关于信息管理与信息系统专业建设的探讨

随着信息技术的广泛的应用,社会对信息管理人才的需求越来越大,因此信息管理与信息系统专业的建设成为当务之急.本文分析了信息管理与信息系统专业的发展现状和存在的问题,并对如何优化该专业的建设提出了几点对策.     

信息管理与信息系统专业课程体系建设的研究与实践

信息管理与信息系统是一门新兴的交叉性学科,专业建设正在不断完善的过程中,专业人才与社会需求还存在较大差距。文章对信息管理与信息系统专业课程体系的建设进行了探讨和论述。     

信息管理与信息系统专业实践能力提高的对策分析

实践是提高能力的最为有效的途径.信息管理与信息系统专业涉猎的学习科目比较多,这也就代表着需要学习的东西也非常多.所以,在进行学习信息管理与信息系统专业的时候,就需要做好承受压力的准备,在学习中保持着积极的态度,在学习中提升自己对于专业学习的兴趣,以自己最大的能力来学习信息管理与信息系统专业.如何提高学生在信息管理与信息系统专业方面的实践能力,成为了教学中的关键.     

信息管理与信息系统专业实践教学体系研究

文章深刻分析了信息管理与信息系统专业实践教学的意义，及现实教学中存在的问题，对专业实践教学体系的建立及组织管理进行了探讨。     

财经类院校信息管理与信息系统专业发展研究

综述信息管理与信息系统专业的发展历史,分析目前国内高校信管专业建设中存在的问题,结合教学研究实际,提出财经类院校信管专业发展的建议。     

基于项目式教学的信息管理专业教学模式研究

信息管理与信息系统专业作为一门实践性很强的专业,在人才培养方面存在着所学与所需脱节,理论强于实践,缺乏团体协作等问题,严重影响着专业的发展。文章从信息管理与信息系统专业的人才需求方向入手,分析了项目式教学在信管专业人才培养方面的应用,指出其重点及实施的具体模式,提高了应用性人才的培养能力。     

信息管理与信息系统专业创新课程体系研究

随着信息技术的高速发展,社会对信息人才的要求不断变化。为适应社会需求,信息管理与信息系统专业有必要重新审视原有课程体系,以期培养适应社会变化的专业领域人才。以哈尔滨理工大学为例,通过对该校信息管理与信息系统专业定位、培养目标及学科性质的分析,设计一套完整的、适合于理工院校信息专业的课程体系,从而达到为社会输送信息专业复合型应用人才的目的。     

浅析《信息管理与信息系统》专业人才培养

本文简要说明了信息管理与信息系统专业的需求状况，分析了当前该专业在实践能力培养方面的不足，提出了以实践能力培养为主线的人才培养方法以及相应的教改创新举措。     

信息管理与信息系统专业实践教学改革研究

信息管理与信息系统专业是一个实践性很强的专业,如何培养出具备信息管理学、管理学、经济学、计算机科学等基本知识,具有较强的动手能力、组织能力和创新能力,符合社会需求的应用型人才,是高等学校在教学过程中需要不断探索的问题。本文就信息管理与信息系统专业实践教学中存在的问题进行了分析,并提出了对策建议。     

信管专业实践教学问题探讨

信息管理与信息系统专业是一门交叉学科，不仅要求学生掌握基本的理论知识，而且要求学生具有较强的实践能力。针对当前信管专业实践教学中存在的一些问题进行了分析，提出了几种关于实践教学模式、考核方法等环节的改革措施。     

Applying the Technology Acceptance Model to the introduction of healthcare information systems

With the rapid development of information systems and advances in healthcare technology paired with current concerns arise over patients' safety and how to cure them efficiently, the healthcare information systems are attracting the attention of more and more people. The purpose of this study is to propose a conceptual model, appropriate for the intention to use healthcare information systems, by adopting the system, service, and information qualities covered in the Information System Success Model proposed by DeLone and Mclean [1] as the external variables and integrating the three dimensions of perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and intention to use — referred to in Venkatesh and Davis' updated Technology Acceptance Model, TAM [2]. This study first analyzes relevant researches on the intention to use such systems as the basis for the questionnaire design, then conducts questionnaire survey among district hospital nurses, head directors, and other related personnel. After the questionnaires are collected, SEM is used to analyze the data. The analysis shows that the proposed factors positively influence users' intention to use a healthcare system. Information, service and system quality influence user's intention through the mediating constructs, perceived usefulness and perceived ease-of-use. Managerial implications are provided accordingly. Suggestions for introducing healthcare information system are then provided as well.     

On the demand for information

Most previous research on the economics of information has been based on the expected utility hypothesis and Bayesian learning. Yet there is experimental evidence that decision makers do not always maximize expected utility and that human learning is not always consistent with Bayes' rule. Using a two-period model, this paper examines the valuation of information as well as the demanf for information in the broader context of a state preference approach under an ordinal representation of preferences. In particular, it is not assumed that the decision maker is Bayesian, nor that he behaves in a way consistent with the expected utility hypothesis. In this general framework, the value of information is defined and analysed. Also, under active learning, the optimal allocation of information gathering activities is discussed. Behavioural properties of the demand for information are derived making use of a compensation function. Implications of the results for measuring the value of information and for the economic analysis of learning activities are discussed.     

Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition

Summary. We provide a condition for ranking of information systems in agency problems. The condition has a straightforward economic interpretation in terms of the sensitivity of a cumulative distribution with respect to the agent's effort. The criterion is shown to be equivalent to the mean preserving spread condition on the likelihood ratio distributions. Received: November 10, 1999; revised version: February 17, 2000     

《管理信息系统》课程的实验教学探索

本文根据《管理信息系统》课程的性质及实验教学的要求，分析该课程实验教学的内容与组织，并针对实验教学的现状提出几点建议。     

The value of a stochastic information structure

Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution over the state space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and the action taken. An information structure determines the set of possible signals and the probability of each signal given a state. For a fixed decision problem, the value of an information structure is the maximal expected utility that the decision maker can get when the observed signals are governed by this structure. Thus, every decision problem induces a preference order over information structures according to their value. We characterize preference orders that can be obtained in this way. We also characterize the functions defined over information structures that measure their value.     

浅议档案信息自动化系统管理

档案信息自动化系统是一项需要运用多种学科知识,多专业配合,多部门协作,多环节配套的复杂系统工程。系统建设发展到目前阶段,研究探讨对系统的协调组织、加强管理和科学决策,是十分必要的。     

Pessimistic information gathering

An agent gathers information on productivity shocks and accordingly produces on behalf of a principal. Information gathering is imperfect and whether it succeeds or not depends on the agent's effort. Contracting frictions come from the fact that the agent is pessimistic on the issue of information gathering, and there are both moral hazard in information gathering, private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort. An optimal menu of linear contracts mixes high-powered, productivity-dependent screening options following “good news” with a fixed low-powered option otherwise.     

The structure of information networks

We develop a strategic model of information acquisition in networks where agents pay for all the pieces of information they acquire, including those through indirect links. The cost of information depends on the distance it traverses in the network. We consider two possibilities in this context: (1) costs increasing with distance, and (2) costs decreasing with distance. The paper also examines situations where it is more expensive to acquire information of higher value. We show that there is almost no divergence between the efficient and Nash equilibrium information architectures. We then study the effect of decay in networks where information through longer paths is cheaper. Finally, we also examine a model with costly link formation that combines both types of cost related assumptionsWe are grateful to Hans Haller, Rob Gilles, Susanne Maria Schmidt, Sumit Joshi, Georg Erber, Beth Allen, Mark Machina, Bob Martin, Johanna Francis, Cheryl Long, Raja Kali, Kaz Miyagiwa, Micheal Kosfeld, Bibhudutta Panda and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. The paper has further benefited from the comments of participants at Game Theory and Applications Mumbai 2003, Royal Economic Society Meetings 2003, SED 2004 and GAMES 2004. Sudipta Sarangi acknowledges the hospitality of DIW Berlin where a part of this research was carried out. Rajgopal Kannan acknowledges the support of NSF grants IIS-0329738 and IIS-0312632     

Imprecise information disclosure and truthful certification

This article studies the interaction of information disclosure and reputational concerns in certification markets. We argue that by revealing information less precisely, a certifier reduces the threat of capture because this reduces her gains from selling fraudulent certificates. As a result, only imprecise disclosure rules are implementable for intermediate discount factors. Our results therefore suggest that contrary to the common view, imprecise disclosure may be socially desirable. Regulatory intervention may provoke market failure especially in industries where certifier reputational rents are low.