Evaluating sovereign risk spillovers on domestic banks during the European debt crisis

Using a Markov-switching model with time-varying probabilities, spillovers from sovereign to domestic bank CDS spreads during the European debt crisis for a set of 14 European countries and 30 European banks are investigated. Our model is able to capture how the increased sovereign risk observed between 2010 and 2013 throughout Europe has impacted i) the probability that banks fall into a crisis regime and ii) the probability that banks stay in the crisis regime. The latter state is characterized by a high volatility and large positive returns of CDS spreads. Different regime-dependent indicators have been computed to assess heterogeneity within the region. The evidence indicates that the intensification of sovereign risk observed during the European debt crisis has positively and significantly driven the regime shifts in volatility of the bank CDS spreads due to increased risk aversion. The results show that the increase in sovereign credit risk seems to have generated second-round effects for some banks that have experienced a deterioration in their funding conditions due to a rise in the domestic sovereign default risk. Overall, our results suggest that sovereign CDS spreads can be considered good forewarning indicators for predicting the evolution of bank CDS spreads. We also find that the effects differ depending on the country and the financial institution. This result suggests that banks are heterogeneously exposed to sovereign credit risk within the same country. One argument relates to the size of these financial institutions and the domestic exposure to sovereign debt.     

European policy and markets: Did policy initiatives stem the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area?

We investigate how European policy initiatives influenced market assessments of sovereign default risk and banking sector fragility during the sovereign debt crisis in four adversely affected countries — Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy. We focus on three broad groups of policies: (a) ECB policy actions (monetary and financial support), (b) EU programs (financial and fiscal rules as well as financial support in crisis countries), and (c) domestic austerity programs. We measure immediate market impact effects: what policies changed risk perceptions, using CDS spreads on sovereign bonds and banks in this assessment. We employ dynamic panel and event study methodologies in the empirical work. We find that a number of programs initially stabilized sovereign and bank bond markets (e.g. Outright Monetary Transactions program), although announcement and implementation impacts on markets differed in some cases (e.g. second Covered Market Bond Program). Actions designed to shore up sovereign markets often lowered risk assessments in bank bond markets and policies designed to ensure safety and soundness of the European banking system in some cases significantly impacted sovereign debt markets. Finally, a number of policies designed to stabilize markets had surprisingly little immediate impact on either sovereign or bank bond market risk assessments.     

One crisis,two crises…the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt problems

This article explores the link between the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a panel data approach, we estimate the impact of the different government interventions aimed at rescuing financial institutions on the significant increase of the costs of public debts as measured by the interest rate spreads with respect to Germany. We show evidence on the existence of a statistically significant link between the two crises embodied by capital injections and government guarantees. More specifically, the two types of government interventions have a negative impact on the cost of the sovereign debts under study. This empirical result can explain why the sovereign debt crisis immediately followed the subprime crisis.     

Cyclical behavior of the financial stability of eurozone commercial banks

In light of the financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, we investigate the cyclical behavior of the financial stability of banks of the Eurozone, using an unbalanced dynamic panel of 722 commercial banks covering the period 1999–2013, and the generalized method of moments system. We find a negative relationship between business cycle and bank risk-taking, indicating that financial stability is procyclical. In addition, the study shows that lending activity increases risk-taking while rising capital requirements boost financial stability. Moreover, our findings suggest positive co-movements between the business cycle and lending, compared to bank's capital, whereby the procyclicality of lending and bank capital have negative effects on the financial stability of commercial banks in the Eurozone. We notice then that the cyclical behavior of commercial banks, in terms of capital requirements and lending activities, depends on their size. Therefore, lending and capital of smaller banks are procyclical while lending and capital of larger banks are countercyclical. Finally, we find the Troika institutions’ bailouts programs significantly impacted banking stability in the Eurozone.     

Explaining European Union Citizens’ Trust in the European Central Bank in Normal and Crisis Times

We study the determinants of trust in the European Central Bank (ECB) as measured by the European Commission's Eurobarometer survey, in particular during the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. We find that the fall in trust in the ECB in crisis times can be rather well explained based on the pre‐crisis determinants. We also show that the fall in trust reflected the macroeconomic deterioration, a more generalized fall in the trust in European institutions in the wake of the crisis, and the severity of the banking sector's problems, to which the ECB was associated in the public opinion.     

Learning from Japan: The European Central Bank and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

What shapes central banks’ learning from the policy experiments of their peers? Both economic ideas and organizational interests play important roles. Thus, New Keynesian ideas led central banks to interpret Japan's experience with quantitative easing (2001–2006) through the impact on risk spreads, although the Japanese central bank never intended such effects. In turn, scholars and policy-makers alike ignored one critical lesson: successful policy innovations depend on banks’ funding models. It is argued here that this was a crucial omission because the shift to market-based funding impairs the effectiveness of the traditional crisis toolkit. Central banks must intervene directly in asset markets of systemic importance for funding conditions, as the Bank of Japan did by buying government bonds. Hence, market-based finance engenders a trade-off between financial stability and institutional stability defined through central bank independence. During critical periods, central banks cannot preserve both. The ECB illustrates this trade-off well. Early in the crisis, it outsourced financial stability to a (largely) market-dependent banking system to protect its independence. With the introduction of Outright Monetary Transactions in September 2012, the Bank recognized that the market-based nature of European banking required outright purchases of sovereign bonds. This new instrument gave the ECB additional powers to shape national fiscal decisions in the name of an independence that no longer has theoretical justifications.     

Do bank bondholders price banks’ ability to manage risk/return?

In this paper, we empirically investigate whether bank bondholders value risk management, measured as risk-return efficiency (RRE), when pricing bond spreads. Based on a sample of 2,452 bonds issued by 78 European listed banks, for the period 2001–2015, we find evidence that the ability of banks to manage risk affects bond spreads: banks with more capable managers obtain a lower cost of debt. In particular our results show that bank bondholders are even more sensitive to RRE during the crisis period, for relatively poorly rated bonds, for unsecured/subordinated debt, and for long maturity debt. Our findings highlight that bondholders’ monitoring of banks is effective and takes into account the efficiency of risk management during financial and economic downturns, but during sound periods bank bondholders should strengthen their monitoring of risk management.     

Do stress tests matter? A study on the impact of the disclosure of stress test results on European financial stocks and CDS markets

During the recent sovereign debt crisis, the European Banking Authority conducted two stress tests on European banks in order to gauge their capital needs, core Tier-1 ratios and ratios of resilience to adverse shocks. We assess the informational content of the disclosure of the stress test outcomes. We conclude that the stress tests conveyed new information and that the outcomes were not anticipated by the stock market but were partially anticipated by the credit default swap (CDS) market. However, while the stock market reacted to the disclosure of the stress test outcomes, in the CDS market there is some evidence of a ‘reverse’ reaction. Moreover, the publication of the outcomes of the stress tests had a stronger impact on the stock prices of riskier financial institutions. A similar pattern is evident in the CDS market, albeit narrowed to one of the stress tests and amid the financial institutions with higher perceived credit risk.     

Mispricing of Risk in Sovereign Bond Markets with Asymmetric Information

The likelihood that a government will repay its sovereign debt depends both on the amount of debt it issues and on the government's future ability to repay. Whilst the former is publicly observable, the government may have more information about the latter than investors. This paper shows that this asymmetric information problem impairs the market's ability to differentiate economies according to their fiscal sustainability, and can lead to a disconnect between bond prices and default risk. The model can help rationalise the behaviour of Eurozone bond prices prior to the recent European sovereign debt crisis.     

Sovereign risk and deposit dynamics: evidence from Europe

The unprecedented expansion of sovereign balance sheets since the beginning of the global crisis has given a new meaning to the term sovereign risk. Developments in Europe since early 2010 revealed new challenges for the functioning of private banks in an environment of heightened sovereign risk and may have contributed to deleveraging. The article uses an innovative way of measuring the perception of sovereign risk and its impact. Using an extension of a common market discipline framework, it shows that exposure to sovereign risk may have limited the ability of banks in Europe to collect deposits. Potential identification issues between deposits and bank efficiency are controlled by using data envelopment analysis (DEA). The results are robust to inclusion of conventional measures of bank performance and the sector-wide holdings of foreign sovereign debt.     

Time-varying dependence in European equity markets: A contagion and investor sentiment driven analysis

In the light of the global financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis, this paper investigates the dependence patterns in 24 European equity markets from January 5, 2004 to July 1, 2016. We further examine whether these stressful events trigger contagion. Given that investors tend to behave irrationally in turmoil periods, we add to the literature by studying the effect of investor sentiment on markets correlations. Our results reveal heterogeneity in the time-varying dependence and across markets. Contagion is confirmed in turbulent times, a spillover effect from periphery euro area being detected. We find that similar sentiments increase correlations, especially in crises, suggesting that investors’ perceptions are an important channel of moving markets in the same direction. Furthermore, negative sentiments, such as fear or pessimism, amplify the linkages between markets. Our results offer useful insights to policy makers for reacting timely to financial shocks and for designing a more integrated market.     

Sovereign credit ratings in the European Union: A model-based fiscal analysis

We present a model-based measure of sovereign credit ratings derived solely from the fiscal position of a country: a forecast of its future debt liabilities, and its potential to use fiscal policy to repay these. We use this measure to calculate credit ratings for 14 European countries over the period 1995–2012. This measure identifies a European sovereign debt crisis almost two years before the official ratings of the credit rating agencies.     

Bank ownership type and temporal evolution of long‐term bank funding in the period 2005–2017

This study uses a large panel dataset of Western European banks to examine the determinants of bank funding stability. Banks are divided into three categories by bank ownership type; the ownership types in this study are commercial banks, cooperative banks and savings banks. Three sources of stable bank funding are investigated: customer deposits, equity, and long‐term liabilities. Furthermore, the sum of these funding components is used as a proxy variable for a bank's total available stable funding (ASF). A special focus is on the temporal evolution of these funding types. The regression results show that commercial banks’ funding became much more stable in the period 2005–2017. However, that funding remains, on average, less stable than does cooperative and savings banks’ funding. In addition, funding stability has remained at the pre‐crisis level in cooperative and savings banks, despite a steep dip in cooperative banks’ ASF during the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, banks substantially decreased financing from long‐term liabilities after the financial crisis, replacing it with customer deposits and equity.     

An Alternative Approach to the Institutional Economics of the Eurozone Crisis

I argue that the Eurozone crisis is neither a crisis of European sovereigns in the sense of governmental over-borrowing, nor a crisis of sovereign debt market over-lending. Rather, it is a function of the “sovereign debt market” institution itself. Crisis, I argue, is not an occurrence, but an element fulfilling a precise technical function within this institution. It ensures the possibility of designating — in the market’s day-to-day mechanisms rather than analytical hindsight — normal (tranquil, undisturbed) market functioning. To show this, I propose an alternative view on the institutional economics of sovereign debt markets. First, I engage literature on the emergent qualities of the institutions “market” and “firm” in product markets, concluding that the point of coalescence for markets is the approximation of an optimal observation of consumer tastes. I then examine the specific institution “financial markets,” where the optimal observation of economic fundamentals is decisive. For the specific sub-institution “sovereign debt market,” I conclude that the fundamentals in question — country fundamentals — oscillate between a status of observable fundamentals outside of markets and operationalized fundamentals influenced by market movements. This, in turn, allows me to argue that the specific case of the Eurozone crisis is due to neither of the two causes mentioned above. Rather, the notion of “crisis” takes on a technical sense within the market structure, guaranteeing the separation of herd behavior and isomorphic behavior on European sovereign debt markets. By the same token, the so-called Eurozone crisis ceases to be a crisis in the conventional sense.     

Measuring the end of the European financial crisis

In 2013 it was declared that ‘the eurozone crisis is over’. However, in fact, the series of financial crises since 2008 may have interrupted the process of EMU enlargement, which in turn triggered a continuing crisis of confidence in the euro. In this paper we extend the sigma‐convergence test to provide a more precise understanding of real interest rate parity (RIP) convergence. On the basis of this, we predict the timing for eliminating the cost of economic asymmetric shocks. Our estimation indicates the RIP among EMU members and accessions were still valid after the disruptions of the 2008 financial crisis. However, the situation has been even worse since the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis, and ceteris paribus, symmetry cannot be achieved without further policy actions. This implies that the EMU authority must do its best to strengthen symmetry and thereby solidify the EMU, at which point it will be better able to re‐start the process of enlargement.     

Why Crisis Continue?——The Endogenous Reason of Financial Crisis and Evolution to the Debt Crisis and the Enlightenment

当前欧债危机越演越烈,需要重新思考金融危机爆发并且演化为主权债务危机的内生性根源.此次金融危机中,资本主义社会的基本矛盾是危机发生的制度性根源.这一矛盾外化为“相对过剩”.经济机制层面,新自由主义影响下的自由市场经济体制放大了市场经济固有的缺陷,为危机的爆发积累了机制性原因.微观市场层面,缺乏金融监管、不当的房地产和货币政策则是诱发危机的直接原因.高赤字和高负债的背景下,一些国内经济和社会矛盾突出的国家发生主权债务危机是金融危机深化的必然结果.处理好自由市场经济和规制市场经济、金融创新和金融监管、实体经济和虚拟经济的关系以及地方债务问题是此次金融和债务危机给我国的最大启示.     

Modelling European sovereign bond yields with international portfolio effects

This paper proposes a portfolio choice model with two countries to evaluate the specific role of volatility and co-volatility risks in the formation of long-term European interest rates over the crisis and post-crisis periods with an active role of the European Central Bank. Long-term equilibrium rates depend crucially on the covariances between international bond yields anticipated by investors. Positively anticipated covariances amplify the phenomena of fundamental contagions related to the degradations of public finance and solvency of sovereign debt issuer, while negatively anticipated covariances amplify the phenomena of Flight-to-quality. The two-step econometric approach over the period January 2006 to September 2016 analyses 21 European market pairs in a bivariate GARCH framework. Empirical results show that the decline in German and French long-term rates from March 2011 is partially due to the decrease in both risk premium and covariances with periphery countries. These declines actually amplify the mechanisms of Flight-to-quality. Finally, a lower sensitivity of rate to volatility and co-volatility risks during the crisis period gives credit to the hypothesis of a occasional fragmentation of the European sovereign bond markets (De Santis and Stein, 2016, Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2017).     

Financial stress and economic activity in Germany

The financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis have shown that financial stress may be an important driver for economic activity. In this paper, I derive a financial stress index for Germany, using a dynamic approximate factor model that summarizes a stress component of various financial variables. Subsequently, I analyze the effects of financial stress on economic activity in a threshold vector autoregressive model. I find that if the index exceeds a certain threshold, an increase in financial stress causes economic activity to decelerate significantly, whereas if it is below this threshold, economic activity remains nearly unaffected.     

Monetary policy in steering the EONIA and POLONIA rates in the Eurosystem and Poland: a comparative analysis

The effectiveness of the monetary policies of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) is compared directly in terms of influencing the spread between the interbank overnight rate and the main rates of the central banks during periods of different economic conditions, i.e. the global financial crisis of 2008, the European sovereign debt crisis and the period of relative stability. Three categories of determinants of the Euro Overnight Index Average/Polish Overnight Index Average (EONIA/POLONIA) spreads are considered: (1) monetary policy instruments such as open market operations, standing facilities and minimum reserve requirements; (2) measures of liquidity conditions; and (3) market expectations and risk measures. Applying the ARFIMA–GARCH models, we show that the statistical and economic properties of the EONIA and POLONIA spreads are quite different. The EONIA spread has a long memory while the POLONIA spread is characterized by a short memory. This difference is important from the viewpoint of a stabilizing monetary policy. The impact of shocks on the future levels of the spread was stronger for the POLONIA spread, but it was short-lived in comparison with the EONIA spread. Most of the analysed variables significantly influenced the spreads during the financial crisis, while the biggest differences in the impact of determinants between the EONIA and POLONIA spreads occurred during the period of relative stability. Substantial differences also exist between the volatilities of both spreads.     

Tree networks to assess financial contagion

We propose a two-layered tree network model that decomposes financial contagion into a global component, composed of inter-country contagion effects, and a local component, made up of inter-institutional contagion channels. The model is effectively applied to a database containing time series of daily CDS spreads of major European financial institutions (banks and insurance companies), and reveals the importance of monitoring both channels to assess financial contagion. Our empirical application reveals evidence of a high inter-country and inter-institutional vulnerability at the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 and during the sovereign crisis in 2011. The results identify France as central to the inter-country contagion in the Euro area during the financial crisis, while Italy dominates during the sovereign crisis. The application of the model to detect contagion between sectors of the European economy reveals similar findings, and identifies the manufacturing sector as the most central, while, at the company level, financial institutions dominate during the 2008 crisis.