垄断性资源定价、竞合博弈与序贯决策——以铁矿为例

文章依据铁矿石价格谈判的背景和原则,构建了供应链上游资源垄断者和下游两生产企业之间竞争及竞合的两个博弈定价模型。研究表明,供应链上游资源垄断者主要依据下游生产企业的利润水平确定其资源定价,影响下游议价能力的根本因素是其产量而非谈判技巧,竞合策略下价格谈判的先行者将获得更大的产量和利润优势。算例仿真结果则显示,与竞争策略相比,合作谈判策略能有效提高供应链下游生产企业的议价能力,降低上游垄断者的资源定价能力,有效缩减整体谈判成本。     

上游两家企业的产业链产品转移定价研究

文章通过建立价格博弈模型,对上游两家企业和下游一家企业组成的产业链产品转移定价问题进行了研究。讨论了转移产品的价格上下游企业均不能确定、由上游企业制定和由下游企业制定三种定价方式下,产业链各企业的利益分配,分析并提出了由科技领先或优化管理流程而引起的生产成本降低是上游企业在不同竞争条件下获取更大利润的前提,得出上游两家企业谁的生产成本低谁获利大的结论。同时也得出了无论上游企业还是下游企业,谁在产业链中具有价格决定权,谁将获取更大的利润。     

下游厂商纵向一体化研究——基于中间产品质量的视角

产品质量问题引发了一系列的社会问题.中间产品的低质量造成了最终产品的低质量.上游厂商利用中间产品生产的信息不对称,产生了以牺牲质量来降低成本的机会主义行为,给下游厂商造成了巨大的损失.中间产品的低价格和生产的信息不对称是中间产品低质量产生的根源,通过研究发现厂商纵向一体化消除了中间产品生产的信息不对称及由此引起的内生交易费用.本文用一般性的数理模型分析了厂商纵向一体化的条件,并得出结论.     

“递进”买方势力视角下两部收费制的规制机理研究--兼论政府反垄断部门应对策略

近年来,两部收费制策略引发的反垄断案件频发,下游买方势力的逐渐增强使得纵向控制规制问题变得更加错综复杂。以往研究对买方势力动态变化影响企业策略性决策以及弱化上游市场竞争的问题关注不足。基于此,构建由上游在位者、潜在进入者和下游零售商组成的纵向产业链模型,以下游零售商买方势力的递进变化为切入点,深度剖析两部收费制策略的内在规制机理。结果表明:当下游企业没有买方势力或者具有较弱的抗衡势力时,两部收费制策略从本质上并未弱化上游市场竞争。然而,一旦潜在进入者无法打破在位者建立的进入壁垒,在位者便会充分利用其市场支配地位实施转售价格维持、搭售等一系列纵向控制手段,进而弱化上游市场竞争,以期实现“一家独大”。当下游企业主导交易时,在满足一定条件下,通道费合约会产生排他效应,其弱化上游竞争的程度有限。因此,政府反垄断部门制定规制政策应充分考虑企业纵向控制和逆纵向控制行为。     

考虑紧急订货的供应链库存控制策略研究

库存控制的研究一般只考虑正常订货的情况，但实际上紧急订货经常出现。供应链库存控制策略的制定时，上游厂商为下游厂商的紧急订货准备一定量的产品，可以减少缺货损失，降低成本。本文在分析了考虑紧急订货的供应链库存控制成本的基础上，提出了关于最优策略的数量模型，并给出了求取最优解的方法。     

生产资料与生活资料市场价格传导关系的断裂

一、价格传导关系受阻及其代表性解释始于2003年的这轮经济增长使价格传导关系呈现出许多新的特点,其中最引人注目的是,上游产品价格涨幅远远大于下游产品价格涨幅,上游产品涨价后不能及时向经济学家……下游传导、生产资料价格上涨不能向居民消费价格传导。这一现象引起了经济     

生态产业链上下游企业的价格激励机制分析

下游企业对上游企业改造副产品的合理定价是构建生态产业链的关键问题。文章通过对完全信息情况下和不完全信息情况下的价格激励模型分析,得出如下结论:当上下游企业信息对称时,下游企业可提供固定价格合同,以诱使上游企业采取有效率的努力水平;当上下游企业信息不对称时,下游企业可对低成本参数型上游企业提供固定价格合同,对高成本参数型上游企业提供成本分摊合同,尽管此合同菜单使高成本参数型上游企业的努力水平向下扭曲了,但它避免了低成本参数型上游企业模仿高成本参数型上游企业。     

纵向约束：来自外部性与信息不对称角度的解释

研究在一种中国产品市场上扮演供给角色的上游企业和该种产品的需求者即下游企业的关系出于一种考虑：下游企业在转换产品的形态或直接销售时做出的进一步决策,是在中间产品被上游企业售出后作出的，由于下游企业的这些决策影响上游企业的利润，因此上游企业控制下游企业的这些决策。     

基于钢企纵向一体化程度下的竞争博弈分析

在铁矿石寡头市场供应情况下，钢企的纵向一体化程度又受到产业链上下游企业竞争博弈的影响。文章以博弈论为工具，建立了一个上游矿企寡头供应商和下游纵向一体化钢企的两阶段动态竞争博弈。第一阶段，下游钢企进行Cournot博弈，在无差异生产条件下，钢企一体化程度影响到各自边际成本和产量。第二阶段，在无产量约束或有Bertrand博弈均衡产量为约束条件下，上游寡头矿企之间进行Bertrand寡头博弈，以分析铁矿价格对钢企的一体化程度的影响。最后得出：上游矿企寡头供应商竞争状况决定作为中间产品的铁矿的价格，而铁矿原料的价格又影响到下游钢企一体化程度的趋势变化。从而在今后市场竞争中，为我国钢企获取原料资源以及经营决策提供了参考。     

论需求波动与资产专用性对煤电产业纵向一体化的影响

煤电产业链的纵向安排既受到需求波动的影响,也受制于专用性投资。当煤需求不足时,上游成本差异决定了可能出现的市场结构:兼并追随或成本高的上游厂商U2的前向一体化;当成本差异足够大时,只可能出现事前垄断。在需求过剩时,所有纵向市场结构都可能出现。如果成本差异足够大,成本低的上游厂商U1和下游厂商D1一定合并,被迫的兼并追随可能发生。对我国煤电产业的分析表明,从煤电产业长远发展来看,一体化应该是一种有利的纵向安排,但其负面效应也不容忽视。     

Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship

This paper investigates the effects of bargaining power on downstream firms’ profits. Consider a vertically related industry consisting of one upstream and two downstream firms, the latter having different marginal costs. Each pair bargains over a linear wholesale price, and then the downstream firms engage in Cournot competition. We show that the inefficient downstream firm may benefit from an increase in the bargaining power of the upstream firm. Furthermore, we obtain similar results when each downstream firm trades with its exclusive upstream agent, under non-linear demand function, or when downstream firms compete in price.     

Exclusion via Non‐Exclusive Contracts

We establish that non‐linear vertical contracts can allow an incumbent to exclude an upstream rival in a setting that does not rely on the exclusivity of the incumbent's contracts with downstream firms or any limits on distribution channels available to the incumbent or rival. The optimal contract we describe is a three‐part quantity discounting contract that involves the payment of an allowance to a downstream distributor and a marginal wholesale price below the incumbent's marginal cost for sufficiently large quantities. The optimal contract is robust to allowing parties to renegotiate contracts in case of entry.     

Market Games in Successive Oligopolies

This paper introduces a new approach to successive oligopolies. We draw on market games à la Shapley–Shubik to examine how successive oligopolies operate between downstream and upstream markets when the input price is determined by the action of all firms, downstream and upstream both. This approach differs from the classical one as it allows us to consider downstream firms that exercise market power both in both downstream and upstream markets. We perform a comparison of the market outcome with each scenarios as well as a welfare analysis.     

On intrabrand and interbrand competition: The strategic role of fees and royalties

We examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition. We characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty (or wholesale price) and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms. Royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals. When the number of downstream firms is endogenous, each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm. This result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments. We discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per-unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives.     

Joint ownership and interconnection pricing in network industries

This paper investigates a vertical market structure called joint ownership, where a monopolistic upstream firm is jointly owned and operated by competing downstream firms. As such, a common interconnection price to an upstream bottleneck is determined by bargaining among the downstream firms. We show that (1) joint ownership can be superior to the other ownership structures by overcoming vertical externality of double marginalization; (2) collusive outcomes, however, may arise surrounding the setting of common interconnection price; (3) an overall performance of joint ownership depends crucially upon how equity shares are initially distributed and which bargaining rules are employed; and finally (4) a policy measure to promote downstream competition may have ambiguous consequences under joint ownership. Some managerial and political implications in implementing joint ownership in practice are also provided.     

Upstream and downstream pollution taxations in vertically related markets with imperfect competition

When two markets are vertically related, the government can control pollution at the upstream as well as the downstream market levels. This paper employs the stylized model of input price discrimination and compares the effectiveness of upstream and downstream pollution taxations. We consider the situation in which downstream firms have heterogeneous abatement technologies and an upstream monopolist performs input price discrimination against them. In order to mitigate pollution, the government imposes input tax on the intermediate inputs and emission tax on the pollutant. We show that the degree of input price discrimination decreases with a rise in the input tax and increases with a rise in the emission tax. We further examine the effect of a green tax reform in which the government changes the source of taxation from input tax to emission tax. We argue that although this green tax reform may reduce the tax revenue of the government, it will certainly increase social welfare.      

Bottleneck co-ownership as a regulatory alternative

This paper proposes a regulatory mechanism for vertically related industries in which the upstream “bottleneck” segment faces significant returns to scale while other (downstream) segments may be more competitive. In the proposed mechanism, the ownership of the upstream firm is allocated to downstream firms in proportion to their shares of input purchases. This mechanism, while preserving downstream competition, partially internalizes the benefits of exploiting economies of scale resulting from an increase in downstream output. We show that this mechanism is more efficient than a disintegrated market structure in which the upstream natural monopoly bottleneck sets a price equal to average cost.     

BERTRAND Vs. COURNOT COMPETITION WITH UPSTREAM FIRM INVESTMENT

This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot competition in a vertical structure in which the upstream firm sets the input price and makes R&D investments. We show that from the downstream firms’ point of view, Cournot competition has the advantage of a more monopolistic effect, leading to the setting of a higher price, but has the disadvantage of inducing a lower incentive for the upstream firm to invest. On the other hand, Bertrand competition has the advantage of providing a greater incentive for the upstream firm to invest but has the disadvantage of a more competitive effect, leading to the setting of a lower price. Our main findings are as follows. First, R&D investment level is greater under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Second, from the standpoint of the upstream firm and industry, Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition. Third, from the standpoint of the downstream firms, Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot when investment is sufficiently efficient and products are sufficiently differentiated.     

Franchise fee,contract bargaining,and economic growth

This paper combines the industrial organization (IO) theory and the R&D-based endogenous growth theory in a model of a successive imperfect competitive economy. The current study assumes that firms between upstream and downstream industries bargain over both the price of intermediate goods and the franchise fee. Findings show that the intermediate goods firm with a R&D sector charges the price equal to the marginal cost. Economic rent may also be partly transferred into the franchise fee determined by the relative bargaining power. In particular, the traditional double marginalization result, such as in Spengler (1950), does not take place here due to the above-mentioned bargaining scheme. Finally, this work shows that final goods firms in vertically linked industries play an important role in an economic growth model. The more bargaining power the final goods firms have (or the more returns to specialization upstream firms have, or the less substitution elasticity the final goods have), the more the economy grows. However, the consumer preference for diversity seemingly does not affect economic growth rate.