ARE COGNITIVE SKILLS RELEVANT IN GENDER EARNINGS DECOMPOSITIONS?

While cognitive skills are known to play an important role in labour market success, empirical evidence is mainly concentrated in its effect on returns to schooling. Evidence on the role of cognitive skills in gender earnings gap decompositions is virtually absent. I use two approaches to investigate the potential for cognitive skills to affect the size and pattern of the unexplained component of the earnings gap (‘relative discrimination’) across the wage distribution, using data from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS). It has been shown that when the raw cognitive score is used to control for cognitive skills, the return to schooling cognitive skills is generally underestimated. Once a distinction is made about the origins of cognitive skills (acquired in school versus outside the school), the returns to cognitive skills can vary depending on their origin. I find that using the raw score to control for cognitive skills does not result in any significantly different estimates of the unexplained component of the gap compared to when cognitive skills are not controlled for. However, once cognitive skills by origin of skill are used in place of total cognitive skills, the results change substantially for three of the five countries examined.     

Low level equilibrium trap,unemployment, efficiency of education system,child labour and human capital formation

This paper builds an overlapping generations household economy model to examine the impact of adult unemployment on the human capital formation of a child and on child labour, as viewed through the lens of the adult’s expectations of future employability. The model indicates that the higher the adult unemployment rate in the skilled sector, the lesser is the time allocated by an unskilled adult towards schooling of her child. We also find that an increase in the unskilled adult’s wage may or may not decrease child labour in the presence of unemployment. The model predicts that an increase in child wage increases schooling and human capital growth rate only if the adults in the unskilled sector earn less than subsistence consumption expenditure. As the responsiveness of skilled wage to human capital increases, schooling and human capital growth rates increase. The model dynamics bring out the importance of education efficiency and parental human capital in human capital formation of the child. In the case of an inefficient education system, generations will be trapped into low level equilibrium. Only in the presence of an efficient education system, steady growth of human capital is possible. Suitable policies that may be framed to escape the child labour trap are discussed as well.     

Revisiting human capital and aggregate income differences

We revisit human capital and development accounting. In quantifying human capital, we split it into three components; schooling (years of education), cognitive skills (as proxied by test score results), and a health indicator (for which adult survival rates are used). Our calculations are reported for a substantive cross-section of countries for the year 2000. According to our most conservative estimates, the most complete measure of human capital accounts for 19–28% of differences in output per worker across countries, but when excluding the health component this value falls to 17–22%, and further to 13–14% when only considering schooling. We present group comparisons, finding for some regions values as large as 40–50%.     

Low-Wage Youth Employment: A Permanent or Transitory State?*

One of the striking features of the youth wage distribution in the extent to which an individual's relative position in the distribution changes between contiguous years. Formal modelling of these changes using a bivatiate probit model suggests that low-wage employment should not, in general be viewed as a permanent state. Individuals in low-wage jobs in adjacent years are characteried by u lack of human capital Accordingly. remedical action might be directed towards augmenting their skills through supplementary schooling or labour market training.     

Globalisation Can Help Reduce Child Labour

Whether globalisation is good or bad for child labour dependson initial conditions and domestic policies. In countries withcomparatively large endowments of educated workers, pullingdown trade barriers is a policy that, together with measuresaimed at relaxing the household liquidity constraint, wouldhelp reduce child labour. By contrast, in countries with a largelyuneducated workforce, pulling down trade barriers may make theproblem worse. In such countries, the objective of policy shouldbe to raise the private return to education by reducing theprivate cost of schooling, and raising life expectancy. (JELD13, F12, I20, J13, J24, O15)     

Investment credit and child labour

It is generally assumed that credit has a positive effect on children's schooling among poor households. This article shows that need not be the case when households obtain credit for investment purposes. In fact, investment loans may not have any effect on the likelihood of schooling for children who work in their family business. Our estimates confirm that this is the case; credit used to finance investments has no effect on the odds of schooling for employed children. This may be because investment loans increase children's labour productivity, which in turn increases the opportunity cost of schooling. The results of this study suggest that improving access to credit may not, by itself, constitute a solution to the problem of child labour in developing countries.     

Education, Work and Wages in the UK

Abstract. This paper is concerned with the relationship between education, wages and working behaviour. The work is partly motivated by the sharp distinction in the literature between the returns to education and the effect of wages on labour supply. Education is the investment that cumulates in the form of human capital while labour supply is the utilization rate of that stock. Yet, variation in education is usually the basis for identifying labour supply models – education is assumed to determine wages but not affect labour supply. Moreover, it is commonly assumed that the private rate of return to education can be found from the schooling coefficient in a log-wage equation. Yet, the costs of education are largely independent of its subsequent utilization but the benefits will be higher the greater the utilization rate. Thus the returns will depend on how intensively that capital is utilized and we would expect that those who intend to work least to also invest least in human capital. Indeed, the net (of tax liabilities and welfare entitlements) return to education will be a complex function of labour supply and budget constraint considerations.
Here we attempt to model the relationship between wages, work, education and the tax/welfare system allowing for the endogeneity of education as well for the correlations between the unobservable components of wages and working behaviour. We use the estimates to simulate the effect of a new UK policy designed to increase education for children from low-income households.     

What is behind low wages in central and eastern Europe?

This paper compares wages across Europe in relation to the characteristics of workers and firms, with a particular focus on wage levels in central and eastern European countries. Worker and workplace endowments can be taken as a proxy for labour productivity. We estimate the extent to which wage differences observed at an aggregate level can be related to the different compositions of workforces and workplaces, as well as the types of jobs conducted in separate countries. We also decompose the observed differences in returns on endowments by identifying the sectors and occupational categories that contribute most to the wage gaps observed at the aggregate level. The wage gaps in low-wage countries actually appear larger once differences in worker, work and workplace characteristics are controlled for. In contrast, the differences in wages between high-wage countries diminish when we control for these endowments. The wage gap between East and West thus seems to be explained by a much lower return on skills and other characteristics rather than by differences in the composition of workforces and firms. Sectoral and occupational analysis suggests that central and eastern European countries have developed a generalised low-cost and low-wage model, with relative returns particularly low on higher skills. There is much less wage disparity across European countries in more labour intensive and lower-paid services sectors, such as accommodation and food service activities. The magnitude of the wage gap seems to be driven by the relative position of sectors and occupations in high-wage countries.     

Growth effects of structural reforms in Southern Europe: the case of Greece,Italy, Spain and Portugal

This paper develops a semi-endogenous growth model for analysing the intertemporal effects of structural reforms in Southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece). The model follows the product-variety paradigm in a semi-endogenous setting, and includes a disaggregation of labour into different skill groups. We use a comprehensive set of structural indicators in order to calibrate the model to important macroeconomic ratios and levels of productivity and employment. Our results show that structural reforms yield significant economic gains in the medium and long run. The results point to the importance of product market reforms and labour market related education and tax reforms as the most promising areas of structural policy interventions. This paper also argues for placing more emphasis on education policy which is key in upgrading the labour force, especially in these countries where the share of low skilled labour is among the highest in the euro area.     

Looking for the workforce: the elderly,discouraged workers,minorities, and students in the Baltic labour markets

This paper looks at the evolution of the labour markets in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania since the beginning of transition until 2003, with a particular focus on labour force participation. How did labour supply in the Baltic countries respond to changes in minimum wages, unemployment benefits and retirement regulation? Do the marked differences in labour market policies between the countries result in different patterns of participation? What are the obstacles to and driving forces of participation? We find that relative contribution of participation and demographic trends to the dynamics of the labour force varied substantially both over the years and across the three countries. Participation, in turn, has been shaped by sometimes complicated interactions between schooling decisions of the youth, retirement, policy changes, and external shocks. Resulting differences in trends and patterns are quite substantial, indicating that there is a room for increasing participation in each of the countries. Panel data analysis of determinants of participation and discouragement based on labour force survey data suggests that increasing after-tax real minimum wage has significant positive effects on participation and reduces discouragement in Lithuania. In Estonia, by contrast, a positive effect of minimum wage on participation is found only for teenagers of both genders and for young males. We do not find any evidence that partner’s wage has a negative effect on participation. Ethnic minorities, especially females, in all three Baltic countries are less likely to be in the labour force, other things equal.     

Adaptability, productivity, and educational incentives in a matching model

We study the connections between the labour market and the education sector in a matching framework with ex-post wage bargaining. Workers have multidimensional skills and the search market is segmented by technology. Education is a time-consuming activity and determines jointly the scope - or adaptability - and intensity - or productivity - of individual skills. We establish three main results. First, unemployment provides incentives to schooling by raising the need for adaptability. Second, private returns to productivity are below social returns, but no hold-up phenomenon is involved. Third, due to wage and congestion externalities, private returns to adaptability exceed social returns. As a consequence, both over- and under-education may take place in equilibrium.     

Three levels of education and the economic growth

The aim of this article is to solve the question how the three main stages of education contribute to the labour productivity growth in selected 125 countries in the period 1999–2014. The model is based on the neoclassical production function enhanced with human capital. The authors draw on the Penn World Tables 9.0 and UNESCO databases. The key benefit of this article is that human capital is characterized according to the returns to education from average number of years of formal schooling at the primary, secondary and tertiary level. Based on the panel data analysis, the contributions of capital and of the three levels of education to the growth of labour productivity are estimated. At the same time, the model allows to estimate the contribution of total factor productivity. The results of the analysis show that tertiary education has the strongest impact on labour productivity across the considered economies. At the same time, the breakdown of aggregate human capital by level of education leads to better clarification of the effects of human capital and physical capital on labour productivity. The conclusions also indicate a tendency towards rising returns to scale induced by the secondary and tertiary education.     

Wish you were here? Quasi-experimental evidence on the effect of education on self-reported attitude toward immigrants

We use European Social Survey and Labour Force Survey data from 2002 to 2012 to estimate the causal effect of years of education on European natives׳ opinion toward immigration, by exploiting the exogenous discontinuity generated by reforms in compulsory education in Europe in the 1940s through the 1990s. Our findings show that higher levels of education lead to a more positive reported attitude toward immigrants. We also investigate the mechanisms behind the effect of education on reported attitudes by evaluating both economic and non-economic channels. We find that higher levels of education place individuals in occupations that are less exposed to the negative effects of migration, although not in sectors/occupations where the share of migrants is necessarily smaller, suggesting that migrants and low-educated natives may be complementary rather than substitutes in the labour market. In addition, education alters values and the cognitive assessment of the role of immigration in host societies, with a positive effect on reported attitude toward diversity and on the assessment of immigration׳s role in host countries. Our findings suggest that education as a policy instrument can increase social cohesion in societies that are subject to large immigration flows.     

Introducing Time‐to‐Educate in a Job‐Search Model

Transition patterns from school to work differ considerably across OECD countries. Some countries exhibit high youth unemployment rates, which can be considered an indicator of the difficulty facing young people trying to integrate into the labour market. At the same time, education is a time‐consuming process, and enrolment and dropout decisions depend on expected duration of studies as well as on job prospects with and without completed degrees. One way to model entry into the labour market is by means of job‐search models, where the job arrival hazard is a key parameter in capturing the ease or difficulty in finding a job. Standard models of job search and education assume that skills can be upgraded instantaneously (and mostly in the form of on‐the‐job training) at a fixed cost. This paper models education as a time‐consuming process, a concept which we call time‐to‐educate, during which an individual faces the trade‐off between continuing education and taking up a job.     

Explaining educational attainment across countries and over time

Consider the following facts. In 1950, the richest countries attained an average of 8 years of schooling whereas the poorest countries 1.3 years, a large 6-fold difference. By 2005, the difference in schooling declined to 2-fold because schooling increased faster in poor than in rich countries. What explains educational attainment differences across countries and their evolution over time? We consider an otherwise standard model of schooling featuring non-homothetic preferences and a labor supply margin to assess the quantitative contribution of productivity and life expectancy in explaining educational attainment. A calibrated version of the model accounts for 90 percent of the difference in schooling levels in 1950 between rich and poor countries and 71 percent of the faster increase in schooling over time in poor relative to rich countries. These results suggest an alternative view of the determinants of low education in developing countries that is based on low productivity.     

The Decline of Schooling Productivity in OECD Countries

Based on Baumol's cost-disease model, we develop two alternative measures of the change in the productivity of schooling. Both productivity measures are based on changes in the relative price of schooling. We find that in most OECD countries the price of schooling has increased faster in 1970–94 than would be compatible with constant schooling productivity. In addition, we show that the average performance of pupils has remained constant at best in most OECD countries. Our results imply a larger decline in the productivity of schooling in many OECD countries than in the United States.     

Growth and human capital: good data,good results

We present a new data set for years of schooling across countries for the 1960–2000 period. The series are constructed from the OECD database on educational attainment and from surveys published by UNESCO. Two features that improve the quality of our data with respect to other series, particularly for series in first-differences, are the use of surveys based on uniform classification systems of education over time, and an intensified use of information by age groups. As a result of the improvement in quality, these new series can be used as a direct substitute for Barro and Lee’s (2001; Oxford Economic Papers, 3, 541–563) data in empirical research. In standard cross-country growth regressions we find that our series yield significant coefficients for schooling. In panel data estimates our series are also significant even when the regressions account for the accumulation of physical capital. Moreover, the estimated macro return is consistent with those reported in labour studies. These results differ from the typical findings of the earlier literature and are a consequence of the reduction in measurement error in the series.      

Labour market institutions and labour market performance

This paper studies the relationship between labour market institutions and policies and labour market performance using a new and unique dataset that covers the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which in the last two decades experienced radical economic and institutional transformations. We document a clear trend towards liberalization of labour markets, especially in the countries of the former Soviet Union, but also substantial differences across the countries studied. Our econometric analysis implies that institutions matter for labour market outcomes, and that deregulation of labour markets improves their performance. The analysis also suggests several significant interactions between different institutions, which are in line with the idea of beneficial effects of reform complementarity and broad reform packages.     

Some institutional design for shareholder socialism

Abstract

In times of a declining labour share and an intense international tax competition, some form of market socialism may contribute to hold income inequality in check. However, the concept of market socialism involves three major pitfalls: cronyism, technological stagnation, and power concentration. These pitfalls could be avoided by an appropriate institutional design that includes the combination of public ownership with an extensive use of the stock market, an incentive-compatible mechanism for the takeover of private firms, and participatory democracy.     

The democratic transition

Over the last two centuries, many countries experienced regime transitions toward democracy. We document this democratic transition over a long time horizon. We use historical time series of income, education and democracy levels from 1870 to 2000 to explore the economic factors associated with rising levels of democracy. We find that primary schooling, and to a weaker extent per capita income levels, are strong determinants of the quality of political institutions. We find little evidence of causality running the other way, from democracy to income or education.