Residence-and source-based taxation of capital income in an overlapping generations model

By using an intertemporal equilibrium model with overlapping generations, this paper explores how residence-and source-based taxes on capital income affect the external current account in small open economies. These taxes influence the saving-investment balance not only through their incentive effects on rates of return but also through their impact on the intergenerational distribution of resources. This paper, in its examination of these effects — both intertemporal substitution and intergenerational distribution — identifies the net effect of the various impacts.The author would like to thank Dieter Bös and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

Environmental quality,the macroeconomy,and intergenerational distribution

The paper studies the dynamic allocation effects and intergenerational welfare consequences of environmental taxes. To this end, environmental externalities are introduced in a Blanchard–Yaari overlapping generations model of a small open economy. A rise in environmental taxes – taking into account pre-existing distortionary taxes and endogenous labor supply – is shown to yield an efficiency gain if agents care enough for the environment. The benefits are unevenly distributed across generations because agents are heterogeneous in their capital ownership. An accompanying debt policy can be designed – prescribing debt accumulation at impact and debt redemption in the new steady state – to ensure everybody gains to the same extent. With lump-sum recycling of environmental tax revenue, aggregate employment is unaffected in the short run, but falls in the long run. Furthermore, it raises environmental quality more in the long run than in the short run. Recycling revenue through a cut in labor taxes, however, is shown to yield a rise in employment in the short run, which disappears during transition. In the new steady state, environmental quality is higher at the expense of a lower level of employment.     

Investments into education—Doing as the parents did

Empirical evidence suggests that parents with higher levels of education generally attach a higher importance to the education of their children. This implies an intergenerational chain transmitting the attitude towards the formation of human capital from one generation to the next. We incorporate this intergenerational chain into an OLG-model with endogenous human capital formation. In absence of any state intervention such an economy might be characterized by multiple steady states with low or high human capital levels. There are also steady states where the population is permanently divided into different groups with differing human capital and welfare levels. Compulsory schooling is needed to overcome steady states with low human capital and welfare levels. Tax financed education subsidies can lead to further pareto-improvements.     

Sustainable Forestry: Timber Bequests, Future Generations and Optimal Tax Policy

This paper analyzes harvesting and timber bequest behavior in a two-period overlapping generations model where the government uses site productivity, yield and inheritance taxation. The ceteris paribus effects of forest and inheritance taxes are derived first, then the paper discusses the optimal design of forest and inheritance taxes by assuming that intergenerational externalities are either absent or operative. In the absence of intergenerational externalities, it is optimal to use only the site productivity tax, and not to introduce yield and inheritance taxes at all. In the presence of intergenerational externalities the situation changes. The paper demonstrates that the externality can be internalized by introducing either a yield tax or an inheritance subsidy, or both. If the government is able to use both at the same time, it is desirable to use the yield tax to 'punish' excessive harvesting and an inheritance subsidy to 'bribe' to give bequests.     

The Intergenerational Overlap and Human Capital Formation*

A new microeconomic explanation for the divergent experiences of economies in forming human capital is proposed. It is suggested that the positive effect of a longer life expectancy on human capital formation arises from two separate effects: a life‐expectancy effect and a prolonged intergenerational overlap effect. It is argued that the duration of the overlap between generations and the associated parental support can affect the marginal cost of human capital formation and hence its level: parental support is cheaper than market financing. The strong correlation between the formation of human capital and life expectancy is thus attributed not merely to a higher marginal benefit arising from a longer payback period but also to a lower marginal cost arising from a prolonged intergenerational overlap. Conditions are provided under which a longer overlap results in a higher level of per capita output.     

教育融资体制对代际流动性与不平等程度的动态影响：基于OL G模型的分析

传统的代际流动性研究并没有对代际流动性的短期值和长期值作有效区分,也未考虑人力资本形成中的不确定性,因而“代际流动性越高则不平等程度越低”这一分析结论并未在中国的现实中呈现。文章据此通过构建一个代际交叠模型比较分析了公共教育体制和市场教育体制下的代际流动性。模型动态分析发现：(1)公共教育体制下的不平等程度的长期值比市场教育体制下更低。(2)代际流动性短期值的升高并不总是伴随着不平等程度的下降,当社会受到某种剧烈冲击时可能发生两者同升同降的情况。(3)政府进行激进式的教育体制改革会使人力资本收敛速率发生跃升,并且使不平等程度的短期值和长期值都增大,而代际流动性则会在突降后在逐渐收敛到新的更低的稳态值。(4)人力资本积累不确定性参数值反映了个体不可观测的技能或先天禀赋,是影响代际流动性和不平等程度的重要因素。不确定性的突然上升会使不平等程度的短期值迅速上升,并且会使不平等程度的长期值达到新的高位,虽然代际流动性短期值也会迅速上升,但依旧会逐渐收敛到以前的稳态值不变。文章的研究有益于厘清代际流动性与不平等程度的复杂关系,也能为相关实证研究提供参考。     

Choosing between gifts and bequests: How taxes affect the timing of wealth transfers

A number of theories have been advanced to explain the size and timing of intergenerational transfers. One factor only recently explored is the effects of taxes, and in particular the estate tax, on such transfers. This paper represents the first attempt to explore how capital gains and gift taxes, in addition to the estate tax, interact to influence incentives in the timing of transfers. Using estate tax data and exploiting variations in state inheritance, gift, and capital gains tax rates, this paper finds taxes to be an important consideration in the choice between gifts and bequests. In particular, each of capital gains and gift taxes are found to be important determinants of the timing of transfers. These findings are robust to a number of specifications that control for borrowing, charitable bequests, marital status, and the portfolio composition of wealth transfers.     

Optimal income taxation with human capital accumulation and limited record keeping

This paper characterizes optimal income taxes in a dynamic economy where human capital is unobservable and the government is restricted to use taxes that depend only on current income. I show that unobservability of human capital tends to decrease the labor wedge, while the effect on the human capital wedge is uncertain. I also analyze the relationship between optimal taxes in economies with and without endogenous human capital and identify two qualitative reasons why the optimal tax codes will differ. I perform numerical simulations to calculate the quantitative relevance of endogenous human capital formation for optimal tax policy. I find that endogenous human capital lowers marginal tax rates by about 9% on average, as compared with a static model without human capital.     

Stability, global dynamics and Markov equilibrium in models of endogenous economic growth

This paper studies the local and global dynamics of two-sector models of endogenous growth with economy-wide external effects and taxes on capital and labor. The local analysis classifies the parameter space depending on the number of stationary solutions and local stability of equilibria. The global analysis shows that if taxes are within certain bounds and the size of the external effects on the average level of human capital is smaller than the share of physical capital, the equilibrium path is monotone and therefore a continuous Markov equilibrium can be constructed.     

Cross-border acquisitions and taxes: efficiency and tax revenues

Abstract .  We develop a theoretical oligopoly model to study how international differences in profit and capital gains taxes affect foreign acquisitions. Reductions in foreign profit taxes tend to trigger inefficient foreign acquisitions, while reductions in foreign capital gains taxes may trigger efficient foreign acquisitions. Foreign acquisitions can increase domestic tax revenues even when profit taxes are evaded. The reason is that bidding competition between foreign firms ensures that all benefits from the acquisition, including tax advantages, are captured by a domestic seller paying capital gains taxes. Tax code issues, such as the treatment of goodwill, are shown to affect the pattern of foreign acquisitions.