Trade policy reform and international trade tax revenue in Uganda

This paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between tariff reform and customs tax revenue by explicitly capturing the institutional features of decision making in the econometric modeling. The results show that exchange rate depreciation has had pass through effects to the domestic market price of imports which reduces trade tax revenue to GDP ratio in the long run, though it increases trade tax revenue in the short term. There are also seasonal patterns in the short term trade tax payment. The results point to some scope to harness the benefits associated with trade policy reform without having to worry a lot about its effects on trade (and overall) tax revenue. In fact, it would be possible to realise modest increases in trade tax revenue if the exemption regime were to be reviewed and if there was capacity to contain the disruptive impact of sharp exchange rate depreciations.     

International trade and domestic distortions

When full competition prevails in product, labor, and capital markets, positive or negative external trade shocks may be accommodated by the migration of jobs between sectors; the negative impact on some households?? income of lower nominal wages will be more than offset by lower prices of imported final goods. Unemployment, if any, will be temporary, unless labor market rigidities prevent the necessary adjustment. By contrast, we argue that trade shocks trigger a process of creative destruction that necessarily causes distortions in the structure of productive capacity and, hence, market disequilibria. Therefore, the structural change that follows trade shocks can no longer be analyzed within an equilibrium framework. The transition following a shock may be characterized by increasing imbalances, and create scope for policy intervention. The model presented in this paper, which focuses on the time dimension of production and market imbalances, allows us to clarify the debate.     

Electoral regime and trade policy

We study how trade protection varies with the electoral rules for legislative representation. In particular, we investigate different hypotheses about why trade policy differs between countries with legislatures elected by a plurality election rule in single member constituencies and legislatures elected by a proportional, or party-list, rule. Our results, which are in line with the existing literature, show that countries with list-PR systems tend to have lower trade barriers than countries with majoritarian systems. We expand on this literature by looking at the mechanisms through which this correlation can be explained. Our findings indicate that, contrary to existing theory, neither constituency size nor party strength are important when explaining this correlation. Country size does matter, but does not explain the whole of the correlation.     

China's foreign trade policy and world trade organization membership

This paper provides an overview of China's major economic reforms and how they impacted certain key domestic economic indicators such as income, production, employment, and prices. More importantly, the paper concentrates on China's foreign trade focusing on such issues as import and export policies, exchange rate controls, foreign investments, balance of payments, traded commodities, and major trading partners. China's chance of becoming a member of the World Trade Organization is also addressed.     

Trade policy and ecology

Trade sanctions on product exports are often used as measures for conservation of stocks of living resources. Two opposing approaches are investigated. The harvest approach argues that sanctions reduce the harvest, and thus protects the stock. It is shown that this does not consider the long run effects nor the effects of sanctions on the management system. The investment approach argues that increased price protects the stock, making the species a profitable investment. It is shown that this approach does not consider the asset effects of price changes, and that the sanctions usually increase the stock in an one species analysis. If the wildlife competes for land the conclusions may be different, but still sanctions usually works. If the manager has a joint management of several species, the stock effects of sanctions are ambiguous, depending on both the species interaction, and the profitability of the harvesting from each of them. In this case it is not possible to use intuitive reasoning, sanctions give distortions to all stocks simultaneously. The threat of extinction depends crucially on the unit cost in harvesting of depleted stocks. The paper concludes that trade policy is a too general measure for the management of living resources, and may implicate important economic distortions to the ecological system.This study is partially funded by the Research Council of Norway (Environment and Development). I thank Derek Clark, Tore Thonstad, Frode Steen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

技术性贸易壁垒——国际贸易的单项二极管

世界上许多国家,为了保护本国的生态环境、消费者权益和其他目的,在贸易中采取了各种各样的技术性措施,禁止或限制其他国家的某些产品进入本国市场。但是,发达国家和发展中国家对于这种政策工具的运用还存在巨大的差异。文章试就技术性贸易壁垒“南北”差异的表现形式及形成的原因进行讨论和研究。     

Trade policy and mixed enterprises

Abstract .  This paper demonstrates that the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal activities nor welfare if the government chooses optimal trade policy instruments. In the case of rivalry in the home market, the optimal import tariff is independent of the degree of state ownership, and the optimal production subsidy decreases with state ownership if the optimal tariff is positive. For the case of Cournot rivalry in a third market, the optimal export subsidy increases with state ownership, while in the case of Bertrand rivalry with differentiated products, the optimal export tax increases with state ownership.     

Export market correlation and strategic trade policy

In the traditional models of strategic trade policy pioneered by Brander and Spencer, exports of the domestic firm, engaged in a Cournot-Nash competition with the foreign firm in a neutral market, must be subsidized to maximize national welfare. We demonstrate that when the firms play the Cournot-Nash game in two stochastic and positively correlated markets, it may be optimal to tax exports to the more volatile market while subsidizing it in the other. The policy combination reduces the amplitude of aggregate profit and raises the utility of the risk-averse firm in a manner similar to the theory of portfolio choice. JEL Classification: F12, D18
Marchés d'exportation co-reliés et politique commerciale stratégique. Dans les modèles traditionnels de politique commerciale stratégique proposés par Brander et Spencer, les exportations de la firme nationale, qui est engagée dans une concurrence à la Cournot-Nash avec une firme étrangère dans un marché neutre, doit être subventionnée si l'on veut maximiser le niveau national de bien-être. On montre que, quand les entreprises jouent un jeu à la Cournot-Nash dans deux marchés d'exportation stochastiques et positivement co-reliés, il peut être optimal de taxer les exportations vers le marché le plus volatile et de subventionner les exportations vers l'autre marché. Cette combinaison de politiques réduit l'amplitude de variation des profits agrégés et augmente l'utilité de l'entreprise qui a une aversion au risque d'une manière qui ressemble à ce qui se passe dans la théorie des choix de portefeuilles.     

Inter-industry wage differentials and strategic trade policy

Recent studies suggest that inter-industry wage differentials exist which are neither caused by different endownments of the workers with human capital, nor by different working conditions, nor by institutional rigidities. Higher employment in high-wage sectors due to exports, therefore, raises welfare. According to empirical evidence presented here more likely than not net exports from sectors paying wage premia lead to some extra gains from trade (that cannot be explained by trade policy promoting primary sectors by high amounts of subsidies per employee) for the German economy. A case is made, however, against strategic trade policy in favour of these sectors pointing to uncertainty about the amount of the differentials, their international (dis)similarity, and their sources.

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Zusammenfassung Empirische Untersuchungen deuten darauf hin, daß auch in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Arbeitskräfte mit gleicher Humankapitalausstattung, die unter gleichen Arbeitsbedingungen in Unternehmen gleicher Größe in einer Region arbeiten, unterschiedlich entlohnt werden, wenn sie in unterschiedlichen Sektoren arbeiten. Bestehen solche Sektorlohndifferentiale, dann hat eine Ausweitung der Beschäftigung in Hochlohnsektoren positive Wohlfahrtseffekte. Es wird daher vielfach gefordert, diese primären Sektoren vor internationaler Konkurrenz zu schützen und sie durch Subventionen zu fördern. Die vorliegende Arbeit präsentiert empirische Evidenz dafür, daß die Bundesrepublik Deutschland Extra-Gewinne aus dem Außenhandel bezieht, weil zwischen der Netto-Exportquote und der Höhe des Sektorlohndifferentials ein positiver Zusammenhang besteht, ohne daß sich die Subventionspolitik an diesen Differentialen orientiert. Gegen eine gezielte Förderung der Hochlohnsektoren im Rahmen einer strategischen Handelspolitik werden dann drei Argumente vorgebracht, die mit Unsicherheiten über Höhe, internationale Ähnlichkeit und Ursachen der Differentiale zusammenhängen.

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Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of the international economists' group of the Verein für Socialpolitik at Hohenheim University in May 1991, at the Sixth Annual Congress of the European Economic Association in Cambridge in September 1991, and at the Universities of Hamburg and Bielefeld. I would like to thank participants at the discussions and four anonymous referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Environmental policy instruments and imperfectly competitive international trade

Policy makers, industrialists and environmentalists express concern that the imposition of tough environmental policies in some countries displaces production, and hence pollution, to countries which impose less tough environmental policies. Yet empirical studies of such impacts suggest they are small. However, these findings are derived from models in which international trade is modelled as being perfectly competitive. In this paper I model trade as imperfectly competitive with scope for strategic behavior by producers, in this case investment in capital. I show that the choice of environmental policy instrument can have a marked impact on the incentives for producers to act strategically, with environmental standards significantly reducing the incentives for strategic overinvestment relative to environmental taxes or no environmental policy at all. Whether welfare is higher using standards or taxes depends on whether producing countries are also significant consumers of the polluting product, and on whether all producing governments act to reduce emissions or only some subset of governments. To assess the quantitative significance of these theoretical results I conduct policy simulations on a calibrated model of the world fertilizer industry. These simulations show that the impact of environmental policy on strategic behaviour can be large.     

North-south trade: An impasse in policy formulation

The strains that exist in commercial relations between the industrialized world (the North) and the developing world (the South), can be attributed to the over-simplified analysis brought to the dialogue by spokespersons from both groups. Spokespeople for the North talk in terms of the desirability of free trade without any recognition of the costs of adjustment which sharp increases in imports inflict. Southern spokespeople take the northern rhetoric at face value and believe that political pressures which impede southern exports are simple evidence of northern greed and intransigeance. If short-run costs of adjustment were to be explicitly recognized by both parties, it would again be possible for the two blocs to conduct a positive dialogue which would recognize the mutual benefits which can be derived from co-operation.     

Cooperative R&D and strategic trade policy

Abstract.  In this paper three different cooperative R&D arrangements in a strategic trade policy model are examined. A policy game between two governments is analysed, where each government chooses a particular cooperative R&D policy in order to maximize national welfare. Allowing cooperation in R&D is also compared with the use of R&D subsidies. It is jointly optimal for both governments to allow their firms to participate in the same type of cooperative R&D, and allowing cooperation in R&D can be superior to the use of R&D subsidies. JEL Classification: F13, L24     

Unemployment and the welfare effects of trade policy

Abstract.  In this paper the welfare effects of tariffs and import quotas in the presence of involuntary unemployment are derived and compared. The framework used is the standard model of a competitive small open economy with many goods and factors. Optimum levels of the respective trade policy instruments are derived, as well as welfare increasing reform strategies. In all cases, the labour intensity of the import‐competing sectors turns out to be a crucial variable for deriving the welfare effects. JEL classification: F13, F16     

New trade theory versus old trade policy: a continuing enigma

This paper examines the theoretical and empirical grounds fortrade liberalisation. We note that many of the conventionalarguments relating to the static and dynamic gains from liberalisationare based on fragile theoretical grounds. We also show that,although new trade theory takes account of some of the complexitiesof international trade and although the analytical thrust ofmany models justifies intervention, such policy conclusionsare rejected even by those at the forefront of these theorieson the grounds of political economy arguments which do not standup to careful scrutiny. Finally, we show that arguments favouringtrade liberalisation are not supported by existing empiricalresearch, which generally fails to capture the complex and ambiguouseffects of liberalisation and openness.     

Trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies

Trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies are analyzed in a duopoly model of trade and vertical product differentiation. We first show that the incidence of trade liberalization is sensitive to whether firms in transition economies are producers of low or high quality. Second, we find that neither free trade nor the absence of a domestic subsidy are optimal: Both a tariff and a subsidy increase price competition and while the former extracts foreign rents the latter results in quality upgrading. Third, there exists a rationale for a government to commit to a socially optimal policy to induce quality leadership by the domestic firm when cost asymmetries are low. Finally, we establish an equivalence result between the effects of long-run exchange rate changes and those of trade policy on price competition (but not on social welfare).     

Urban unemployment and optimal trade policy in a cash-in-advance economy

This paper examines the welfare effects of commercial and tax/subsidy policies on a developing economy with sectoral unemployment and differential cash-in-advance constraints. The optimal tariff can be negative when the cash-in-advance requirement for buying the importable good is larger than that for the exportable good. In addition, when capital is sectorally mobile, production taxes are superior to production subsidies to the importable sector. Nevertheless, to reach the first-best optimum, a uniform wage subsidy to both sectors is required.     

A dynamic model of endogenous trade policy

Empirical evidence suggests that past levels of protection are significant determinants of current levels of protection. We investigate dynamic interactions among interest groups and resulting endogenous links between current and future trade policies. We explore these intertemporal links in a small open economy in which lobbying and tariff policies are the outcome of a dynamic game among factor owners. The model can generate cycles with prolonged periods of free trade and/or prolonged periods of restricted trade (i.e., persistent trade policies). An interesting aspect of the environment is the role of lobbying as a partial substitute for intertemporal trade. JEL Classification: F13, C73
Un modèle dynamique de politique commerciale endogène. Les résultats d'analyses empiriques montrent que les niveaux passés de protection sont des facteurs importants dans l'explication des niveaux de protection actuels. Ce mémoire analyse les interactions dynamiques entre groupes d'intérêt et les liens endogènes qui en résultent entre les politiques commerciales présentes et futures. On explore ces liens intertemporels dans une petite économie ouverte où lobbying et politiques tarifaires sont le résultat d'un jeu dynamique entre les propriétaires des facteurs de production. Le modèle peut engendrer des cycles où on observe des périodes prolongées de libre commerce et/ou des périodes prolongées de commerce restreint (i.e. des politiques commerciales persistantes). Il appert que le rôle du lobbying est un substitut partiel pour le commerce intertemporel.     

Trade creation and trade diversion in the Canada – United States Free Trade Agreement

In this paper the changes in trade patterns introduced by the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement are examined. Variation in the extent of tariff liberalization under the agreement is used to identify the impact of tariff liberalization on the growth of trade both with member countries and non-member countries. Data at the commodity level are used, and the results indicate that the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement had substantial trade creation effects, with little evidence of trade diversion. JEL Classification: F13, F14
Création de commerce et diversion de commerce dans l'Accord de libre-échange Canada-U.S. Ce mémoire examine les changements dans les patterns de commerce international engendrés par l'Accord de libre-échange entre la Canada et les Etats-Unis. La variation dans l'intensité de libéralisation tarifaire selon les secteurs dans l'Accord est utilisée pour identifier l'impact de la libéralisation tarifaire sur la croissance du commerce à la fois entre les pays membres et avec les pays non-membres. A l'aide de données par produits, on montre que l'Accord a eu des effets substantiels de création de commerce mais qu'il n'y a pas lieu de croire qu'il y a eu beaucoup de diversion de commerce.     

Optimal trade policy in tariff games with inside money

We construct a bilateral trade model incorporating two physical goods and a financial asset (inside money) to discuss the optimal trade policy that countries would choose to maximize their respective utilities. In this Nash tariff game, the trade of physical commodities only occurs geographically across countries, and the trade of inside money allows for intertemporal allocation of consumptions. When the preferences, present and future endowments for each country are given, according to our numerical analysis, trade surplus or deficit (inside money) and optimal tariff rates are endogenously determined when general equilibrium conditions hold. One country may purchase inside money to shift current consumption to the future, and the other may be willing to issue inside money for smoothing its consumptions in two periods. This imbalance trade contradicts traditional trade models which imply a balanced trade policy. We further find that the price of inside money as an implied interest rate also is determined by the trade intervention policies.     

Industrial targeting in free trade areas with policy independence

Abstract.  We investigate the limits of a mechanism for free trade area (FTA) formation that simultaneously satisfies internal industrialization targets. For arbitrary targets, we find necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee that the mechanism is efficient for member countries individually, even if other members do not implement the efficient policy. When the objective is conservative – designed to protect the level of industrialization previously achieved by the target industry – member countries are guaranteed gains from the efficient policy and their FTA participation. The analysis covers cases with transportation costs and explains why minimally restrictive rules of origin support efficiency and policy independence.