage rates. The total surplus is then not affected by the actions of the SOE. International trade does not otherwise reduce the scope for its non‐profit objectives if workers and firms are mobile, but productivity differences might require restrictions in order to avoid a complete relocation of the workforce in either country.     

Efficient moral hazard

This paper presents an infinite-horizon, discounted dynamic programming model of the endogenous opportunity costs of an agent’s effort that is allocated among an endogenous number of principals. An agent allocates effort between evaluating new principals and attending to current principals. Since each principal’s return is not maximized by the agent’s optimal allocation, moral hazard occurs in equilibrium. However, since the agent maximizes the total expected value of all undertaken projects, the agent’s allocation of effort is efficient. If the agent chooses a single principal, then moral hazard does not occur and the allocation is efficient. These results are contrary to the inefficient moral hazard results in bilateral principal-agent (P-A) and common agency (C-A) models.     

Incentives for motivated agents under an administrative constraint

Consider an agent who has an expertise in producing a non-marketable good. This good is valued by a single principal, and there is a verifiable measure of the agent’s performance. Crucially, the agent is intrinsically motivated due to ‘warm glow altruism’. In addition, the agent’s budget, which is controlled by the principal, must not be less than the monetary performance-cost faced by the agent. This gives rise to a limited-liability constraint. It also restricts the agent’s ability to under-report costs. In such environment, we determine the link between the agent’s budget and performance. Our results come in contrast to the received solution of the principal-agent problem and to most in the literature on mission-motivated organisations and public services provision.     

German Monetary Union: An historical counterfactual analysis

This paper views German Monetary Union as a sequence of large asymmetric shocks to the European economies. As such it can be analysed with a large, new-Keynesian macro-econometric model of the relevant economies such as NiGEM. The ‘news’ in the sequence of shocks is assessed by analysing contemporary, NiGEM based, forecasts, and important events are then ‘peeled-off’ in reverse order. The resulting counterfactual history analyses the effects of the collapse of the Soviet economy on the EC and Scandinavian economies, and it is argued that the recession in countries such as Finland was not primarily caused by trade effects. The costs of support programmes for East Germany are then removed, creating a negative fiscal shock. Finally the paper analyses the overall effects of the set of shocks. In each part of the counterfactual history, individuals from forward looking expectations and the authorities operate fiscal solvency rules and target monetary aggregates.     

ANTIDUMPING,INTRA‐INDUSTRY TRADE,AND QUALITY REVERSALS

We examine an export game where two (home and foreign) firms produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is more R&D efficient and is based in a larger and richer market. The unique (risk‐dominant) Nash equilibrium exhibits intra‐industry trade, and the foreign producer manufactures a higher‐quality product. When transport costs are low, unilateral dumping by the foreign firm arises; otherwise, reciprocal dumping occurs. For some parameters, a domestic antidumping policy leads to a quality reversal in the international market whereby the home firm becomes the quality leader. This policy is desirable for the implementing country, though world welfare decreases.     

Analysis of the Interaction between Regional R&D Productivity and the Investment Strategies of Multinational Enterprises

The aim of this article is to analyze the interaction between regional R&D productivity and the investment strategies of multinational enterprises. The discussion is based on the hypothesis that R&D investments cause a reduction in the production costs and an increase in firms’ market share; furthermore, R&D costs may be affected by national industrial policies. Supposing the existence of asymmetries in local research productivity, necessary and sufficient conditions for a geographical diversification of resources have been found. Suggestions with respect to the optimal allocation of R&D investment are finally derived.     

Social capital, inclusive networks, and economic performance

Empirical studies show that the relationship between social capital and economic performance is ambiguous. The paper points to the potential trade-off between the sustainability of self-enforcement and the magnitude of gains from trade in social networks as an explanation. Based on an infinitely repeated multi-player prisoners’ dilemma it is shown how self-enforcement of cooperation within a network is influenced by its inclusiveness, its communication capacity, and the complexity of the exchange setting. The paper shows that inclusive social capital can combine both low enforcement costs and high gains from trade even in a complex exchange setting.     

International climate regimes: Effects of delayed participation

This paper analyses how delayed participation by regions can affect international climate regimes in terms of the feasibility, costs, timing, magnitude and nature of the long-term mitigation response. We use the energy-systems optimization model MESSAGE to construct several climate change mitigation scenarios with various levels of regional participation in short-to-mid term. By comparing these with a global scenario that assumes full spatial and temporal flexibility throughout the century, we are able to evaluate how participatory decisions affect the mitigation response as well as the costs and technology choices. We find that short-term postponement of participation from some regions can often lead to a delay of mitigation measures on the global level. However, if the regional delay lasts until mid-century, participants of the regime are likely to increase their efforts in the short term. Mitigation costs are found to substantially increase as a result of delayed participation—the extent of the increase depends on the relative importance of the region that postpones its participation, the stringency of the climate target and the ability to reorganize mitigation measures. Our analysis also shows that a region's decision to delay its participation in an international climate regime can lead to accumulated inertia in its energy system and thus to a delayed ‘technological transition’ toward a low-carbon future.