Growth,fertility and human capital: A survey

This paper surveys recent work on endogenous fertility and endogenous growth. These models provide the building blocks for a theory of development. They are capable of explaining income and fertility differentials between rich and poor countries. They can produce switching behavior, countries that transform themselves from no growth economies into high growth economies. The fertility and growth effects of social security programs are also examined. Finally models with increasing returns to population are presented. They are capable of reproducing very long term relationships between human capital, fertility and economic growth.     

An econometric analysis of the effects of population change on economic growth: a study of Taiwan

This study used an econometric model, estimated from time series data, to evaluate the effects of demographic factors on the T aiwanese economy. The simulation results suggest that, in the short run, a stationary population produces significantly higher income per capita than rapid population growth; in the long run, however, rapid population growth produces a slightly higher income per capita. Under assumptions of very low fertility trends, the population size, equivalent adult consumers, and labor force can be expected to grow by no more than 50% in a century, whereas under the very high fertility trend assumptions, they would more than double. The reason that lower fertility populations produce a smaller gross domestic product per capita in the long run than the normal fertility population is that the negative effects of a slower growing labor force dominate the positive effects of a faster growing capital formation. In terms of the present values of annual income per capita, the slow growing population shows considerably better economic performance. Given the immediate economic advantages of lower fertility, it is important for developing countries with high birth rates to reduce fertility in order to produce higher per capita income effects and break out of poverty. It is considered of little importance that the slow growing populations eventually produce slightly smaller per capita.     

A TALE OF TAX POLICIES IN OPEN ECONOMIES

To evaluate fiscal policy reforms for Euro‐area countries, this article develops and calibrates a small open economy model. Debt reduction reforms require higher tax rates in the short term in exchange for lower rates in the long term as the debt‐servicing burden falls. Using the capital income tax to implement such a policy leads to welfare gains; the consumption tax, a very small welfare gain; and the labor income tax, a welfare loss. Holding fixed the long‐run debt–output ratio, offsetting a lower capital income tax with either a higher labor income or consumption tax generally yields welfare gains.     

Does the Mortality Decline Promote Economic Growth?

This paper analyzes qualitatively and quantitatively the effects of declining mortality rates on fertility, education and economic growth. The analysis demonstrates that if individuals are prudent in the face of uncertainty about child survival, a decline in an exogenous mortality rate reduces precautionary demand for children and increases parental investment in each child. Once mortality is endogenized, population growth becomes a hump-shaped function of income per capita. At low levels of income population growth rises as income per capita rises leading to a Malthusian steady-state equilibrium, whereas at high levels of income population growth declines leading to a sustained growth steady-state equilibrium.     

Convergence and catching up in ASEAN: a comparative analysis

The increasing diversity of average growth rates and income levels across countries has generated a large literature on testing the income convergence hypothesis. Most countries in South-East Asia, particularly the five founding ASEAN member countries (ASEAN-5), have experienced substantial economic growth, with the pace of growth having varied substantially across countries. Recent empirical studies have found evidence of several convergence clubs, in which per capita incomes have converged for selected groupings of countries and regions. This paper applies different time series tests of convergence to determine if there is a convergence club for ASEAN-5, as well as ASEAN-5 and the USA. The catching up hypothesis states that the lagging country, with low initial income and productivity levels, will tend to grow more rapidly by copying the technology of the leader country, without having to bear the associated costs of research and development. Given the important effects of technological change on growth, this paper also examines whether ASEAN-5 is catching up technologically with the USA.     

Population growth and economic growth: a reconsideration

The relationship between population growth and development has long been a controversial topic in the economic development literature. Early work by Hoover and Coale and more recent work by Blanchet suggest that high fertility suppresses per capita income growth. However, recent work by Kelley and Srinivasan are ambivalent about such a neo-Malthusian relationship between population growth and economic growth. The authors examine these conflicting positions. They emphasize that the rates of both population growth and income growth are endogenous variables within a general equilibrium framework. An endogenous growth model with endogenous fertility is then developed. It is found that when all exogenous variables are controlled for, there exists an inverse relation between population growth and economic growth. However, when some exogenous factors change, such as an improvement in technological progress, the relation becomes ambiguous. This suggests that the conflicting findings in the literature may be because of the presence of substantial heterogeneity in unobserved variables across countries and over time in cross-country panel data sets.     

Effect of social security on fertility and savings: an overlapping generations model

Old-age pension schemes do not exist in most developing countries, so adults bear children as security investments for the future. This phenomenon leads to unduly high rates of population growth. It has been hypothesized that introducing social security programs in such countries would increase savings rates and reduce the number of children born over the long term. The author studies the general equilibrium effects of some social security programs on rates of population growth and capital accumulation within an overlapping generations framework with endogenous fertility and savings. Specifically, Raul's overlapping generations growth model is extended to study the general equilibrium effects of payroll-tax-financed and child-tax-financed social security programs. It is shown that if the rate of intergenerational income transfers from young to old or child care cost is low, competitive equilibrium leads toward overpopulation and capital accumulation in a modified Pareto optimal sense; a social security program in such a case is therefore Pareto improving. A fully-funded system is not neutral when financed by child taxes. Finally, it is also shown that unlike in the case of exogenous fertility where competitive equilibrium attains steady state only asymptotically, fertility, when endogenous, may attain a unique globally steady state in finite time.     

PUBLIC EDUCATION, FERTILITY INCENTIVES, NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC GROWTH AND WELFARE

Using a simple overlapping generations model of neoclassical growth, we analyse the effects of both child allowances and the system of public education on the rate of fertility, the per capita income and the individual lifetime welfare. The essential message of the present paper is that developed countries plagued by below-replacement fertility and income stagnation may raise per capita income and the rate of fertility at the same time by increasing the public education expenditure rather than by resorting to child allowances. The latter, in fact, are found to be harmful for long-run neoclassical economic growth and, in contrast with the common belief, for the rate of population growth as well. Moreover, welfare analysis has shown the existence of a Pareto-efficient welfare-maximizing educational contribution rate.     

The impact of health sector on R&D,economic growth and wages

We extend the existing R&D growth literature by focusing on the short-, medium-, long-run effects of the health sector on R&D intensity, economic growth and wages, and by considering 21 OECD countries between 1991 and 2008. We show that: (i) there is a unique and stable steady state; (ii) an increase in health-labour share in skilled population has no effect on growth, but affects negatively (positively) the R&D intensity (the skill premium); (iii) Anglo–Saxons countries have the lowest health-labour share in skilled-labour population, and Nordic countries have the lowest skill premium and the highest consumption/production of healthcare per capita.     

Can sustained economic growth and declining population coexist?

Most of the developed countries have been experiencing sub-replacement fertility. This leads to worries over the sustainability of economic growth in these countries. Given this concern, we ask the following questions: Is there a force that would allow economic growth and declining population to coexist? Is there a mechanism that could reverse the decline in fertility? We argue that returns to human capital in production provide the key to understanding this relation. Our theoretical framework predicts that, when the degree of increasing returns to human capital in traditional production technologies falls, advanced economies switch their productive efforts from labor-oriented technologies that require a constant creation of young workforce toward human capital-oriented technologies that support an ageing population. We call this shift the “endogenous efficiency-augmenting mechanism”. This suggests that sustained economic growth and a declining population can coexist in the long run. Finally, we compare our model against the data and find: (i) The degree of increasing returns to human capital has been falling over time throughout the world along with population growth rates. (ii) Increasing returns to human capital and population growth rates are positively correlated. (iii) Predictions of our model are consistent with what the data reveal.     

Decreasing fertility,economic growth and the intergenerational wage gap

Persistent low fertility rates lead to lower population growth rates and eventually also to decreasing population sizes in most industrialized countries. There are fears that this demographic development is associated with declines in per capita GDP and possibly also increasing inequality of the wage distribution. We investigate whether this is true in the context of neoclassical growth models, augmented with endogenous fertility decisions and endogenous educational decisions. Furthermore we allow for imperfect substitutability across workers of different age in the production process and learning by doing effects as well as human capital depreciation. In particular, we assess the intergenerational wage redistribution effects which follow after a demographic change to persistent low fertility rates.     

The Impact of the German Child Benefit on Household Expenditures and Consumption

The German Child Benefit (‘Kindergeld’) is paid to legal guardians of children as a cash benefit. The benefit does not depend on household income or other household characteristics. I use exogenous variations in the amount of child benefit received by households in the German Socio‐Economic Panel to estimate the impact of a given change in the child benefit on food expenditures of households, the probability of owning a home, rent per square meter, measures of the size of the home, as well as parents’ smoking behavior and parents’ alcohol consumption. Households primarily increase per capita food expenditures in response to increases in child benefit, and they also improve housing conditions. The effect of child benefit on per capita food expenditures is larger for low‐income households compared to high‐income households. I do not find a significant effect of child benefit on parents’ smoking or drinking.     

Health and the evolution of welfare across Brazilian municipalities

This paper describes the pattern of reductions in mortality across Brazilian municipalities between 1970 and 2000, and analyzes its causes and consequences. It shows that, as in the international context, the relationship between income and life expectancy has shifted consistently in the recent past. But reductions in mortality within Brazil have been more homogeneously distributed than across countries. We use a compensating differentials approach to estimate the value of the observed reductions in mortality. The results suggest that gains in life expectancy had a welfare value equivalent to 39% of the growth in income per capita, being therefore responsible for 28% of the overall improvement in welfare. We then use a dynamic panel to conduct a preliminary assessment of the potential determinants of these gains. We show that improvements in education, access to water, and sanitation seem to be important determinants of the dimension of changes in life expectancy not correlated with income.     

Health and the evolution of welfare across Brazilian municipalities

This paper describes the pattern of reductions in mortality across Brazilian municipalities between 1970 and 2000, and analyzes its causes and consequences. It shows that, as in the international context, the relationship between income and life expectancy has shifted consistently in the recent past. But reductions in mortality within Brazil have been more homogeneously distributed than across countries. We use a compensating differentials approach to estimate the value of the observed reductions in mortality. The results suggest that gains in life expectancy had a welfare value equivalent to 39% of the growth in income per capita, being therefore responsible for 28% of the overall improvement in welfare. We then use a dynamic panel to conduct a preliminary assessment of the potential determinants of these gains. We show that improvements in education, access to water, and sanitation seem to be important determinants of the dimension of changes in life expectancy not correlated with income.     

World Population Growth; Past, Present and Future

Past, current and projected future population growth is outlined. Barring a calamitous pandemic, a further increase in the world’s population from 7 to between 8.8 and 10 billion by mid-century is unavoidable. This increase is driven by high fertility in sub-Saharan Africa whose population is forecast to more than double in the next 40 years and by a modest rise of 23 % in Asia’s huge population. Beyond mid-century, the range of plausible demographic destinations widens; much depends on fertility rates in the next few decades because they will determine the number of potential reproducers in the second half of the century. Vigorous promotion of family planning, particularly in Africa, is crucial to achievement of population stabilisation. Unchanged fertility implies a global population of 25 billion by the end of the century. In the next few decades the contribution of human population growth to global environmental change is moderate, because nearly all growth will occur in poor countries where consumption and emission of greenhouse gases is low. The implications for food production, and thereby water consumption, are greater. Much of the future need for food will be driven by increased numbers rather than changing diets. Loss of bio-diversity and natural habitats, degradation of fragile eco-systems due to over-exploitation and aquifer deletion are likely consequences.     

The Galor–Weil model revisited: A quantitative exercise

The long-run growth model of Galor and Weil [Galor, O., Weil, D., 2000. Population, technology, and growth: From Malthusian stagnation to the demographic transition and beyond. American Economic Review 90, 806–829] is examined quantitatively. We first give parametric forms to some functions which were only given on general form in the original article. We then choose numerical parameter values in line with calibrations of related long-run growth models, and with data. Finally, we simulate the model. We find, inter alia, that the time paths for population, and other variables, display oscillatory behavior: they move in endogenous cycles. As the economy transits from Malthusian stagnation to modern growth these oscillations die out. This is consistent with population growth rates fluctuating considerably in historical data, but having stabilized in modern economies. We also show that these cycles are not an artifact of the two-period life setting: allowing adults to live on after the second period of life with some probability does not make the oscillations go away. Rather, the cycles are driven by fertility being proportional to per capita income minus the parental subsistence requirement. When population is large, and per capita incomes close to subsistence, fertility is therefore sensitive to changes in population levels.     

Skill Composition,Fertility, and Economic Growth

While high fertility persists in the poorest countries and fertility declines with per capita income in developing countries, fertility and per capita income are now positively associated across most developed countries. This paper presents a model where a U‐shaped relationship between overall fertility and per capita income reflects within country differences in workforce skill composition and household choice of occupation, fertility, and childrearing. The fraction of skilled workers rises with economic growth. By allowing for both differences in the fertility of skilled and unskilled workers and purchased childrearing inputs, we explain a poverty trap with high fertility, fertility decline with economic development, and the possible reversal of fertility decline in a developed economy where most workers are skilled.     

Dining out,the missing food consumption in China

Food security concern in China is also the world’s concern. Studies on food consumption in the past, however, often neglected the increasing food consumed away from home (FAFH). Drawn on a survey data recently conducted in nine cities by a week-long diary method, we found that FAFH in urban China accounts for a significant proportion of total food consumption, although its share varies by food category. With substantial expected income growth, overall FAFH consumption will likely continue to rise, but would be negatively affected by the rapid societal aging process, both in dining out probability and per capita consumption level. The main findings of this study have implications for food processing and service industries as well as for studies in food-related environmental issues.     

The brain drain and the world distribution of income

Skilled emigration (or brain drain) from developing to developed countries is becoming the dominant pattern of international migration today. Such migration is likely to affect the world distribution of income both directly, through the mobility of people, and indirectly, as the prospect of migration affects the rate of return to education in both the sending and receiving economies. This migration pattern will therefore affect human capital accumulation and fertility decisions in both the sending and receiving economies. This paper analyzes these effects in a dynamic two country model of the world economy where agents in both countries make optimal fertility and human capital decisions. The implications of the analysis for the world distribution of income are derived in the light of recent empirical findings of the brain drain literature. The analysis shows that the current trend towards predominantly skilled emigration from poor to rich countries may in the long run increase inequality in the world distribution of income as relatively poor countries grow large in terms of population. In the short run however, it is possible for world inequality to fall due to rises in GDP per capita in large developing economies with sufficiently low skilled emigration rates.     

TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND POPULATION GROWTH: DO WE HAVE TOO FEW CHILDREN?

Do we have too few children? We intend to address this question. In developed countries, the fertility rate has declined since WWII. This may cause a slowdown in the growth of GDP in developed countries. However, important factors for the well‐being of individuals are per capita variables, like per capita growth and per capita consumption. In turn, the rate of technological progress determines the growth rates of per capita variables. If the population size is increasing, the labour inputs for R&D activity increase, and thus speed up technological progress. As individuals do not take account of this positive effect when deciding on the number of their own children, the number of children may become smaller than the socially optimal number of children. However, an increase in the number of children reduces the assets any one child owns: that is, there is a capital dilution effect. This works in the opposite direction. We examine this issue using an endogenous growth model where the head of a dynastic family decides the number of children.