Political institutions and economic volatility

We examine the effect of political ‘institutions’ on economic growth volatility, using data from more than 100 countries over the period 1960 to 2005, taking into account various control variables as suggested in previous studies. Our indicator of volatility is the relative standard deviation of the growth rate of GDP per capita. The results of a dynamic panel model indicate that democracy reduces economic volatility. We also find that some dimensions of political instability and policy uncertainty increase economic volatility.     

Is democracy good for growth? — Development at political transition time matters

Is democracy a better political regime for economic prosperity than autocracy? This paper shows that the answer depends on the initial economic development level during the democratic transition when the foundation of institutions was laid. Democracy facilitates growth only in countries that already have adequate development at transition time. These countries are more likely to create and sustain growth-enhancing institutions than others. Without appropriate development, democracy does not improve growth; this applies to about 40% of the third-wave democratized countries. These results are based on a sample of 153 countries in 1960–2010 and robust to various specifications and endogeneity issues.     

Wealth inequality,democracy and economic freedom

Using a novel panel data set from the Credit Suisse on the top wealth shares for 46 sample countries spanning 2000–2014, this paper empirically investigates to what extent wealth inequality influences economic freedom and whether this relationship is affected by the level of democracy. Economic freedom is measured by the Fraser Institute's economic freedom summary index as well as its five major sub-indices, such as government size, property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade, and regulations. Wealth inequality is measured by the top wealth shares. Trade union density is used as an instrument for wealth inequality. Empirical results suggest that the rising wealth inequality significantly hampers overall economic freedom, property rights protection, freedom to trade, soundness of money and regulatory environment. Furthermore, this negative effect of wealth inequality is reinforced at a lower level of democracy. These findings are robust to alternative measures of wealth inequality, economic freedom, treatment for endogeneity, and model specification.     

The effect of democracy on different categories of economic freedom

Many empirical studies conclude that democracy increases economic freedom. However, these studies use highly aggregated indices of economic freedom, which eliminates interesting information. The purpose of this paper is to study empirically how in developing countries different categories of economic freedom are affected by democracy, measured either as political rights or civil liberties. Democracy appears to have a positive effect on the economic freedom categories Government Operations and Regulations and Restraints on International Exchange, but no effect on the categories Money and Inflation and Takings and Discriminatory Taxation. That a high level of democracy would have a negative effect on economic freedom reform receives no support in this study. The robustness of the results to the model specification and extreme points is tested.     

Autocracy,Democracy, and FDI Inflows to the Developing Countries

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between political regimes and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to the developing countries for a sample of 134 countries over the 1983–2002 period. Using two categorical measures of regime type and three different measures of FDI, this study finds that, regardless of the measures of regime type, democracies are not significantly associated with either FDI in level or FDI as a ratio to GDP; democracy is positively related to a higher level of per capita FDI, but this result is not robust to alternative measures of political regime. Taken as a whole, there is no evidence of a systematic relationship between democracy and FDI inflows. This result suggests that being a democracy does not help attract higher levels of FDI.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM: A SURVEY

A large literature has found positive associations between economic freedom and income, growth, and a variety of other desirable outcomes. This paper surveys the literature that seeks to explain the causes of economic freedom. Some of the most consistent findings in this literature are that current levels of economic freedom are strongly correlated with past levels; freer countries have more difficulty continuing to improve their economic freedom; democracy and political freedom are positively associated with economic freedom; and inequality is negatively related. (JEL E02, E14, O17, O43, P1)     

Trade uncertainty,income, and democracy

Existing studies establish a strong correlation between income and democracy. Little, however, is known about whether income shocks driven by non-economic fundamentals matter for political transitions. This study employs trade uncertainty as a non-economic fundamental and examines the effect that trade uncertainty driven income variations have on democratic transitions over the period 1960–2013. We find that higher income fosters democratic transitions, but this effect works mainly for developing than developed countries. Specifically, using trade uncertainty as an instrument, we find that the Polity2 score, a measure of democracy, increases by at least 2.3 points following a 1 percentage point increase in GDP growth. This positive association is robust to exploiting conditional heteroskedasticity for identification, using different time periods, including lagged Polity2 as a regressor, and using alternative measures of GDP and democracy.     

Level of economic development and political democracy revisited

This article reassesses a democracy-economic development linkage for the period 1972 to 1990. The results show that economic development has a significant effect on democratic performance in the semiperiphery and periphery, yet in an opposite direction. For the core, there is no linkage from economic development to political performance. Moreover, the finding also suggests that democracy enhances economic development only in the core and semiperiphery. This finding thus contradicts Barro's [1996] contention that more democracy enhances economic growth at low levels of political freedom, but it depresses economic growth when a moderate level of freedom has already been attained.     

Democracy vs. dictatorship

A democratic society is often regarded as a prerequisite for economic growth and development. Yet, most empirical studies are not capable of identifying a positive link between GDP growth and democracy indexes. In addition, it is a stylized empirical fact that: (i) most developing countries are dictatorships; and (ii) many poor dictatorships have experienced high growth performances and emerged from poverty such as South Korea, China and Egypt. Against this background, it is of interest to analyse in which ways the growth performance between autocratic and democratic economies may differ, in particular among low-income countries. To answer this question, we compare the endogenous growth paths of two economies that differ only in their political regimes in the context of an overlapping generations model. The key features of the model are: (i) a positive bequest motive in the form of investments in education or productive public capital (infrastructure); (ii) a higher marginal (inter-temporal) utility of consumption today versus consumption tomorrow in low-income countries (for example, subsistence level of consumption); and (iii) a dictator that cares about her income or the income of her dynasty tomorrow. In this framework, we demonstrate that poor but large and stable dictatorships exhibit a higher equilibrium growth rate than comparable (equally poor) democracies. Moreover, there exists a particular threshold value in income such that the growth-reducing impact of dictatorial consumption (corruption) outweighs the higher (initial) public investments. Above this, the growth rate under democracy dominates the one in dictatorship.     

State Development Planning: Did it Create an East Asian Miracle?

East Asian countries have recorded large increases in per capita GDP over the last fifty years. Some observers have referred to this growth as an “East Asian Miracle.” One popular explanation attributes the rapid growth to state led industrial development planning. This paper critically assesses the arguments surrounding state development planning and East Asia’s growth. Whether the state can acquire the knowledge necessary to calculate which industries it should promote and how state development planning can deal with political incentive problems faced by planners are both examined. When we look at the development record of East Asian countries we find that to the extent development planning did exist, it could not calculate which industries would promote development, so it instead promoted industrialization. We also find that what rapid growth in living standards did occur can be better explained by free markets than state planning because, as measured in economic freedom indexes, these countries were some of the most free market in the world.JEL classification: O200, O170, O530, B530, P170