Can a larger market foster R&D under monopolistic competition with variable mark-ups?

We study monopolistic competition with symmetric directly additive preferences (generating variable mark-ups) and an endogenous technology choice. Each firm chooses an investment in R&D to decrease its marginal cost. We prove that the equilibrium R&D investment increases with market size (a larger population or trade) only if the price-elasticity of demand is an increasing function. Together with the output levels, such equilibrium investments may be socially excessive or insufficient, depending on whether the elasticity of the subutility is increasing or decreasing. The main implication is that opening up to free trade can foster R&D through variable mark-ups.     

Research Joint Ventures with Asymmetric Spillovers and Symmetric Contributions

The paper proposes a new type of R&D cooperation between firms endowed with asymmetric spillovers, which we call symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization, based on reciprocity in information exchange. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures and also share information, but such that the asymmetric spillover rates are increased through cooperation by equal amounts. It is found that this type of cooperation reduces R&D investment by the low spillover firm when its spillover is sufficiently low and the spillover of its competitor is sufficiently high. But it always increases the R&D of the high spillover firm, as well as total R&D (and hence effective cost reduction and welfare). A firm prefers no cooperation to symmetric RJV cartelization if its spillover rate is very high and the spillover rate of its competitor is intermediate. The profitability of symmetric RJV cartelization relative to other modes of cooperation is analyzed. It is found that symmetric RJV cartelization constitutes an equilibrium for a very wide range of spillovers, namely, when asymmetries between spillovers are not too large. As these asymmetries increase, the equilibrium goes from symmetric RJV cartelization, to RJV cartelization, to R&D competition, to R&D cartelization.     

A dynamic general equilibrium model for public R&D investment in Taiwan

In terms of economic development policies, public research and development (R&D) investment may be one of the most critical and useful tools in Taiwan, having frequently played a role in leading related overall investment in Taiwan. Although the impact channels of R&D investment are varied and complex, its benefits in terms of the development of human capital, industrial productivity, and basic research are clear. With the rapid growth of the private sector in the Taiwan economy, it is, however, debatable whether the government should continue to use the public financial budget to invest in R&D. By using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate the impact of public R&D investment on the economy in Taiwan, the empirical evidence of the present paper is that public R&D investment gives rise to different short-term and medium-term impacts on real GDP that are mostly felt in the third or fourth years of their implementation among different industries. These impacts then gradually converge back to equilibrium in the long run. Public R&D investment boosts the technology of high-tech industries and increases exports, but it also crowds out the output of primary industries. Although the public R&D investment has a positive effect on the real wage, its effect on inflation should not be overlooked. Because of the pros and cons surrounding the impact of public R&D investment on industries and the economy, the study provided by the present paper can serve as valuable reference not only to decision-makers in government agencies but also to academic researchers.     

Competitive investing equilibrium under a procurement mechanism

This paper proposes a procurement mechanism for a research and development (R&D) project, in which the stochastic nature of R&D is incorporated, and the potential agents needed to invest prior to the agent are selected. The incentive contract aims to attract the investment of potential agents through a sharing rate. By establishing the stopping time game, an optimal investing strategy for potential agents is derived. Furthermore, the investment equilibria are discussed, and the conditions under which the equilibrium represents preemption or simultaneous investment are presented.     

Optimal research and development and the cost of business cycles

While research and development (R&D) investment has been procyclical in the post-war period, recent literature suggests that the optimal path for R&D is countercyclical, and that the economy would be better off by subsidizing R&D in recessions. The objective of this paper is to analyze the welfare effects of distortions in the intertemporal allocation of R&D resources and to compare diverse policy interventions so as to improve social welfare. To this end, we introduce a calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with Schumpeterian endogenous growth that is capable of explaining the observed procyclicality of R&D. Our results show that the cost of business cycles is lower in the decentralized economy with procyclical R&D than in the efficient allocation with countercyclical R&D. This is because the suboptimal propagation of shocks in the decentralized equilibrium offsets some of the existing steady-state distortions. In this second-best context, countercyclical R&D subsidies have no positive effect on welfare. In contrast, fiscal policies aimed at restoring the optimal steady-state produce large welfare gains.     

What is the optimal rate of R&D investment to maximize productivity growth?

Governments in modern economies devote much policy attention to enhancing productivity and continue to emphasize its drivers such as investment in R&D. This paper analyzes the relationship between productivity growth and levels of R&D investments. The econometric analysis shows that more than 65 per cent of productivity growth variance is due to its dependence on gross domestic expenditure on R&D expressed as percentage of GDP (GERD). Economic analysis shows that productivity growth = f(GERD) is a concave function downwards due to diminishing returns to research investments. In addition, the research shows that the range of GERD between 2.3 per cent and 2.6 per cent maximizes the long-run impact on productivity growth and it is the key to sustained productivity and technology improvements that are becoming more and more necessary to modern economic growth.     

Research and development,productive structure and economic effects: Assessing the role of public financing in Brazil

Investments in research and development (R&D) have played a key role in promoting productivity improvements and economic growth. This paper explores the economics effects of public R&D investment funding in Brazil, taking into account the changes in total factor productivity (TFP) in high-, medium- and low-technology sectors. Public funding plays an important role in the development of R&D activities in Brazil and its participation has increased since 2010. Our paper simulates a withdrawal of R&D investments and TFP linked to public financing from an R&D-based computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, which recognizes the stock-flow relation between R&D investment and knowledge capital. Without public R&D investment funding, the main findings indicate losses in TFP, adverse effects on the formation of physical capital, shrinkage of more intensive R&D industries, and more future dependence on the public sector for knowledge stock, especially for education.     

Asymmetric firms,technology sharing and R&D investment

We use a combination of theory and experiment to study the incentives for firms to share knowledge when they engage in research and development (R&D) in an uncertain environment. We consider both symmetric and asymmetric starting points with regards to the amount of initial knowledge firms have before conducting R&D and look at how differences in starting positions affect the willingness of firms to share knowledge. We investigate when and if firms find R&D cooperation beneficial and how investment in R&D is affected by the outcome of the sharing decisions. The experimental evidence shows that overall subjects tend to behave consistently with theoretical predictions for the sharing of knowledge, although leaders who are not compensated by a side payment from laggards are more willing to share than predicted by the theory, and leaders who are compensated are less willing. The data on investment suggests less investment with sharing than without, consistent with theory. Compared to exact numerical predictions, there is overinvestment or underinvestment except for symmetric firms under no sharing. All cases of overinvestment and underinvestment, regardless of sharing or not and regardless of starting positions, are well explained by smoothed-out best (quantal) responses.     

Cooperation vs. competition in R&D: The role of stability of equilibrium

We consider a model in which firms first choose process R&D expenditures and then compete in an output market. We show the symmetric equilibrium under R&D competition is sometimes unstable, in which case two asymmetric equilibria must also exist. For the latter, we find, in contrast to the literature that total profits are sometimes higher with R&D competition than with research joint venture cartelization (due to the cost asymmetry of the resulting duopoly in the noncooperative case). Furthermore, these equilibria provide another instance of R&D-induced firm heterogeneity.     

How do housing cycles influence listed firms’ R&D investment: evidence from the collateral channel

ABSTRACT

Firm innovation is essential to long-run economic growth. Financially constrained R&D firms may use firm-owned properties as collateral to finance their R&D projects. Therefore, the housing price cycle can affect firms’ R&D investment through influencing their real estate value. By examining listed R&D firms during the housing boom period 2002–2006 in the U.S., we find that a $1 increase in real estate value leads a firm to increase its R&D investment by $0.38. We also find that this collateral effect is more pronounced among financially constrained R&D firms than that among unconstrained ones. Additionally, we examine the housing bust period 2008–2012, and find that real estate depreciation retarded R&D investment, especially among constrained R&D firms.     

Asymmetry, stability and growth in a step-by-step R&D-race

We define a notion of stability of equilibrium in an infinitely repeated step-by-step R&D race. The unique symmetric equilibrium is shown to be unstable, and stable asymmetric equilibria arise, if product market competition is intense, firms are patient, imitation is difficult and innovations are large. Some predictions based on symmetric equilibria, e.g. that less patient firms always invest less in research, or that more intensive competition leads to higher economic growth, are reversed for “realistic” values of the underlying parameters.     

Investment and emission control under technology and pollution externalities

This paper studies incentives to develop advanced pollution abatement technology when technology may spillover across agents and pollution abatement is a public good. We are motivated by a variety of pollution control issues where solutions require the development and implementation of new pollution abatement technologies. We show that at the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game with R&D investment and emission abatement, whether the free rider effect prevails and under-investment and excess emissions occur depends on the degree of technology spillovers and the effect of R&D on the marginal abatement costs. There are cases in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium investments in emissions reductions exceed the first-best case.     

Research & development and growth: A Bayesian model averaging analysis

We examine the effect of research and development (R&D) on long-term economic growth using the Bayesian model averaging (BMA) to deal rigorously with model uncertainty. Previous empirical studies, which applied BMA, investigated the effect of dozens of regressors on long-term growth, but they did not examine the effect of R&D due to data unavailability. We extend these studies by proposing to capture the investment in R&D by the number of Nobel prizes in science. Using our indicator, the estimates show that R&D exerts a positive effect on long-term growth. This result is robust to many different parameter and model prior structures as well as to alternative definitions of R&D indicator.     

Demand Shift Effect of R&;D and the R&;D Organization

We assume that R&D investment by a firm improves the quality of the product. This is reflected in an upward shift of the demand function. Firms can do R&D either independently or cooperatively. We show that cooperative research strictly dominates non-cooperative research, both in terms of profitability and welfare. Also, R&D investment by each firm under cooperative research is larger for a relatively high R&D output elasticity. The higher the degree of product differentiation and/or larger the R&D output elasticity is, the larger the increase in quality level under cooperative research, compared to non-cooperative research, will be.     

The impact of corporate debt on long term investment and firm performance

Prior research indicates a linkage between debt, research and development (R&D) and physical investment, and that the relationship varies depending on the type of firm (science versus non–science). Leverage also plays a multidimensional role in corporate performance and growth. The relationship between financial leverage and R&D expenditure is analysed using a sample of large United States (US) manufacturing firms. Then, the impact of leverage on R&D expenditure is studied using corporate performance drivers as intermediate variables. The results indicate that there is a strong negative relationship between the degree of financial leverage and the level of R&D expenditure that firms undertake. The negative relationship is robust to changes in model specifications and sample periods. More importantly, the results show that it is higher leverage that leads to lower R&D expense rather than R&D causing variations in future leverage. In addition, the results indicate that higher leverage adversely influences future investment in R&D which may in turn lead to negative impact on long term operating performance and future growth opportunities.     

What are good R&D investment strategies for leaders and followers?

Research and development (R&D) investment affects the growth of firms in the same industry differently according to their technological positions. This study empirically investigates differences in how R&D investment influences firm growth between technological leaders and followers. Additionally, this study investigates the moderating effects of complementary assets and market competition on the relationship between R&D investment and firm growth. Using a sample of 2322 observations from 492 firms in the U.S. chemical and allied products industry for the period 2000–2009, we show that an increase in R&D investment leads to greater firm growth for technological followers than for technological leaders. We also find that the moderating effects of complementary assets and market competition vary depending on whether a firm is a technological leader or follower.     

Information disclosure, banking development and knowledge-driven growth

In this study we develop a knowledge-driven growth model which explicitly models the banking sector as monopolistically competitive. The main mechanism through which financial intermediaries affect the real economy is through the evaluation and provision of liquidity to R&D projects. We distinguish two scenarios. In the regime with information disclosure, banks are able to use the stock of information obtained by the banking industry from evaluating R&D projects. This information externality brings about efficiency improvements, thereby leading to a positive entry of banks, more bank-funded research and in turn positive economic growth. By contrast, in the regime with no information disclosure, it is not profitable for new banks to enter the industry. This implies that no more potential R&D projects can be evaluated and hence financed, thus leading the economy to a zero-growth equilibrium.     

Cooperative R&D and Commitment to A Policy of Know-how Trading

In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to investigate the impact of adopting a strategy of know-how trading on the degree of research and development (R&D) cooperation. We show that the consequences of cooperation in know-how sharing under the conditions of the model are similar to a policy of cooperation in R&D investments in areas with large spillovers. An industry-wide policy of cooperation among competitors with respect to R&D investment and sharing would simply result in maximal joint profits. This cooperative R&D outcome could be generalized to any degree of spillover other than 100%. In this paper, the commitment to a policy of know-how trading by the participants in an industry is explained by the firm’s attempt to induce the equilibrium of a single industry-wide cooperative research joint venture. In a repeated game framework, we show that pre-commitments by non-cooperative firms to disclose their own know-how to the industry can be effective in inducing cooperative R&D investments by the participants.     

Effects of a blocking patent on R&D with endogenous survival activities

This study analyzes the effect of strengthening patent protection for innovation and economic growth by introducing a blocking patent into the endogenous growth model developed by Furukawa (Econ Lett 121(1):26–29, 2013a), which features survival activity of patent holders in the R&D sector with a variety-expansion model. Results show that strengthening patent protection can raise the economic growth rate and social welfare through an endogenous survival investment. Additionally, this study examines the effects of increasing subsidies for R&D. We find that increasing R&D subsidy rate can negatively affect economic growth and social welfare because of the investment for survival activities. This result shows the novel role of a blocking patent in determining innovation effects of R&D subsidies. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of patent breadth which is another patent instrument in this model on innovation and economic growth. Results show that the growth and welfare effects of the profit-division rule and the subsidy rate for R&D may vary with the size of patent breadth.     

Does R&D spending boost tangible investment? An analysis on European firms

This article investigates the relationship between firm’s R&D intensity, expressed as R&D expenditure over sales, and investment intensity in tangible assets. It is commonly acknowledged that R&D requires additional physical investment to be implemented. R&D increases a firm’s productivity and return to tangible investments, thus, providing to the firm incentives to bear high tangible capital costs and to invest more. This represents a crucial issue for a firm’s growth, particularly considering the strong interaction between physical capital accumulation and technological progress. The analysis is based on a large sample of manufacturing firms across seven European countries in the period 2007–2009. Since the sub-sample of firms performing R&D might not be random, there may potentially be an endogeneity issue. The analysis also considers that firms may decide to spend on R&D and investment in physical capital simultaneously. The questions of both endogeneity and simultaneity are dealt with by employing an instrumental variable two-step procedure. We find a positive and significant impact of R&D intensity on firms’ tangible investment intensity. The econometric results highlight the importance of financial factors, particularly with respect to firms’ internal resources. Exposure to international trade has a negative impact on investment, possibly depending on the time-span of the sample used.

Abbreviations: Technological Innovation and R&D; Investment Capital; Industry Studies; Firm Behavior; Empirical Analysis