浅议中国党内民主建设的几种途径

党内民主是党的生命,发展党内民主,充分发挥广大党员和各级党组织的积极性、主动性、创造性,是党的事业兴旺发达的重要保证。从六个方面系统地阐述了发展党内民主的基本途径：坚持民主集中制;切实保障党员民主权利;健全党委内部的议事和决策机制;切实完善党的代表大会制度和党的委员会制度;进一步扩大干部工作中的民主;建立健全党内监督机制。     

高校党内民主与党建科学化建设研究

高校党内民主的主体是高知群体,这使得高校党内民主建设具有一定的特殊性。完善高校党内民主制度,提高党建科学化水平就要完善党内权力授予程序、代表大会工作程序和党内决策程序,并注重制度建设的整体性。高校党内民主的最终目的是引导党员参与行使权利,充分发挥其党员主体作用。     

建立有效的党内监督机制

党内民主以及党内监督，是目前党建理论界比较关注的一个热点问题，许多学者从不同的角度提出有意义的观点，也提出了一些有创新精神的发展党内民主、加强党内监督的措施和方法。笔者认为，党内民主是党内监督的前提，党内监督是党内民主的保证。发展党内民主，建立有效的党内监督机制，是建立社会主义民主政治的题中应有之义。只有发展党内民主，加强党内监督，才能充分发挥广大党员和各级党组织的积极性、主动性和创造性，才能使党内监督持久有效。     

完善党代会制度与以党内民主促进党内监督

关于党内监督的论述,学者们已经论述颇丰,党内民主是党的生命,以党内民主促进党内监督是改革和完善现行党内监督机制体制的一种解析视角,党内民主体现在许多方面,关键是要发挥党员的主体地位,而党代会制度是党员发挥主体地位的有效载体,党代会常任制应该是党代会以后改革的方向,并对党代会改革的细节、过程加以探讨,以使的这一制度规范化、法制化,具有切实可操作性。     

浅议企业民主管理的利益机制

企业民主管理是现代企业制度之一。职工民主管理的好坏除了取决于对企业管理的参与度是否适当、参与形式是否合理外 ,还取于职工对参与企业管理是否有积极性和责任感。而这种积极性和责任感必须有利益机制来实现 ,目前这种利益机制主要有职工持股制度和按劳分红制度。文章就是从这两个方面阐述了激励职工参与民主管理的利益机制     

党内民主的含义及其规定性要求

党内民主是以民主集中制为基本原则,本着平等、参与、公开的精神而形成的一种无产阶级政党的组织制度。它的本质是要使全体党员成为党内事务的主人,实现党员在党内政治生活中的参与权、知情权和监督、批评权,实现党规党法所规定的党员的权利、义务和在纪律面前人人平等。其规定性要求有如下几个方面：平等的要求。列宁指出,民主意味着平等。这个意思同样适用于党内。在党内,党员是党内事务的主体,必须保证全体党员在政治上、纪律上和义务上的一律平等。党的领导人和党员只有职务的不同,即分工的不同,在党规党法面前,领导人与其他党…     

党员主体意识淡薄的原因分析及制度建议

党员主体意识的确立是党内民主实现的心理前提。目前，由于生产力发展水平不高、封建专制文化的束缚、苏共建党模式的影响、党内民主实践的滞后，以及长期以来我们对民主的宣传误导，许多党员主体意识淡薄，政治参与积极性不高。要真正实现党内民主，就必须加强党的制度建设，通过制度保障党员的权利，激发党员的主体意识，确立党员的主体地位。     

发展党内民主与提高党的执政能力

(一)发展党内民主是提高党的执政能力的必然要求。因为发展党内民主对于提高党的执政能力具有以下作用：一是示范作用。党内民主实际上是领导决策层民主的问题。领导决策层民主权利落实得如何,人民民主、基层民主就怎样发展。二是推动作用。随着党内民主政治建设的加强,党员群众参与干部选用工作的积极性和主动性越来越强,     

发展党内民主的六大途径

党内民主是党的生命,发展党内民主,最重要的最根本的是要完善党内民主制度。党内民主制度建设是永葆党的生机与活力的关键,是党的事业兴旺发达的重要保证。完善党内民主制度要着重健全党的代表大会制度、党的委员会全体会议制度、党的常委会的议事和决策制度、党内选举制度、党员民主权利的保障制度和党内监督制度。     

发展党内民主的六大途径

党内民主是党的生命,发展党内民主,最重要的最根本的是要完善党内民主制度.党内民主制度建设是永葆党的生机与活力的关键,是党的事业兴旺发达的重要保证.完善党内民主制度要着重健全党的代表大会制度、党的委员会全体会议制度、党的常委会的议事和决策制度、党内选举制度、党员民主权利的保障制度和党内监督制度.     

实现党内和谐的必备条件分析——学习毛泽东和谐思想的体会

建设社会主义和谐社会,首先需要实现党内和谐,以党内和谐的示范带动全社会的和谐。要实现党内和谐,需要具备相应的主客观条件。首先,党内在思想上必须统一;其次,党的各级组织必须具有凝聚力;第三,党内必须充分发扬民主;第四,党内必须严厉惩治腐败行为。     

British colonialism and democracy: Divergent inheritances and diminishing legacies

Did British colonial rule promote post-independence democracy? We provide evidence that the relationship follows a strong temporal pattern. Former British colonies were considerably more democratic than other countries immediately following independence, but subsequent democratic convergence has largely eliminated these differences in the post-Cold War period. Existing theories expounding superior British culture or alternative colonial institutions cannot account for divergent inheritances and diminishing legacies. To explain the time-varying pattern, we analyze European powers’ varying policy approaches to decolonization as well as changes in the international system. Britain more consistently treated competitive democratic elections as a prerequisite for gaining independence, leading to higher initial democracy levels. However, nascent democracies that lacked deep-rooted societal transformation faced challenges to democratic consolidation because of Cold War superpower competition. Later shifts in the international system toward promoting democracy further contributed to convergence by destabilizing colonially rooted dictatorships.     

Democracy and Education in twentieth‐century Latin America

Do democratic electoral systems strengthen a country's outcomes in education? Does the degree of inclusiveness of a democratic system matter? This article offers evidence that political competition and the inclusion of marginalized populations in electoral systems transformed education over an 80‐year period in Latin America. It finds that democracy has a positive effect on education enrollment and illustrates how current work on democracy and development has overlooked important democratic subcomponents, specifically, who votes and how. Our results deepen current work on democracy, operationalizing the impact of electoral expansion in comparative analysis and showing how democracies respond to specific education demands.     

民主制度的责任视角:一个基本模型

竞争性民主是现代民主制度的主要实现方式。政治竞争的一些内在特征,包括选民"选择"行为特点、信息不对称以及候选人事前承诺不可置信等问题常常导致无效竞争。保证民主选举中竞争有效运行的关键在于存在保证竞选人在当选后的任期中会努力实现自己承诺的责任机制,从而提高事前承诺的可置信程度。文章通过一个简单的正式模型展示了这一点,进而尝试从选举机制、评价机制与声誉机制等方面初步探讨构建审责机制的可能路径。     

Toward Subnational Democracies of Scale: Tensions between Democratic Legitimacy,Legality, and Effective Governance

Although democracy is often discussed as a universally applicable ideology, the liberal democratic state tends to assess democracy on the basis of government institutions. This paper argues that democratic institutionalism favours national governments and makes it difficult for subnational governments to expand their governance capacity and exercise additional powers. Greenland, Shetland, and Tresco (Isles of Scilly) serve as case studies of different subnational strategies for exercising greater governance capacity: 1) Actual adherence to democratic form (Greenland), 2) Symbolic adherence to democratic form (Shetland), and 3) Operating external to democratic form (Tresco). Despite the efforts of local governance actors, governance in these three island communities has proved problematic in terms of democratic legitimacy, legality, and/or effectiveness. It is argued that pressure toward the development of liberal democratic government institutions can in fact decrease the quality of subnational democracy. This requires a reassessment of definitions of democracy and authoritarianism. It is necessary to pursue place-specific and community-sensitive democracies of scale if we wish to democratically empower local communities.     

当前中国发展基层民主的途径探索

发展基层民主、保障人民享有更多更切实的民主权利是发展社会主义民主政治的基础性工程。改革开放以来,学者们就如何推进和发展基层民主的方法、途径和措施等方面进行了深入地研究,取得了一系列成果。在把握当前中国基层民主发展现状的基础上,进一步探索有效发展基层民主的途径,对于加强社会主义民主政治建设具有重要理论和实践意义。     

Democracy and Economic Growth: Optimal Level and Transmission Channels

After evening out all the benefits and costs, the overall optimal level of democracy is about 3.2, on a scale of 1 to 7. On average, fully dictatorial countries have a conditioned growth rate of –1.113 percent, fully democratic countries have a conditioned growth rate of 1.146 while countries with the optimal level of democracy/autocracy have a conditioned growth rate of 2.665. In the case of a fully dictatorial country, moving one unit towards democracy can raise the GDP growth rate by about 1.725 points; while for a fully democratic country, moving towards autocracy by one unit can raise the growth rate by about 0.885 points. This study provides useful information for many developing countries which are experiencing substantial pressures to restructure their political system.     

Democracy and climate change policies: Is history important?

This paper argues that it is countries' historical experience with democracy, the democratic capital stock, rather than current levels of democracy that determines current climate change policies. Empirical evidence using data starting as far back as year 1800 for 87 countries, which together are responsible for 93.7% of global carbon emissions, suggests that the democratic capital stock has an important and robust effect on climate change policies. A history of executive constraints is particularly important. The current level of democracy does not play a role once democratic capital has been accounted for.     

克服农村基层腐败现象,保障农民合法权益

近几年,随着改革开放的日益深入,尤其是城市化进程的加快,农村的大量土地被征用,基建项目也随之扩张,一方面农村拥有的资源日渐丰富,另一方面在农村基层组织管理上涌现出了不少新问题。特别是村干部腐败案件的不断发生,成为新农村建设中一个非常不和谐的音符,严重败坏了党在农村的形象,降低了广大人民群众对农村基层党员干部的信任度,因此必须高度重视农村的党风廉政建设问题,构建科学有效的村务管理机制,积极完善村级监督模式,推动农村民主政治建设。     

Democracy, Governance, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence

The paper examines how democracy affects long-run growth by influencing the quality of governance. Empirical evidence is first presented showing that measures of the quality of governance are substantially higher in more democratic countries. A general-equilibrium, endogenous growth model is then built to show how a governance-improving democracy raises growth. In this model, stronger democratic institutions influence governance by constraining the actions of corrupt officials. Reducing corruption, in turn, stimulates technological change and spurs economic growth. Empirical evidence is presented showing that democracy is in fact a significant determinant of total factor productivity (TFP) growth between 1960 and 1990 in a cross-section of countries. But this contribution occurs only insofar as stronger democratic institutions are associated with greater quality of governance.