Political stability and growth: An application of dynamic GMM and quantile regression

This paper studies the effect of political stability on economic growth by taking 120 developing countries over the period of 1996–2014. We apply relatively advanced dynamic two step system-GMM and quantile regression. Political stability is found to be a key determinant of economic growth. More importantly, political instability (or risk) is found to be higher in the OIC countries and is a deterrent to economic growth. Also, for the lower and middle income OIC countries, political instability appears to affect economic growth more severely perhaps due to the absence of strong economic and political institutions. Moreover, political instability is also found to be significantly higher in the oil-dependent OIC countries. Notably, political instability is likely to affect growth through the channels of investment and human capital accumulation in the developing countries. Finally, the impact of political stability and political instability on growth is found to be equally distributed across the OIC countries with higher or lower growth level. Therefore, the development of political and economic institutions along with human capital development is recommended for all the developing countries in general and the OIC countries in particular.     

Central bank independence,inflation and political instability in developing countries

We test whether political instability affects central bank independence in developing countries. Both a legal measure and the turnover tate of central bank governors are used as proxies for central bank independence and the frequency of government transfers is used to proxy political instability. Only the number of coups affects the turnover rate of central bank governors. We also find that both the turnover rate of central bank governors and political instability affect the rate of inflation.     

The political economy of seigniorage

While most economists agree that seigniorage is one way governments finance deficits, there is less agreement about the political, institutional and economic reasons for relying on it. This paper investigates the main political and institutional determinants of seigniorage using panel data on about 100 countries, for the period 1960–1999. Estimates show that greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage, especially in developing, less democratic and socially-polarized countries, with high inflation, low access to domestic and external debt financing and with higher turnover of central bank presidents. One important policy implication of this study is the need to develop institutions conducive to greater political stability as a means to reduce the reliance on seigniorage financing of public deficits.     

Political,Institutional, and Economic Factors Underlying Deficit Volatility

It is well known that fiscal policy can counter‐cyclically smooth out the effect of unexpected shocks and public deficit volatility may reflect the (optimal) policy response to them. However, the welfare losses associated to fiscal instability are also an important challenge for many countries, as it typically implies an inefficient allocation of resources, higher sovereign risk premium and an inadequate provision of public services. In this paper, we empirically analyze the political, institutional, and economic sources of public deficit volatility. Using the system‐generalized method‐of‐moments (GMM) estimator for linear dynamic panel data models and a sample of 125 countries analyzed from 1980 to 2006, we show that higher public deficit volatility is typically associated with higher levels of political instability and less democracy. In addition, public deficit volatility tends to be magnified for small countries, in the outcome of hyper‐inflation episodes and for countries with a high degree of openness.     

Competing models of international lending activity

Four competing models of the World Bank's lending to developing countries are constructed and econometrically estimated by pooled time series and cross-section data. The analysis suggests that a model combining economic and political determinants performs best. Besides per capita income, inflation, balance of payment and budget deficit, external debt and past growth, political determinants such as the ‘capitalist’ climate or political instability are also important, as well as a recipient country's former status as a colony or dominion. This politico-economic-model is successfully used to forecast the distribution of IBRD loans and IDA credits among the developing countries.     

The effects of elections on macroprudential policy

We provide evidence for a specific challenge in the design of macroprudential policy, namely political interference. Using panel data from 80 countries over the period of 1990–2016, we uncover the electoral cycles in macroprudential policy. We show that a loosening in macroprudential policy becomes more likely in the pre-election year, especially in countries with lower institutional quality. There is no evidence for the reversal of such actions in the post-election year. We also find that capital account openness, the history of macroprudential policy actions and inflation matter in determining the strength of electoral cycles in macroprudential policy, in addition to institutional quality. The electoral cycles are found to be stronger in countries that are financially less open, that relied less on macroprudential policy in the past, and that have lower inflation.     

Political instability and labour market institutions

This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and labour market institutions. We develop a theoretical model in which political instability creates incentives for a government to introduce labour market regulation in the economy. The distortionary effect of regulation on unemployment effectively puts a constraint on the design of fiscal and public policies. We empirically investigate these predictions using panel data for 21 OECD countries for the period 1985–2006. Our results are consistent with the view that political instability is associated with more regulated labour markets, lower labour taxation, and lower unemployment benefit replacement rates.     

Thy Neighbor's Curse: Regional Instability and Economic Growth

We show that regional instability, defined as politicalinstability in neighboring countries, has a strong negative effecton a country's economic performance. The magnitude of this negativeexternality is similar in size to that of an equivalent increasein domestic political instability. We also identify two mainchannels through which regional instability lowers economic performance.First, regional instability disrupts trade flows. The sharesof merchandise and manufactured trade are lower in countrieswith high regional instability. Second, regional instabilityleads to increased military outlays. Defense expenditures arehigher in countries with high regional instability. In contrast,the share of government expenditures allocated to education islower in countries with politically unstable neighbors. Our resultssuggest the existence of negative spillovers among politicallyunstable neighboring countries. These adverse regional influencesshould be taken into account when projecting the future economicperformance of countries. The evidence presented also suggeststhat the gains from reducing regional instability extend farbeyond the welfare of the country experiencing political unrest.Policies directed at settling current territorial disputes ina peaceful and orderly manner can have large beneficial effectsfor parties not directly involved in the conflict.     

Individualism and political instability

This paper examines the relationship between the individualism-collectivism dimension of culture and political instability using a dataset covering around 100 countries. To shed light on the causal effect of culture on political instability, the identification strategy exploits the variation in historical pathogen prevalence and the information provided by the genetic distance between countries. The results reveal that individualism has a negative and statistically significant impact on the degree of political instability, which means that this cultural trait contributes to making the political environment more stable. This finding is robust to the inclusion in the analysis of a substantial number of controls that may be correlated with both individualism and political instability, including other cultural dimensions. In fact, the relationship between individualism and political instability does not depend either on the specific measures used to quantify the level of individualism and political instability within the various countries or the estimation strategy adopted. The estimates also show that part of the observed effect of individualism is due to the impact of institutional quality, which acts as a transmission channel linking this cultural trait and political instability.     

Political instability and economic growth

This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950 through 1982. We define political instability as the propensity of a government collapse, and we estimate a model in which such a measure of political instability and economic growth are jointly determined. The main result of this paper is that in countries and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse, growth is significantly lower than otherwise. We also discuss the effects of different types of government changes on growth.     

Delays of Inflation Stabilizations

In some new political economic models, delays of stabilizations result from coordination problems caused by collective choice-making mechanisms. Although several previous studies have tested the effects of political instability and fragmentation on seigniorage, deficits, or inflation, no direct tests of the influence of these factors on the delays of stabilizations have previously been undertaken. This paper reports the results of such tests. The degree of fragmentation of the political system and the level of inflation are identified as important determinants of the timing of inflation stabilizations.     

Monetary and Fiscal Management, Finance, and Growth

This paper addresses three related aspects of monetary and fiscal management in Europe and elsewhere. First, I discuss the implications of economic integration for monetary and fiscal policy, especially the narrow focus on low inflation as the main objective of monetary policy. I argue that because inflation springs from several sources, monetary authorities held responsible by law for maintaining low inflation need to exercise their newfound independence by reserving the right to address all sources of inflation. In this context, I also ponder the question as to whether the increased independence of fiscal policy from short-term political interference would be desirable. Second, I present new empirical evidence of the relationship between inflation, finance, and economic growth across countries, arguing that long-run growth considerations provide an important additional justification for why price stability ought to remain a priority of independent policy makers. Third, I review some further aspects of the relationship between fiscal policy and economic growth, emphasizing the traditional three-pronged role of fiscal management: stabilization, allocation, and distribution, all of which can be conducive to growth. The argument leads to the conclusion that only the stabilization function of fiscal policy and, perhaps, some aspects of the allocation function as well could be usefully delegated in an attempt to immunize them from shortsighted and socially counter-productive political interference, but not the distribution function.     

How credible is inflation targeting in Asia? A quantile unit root perspective

This article examines the dynamic behavior of the inflation rate for eight Asian countries using a quantile unit root test. We advocate a three-way definition of inflation targeting based on perfect, imperfect and zero credibility and advance the analysis by incorporating a fully-fledged adoption of inflation targeting. In doing so, we offer new insights by showing that the credibility of inflation targeting and the alternative monetary policy frameworks in Asia are imperfect, except for Malaysia and South Korea under a fully-fledged adoption of inflation targeting. In contrast to past studies that focus on the mean-reversion in inflation rates, we also consider trend-reversion and find that Asian inflation targeting countries have been building up their monetary policy credibility more than the non- inflation targeting countries in terms of a faster rate of decline in inflation rate changes. Our results generally indicate the presence of mean reversion at the lower quantiles only. Where stationarity is present, we find evidence of a varied speed of adjustment process across the quantiles. Finally, we determine the threshold levels whereby inflation becomes stationary and demonstrate that Asian inflation rates generally display stationary behavior during periods of inflation declining or slowing down.     

Determinants of the sacrifice ratio: Evidence from OECD and non-OECD countries

This paper measures sacrifice ratios for all countries in the world over an approximately forty year time period, in addition to exploring the determinants of worldwide sacrifice ratios. We test the most commonly-cited determinants: the speed of disinflation, openness, inflation targeting, central bank independence, and political factors for both OECD and non-OECD countries. We find that the speed of disinflation is the most important determinant of OECD sacrifice ratios, but puzzlingly has no effect on non-OECD nations' disinflation costs. Instead we find evidence that greater central bank independence and more openness are associated with lower non-OECD sacrifice ratios. We also find that the ratio of government debt to GDP – a variable that is not important when it comes to OECD countries – is highly significant for non-OECD economies. Specifically, we find that higher indebtedness is associated with lower sacrifice ratios in non-OECD nations, suggesting that greater levels of debt do not lead to higher expectations of inflation. Furthermore we find evidence that the negative impact of debt on non-OECD sacrifice ratios is being driven by middle income economies.     

Is inflation targeting credible in Asia? A panel GARCH approach

We examine the relationship between inflation targeting and the behavior of the level and volatility of inflation for eight Asian countries over the period 1987–2013. In contrast to existing studies that rely upon time series methods, we employ a novel panel GARCH model that accounts for heterogeneity and interdependence across countries. Our main contribution is to shed new light on the inflation targeting credibility hypothesis based on lower inflation and inflation volatility as well as on the correlation between unanticipated inflation shocks within a panel GARCH framework. We find strong evidence of a reduction in the level of inflation that operates from the impact of actual inflation targets in the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. We also find that the adoption of inflation targeting helped lower inflation volatility in the Philippines and South Korea. Overall, the results suggest that Asian inflation targeting regimes are more credible in terms of reducing the level of inflation than lowering inflation volatility. There is also evidence that the covariance of inflation shocks among inflation targeting and non-targeting countries tends to increase.     

Political democratization, economic liberalization, and growth volatility

This study empirically investigates the effects of political and economic liberalization on growth volatility using a difference-in-difference method for a sample of 158 countries over the 1970-2005 period. The results show that, when examined separately, economic liberalization leads to a significant reduction in volatility while democratization is not followed by a decrease in growth volatility. For countries that undertake only one liberalization, opening up the economy to international trade reduces volatility in growth; becoming a democracy, on the other hand, seems to increase macroeconomic instability. For countries that implement both political and economic liberalizations, no statistically significant effect on volatility is detected. These results serve to provide additional support for the policy recommendation that developing countries should liberalize their economy first and then consider political liberalization.     

Does political instability affect exchange rates in Arab Spring countries?

This article investigates the dynamic relationship between political instability and exchange rates in five Arab Spring countries over the period 1992Q1–2016Q4. We include macroeconomic fundamentals to identify the transmission channels through which political instability may affect exchange rates. Based on VAR and ARDL models, our results report that political instability is associated with a significant drop in the value of domestic currencies of these countries. Economic growth is found to be the key mechanism channel. We find also that the dependence between variables is more emphasized in the short run than in the long run.     

Non-linearity in the inflation–growth relationship in developing economies: Evidence from a semiparametric panel model

Using data on developing economies, we estimate a flexible semiparametric panel data model that incorporates potentially nonlinear effects of inflation on economic growth. We find that inflation is associated with significantly lower growth only after it reaches about 12 percent, which is notably lower than the comparable estimate obtained from a threshold model. Our results also suggest that models with restrictive functional form assumptions tend to underestimate marginal effects of inflation on economic growth. We also document significant variation in the effect of inflation on growth across countries and over time.     

Inflation, Inflation Variability, and Corruption

We present a model where agents can inflate the cost of goods needed to start an investment project and inflation variability increases monitoring costs. We show that inflation variability can lead to higher corruption and lower investment. We document a positive relationship between corruption and inflation variability in a sample of 75 countries. The effect is robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects, other controls, and 2SLS estimation. The results are economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in inflation variance from the median increases corruption by 12 percent of a standard deviation and reduces growth by 0.33 percentage points. Our paper highlights a new channel through which inflation reduces investment and growth, thus bridging the perception gap over the costs of inflation between economists and the public. We also find evidence that political competition reduces corruption and that corruption is pro-cyclical.     

The non‐monotonic relationship between seigniorage and inequality

Abstract. We present an analysis of how political factors may come into play in the equilibrium determination of inflation. We employ a standard overlapping generations model with heterogenous young‐age endowments, and a government that funds an exogenous spending via a combination of non‐distortionary income taxes and the inflation tax. Agents have access to two stores of value: fiat money and an inflation‐shielded, yet costly, asset. The model predicts that the relationship between elected reliance on the inflation tax (for revenue) and income inequality may be non‐monotonic. We find robust empirical backing for this hypothesis from a cross‐section of countries. JEL classification: E5, P16