Higher Education: Subsidizing Tuition versus Subsidizing Student Loans

We use a simple two‐period equilibrium framework to explore the effects of two different subsidization regimes for higher education on the formation of human capital and on the distribution of incomes. Individuals finance their investments in higher education through income‐contingent education loans as well as subsidies from the government. The subsidy is tax‐financed. We compare an egalitarian subsidy scheme, which reduces by a uniform amount the tuition charged to students, with a student loan subsidy which is proportional to the student's debt service obligation. We show that both types of subsidies reduce the economy‐wide underinvestment in higher education and lead to a more equal income distribution. Furthermore, according to some social welfare criterion, the student loan subsidy regime dominates the tuition subsidy regime if the subsidy level is predetermined, while the converse is true if the subsidy level constitutes a choice variable of the government.     

Endogenous trade policy in general equilibrium: An interaction of redistribution rule,trade openness,and labor market condition

Using a general equilibrium framework, the paper derives trade policy endogenously for a small country. It shows that, contrary to the existing literature, a lobbying industry is not guaranteed trade protection; it may even face trade taxes. Besides lobbying, trade policy depends on other factors such as the trade revenue distribution rule, income distribution across groups, trade openness, factor substitutability in production, industry employment size, and labor market flexibility. The paper also shows that the observed phenomenon of government preference for import tariffs over export subsidies—a long overdue puzzle—is an inherent outcome of lobbying equilibrium. It also shows that trade policies such as import tariffs and export taxes that have the same impact on economic market—Lerner symmetry (1936)—are driven by the same forces in the political market.     

Assessing policies to equalize opportunity using an equilibrium model of educational and occupational choices

The inter-generational correlation of education in the U.S. is tremendous. For instance, in PSID data from 1990, young males with college-educated parents had a 70% chance of attending college. But those with high school drop-out parents had only a 15% chance. In this paper, we analyze the impact of college attendance bonus schemes designed to increase college attendance rates (and PV of lifetime income) of youth from disadvantaged backgrounds. Of course, policies that increase the supply of skilled labor may reduce the college wage premium (see Heckman et al. [Heckman, James, Lochner, Lance and Taber, Christopher, Explaining rising wage inequality: explorations with a dynamic equilibrium model of labor earnings with heterogeneous agents, Review of Economic Dynamics, 1 (1998a), 1–58; Heckman, James, Lochner, Lance and Taber, Christopher, General-equilibrium treatment effects: a study of tuition policy, American Economic Review, 88:2 (1998b), 381–386]). This may have the unintended consequence of wiping out most of the gains to the targeted groups. The strength of such equilibrium effects on wages depends on the substitutability between different types of labor. Thus, it is important to evaluate education subsidies within an equilibrium framework that allows for flexible patterns of substitution across factor inputs. This is exactly what we do here, using an overlapping generations equilibrium model of the U.S. labor market fit to PSID data from 1968 to 1996. The model allows for imperfect substitution among types of labor differentiated by education, gender, age and ten (1-digit level) occupations — a much finer differentiation than has been considered in prior work.We find that very large college attendance bonuses are necessary to equate college attendance rates between youth whose parents had only high school degrees or were high school dropouts and youth whose parents attended at least some college. The size of these bonuses far exceeds any reasonable measure of college costs; suggesting the “costs” the bonuses overcome are primarily psychic or effort costs. For example, youth from disadvantaged backgrounds may be poorly prepared for college. This suggests that bonuses targeted at college age youth are probably a very inefficient way to reduce inequality. Earlier intervention is likely called for.     

UNIVERSAL ACCESS,PARALLEL TRADE AND INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE

Governments often subsidize poorer groups in society to ensure their access to new drugs. We analyse the optimal income‐based price subsidies in a strategic environment. We show that universal access is less likely to arise when price arbitrage prevents international price discrimination. When this is not the case, under some income ranges, bilateral universal coverage can be supported by equilibrium subsidies together with bilateral partial provision. In such a case, international health policy coordination becomes relevant. We also show that asymmetric universal access to medicines across countries can arise, even when countries are ex ante symmetric, when international price discrimination is possible and governments cannot design subsidies proportional to either income or quality.     

MEASURING THE IMPACT OF VALUING HEALTH INSURANCE ON LEVELS AND TRENDS IN INEQUALITY AND HOW THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010 COULD AFFECT THEM

A substantial part of the U.S. inequality literature focuses on yearly levels and trends in pre‐tax, post‐transfer cash income and its distribution over time and finds that median income appears to be stagnating, with income growth primarily coming at higher income levels. When we use data from the Current Population Survey for 1995–2008 and add the value of employer‐ and government‐provided health insurance coverage, not only does it increase the upward trend in the level of resources controlled by Americans, but also reduces the level of inequality in these resources and its upward trend. We then provide a highly stylized example of this broader income measure's value in capturing the impact of two key provisions of the Affordable Care Act of 2010—an expansion in Medicaid and the provision of subsidies to lower‐income families for purchasing private coverage on state‐run exchanges. Even though these incremental expansions build on existing systems of government‐provided health insurance, we find that the vast majority of the benefits would still accrue to the bottom three deciles of the income distribution when we include the value of employer‐ and government‐provided health insurance in our expanded yearly income measure. (JEL D31, H51, I14)     

Italy’s demographic trap: Voting for childcare subsidies and fertility outcomes

In this paper we study how population aging impacts the age distribution of the voting electorate and voters’ choices over childcare subsidies. We build a computable general equilibrium framework populated by heterogeneous agents who, over the course of their life-cycle, make endogenous and age-dependent fertility choices. The model is calibrated to match economic and population outcomes of the Italian economy. Child support favors young and fertile cohorts but can also impact all population subgroups through changes in prices, income taxation and population growth. A probabilistic voting model is used to measure voting outcomes over a range of childcare subsidy levels and tax policies. Our findings show that childcare subsidies have a positive impact on the total fertility rate and are welfare improving when financed with both capital and labor income taxation and in combination with lower pension contribution rates. A 10 percent increase in the level of subsidies can increase the population growth rate by an average of 0.47–0.70 percentage points. We find that voting choices of different population subgroups, while depending on the tax used to finance new expenditure, lead to lower levels of childcare subsidies, lower fertility rates and to a demographic ‘trap’.     

REMOVING THE “VEIL OF IGNORANCE”: NONLINEARITIES IN EDUCATION EFFECTS ON GENDER WAGE INEQUALITIES

A large literature studies the mean gender wage gap in developing countries and finds mixed evidence about the role of education policies in closing gender earnings inequalities. We contribute to this literature by exploring two types of nonlinearities in wage earning regressions: (1) nonlinearities on the effects of education on expected earnings along the distribution of education endowments; and (2) heterogeneities on the contributions of education to the gender wage gap at different quantiles of the wage distribution. Our analyses provide new insights on how these nonlinear effects can be used to set up better targeted gender and development policies. (JEL I26, C14)     

A Welfare Analysis of Policy Responses to the Skilled Wage Premium

I build a model with heterogeneous agents which is consistent both with rising wage inequality across education levels and with an increasing relative number of college graduates. I use the model to investigate the welfare implications of policies which influence the structure of net wages. Each policy affects agents directly through taxes and subsides and indirectly as wages respond to changes in the relative supply of skilled and unskilled workers. I find that as wage inequality grows due to skill-biased technological change, policies which promote a more egalitarian wage structure can become increasingly acceptable to all agents and that for nearly all agents, education subsidies may be preferred to direct transfers as a means of decreasing wage inequality. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E60, I28, H52.     

Systematic Political Grass–Root Support for Tariffs

The leading political–economy–of–trade models are virtually silent on two fundamental questions raised by Rodrik in 1995. Why are trade policies systematically biased against trade? And why are tariffs rather than more efficient production subsidies adopted to redistribute income? This paper shows that systematic political grass–root support for trade–restricting and inefficient tariffs emerges when the government has a revenue goal and collecting taxes is costly. Even if no tax instrument enjoys an advantage with respect to collection costs and the factor ownership distribution is unbiased, more people support tariffs than import or production subsidies. More generally, the presence of tax–collection costs creates a grass–root support bias for taxes over subsidies as instruments to redistribute income.     

Education,Innovation and Long‐Run Growth

We extend a second‐generation Schumpeterian growth model to incorporate human capital accumulation to clarify the general equilibrium effects of subsidy policies on human capital accumulation and R&D activities in a unified framework. Despite the conventional argument that subsidies always stimulate these growth‐promoting activities, we find that subsidies asymmetrically affect human capital accumulation and R&D activities. Our theoretical results suggest that research using standard models of human capital might find false negative relationships between education subsidies and economic growth.     

The Increase in College Premium and the Decline in Low‐Skill Wages: A Signaling Story

The increase in the college premium over the last 30 years in the United States is to a large extent driven by a reduction in noncollege wages. We show that the signaling effects triggered by an improvement in the incentives to attend higher education can explain this fact, as well as the increase in the number of college graduates. Under imperfect credit markets and wealth heterogeneity, higher education is not only a signal of ability but also of individuals' (parents') wealth. General conditions on the distribution of wealth guarantee that after an increase in incentives to attend higher education, the absence of a college degree becomes a more evident signal of low ability. This results in a reduction in low‐skill wages but not necessarily in increased high skill wages. The increased incentives to enroll in college can either arise from a skill‐biased technology change or an improvement in access to higher education. An important difference is that while skill‐biased technology change always results in an increase in the college premium, that is not necessarily the case when the increased incentives to enroll arise from improved access to higher education.     

ACCOUNTING FOR SRI LANKA'S EXPENDITURE INEQUALITY 1980–2002: REGRESSION-BASED DECOMPOSITION APPROACHES

Sri Lanka liberalized its economy in 1977, paving the way for more rapid economic growth and higher rates of job creation. But tensions over distributional issues still plague the body politic. This paper investigates the evolution of Sri Lanka's expenditure distribution in the period 1980–2002 and uses three decomposition methodologies—the Fields, the Shapley value decomposition, and Yun's unified method—to determine underlying causes. The study finds that while average adjusted expenditure rose across strata, the rich experienced more rapid expenditure growth leading to greater inequality. Inequality change was driven by differential access to infrastructure, education, and occupation status. Demographic factors, including ethnicity, and spatial factors contributed very little. The study recommends policies that ensure more equitable access to income earning assets such as education and infrastructure services, and that contain the rise in inequality along sectoral, regional, and ethnic fault lines.     

Rethinking Hecs: Its Definition and Fiscal Role in Compensating for Non-deductibility of Tuition Fees

This paper develops a two period model of the higher education decision to determine the required return from higher education. It uses the model to calculate the proportion of full tuition costs which should be charged 'up front' under the Australian Higher Education Scheme (HECS), in order to compensate for the fact that such fees are not deductible against income for tax purposes. Because full tuition costs represent less than 11 per cent of the total costs of higher education, the ideal HECS ratio is relatively high, in the region of 0.7. The low relative importance of tuition costs means that fee subsidy schemes cannot possibly compensate for other distortions such as income tax progression which persist over the working life of graduates.     

ENTREPRENEURSHIP OVER THE LIFE CYCLE: WHERE ARE THE YOUNG ENTREPRENEURS?

Most individuals do not start a business and, if they do, they start well into their 30s. To explain these stylized facts, I estimate a dynamic Roy model with experience accumulation, risk aversion, and imperfect information about ability using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Information frictions and income risk reduce entrepreneurship by up to 40% and 35%, respectively. Entry costs and information frictions explain most of the delayed entry. Results from counterfactual policies targeting delayed entry suggest that entrepreneurship education can yield higher returns than subsidies. Fostering young entrepreneurship yields higher returns than fostering old entrepreneurship.     

ACCOUNTING FOR SRI LANKA'S EXPENDITURE INEQUALITY 1980–2002: REGRESSION-BASED DECOMPOSITION APPROACHES

Sri Lanka liberalized its economy in 1977, paving the way for more rapid economic growth and higher rates of job creation. But tensions over distributional issues still plague the body politic. This paper investigates the evolution of Sri Lanka's expenditure distribution in the period 1980–2002 and uses three decomposition methodologies—the Fields, the Shapley value decomposition, and Yun's unified method—to determine underlying causes. The study finds that while average adjusted expenditure rose across strata, the rich experienced more rapid expenditure growth leading to greater inequality. Inequality change was driven by differential access to infrastructure, education, and occupation status. Demographic factors, including ethnicity, and spatial factors contributed very little. The study recommends policies that ensure more equitable access to income earning assets such as education and infrastructure services, and that contain the rise in inequality along sectoral, regional, and ethnic fault lines.     

我国三峡库区移民家庭收入的微观影响因素

利用重庆市云阳县移民的调查数据,按移民类型和受教育程度对移民家庭收入进行统计分析。然后,按移民类型、受教育程度、年龄段进行分组,对影响移民家庭收入的微观因素进行回归估计。结果显示:移民家庭的经营土地对其家庭收入的贡献不大;劳动力对家庭收入的贡献最大;从年龄结构的角度看,31～45岁、46～60岁年龄段的劳动力对家庭收入的贡献最大;当劳动力的人均受教育年限达到大专水平时,家庭收入会随着劳动力文化水平的提高而增加;16～30岁年龄组中大专文化劳动力比例对家庭收入的贡献显著为正;31～45岁、46～60岁年龄组中初中文化劳动力比例对家庭收入的贡献显著为负;劳动力的非农业收入明显高于农业收入。最后提出:应鼓励移民从事非农业;鼓励青年和中年劳动力向工业和服务业发达的城市自愿流动;鼓励移民子女接受大专及以上教育;尽快健全城镇和农村移民的养老保险制度和最低生活保障制度。     

Educational opportunity and income inequality

Affordable higher education is, and has been, a key element of social policy in the United States with broad bipartisan support. Financial aid has substantially increased the number of people who complete university—generally thought to be a good thing. We show, however, that making education more affordable can increase income inequality. The mechanism that drives our results is a combination of credit constraints and the ‘signaling’ role of education first explored by Spence [Spence, A. Michael, 1973. Job Market Signalling, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3) Aug., 355–374]. When borrowing for education is difficult, lack of a college education could mean that one is either of low ability or of high ability but with low financial resources. When government programs make borrowing or lower tuition more affordable, high-ability persons become educated and leave the uneducated pool, driving down the wage for unskilled workers and raising the skill premium.     

Economic–social interaction in China1

This paper analyzes economic–social interaction in China in connection with the country's change of economic system. I define an economic system in terms of a multi‐dimensional vector of broad institutional characteristics, and I emphasize that important features of the social development are closely related to specific changes in these various dimensions. I classify China's options for future social improvements into three broad categories: (i) policies that improve the stability and distribution of factor income; (ii) government‐created wedges between factor income and disposable income; and (iii) improvements in the quantity, quality and distribution of human services, such as education and healthcare.     

Taxes,Tuition Fees,and Education for Pleasure

The fact that education provides both a productive and a consumptive (nonproductive) return has important and, in some cases, dramatic implications for optimal taxes and tuition fees. Using a simple model, we show that when the consumption share in education is endogenous and tuition fees are unconstrained, the optimal tax/fee system involves regressive income taxes and high tuition fees. A progressive labor income tax system may, on the other hand, be a second‐best response to politically constrained, low tuition fees. Finally, the existence of individuals with different abilities will also move the optimal income tax system toward progressivity.