地方政府税收竞争助推了经济发展不平衡吗——基于劳动力流动的视角

立足新时代中国社会主要矛盾的根本转变和经济转向高质量发展这一新目标,科学厘清地方政府税收竞争与地区经济发展不平衡之间关系,不仅有利于通过规范地方政府间税收竞争加快推进现代财政制度基本框架的确立,还可以促使地方政府以新发展理念为指引,切实推动经济高质量发展。本文从理论层面系统诠释地方政府税收竞争与经济发展不平衡之间的关系及其影响机制,然后构建包含双重固定效应的空间杜宾模型,实证考察地方政府税收竞争对经济发展不平衡的影响效应。本文发现：(1)地方政府之间不仅存在策略互动的税收竞争行为,而且对于地区经济发展不均衡具有正向影响,即地区间税收竞争越激烈,经济发展不平衡程度越高;(2)异质性检验显示,地方政府税收竞争的核心主要源于对营业税和所得税税基的争夺,而且在人口规模较大的城市中该效应更为明显;(3)机制分析表明,地方政府税收竞争主要通过改变劳动力要素的数量和质量对地区经济发展不平衡产生影响。对于上述研究结论,通过改变空间权重矩阵与核心变量的测度方法等进行稳健性检验依然成立。     

税收竞争、分成激励与政府偏好——兼论均等化转移支付的作用

财政分权为地方政府大力发展经济提供激励的同时，也引发了地区之间的税收竞争。分成激励将如何影响地区间的税收竞争强度?在不同政府偏好下税收竞争将怎样影响地区投资、产出差距和居民福利?均等化转移支付在税收竞争中扮演着什么样的角色?为了解答上述问题，本文构建一个税收竞争模型并进行多个维度的拓展，结合数值模拟分析表明：(1)地方政府税收分成比例增加会提高税收竞争强度；(2)地区之间的税收竞争、投资和税收政策显著受到地方政府偏好的影响；(3)随着分成激励的加强，税收竞争将导致地区之间的产出差距和居民福利差距逐渐增加；(4)均等化转移支付制度能够缓解地区间税收竞争。因此，上级政府在制定对地方主政官员考核方式时应该考虑地方政府偏好对地区税收政策和财政支出政策的影响，同时要做好地区统筹，为欠发达地区提供相应政策支持并合理利用均等化转移支付政策工具。     

政府间横向税收竞争的博弈及效应分析

市场化改革、财政分权以及政绩考核等制度,进一步引发了我国政府间税收竞争。横向税收竞争实际上是政府间的一种博弈,是一国范围内不同辖区政府之间为了各自利益最大化而采用税收手段进行的角逐行为及其博弈过程。利用面板数据分析东、中、西部地区税收竞争与经济发展的关系,表明税收竞争对不同地区的经济发展有着不同的效应。所以,规范税收竞争,应从适当赋予地方税权、完善转移支付体系、改革政府绩效考核制度等方面入手。     

我国省际间税收竞争的实证研究

运用地方税收竞争模型,以我国29个省级政府2006-2010年的财政收入以及地方税收收入为依据,对省级政府间税收竞争进行了实证研究。结果表明,省级政府间存在税收绝对竞争和税收相对竞争两种类型。在竞争能力方面,前者与地方的市场化程度呈正比;后者与地方的规模经济效率呈正比。当前我国省际间的税收竞争非常激烈,是现有财政体制的必然结果。因此,完善分税制财政体制,建立合理的地方税体系,规范地方政府债务,是解决省际间税收不良竞争的必然选择。     

基于地区形象塑造视角下的地方税收竞争规范

地区形象是一种生产力,税收竞争是地方政府行为的一个重要方面,对地区形象的塑造有着很大的影响。通过囚徒困境、Bertrand、智猪博弈等模型分析表明,无序的地方政府间税收竞争虽然暂时存在比较利益,但其边际效益是完全递减的,对地区形象的塑造带来很大的负面影响。因此,有必要通过立法规范、中央协调、负所得税机制、政府效能调整、"3R"外在约束等方面来规范和引导地方政府间的税收竞争问题,以期塑造良好的地区形象。     

中国地方政府间的企业所得税竞争研究* ——基于面板数据空间滞后模型的实证分析

中国地方政府没有独立的税收立法权,但仍然可以通过企业所得税优惠开展中国式税收竞争。本文在构建省级企业所得税优惠衡量指标的基础上,使用面板数据空间滞后模型分析表明,中国地方政府间存在无序的策略互补式税收竞争,并且在企业所得税名义税收优惠上的竞争比实际税收优惠更为激烈。中央政府有必要从企业所得税名义税收优惠入手,采取措施规范地方政府间的企业所得税竞争行为,但同时也应该保持税收优惠政策本身及其实施效果的连续性。     

财政体制失衡抑制了地方政府税收努力吗?

本文首先尝试构建一个同时包含发达与欠发达两个地区规模报酬递减的柯布道格拉斯生产函数模型与理论分析框架,系统诠释财政纵向失衡与横向失衡对地方政府税收努力的作用渠道与影响效应;其次通过建立面板联立方程模型与采取三阶段最小二乘法实证考察财政纵向失衡与横向失衡对地方政府税收努力的影响效应,发现财政纵向失衡无论是从全国层面抑或分地区均显著降低地方政府税收努力程度,而财政横向失衡对地方政府税收努力的影响则存在显著的地区异质性。在这之后,本文通过对面板联立方程模型进行标准化回归估计进一步考察了财政纵向失衡与横向失衡对地方政府税收努力的作用渠道与传导效应,发现财政纵向失衡通过直接作用渠道显著降低或抑制了地方政府税收努力;而财政横向失衡对地方政府税收努力的作用渠道与传导效应大小因地区经济发展水平不同而存在较大差异,即发达地区财政横向失衡直接提高地方政府税收努力,而欠发达地区财政横向失衡不仅可以直接降低地方政府税收努力,亦可通过对财政纵向失衡的正向激励间接影响地方政府税收努力产生负向抑制效应。     

集聚效应对我国地方税收竞争行为的影响——基于行业税负的实证研究

差异化的地区经济集聚程度,使我国地方政府间的税收竞争行为存在"逐底竞争"和"逐顶竞争"之分,而产业集聚因素也将对地方税收竞争行为产生重大影响。以我国30个省级行政区2006-2011年面板数据进行实证分析,结果显示,地区间税收竞争行为存在显著差异,而且产业集聚对地方税收竞争态势的影响也不同。因此,中央政府在协调地区间的税收利益时,应区别对待不同性质的经济区,提高经济集聚水平。即利用集聚租实现非匀质地区间自发的税收协调,同时要加强匀质地区间的税收利益协调。     

关于我国地方政府间横向税收竞争的思考

税收作为政府完成职能的必要手段,具有及其重要的意义.在分税制体制下,各级地方政府做为一级实体不可避免的要产生税收竞争.无序的税收竞争导致诸多负面效应,对我国国民经济产生重要影响.本文通过对地方政间横向竞争进行较为深入的原因分析.试图找到相应的解决对策.     

税收竞争与经济增长门槛假说——基于中国经验数据的分析

税收竞争对经济增长的影响存在积极效应和消极效应,它主要通过影响企业决策和公共服务的提供而作用于经济增长。通过对经济增长门槛假说的检验发现:在经济发展水平较高的地区,税收竞争的积极效应大于其消极效应,促进经济增长;而在经济发展水平较低的地区,税收竞争的积极效应小于其消极效应,抑制经济增长。此外,研究结果还表明:中国并未出现恶性的税收竞争,但各地区的税收负担与经济发展水平不相适应。可见,地方政府只有合理利用税收竞争手段,才能促进地方经济的可持续发展。     

过度竞争的现实与理论

根据国内外市场竞争中过度竞争的现状以及国内外学者对于过度竞争的研究,可以用数理方法证明商品同质化是过度竞争的根源。差异化是规避过度竞争的根本途径,在无法避免差异化的市场领域,必要的政府政策干预是必不可少的。     

The rise and fall of monopolistic competition revolution

The widespread idea among economists is that monopolistic or imperfect competition is a set of realistic models that were invented in the 1930s and their purpose was to fill the gap between the polar and, at the same time, hypothetical models of perfect competition and pure monopoly. The main argument of this paper is that the monopolistic competition revolution set in motion a reaction—partly driven by methodological considerations, partly ideological—that ultimately led to the restoration of perfect competition, as the benchmark for evaluating market outcomes. In the end, monopolistic competition eclipsed, and perfect competition from the fridges of economic analysis that was up until the 1920s was placed to the very core of microeconomic model-building.

Price and quantity competition under free entry

This paper complements that of Cellini et al. (Cellini, R., Lambertini, L., Ottaviano, G. I. P., 2004. Welfare in a differentiated oligopoly with free entry: A cautionary note. Research in Economics, 58:125–33.), which shows that Cournot competition may generate higher welfare compared to Bertrand competition in an economy with free entry. Unlike them, we provide a more general proof for this result and show that Cournot competition generates higher welfare compared to Bertrand competition when the products are sufficiently differentiated. If the products are close substitutes, welfare is higher under Bertrand competition. We show that these qualitative results hold whether or not number of varieties increases market size. We also show when the active firms earn higher profits under Bertrand competition compared to Cournot competition.     

价格竞争还是质量竞争--中国出口产品竞争力的实证研究

中国出口产品普遍被认为“价廉质次”,然而这并不能充分解释中国出口贸易长期增长的实质。对中国2001年加入WTO以来出口产品竞争力的实证研究表明：一方面,中国出口产品的相对单位价格呈现持续下降的趋势,这说明低价竞争是中国出口产品的一个主要特征;另一方面,中国出口产品质量在逐年上升,其中高技术出口产品的质量竞争力较为明显,这说明中国出口产品并未陷入低质量产品的陷阱。在新时期进一步深化对外贸易转型中,把握中国出口产品竞争力特征对我国对外贸易政策制定有重要意义。     

旅游区(点)核心竞争力的实质及营建实证

旅游区(点)(以下简称旅游区)是旅游业发展的重要支撑,核心竞争力是反映一个旅游区素质和发展潜能的重要标志。文章运用竞争优势理论和核心竞争力理论并结合旅游业的自身特点,以重庆涪陵天台峡谷景区为例,探讨了旅游区核心竞争力的营造方法,并提出了以目标市场为导向,以彰显旅游资源特色、提供差异性体验为内核的旅游区核心竞争力建设思路。     

'Industrial demonopolization and competition policy in Poland and Hungary': a comment'

Protestations that ‘neither neoclassical economics nor Western experience offers clear guidelines concerning optimal competition policies towards state-owned firms in a transition economy’ are overly pessimistic. Both sources suggest the importance of attacking barriers to entry into markets, especially when those barriers are associated with vertical integration or exclusive vertical contracts by already dominant enterprises. Beyond this, they demonstrate that different priorities of enforcement are appropriate in transition economies and that competition advocacy is especially important in this context.     

Optimal compatibility in systems markets

We investigate private and social incentives for standardization to ensure market-wide system compatibility in a two-dimensional spatial competition model. We develop a new methodology to analyze competition on a torus and show that there is a fundamental conflict of interests between consumers and producers over the standardization decision. Consumers prefer standardization with full compatibility because it offers more variety that confers a better match with their ideal specifications. However, firms are likely to choose the minimal compatibility to maximize product differentiation and soften competition. This is in sharp contrast to the previous literature that shows the alignment of private and social incentives for compatibility.     

Competition schemes and investment in network infrastructure under uncertainty

This paper compares two specific types of competition schemes—service-based and facility-based competition—by focusing on a firm’s incentive to invest in network infrastructure. We show that when monopoly rent is large, facility-based competition means that the initial introduction of infrastructure is made earlier than under service-based competition. However, when monopoly rent and the degree of uncertainty are both small, service-based competition brings about the earlier initial introduction of infrastructure than facility-based competition. The paper includes discussion of the policy implications of these findings.      

Strategic delegation under quality competition

This paper examines strategic manipulations of incentive contracts in a model where firms compete in quality as well as in price. Compensation schemes for managers are based on a linear combination of profits and sales. For a given level of quality, a firm desires to reduce the manager's compensation when product sales increase; this serves as the firm's commitment to raise prices. Nevertheless, in general, a manager has a stronger incentive to produce goods of higher quality if he is compensated according to sales. Therefore, a compensation scheme that penalizes a manager when sales increase may result in products that are inferior to those of its rival. We show that, depending on the nature of quality, a positive weight on sales may be desirable when firms compete in quality and price. Welfare implications are also explored.     

Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly

We consider an infinitely repeated oligopoly in which at each period firms not only serve the spot market by either competing in prices or quantities but also have the opportunity to trade forward contracts. Contrary to the pro-competitive results of finite-horizon models, we find that the possibility of forward trading allows firms to sustain collusive profits that otherwise would not be possible to achieve. The result holds both for price and quantity competition and follows because (collusive) contracting of future sales is more effective in deterring deviations from the collusive plan than inducing the previously identified pro-competitive effects.