Fiscal discipline and exchange rates: Does politics matter?

We look at the effect of exchange rate regimes on fiscal discipline, taking into account the effect of underlying political conditions. We present a model where strong politics (defined as policymakers facing longer political horizon and higher cohesion) are associated with better fiscal performance, but fixed exchange rates may revert this result and lead to less fiscal discipline. We confirm these hypotheses through regression analysis performed on a panel sample covering 79 countries from 1975 to 2012. Our empirical results also show that the positive effect of strong politics on fiscal discipline is not enough to counter the negative impact of being at/moving to fixed exchange rates. Our results are robust to a number of sensitivity checks, including the use of different estimators, alternative proxies for fiscal discipline and sub-sample analysis.     

The importance of composition of fiscal policy: evidence from different exchange rate regimes

We study the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policies in an open economy. We emphasize two transmission mechanisms: the cost channel, by which wage government spending and labor taxes raise the real wage firms must pay, and the exchange rate channel, by which the nominal exchange rate shifts induced by fiscal policy have real effects if (some) prices and wages are sticky. The latter channel implies that changes in wage government spending or in labor taxation should have different effects under flexible than under fixed exchange rates. In a 1964–93 panel of OECD countries we find significant evidence for both channels. Moreover, we find that the real product wage and profitability are more responsive than quantities (employment and output) to fiscal policy innovations.     

Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Systems

A new 'fiscal' theory of price determination has implications for exchange rate systems and common currency areas. We show that deeper monetary integration requires the discipline of a Ricardian regime ; that is, the government must guarantee fiscal solvency for any sequence of prices or exchange rates. Particularly striking results are that a currency peg is not credible without the discipline of a Ricardian regime, and a common currency area is not viable if fiscal policy in two (or more) of the countries in the union is Non-Ricardian. Interestingly, constraints written into the Maastricht Treaty are sufficient for a Ricardian regime.     

Twin deficits and fiscal spillovers in the EMU's periphery. A Keynesian perspective

The objective of this paper is to shed light on the twin deficit hypothesis in Southern Europe and the MENA region, taking into account fiscal spillovers from the core during the global crisis. Using Godley and Lavoie (2007)'s baseline model, we first show that fiscal shocks from a core region could aggravate macroeconomic imbalances in the periphery. We then gather data from the period 1977–2016 for ten MENA and peripheral EMU countries, and model the twin deficit hypothesis in the presence of fiscal spillover with a P-VARX methodology. Our results highlight that fiscal balance, current account, and GDP growth rates in the EMU's periphery are negatively affected by fiscal consolidations in the core. Fiscal discipline in surplus countries is tantamount to a ‘beggar thy neighbor’ effect on the periphery, in times of crisis. We discuss the implications of our results to propose further international coordination of macroeconomic policies.     

Monetary and Fiscal Stabilization of Demand Shocks Within Europe

This paper examines alternative macroeconomic stabilization rules for demand shocks, for a single open economy, and for an integrated European region. These questions are tackled in two ways. First a very simple macroeconomic model is used to focus on intercountry interconnections. Then the effects of shocks are simulated using the McKibbin Sachs MSG2 global economic model. The theoretical model analyzes just how much larger the disturbances caused by asymmetric shocks might be in a European Monetary Union, as compared with outcomes under floating exchange rates, especially (1) if rigid central monitoring and discipline of the fiscal policy prevents the full operation of the inbuilt fiscal stabilizers within individual European countries, and (2) if European monetary policy does not concern itself with fully European objectives. Simulations with the MSG2 model bear out the significance of these risks. They show that a demand shock like GEMU can have strongly negative effects on output in other European countries if either interest rates are raised to counter the demand shock in the originating country, or if, for some reason, fiscal stabilization is not allowed to be as strong as the inbuilt fiscal stabilizers.     

Trade,finance or policies: What drives the cross-border spill-over of business cycles?

In this paper we investigate how income growth rates in one country are affected by growth rates in partner countries, testing for the importance of pairwise country links as well as characteristics of the receiving country (trade and financial openness, exchange rate regime, fiscal variables). We find that trade integration fosters the spill-over of business cycles, both bilaterally and as a country characteristic (trade openness). Results for financial integration are mixed; financial links as pairwise country characteristic are either insignificant or negatively signed (indicating a dampening of cross country spill-overs), but financial openness as characteristic of the receiving country amplifies spill-overs. We find no evidence for a role of the exchange rate regime. Finally, we find that higher government spending and debt reduces countries’ vulnerability to foreign business cycles, presumably through the effect of automatic stabilizers.     

Fiscal crises,decentralization, and indiscipline

How does fiscal decentralization influence fiscal discipline and the probability of a fiscal crisis? Discrete choice analysis used with panel data reveals that crisis probability is associated positively with spending decentralization and negatively with vertical fiscal imbalance. These effects are prevalent in countries with a higher degree of tax revenue decentralization, while a stronger rule of law mitigates such adverse decentralization effects. The findings imply that reduced risk sharing against local shocks under tax revenue decentralization destabilizes the sustainability of a nation's fiscal system. Therefore, policymakers should be cognizant of the undesirable impacts of decentralization on fiscal crisis and indiscipline.     

Can a comparative capitalism approach explain fiscal policy activism?

This study investigates the implications of models of capitalism for the responsiveness of countries’ fiscal policies during business cycles using new data for member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and China. We expand the literature by adding the category of East Asian nonliberal capitalism to the established distinction of liberal market economies and nonliberal coordinated market economies. These three differ substantially not just in their fiscal policies, but also in monetary policies, degree of financial market orientation, exchange rate regime, and labor market organization. As in previous studies, we find that governments of liberal economies adopt more countercyclical fiscal policies. Departing from existing studies, however, among the nonliberal models of capitalism, (East Asian) state-led models have more countercyclical fiscal policies than (European) coordinated market economies, perhaps as countercyclical as liberal economies, both historically and during the 2007–9 crisis. This is due to less independent central banks, managed float of exchange rates, and limited financial market orientation and financial openness in East Asia, which allow for more active fiscal policy. Among political factors, left-of-center governments, fractionalized party systems, and election years are associated weakly with countercyclical fiscal policy, as expected. Labor market coordination and welfare generosity have unclear roles in regard to fiscal policy, a topic for future research.     

THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL AND MONETARY DISCIPLINE ON BUDGETARY OUTCOMES

This article extends the model of Von Hagen and Harden that analyzed the impact of fiscal discipline on budgetary outcomes. We modify the model by adding monetary discipline to interact with fiscal discipline in order to analyze the effects of both on budgetary outcomes. The model predicts that while both inflation and budget deficits are negatively associated with fiscal discipline, they may be positively associated with monetary discipline, proxied by central bank independence. This result obtains due to optimizing agents internalizing the burden of spending: inflation. Although not conclusive due to data limitations, empirical findings also support these predictions. ( JEL D73, E58, H61, H72)     

Macroeconomic Fragility and Exchange Rate Vulnerability: A Cautionary Record of Transition Economies

The interaction between the exchange rate regime and macroeconomic stabilization in several transition economies during 1990–1996 was influenced by the persistence of high inflation rates and the initial disequilibrium between the highly undervalued nominal exchange rates in relation to their purchasing power parity estimates. Policymakers generally adopted the flexible (nominal) exchange rate regimes for manipulating real exchange rates with a view to correcting the exchange rate disequilibrium and conveying inflation control signals. The rates of real appreciation were higher in the earlier years of high inflation rates. By 1996, lower inflation rates required less currency appreciations thereby reducing the negative impact of the latter on trade competitiveness. However, the persistence of unwarranted interest rate differentials, a consequence of the domination of monetary control over prudent fiscal management, and the associated inflows of foreign funds put an upward pressure on exchange rates exacerbating trade competitiveness. The transition record suggests that innovative exchange rate arrangements can provide only a brief interval during which sound fiscal discipline needs to be put in place for controlling inflation.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1998, 26(4), pp. 621–641. Columbia University, New York, New York 10027.     

Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities

Recently several countries have experienced a drop in popularity of national political parties, accompanied by the success of independent movements (e.g. “Civic Lists” in Italy). I exploit the success of “Civic Lists” in Italian municipalities and use them as a comparison group for party-affiliated politicians, to test whether national parties affect fiscal discipline. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), I show that party-affiliated mayors are more fiscally responsible: they run lower deficits, accumulate less debt and reduce expenditures. The effect is significant only for municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules. This suggests that national parties act as a substitute for fiscal rules in constraining politicians. Besides, I provide evidence that the discipline of party-affiliated politicians is linked to better career prospects: party-affiliated mayors have a higher probability of being re-elected and better chances of being promoted to higher levels of government. Alternative stories find less support in the data.     

Inflation and Exchange Rate Targeting Challenges Under Fiscal Dominance

Countries have significantly increased their public-sector borrowing since the Global Financial Crisis. As a consequence, monetary authorities may face pressure to deviate from their policy targets in ways designed to ease the debt burden. In view of this consideration, we test for greater fiscal dominance over 2000-2017 under Inflation Targeting (IT) and non-IT regimes. We find that evidence of fiscal dominance varies across countries and debt configurations. Higher ratios of public debt-to-GDP may appear associated with lower policy interest rates in advanced economies. However, a declining natural rate of interest largely explains the pattern of lower rates and higher debt in these countries. The most robust evidence of fiscal dominance lies among emerging markets under non-IT regimes, composed mostly of exchange rate targeters. For these countries, policy interest rates are non-linearly associated with public debt levels, depending on both the level of hard-currency public debt-to-GDP and the currency composition of public debt. We also show that emerging market economies with greater exchange rate volatility, inflation volatility, and underlying commodity exposure exhibit stronger associations between public debt and policy interest rates.     

Capital control reconsidered: financialisation and economic policy

We consider capital controls and their impact on selected countries, providing a critique of IMF policy. We show how the warning signs of the 1970s were ignored and the consequences became apparent during the ensuing period of neoliberal hegemony. We contend that promoting increased capital mobility is counterproductive as it reduces macroeconomic ‘policy space’. We introduce a development of the international policy ‘trilemma’ in the form of a variant of the idea of the ‘quadrilemma’. We suggest that, in most cases, the key policy driving economic growth is fiscal policy but it may be that its unconstrained use (and that of monetary policy) is not possible either under fixed exchange rates or when free capital mobility exists; a nation may face a ‘demi-quadrilemma’. We contend that, in practice, a country can only adopt ‘two from four’; if it chooses to retain free use of monetary and fiscal policy, it must sacrifice both fixed exchange rates and capital mobility. We advocate the rejection of fixed exchange rates and free capital mobility allowing the retention of requisite monetary and fiscal policy space, and that a multinational approach to the capital control policy would effectively contribute to a growth and development strategy.     

Rent-seeking distortions and fiscal procyclicality

Recent research has demonstrated that while government expenditures are countercyclical in most industrialized countries, they tend to be procyclical in developing countries. We develop a dynamic political-economy model to explain this phenomenon. In the model, public expenditures provide insurance to uninsured households, and optimal fiscal policy is countercyclical. The introduction of a political friction, in which successive governments disagree on the desired distribution of public spending, can lead to procyclical fiscal policies. Numerical simulations of the model allow us to compare quantitatively the relative role of common explanations for fiscal procyclicality. We conclude that political distortions in the fiscal process can explain fiscal procyclicality better than other common explanations, such as borrowing constraints and macroeconomic volatility.     

THE GREAT RECESSION, “RAINY DAY” FUNDS,AND COUNTERCYCLICAL FISCAL POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

We examine the fiscal policy options that were available to Latin American countries at the onset of the current global economic crisis, concluding that most of the major countries in the region possessed the fiscal space (as measured by credible fiscal sustainability and debt headroom) to run prudent countercyclical fiscal deficits. For those countries, the appropriate policy response involved a constrained fiscal expansion focused on productive public spending and financed by drawing on the “rainy day” funds—in the form of large stocks of foreign exchange reserves—that they accumulated in prior years, rather than by market borrowing. (JEL E62, E63, F34)     

Fiscal decentralization and government size: The role of democracy

This paper examines how the level of democracy in a country affects the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size. We argue that political regimes, proxied by their democracy levels, are important for different decentralization theories to predict the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size. We test this argument using panel data from 76 developed and developing countries during 1972–2013. We find strong and robust evidence that fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with government size and that a higher level of democracy tends to mitigate the negative impact of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, our study contributes to the literature by offering a novel insight on mixed results regarding the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size in the literature.     

Budgetdefizit und Leistungsbilanzsaldo-Replik

Summary In a previous article I explained the gradual deterioration of Austria's current balance in the seventies and its pronounced deficit in 1976 and 1977 within the framework of the relative absorption approach by reference to capacity utilization rates that were high compared to those of other countries. The high utilization rates in turn were the consequence of an expansive economic policy, in particular of an expansive fiscal policy. Guger-Wörgötter, on the other hand, interpret the deficit in the Austrian current balance as the result of weak foreign demand and view the budget deficit as an attempt to compensate for insufficient aggregate demand; they conclude that full employment policies should be continued disregarding the economic development abroad. The present paper presents additional evidence that the deficit in the current balance is attributable to the fact that Austria's economic policy maintained a higher rate of capacity utilization than abroad. Such a policy serves a useful purpose and can be financed by foreign currency reserves only in the case of a cyclical demand deficiency; in the long run, however, it can be sustained at best only under a regime of flexible exchange rates (continuing devaluation).     

Sovereign default risk and decentralization: Evidence for emerging markets

We study the impact of decentralization on sovereign default risk. Theory predicts that decentralization deteriorates fiscal discipline since subnational governments undertax/overspend, anticipating that, in the case of overindebtedness, the federal government will bail them out. We analyze whether investors account for this common pool problem by attaching higher sovereign yield spreads to more decentralized countries. Using panel data on up to 30 emerging markets in the period 1993–2008 we confirm this hypothesis. Higher levels of fiscal and political decentralization increase sovereign default risk. Moreover, higher levels of intergovernmental transfers and a larger number of veto players aggravate the common pool problem.     

Flexible exchange rates as shock absorbers

In this paper we analyze empirically the effect of terms of trade shocks on economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes. We are particularly interested in investigating whether terms of trade disturbances have a smaller effect on growth in countries with a flexible exchange rate arrangement. We also analyze whether negative and positive terms of trade shocks have asymmetric effects on growth, and whether the magnitude of these asymmetries depends on the exchange rate regime. We find evidence suggesting that terms of trade shocks get amplified in countries that have more rigid exchange rate regimes. We also find evidence of an asymmetric response to terms of trade shocks: the output response is larger for negative than for positive shocks. Finally, we find evidence supporting the view that, after controlling for other factors, countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes grow faster than countries with fixed exchange rates.     

The effectiveness of fiscal institutions: International financial flogging or domestic constraint?

Many have argued that financial markets are crucial in ensuring that governments maintain sustainable fiscal balances - the so called ‘market discipline hypothesis’. A recent version of this theory holds that both fiscal rules and fiscal transparency are necessary to enable markets to discipline overspending governments. I argue, however, that while these fiscal institutions are effective at improving governments fiscal balances, financial markets are likely not the causal mechanism which discipline governments’ fiscal policies. Instead, I propose that fiscal rules and transparency promote better budget balances because domestic political actors use fiscal institutions to constrain executive policymaking. I test these competing hypotheses of why these fiscal institutions are effective – financial markets vs political competition – and find that country budget balances are increased not as a consequence of financial markets, but when the level of political competition and civil society engagement is sufficiently high. These results are robust to accounting for the possible selection bias of who adopts fiscal institutions.