商业银行信用卡业务发展与风险管理

回顾信用卡业务在我国的发展历程、分析信用卡业务的发展现状,不难发现中国已成为全球信用卡业务增长最快、发展潜力最大的市场。作为未来消费信贷的重要增长点,在金融行业民间资本准入制度的放开、全球化进程不断深入、移动互联快速普及的大数据时代,民间资本、外资银行对信用卡业务的广泛渗透,以及互联网金融的创新发展,必将导致国内信用卡业务参与方关系日趋复杂,信用卡市场竞争日趋激烈。因此,信用卡业务发展过程中所面临的问题及发行风险不容忽视。文中采用行为概率及效用函数的方法对信用卡消费行为进行博弈分析,应用行为分析的结果,对信用卡业务中诸如个人信用登记评估制度,发卡机构营销、审批机制和产品附加值,消费管理和奖惩制度及法律法规制定等相关问题进行了剖析,系统分析了银行信用卡发行过程中的风险,并对信用卡市场的健康发展提出了几点建议。     

BANK COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: LIQUIDITY RISK PERSPECTIVE

We study whether competition affects banks' liquidity risk‐taking, which was at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. We find that banks with greater market power take more liquidity risk, implying that decreased competition leads to financial fragility. During a financial crisis, however, the effect of market power on liquidity risk varies across bank size. Small banks with greater market power reduce liquidity risk while large banks with greater market power do not change their liquidity risk‐taking behavior. This suggests that enhanced charter values due to reduced competition lowers small banks' risk‐shifting incentives when their default risk significantly increases during a crisis. (JEL G21, G28)     

A Model of Money and Credit, with Application to the Credit Card Debt Puzzle

Many individuals simultaneously have significant credit card debt and money in the bank. The credit card debt puzzle is as follows: given high interest rates on credit cards and low rates on bank accounts, why not pay down debt? While some economists go to elaborate lengths to explain this, we argue it is a special case of the rate of return dominance puzzle from monetary economics. We extend standard monetary theory to incorporate consumer debt, which is interesting in its own right since developing models where money and credit coexist is a long-standing challenge. Our model is quite tractable—for example, it readily yields nice existence and characterization results—and helps put into context recent discussions of consumer debt.     

Deregulation, market power and risk behaviour in Spanish banks

This paper provides empirical evidence on the effects of regulatory changes in the market power of Spanish banks. It also analyses the response of banks, in terms of risk-taking behaviour, as a result of a reduction in economic profits. We find that liberalisation measures have increased competition and eroded banks’ market power. We observe that banks with lower charter values tend to have lower equity-assets ratios (lower solvency) and to experience higher credit risk. The last evidence is new in the literature and calls for strengthening regulatory concerns about credit risk management by banks in situations of increased competition.     

Monetary policy and credit cards: Evidence from a small open economy

This paper uses a unique monthly data set that covers the overall credit card usage in a small-open economy, Turkey, to investigate a possible credit channel of monetary policy transmission through credit cards. A reduced-form vector autoregression analysis is employed, where the forecast error variance decompositions are calculated for three-year windows over the period 2002–2009. It is shown that, during the recent financial crisis that has started in 2007, the monetary policy of Turkey has shifted toward focusing on output volatility and interest rate smoothing through setting short-term interest rates, while the inflation rate has been mostly affected by exchange rate movements and inflation inertia. Credit card usage has an increasing effect on inflation rates through time, requiring more policy emphasis on the credit channel through credit cards. When the effects of the credit view and the money view are compared, the former seems to be more effective on the real side of the economy, independent of the level of inflation.     

战略引资和网点规模对银行信贷竞争的影响

以网点规模表征银行规模,从网点吸收存款以支撑贷款业务的角度构建有信贷资金约束的贷款竞争模型,研究外资银行入股对引资银行以及本地信贷竞争的影响。结果表明:只要外资银行改善引资银行的技术水平,贷款市场竞争就会加剧;大银行的市场份额较多,贷款市场竞争加剧对其利润的负面影响较大,大银行为避免这种影响不会过度参与竞争。最后指出,决策层应制定政策以引导优质外资银行入股本地小银行以促进贷款竞争。     

Explaining foreign bank entrance in emerging markets

This paper provides a theoretical framework that can explain the empirical observation that foreign banks from industrialized countries tend to increase their involvement in emerging markets in periods of market instability. In this model, domestic banks have (through past lending operations) more soft information on their borrowers available compared to foreign banks. Foreign banks, however, have a superior screening technology that allows them to obtain more hard information about their borrowers’ investment projects. The model has an important implication: Foreign banks increase their market share when credit market conditions deteriorate. The rationale for this finding is that the comparative advantage of the domestic bank loses value in unstable credit market conditions. Thus, the advantage of having a screening technology becomes more important and allows the foreign bank to increase market share. In times of crisis hard information on projects is relatively more important than soft information on the borrower’s history.     

Credit card cash‐out as informal financing: Evidence from China

Using a proprietary account‐level database from a commercial bank in China, we document that credit card holders can ease their credit constraints through the practice of cash‐out based on bogus transactions using credit cards. We find that such behaviour might be beneficial to both cardholders and banks. First, we find that a 1% increase in the cumulative number of credit card cash‐out transactions lowers the probability of default by 9.59%. Second, for private businesses, a 1% increase in the number of abnormal cash‐out transactions lowers overdue risk by 13.45%. Third, by lowering the overdue risk, the card‐issuing bank earns a larger profit. Our results are consistent with the notion that unconventional credit card cash‐out can mitigate the extent of capital misallocation in emerging markets.     

A QUEST FOR UNFETTERED CREDIT: HOW MONETARY POLICY DRIVES CREDIT RISK TRANSFER OF STRUCTURED FINANCE PRODUCTS

This study examines the effects of monetary policy contractions on bank loans to households and firms and instruments in three different credit risk transfer (CRT) capital markets over two separate time periods (1995–2006 and 2007–2015). The findings show that in both periods, banks decrease business lending but increase lending to consumers through a combination of mortgage, auto, credit card, and student loans from more liquidity produced by consumer‐related CRT activity. Additional results reveal relative CRT movements toward securitized mortgages from bank mortgage debt over both periods and toward securitized and insured business loans from bank business debt in the latter period, which suggest vulnerabilities among interconnected credit markets. (JEL E44, E51, G21, G23)     

Why are credit card rates sticky?

Summary This paper investigates credit card rate stickiness using a screening model of consumer credit markets. In recent years, while the cost of funds has fallen, credit card rates have remained stubbornly high, spurring legislators to consider imposing interest rate ceilings on credit card rates. The model incorporates asymmetric information between consumers and banks, regarding consumers' future incomes. The unique equilibrium is one of two types: separating (in which low-risk consumers select a collateralized loan and high-risk consumers select a credit card loan), or pooling (in which both types of consumers choose credit card loans). I show that a change in the banks' cost of funds can have an ambiguous effect on the credit card rate, so that the credit card rate need not fall when the cost of funds does. Usury ceilings on credit card rates are detrimental to consumer welfare, so would be counter to their legislative intent.I thank George Mailath, Paul Calem, Gerhard Clemenz, Sally Davies, George Kanatas, Leonard Nakamura, Tony Santomero, Tony Saunders, participants in the 1990 Financial Management Association Meetings, and co-editor Michael Woodford for helpful comments.The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System.     

SOME NEW EVIDENCE ON COMPETITION IN PAYDAY LENDING MARKETS

A critical question in the policy debate about payday lending is whether other financial institutions can plausibly provide attractive and lower‐priced substitutes for standard payday loans. I present several new pieces of evidence addressing the question, focusing on whether credit unions, which are often held as the strongest potential competitors to payday lenders, do (or might) viably compete in the payday loan market. National payday loan offerings by credit unions show that very few credit unions currently offer payday loans. Credit union industry reports suggest that those credit unions offering such loans seem unwilling or unable to undercut substantially the prevailing prices set by payday lenders. Those industry reports also reveal that lower‐priced credit union loans generally ration riskier borrowers out of the market by imposing greater restrictions on approval and repayment; risk‐adjusted prices for credit union payday loans may not be lower at all. Survey evidence suggests that most current payday borrowers prefer higher‐priced but less restrictive standard payday loans to lower‐priced but more restrictive alternatives offered by credit unions. The combined demand‐ and supply‐side evidence suggests that one should not expect credit unions (or by extension banks) to offer lower‐priced, higher‐quality alternatives for consumers who currently use payday loans. (JEL G2, L0, L5)     

商业银行信用卡交叉营销管理探索

随着国内银行信用卡业务竞争的进一步加剧,传统营销方式的效率已经不能满足业务发展的需要,各家银行都积极尝试零售业务的战略转型,探索新的营销运作模式。实施信用卡交叉营销,由于可以充分利用客户资源,降低营销成本,成为商业银行加快结构转型,提升核心竞争力的必然选择。但由于信用卡业务自身特点的限制,国内商业银行信用卡交叉营销还存在不少问题,需要从内部机制、客户、渠道、产品等多个方面入手加强交叉营销的管理。     

Interest rate pass-through in Morocco: Evidence from bank-level survey data

We investigate the relationship between banks’ marginal cost and retail lending rates in Morocco. The data covers the rates of new business loans for four market segments broken down by institutional sector between 2006Q2 and 2016Q4. We examine the pass-through mechanism using recently developed heterogeneous panel cointegration framework. Our findings suggest that there is a high degree of pass-through heterogeneity over bank products. The weak adjustment for short-term credit facilities and consumption loans can be explained by credit risk compensation allowing banks to reduce their exposition to systemic risks. Corporate loans are priced more competitive than household and individual entrepreneur products, suggesting that negotiation power or the competition from the borrower side matters. Overall, our results indicate that banking market contestability has improved during the last decade.     

我国银行卡市场发展状况与对策研究

银行卡是具有存款、取款、转账结算、消费等功能的信用支付工具。我国银行卡市场经过二十几年的发展,取得了重大成就。本文从我国银行卡市场的发展状况入手,分析了发展中存在的问题,在此基础上提出了加快我国银行卡市场快速健康发展的对策建议。     

市场规模结构、竞争程度与小微 企业关系型贷款*

本文研究了银行业竞争度与小微企业关系型贷款之间的关系，以及市场规模结构对该关系的影响。信息假说认为，由于信息不对称和代理问题，垄断增加了银行内部化关系型贷款的收益，关系型贷款与竞争度之间呈负相关。然而，越来越多的研究对信息假说提出了质疑。本文在数理推导的基础上，采用江苏省县域地区352家小微企业2011-2015年非平衡面板数据，运用Fractional Logit模型进行实证分析。研究结果表明：市场规模结构是决定竞争度与关系型贷款之间关系的重要因素，当信贷市场中大银行的市场份额占比较大时，银行竞争的加剧对关系型贷款是不利的；当市场中小银行的市场份额占比较大时，竞争的加剧有利于关系型贷款的发放。以往研究对于市场规模结构的忽视可能是导致不同研究结论存在巨大差异的重要原因。本文在此基础上，提出了完善金融基础设施等相关政策建议。     

信用卡支付如何影响主观幸福感?——基于萨缪尔森幸福公式的研究

信用卡是一项功能性金融基础设施,现有研究多数止步于信用卡的消费溢价效应,尚未关注其终极福祉效应.文章基于萨缪尔森幸福公式,分析了信用卡支付影响主观幸福感的作用机理,阐述了其并联机制和串联机制.在此基础上,文章运用条件混合过程模型评估了信用卡支付对主观幸福感的影响,采用因果中介效应分析方法识别了其作用机制.研究发现,信用卡支付显著侵蚀了持卡人的主观幸福感,幸福侵蚀效应是通过串联机制而非并联机制传导的.具体来说,信用卡支付经由欲望膨胀渠道和消费实现渠道所构成的串联机制,降低了持卡人的主观幸福感.另外,信用卡支付的幸福侵蚀效应会因使用动机、家中地位以及城乡和地区差异而表现出异质性.     

Credit quantity and credit quality: Bank competition and capital accumulation

In this paper we show that bank competition has an intrinsically ambiguous impact on capital accumulation. We further show that it is also responsible for the emergence of development traps in economies that otherwise would be characterized by unique equilibria. These results explain the conflicting evidence emerging from the recent empirical studies of the effects of bank competition on economic growth. We obtain them developing a dynamic, general equilibrium model of capital accumulation where banks operate in a Cournot oligopoly. More banks lead to a higher quantity of credit available to entrepreneurs, but also to diminished incentives to offer relationship services that improve the likelihood of success of investment projects. We also show that conditioning on one key parameter resolves the theoretical ambiguity: in economies where intrinsic market uncertainty is high (low), less (more) competition leads to higher capital accumulation.     

Explaining changes in the US credit card market: Lenders are using more information

We examine two changes in the cross-sectional distribution of credit card contracts over time: the increasing variance in interest rates and the increasing variance in credit limits, using data from the 1989–2013 Survey of Consumer Finances. Within this dataset, we show that financial institutions seem to be collecting and using more consumer information when extending credit. We then develop a life-cycle model of lending using a novel contract structure reflecting modern credit cards, where interest rates and credit limits are jointly determined before actual borrowing takes place. Within the model, giving lenders more information on consumers generates realistic results along several dimensions. More information leads to better pricing, moving the market from a ‘pooling’ to a ‘separating’ equilibrium, generating the observed increase in variances, with the gains primarily going to young agents.     

信用卡发展与我国商业银行市场结构变迁研究——基于Panzar-Rosse模型的实证研究

首先采用Panzar-Rosse模型定量研究近几年来我国商业银行业市场结构的变迁,在此基础上进一步研究信用卡的发展与商业银行市场结构变迁的关系。对我国商业银行近十年数据的实证研究表明,由于近些年我国对于银行业的政策不断放开,市场竞争总体来说越来越激烈。但是,信用卡的发展却减弱了商业银行业市场的竞争强度。     

Competition among banks and the pass-through of monetary policy

This paper introduces monopolistically competitive financial intermediaries into the New Keynesian DSGE setting. Modelling bank market power explicitly contributes to understanding two empirical facts: (i) The short-run transmission of changes in money market rates to bank retail rates is far from complete and heterogeneous. (ii) Stiffer competition among commercial banks implies that loan rates correlate more tightly with the policy rate. In my model, the degree of monopolistic competition in the banking sector has a sizeable impact on the pass-through of changes in the policy rate. In particular, a more competitive market for bank credit amplifies the efficiency of monetary policy.