Insider and Outsider Strategies of Influence: The BRICS’ Dualistic Approach Towards Informal Institutions

ABSTRACT

The challenge of ‘emerging’ countries in the 21st century has been conducted in a much more peaceful manner than in past eras when power transitions were most commonly accompanied by war. The hallmark of this peaceful transition has been the elevation of the G20, a forum in which established and emerging powers jointly deal with global economic issues and which – despite or precisely because of its informal character – has become the prime forum for global economic governance. Significantly, however, this new openness and flexibility of the international system and its increasing informalism have not only provided an avenue for emerging powers to be integrated into the inner circle of global economic governance, but have also allowed them to set up alternative institutions. By forming their own exclusive BRICS group in parallel to their membership in the G20, emerging powers have pursued a dualistic strategy that allows them to be simultaneously institutional ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. The article focuses on this seemingly ambiguous international behaviour and explains why the BRICS have opted for this dualistic approach. Far from being socialised into the established system, the oppositional psychology of the past has not disappeared completely.     

China in Global Economic Governance

China has made contradictory claims about its attitude toward the existing international order. Is China a “responsible stakeholder” in the existing international regimes? Or has China been a new type of great power seeking to reform the existing world order, making it more friendly toward the global South? In this article, we look beyond Chinese rhetoric and examine China's behavior in global economic governance. A comparison with other emerging powers and traditional major powers shows that China has been actively involved in global economic governance. But, thus far, China has not exercised substantive leadership nor has it pushed hard for change to benefit the developing countries. The level of its support of the current regimes varies across issue areas and is primarily driven by its changing economic interest.     

From Receding to Reseeding: Industrial Policy,Governance Strategies and Neoliberal Resilience in Post-crisis Britain

ABSTRACT

Industrial policy has been on the agenda of British policy elites since the 2008 financial crisis, particularly since Theresa May became Prime Minister in 2016. This has been seen as a challenge to pre-crisis norms of economic governance associated with neoliberalism. This article explores key aspects of industrial policy development in post-crisis Britain – new forms of vertical support for industry, local government reform, and the public financing of private sector R&D – in order to sketch a new understanding of political and ideological change. It focuses on the institutional mechanisms through which industrial strategy will ostensibly be implemented, including subnational and private spheres of governance. The article argues that recent industrial policy developments do not represent the receding of neoliberalism, but rather have provided opportunities for the reseeding of neoliberal norms in British economic statecraft. The strategy has reinforced forms of state machinery through which pre-crisis elite practice can be maintained and legitimated. By demonstrating that the apparent revival of state intervention in the wake of capitalist crises must not be assumed automatically to challenge pre-crisis economic orders, and highlighting the crucial role of exigent political circumstances, the article makes an important contribution to the literature on neoliberal resilience.     

The Shape of ‘Rising Powers’ to Come? The Antinomies of Growth and Neoliberal Development in Turkey

ABSTRACT

The short-term GDP growth-based economic success of the BRICS has spawned a trend of grouping large emerging market economies under shared monikers. The proliferation of a wide array of labels – from MINTs to VISTAs – within political and financial circles has been accompanied by a growing scholarly interest in the study of these ‘emerging markets’ and future ‘rising powers’. This paper discusses the literature on Turkey’s ‘rising power’ status to problematise the conceptual and analytical parameters that shape these wider debates. Accordingly, I argue that the established parameters are wholly based in, and in turn reproduce, a neoliberal conception of development which prioritises a narrowly construed metric of economic progress based on GDP growth, while simultaneously ignoring the associated socio-economic and environmental costs. The paper interrogates the ways in which select macroeconomic indicators have been deployed to legitimise neoliberal reform in Turkey and utilises this case study to mount a methodological challenge to the relevant IR/IPE literatures that conceptualise ‘emerging markets’ and ‘rising powers’ from growth-oriented perspectives.     

New Protagonists in Global Economic Governance: Brazilian Agribusiness at the WTO

The existing international economic order has been heavily shaped by US power and the US has been a key driver of globalisation and neoliberal economic restructuring, prompting speculation about whether the rise of new developing country powers could rupture the current trajectory of neoliberal globalisation. This paper analyses the case of Brazil at the World Trade Organization (WTO), a core institution in global economic governance. In the last decade, Brazil successfully waged two landmark trade disputes against the US and EU and created a coalition of developing countries – the G20 – which brought an end to the dominance of the US and EU at the WTO and made their trade policies a central target of the Doha Round. Brazil's activism has been widely hailed as a major victory for developing countries. However, I argue that rather than challenging the neoliberal agenda of the WTO, Brazil has emerged as one of the most vocal advocates of free market globalisation and the push to expand and liberalise global markets. I show that Brazil's stance has been driven by the rise of its export-oriented agribusiness sector. This case demonstrates that business actors from the Global South are becoming significant new protagonists in global economic governance; they are taking the tools created by the states and corporations of the Global North – in this case, the WTO and its neoliberal discourse – and turning them against their originators. At the same time, their interests are being wrapped in and advanced through a discourse of development and social justice and a strategic mobilisation of the politics of the North-South divide.     

Market Power and Marketisation: Japan and China's Impact on the Iron Ore Market, 50 Years Apart

ABSTRACT

How can we explain the marketisation of the iron ore market following the emergence of China, whereas the same market had seen change in the opposite direction following the emergence of Japan, 50 years earlier? I argue that relative coordination capacity – or relative market power – between domestic and international stakeholders explains market change at the global level. Via the study of Japan and China's impact on the iron ore pricing and shipping regimes, I show that China's rise led to the marketisation (liberalisation and financialisation) of the iron ore market pricing regime, and the demarketisation of the shipping regime, whereas Japan's rise led to demarketisation in both cases. This article's argument illustrates that China's impact is not equal across markets, contrary to characterisations of China as either a revisionist or status quo power. Second, it argues that China has caused the marketisation of the iron ore pricing regime, which is contrary to expectations on both sides of the debate on China's rise: China was unable to dictate outcomes via a strong state, nor did it seamlessly integrate the global economy. Third, it illustrates the importance of resonance dynamics at the interface of domestic and global market institutions.     

Teaming Up? China,India and Brazil and the Issue of Benefit-Sharing from Genetic Resource Use

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on an area that has not been systematically addressed but is of crucial importance to China, India and Brazil: the global governance of genetic resources. All three are biodiversity-rich and, ever since biotechnology promised to turn DNA into gold, have been significant players in the genetic-resources regime complex. Shortcomings notwithstanding, the establishment of a new access and benefit-sharing regime constitutes a rare instance where emerging countries have succeeded in becoming rule-makers of sorts. We analyse how these three countries have sought to pursue their interests in this area, especially after the extension of national sovereignty over previously ‘free’ genetic resources and the erection of a complex set of rules attempting to regulate access to and benefits from their utilisation from the early 1990s onwards. Despite presenting a generally unified front in international fora, their domestic implementation differs significantly and raises questions about the continuation of a common international position. The article adds to our understanding of emerging countries’ engagement with global governance by focusing on the concrete drivers and domestic processes that have motivated and shaped the agency of China, India and Brazil in this new policy regime.     

Nation Branding for Survival in North Korea: The Arirang Festival and Nuclear Weapons Tests

The article problematises a popular view in nation branding literature that equates nation branding with states’ attendant advertising campaigns. Instead, this article adopts a broader perspective that nation branding can also operate as a policy aimed at enhancing the sense of ontological security among states and as a practice to strengthen the position of the ruling regime by targeting particular audiences within a broader ‘strategic narrative’. From this perspective, this article aims to shed new light on non-liberal capitalist countries’ – specifically North Korea’s – attempts at nation branding policies in terms of various nation branding strategies. In so doing, Clifford Geertz’s anthropological concept of ‘theatre state’ is introduced as an important metaphor to broaden the existing understanding of nation branding by highlighting the unique characteristics of North Korea’s policies of nation branding and nation building. It is argued that great national spectacles such as the Arirang Festival and military demonstrations provide North Korea with a useful platform for participating in the identity competition among other nation states, as well as in the fierce recognition game against the rest of the Korean national community. Obviously, these strategic performances have contributed to communicating with the outside world, deliberately seeking more respect from others, but have simultaneously operated as nation building processes. Therefore, this work concludes that such staged events are sophisticatedly designed to enhance North Korea’s complex interest of nation branding, and, more importantly, argues that techniques and practices of nation branding are neither historically new nor confined to Western liberal capitalist regimes.     

The Role of Southern Intellectuals in Contemporary Trade Governance

This paper identifies the emergence of a new set of trade intellectuals from the global South, primarily from the rising powers. It argues that this group of ‘Southern trade intellectuals’ has formed a loose epistemic community, and traces the impact the group is having on global trade governance. The subject examined differs from most other uses of the epistemic community framework in that it analyses a case in which there is no objective, scientific knowledge being promoted by the group. Instead, the group is engaged in promoting one subjective understanding of events over another. However, the emergence of this epistemic community has been important in providing an alternative trade narrative that has weakened the dominance previously enjoyed by the Western powers over trade analysis. This broadening of the range of trade analysis and expert opinion forms an important, though potentially problematic, area of leadership provided by the rising powers to less developed countries.     

New Powers and the Distribution of Preferences in Global Trade Governance: From Deadlock and Drift to Fragmentation

ABSTRACT

Existing theories make divergent predictions about the impact of new powers on the global political economy. Some argue that a more even distribution of power will erode international cooperation, while others argue that cooperation can continue with the help of international institutions to overcome collective action problems. We argue that this debate overlooks a critical determinant of the shape of power transitions: the distribution of preferences amongst the major powers. It is primarily in the context of divergent preferences that power transitions are likely to give rise to conflict. Moreover, even where preferences diverge, the gains of cooperation provide a strong incentive to continue to pursue goals through multilateralism. This situation leads to forms of institutional change unanticipated by established theories. These include deadlock in expansive multilateral fora, institutional drift as old rules cannot keep up with the changing political and economic context, and fragmentation as countries seek minilateral solutions that reduce preference diversity. We develop this preference-based, institutional argument by examining the distribution of preferences and institutional change at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Doha Round, where the power transition is relatively advanced.