浅析行政诉讼中的证明责任分配

证明责任,是证明主体为了使自己的诉讼主张得到法院裁判的确认,所承担的提供和运用证据支持自己的主张以避免对于己方不利的诉讼后果的责任.作为三大诉讼之一的行政诉讼,意味着对于被管理者的公民、法人和其他组织的权利的一种保障和补救.考虑到平衡公共权力和个人权利的功能,其证明责任的分配同其他诉讼间存在.本文从分析行政诉讼双方证明责任的承担入手,旨在研究行政诉讼中的证明责任.     

美国司法民事没收诉讼的证明

美国司法民事没收诉讼的证明主要包括证明责任、证明标准和证明对象三项内容。美国民事没收诉讼中的证明责任主要由提出没收诉讼的政府承担,政府应提供充分的证据证明被诉财产应当被没收的事实;其证明标准采用民事诉讼中的"优势证据"的证明标准。美国民事没收诉讼中的证明对象是被诉财产的可没收性,即被诉财产是犯罪收益或者被诉财产是犯罪工具、为犯罪提供了便利的财产或者是卷入了犯罪的财产,并且它们与导致没收的犯罪之间有"实质联系"。     

中国持有型犯罪的证明责任研究

中国的持有型犯罪证明责任问题来源于对持有型犯罪中“不能说明来源（合法）的”或“拒不说明来源与用途的”的立法功能理解。它们是追究持有型犯罪的关联犯罪的诉讼环节中出现的经验事实，被立法者规定为持有型犯罪成立所必须的、一种前提性的附加条件。在规范解释意义上，它们本质上是实体的。持有型犯罪证明责任问题其实是一个伪问题。     

抽逃出资的认定

抽逃出资的民事责任既不能被归入传统民法的合同责任,也无法被归入侵权责任,只能被作为一种独立的、特殊的责任看待.此种独立损害赔偿责任并未在《公司法》中得以明确规定,仅由司法解释创设,既为一项独立请求权,则必定要探讨其构成要件、证明责任分配规则以及法律后果.     

论我国反性骚扰的法律制度瓶颈

我国没有制定专门的反歧视法，而是将反歧视条款分散规定在不同的法律条文中。反性骚扰问题在2005年修改的《妇女权利保障法》中对做了原则性规定，在个别地方立法中也有所体现，但由于缺乏可操作性，性骚扰案件在诉讼中多以失败告终。终究其原因，是与我国现阶段反歧视法立法的缺位，与“性骚扰”概念的不明确，与诉讼制度中证明标准缺乏适应性骚扰案件实际特征的相应调整大有关系。笔者将结合近年我国发生的性骚扰案例，分析我国现行法律制度对于解决此问题存在的瓶颈。     

环境侵权民事责任的因果关系推定

与一般侵权行为相比,环境民事侵权行为认定的困难在于污染环境行为的复杂性,以及损害结果的不确定性,从而导致因果关系认定的困难。法官需要根据举证责任分配标准,适当地分配举证责任,力图通过原告的举证责任和被告的说服责任,达到一定的证明程度,以对案件事实形成内心确信。     

论海事赔偿责任限制案件中管辖权分配

在我国的海事审判实践中,申请海事赔偿责任限制与设立海事赔偿责任限制基金是两个分别独立的程序,而相对应的管辖权也各自独立,由此需要进一步分析这一制度设置下引起的海事责任限制基金设立、分配以及确权诉讼等程序中的相关问题。     

会计责任与审计责任难以界定的原因分析

会计责任和审计责任是一对联系紧密的概念，两者通过受托经济责任紧密地联系在一起；同时，会计责任和审计责任是注册会计师审计中两个不同的概念，它们涉及到注册会计师和被审计单位的责任划分和可能承担的法律责任。纵观世界各国历史，由于两者界定不清，曾经引起了一系列的诉讼案件。当前许多行业因不了解审计活动而常常把会计责任与审计责任混为一谈。事实上会计责任与审计责任是两种不同的概念。政府应加大宣传力度，完善相关法律，当审计失败案例发生时，既要加大对注册会计师的处罚力度，也要加大对企业会计造假的处罚力度。     

论刑事证明责任承担

本文着重在于介绍刑事诉讼中证明责任由谁来承担的问题，通过分析实际的案例，对现实中存在的对证明责任承担模糊、错误的认识予以澄清，以期达到在实践中能正确适用的目的。     

表见证明在学生人身伤害事故诉讼中的适用

表见证明是依据一般的生活经验法则来推定待证事实的存在与否,不涉及实体法上的规定,只是在诉讼中对经验规则适应的评价。在学生人身伤害事故中引入表见证明,可以减轻当事人的举证责任,保护弱势学生一方的合法权益,也有利于法官正确认定案件事实,提高了诉讼效率。在诉讼中,法官也要充分保障学校对表见证明提出反证的权利。     

Incentive Contracts for Infrastructure,Litigation and Weak Institutions

In this paper we revisit incentive contract design in a simple setting, after developing a model that captures the fact that in weak institutional settings the procurement of large scale public works through contracts with strong incentives for private firms, may result in excessive litigation over contract terms. This result is possible because we assume that parties in litigation can influence (by purchasing better or more legal services) the observable merits of their case. In weak institutional settings, governments have an inherent disadvantage in these litigation contests. We show that a commitment to a prespecified level of litigation effort by the government, together with weaker incentive contracts, is a more efficient procurement mechanism.Jel Classification: D8, H57, H54, K41, K23, L51     

Limited attention and the optimal incompleteness of contracts

A decision-maker's limited attention is allocated between writingnew contracts and directing current contracts. More time spentwriting a new contract makes the contract more complete. A morecomplete contract performs better and generates higher returns.The optimal allocation of attention implies two types of contracts,relational and market. A relational contract, which is directedperiodically, is optimally less complete than a market contract,which is not directed. The completeness of relational contractsdecreases with the ability to direct contracts, since changingcircumstances can be dealt with later. In addition, the completenessof relational contracts increases with the ability to writenew contracts, since more complete relational contracts aredirected less frequently and leave more time for writing newcontracts. The optimal allocation of attention to relationalcontracts is socially efficient even though it does not maximizethe discounted expected returns of the firm.     

A Simple Model of Contract Enforcement Institutions

We demonstrate that in highly productive economies contract enforcement institutions are endogenously established, and partnership contracts correct inefficient land allocation. In less productive economies, however, such institutions are not established, and partnership contracts are not formed. In economies with intermediate productivity levels, multiple Nash equilibria exist; that is, contract enforcement institutions are established in the high Nash equilibrium whereas they are not formed in the low Nash equilibrium. In this case, institutional quality can be diverse across economies. We also prove that improvement in institutional quality reduces within‐country inequality. All these outcomes are consistent with cross‐country observations.     

环境公益的司法救济

保护环境公益是环境保护最重要的方面。在目前的中国,环境公益受到损害主要依赖于行政机关的救济。然而,仅仅依赖行政救济不足以保护环境公益,我们还需要司法救济。环境公益的司法救济途径有二种,即环境民事公益诉讼和环境行政公益诉讼,二者在诉讼目的、诉讼主体、举证责任、诉讼效果等方面具有诸多的相同点和差异,比较它们的异同对于我国构建环境公益诉讼制度具有积极的指导意义。     

商品契约优于要素契约——以农业产业化经营中的契约选择为例

本文以农业产业化经营中的商品契约为例 ,说明商品契约完全有可能在长期内稳定 ,以至于足以保证龙头企业长期支配农户的土地和劳动力要素 ,从而达到与要素契约相同的效果。商品契约的稳定性主要是通过专用性投资和市场在确保履约方面的作用来实现的。这一结论在一定程度上证伪了科斯和张五常的一些看法。他们认为 ,企业和市场的区别就是要素契约和商品契约的区别。基于农业生产过程中的特殊性 ,单纯的要素契约很难在现阶段的农业生产过程中发挥作用 ,本文的结论不仅为农业产业化经营中的契约选择提供思路 ,也对中国农业发展的路径作了探讨。     

中国举证时限制度的改革与完善

举证时限制度是民事证据制度的重要内容之一,它是落实中国民事诉讼证明责任制度、审限制度不可或缺的手段,也是实现诉讼效率和程序公正价值的重要途径。从举证时限的理论基础及相关背景着手,分析举证时限制度的现状及其在实际运用中存在的问题,提出了完善中国民事诉讼举证时限制度的立法构想。     

Court Efficiency and Procurement Performance

Disputes over penalties for breaching a contract are often resolved in court. A simple model illustrates how inefficient courts can sway public buyers from enforcing a penalty for late delivery in order to avoid litigation, thereby inducing sellers to delay contract delivery. By using a large dataset on Italian public procurement, we empirically study the effects of court inefficiency on public work performance. Where courts are inefficient, we find the following: public works are delivered with longer delays; delays increase for more valuable contracts; contracts are more often awarded to larger suppliers; and a higher share of the payment is postponed after delivery. Other interpretations receive less support from the data.     

The optimality of nominal contracts

Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive cash balances. Received: March 29, 1996; revised version: February 25, 1997     

反倾销导向下环境成本的探讨

反倾销不仅仅是单纯的法律问题,也涉及到会计上的纷争。从会计角度看,出口产品的环境成本缺位,是引起反倾销一个不可忽视的原因。为提高应诉反倾销会计举证的有效性,出口企业提供准确、完善的环境成本资料至关重要。为此,可以根据产品生命周期理论来界定环境成本的内容,运用变动成本法与作业成本法相结合的方法进行环境成本核算。