Why rationality may be a consequence of Hume's theory of choice

Facing R. Sugden's criticism of our interpretation, it is shown in this paper that rationality appears as a possible consequence of Hume's theory of choice. We first argue that Sugden's dismissal of the preference relation from the type of rationality through which Hume's theory is apprehended, is highly disputable, from the point of view of both standard choice theory and Hume's theory of passions. Nonetheless, Sugden's criterion of rationality might be restated in Humean terms as a condition of non-revision of preferences in the dynamics of passions. But, since the process of choice that we have described explicitly takes into account the revision of preferences, and shows that, when this last is no longer required, rationality occurs as an outcome of this process, it is not really concerned by Sugden's criticism.     

Decision and time from a Humean point of view

Until recently, little attention has been paid to the consequences of Hume’s theory of action for intertemporal decision. Yet in view of the recurring discussion concerning situations of conflicting choice between a close and a remote objective, which runs from Book 2 of the Treatise, to the second Enquiry, to the Dissertation, intertemporal decision appears, at least in part, to be an outcome of the role of the natural relation of contiguity in the formation of the structure of desires, and thus different from the structure of pleasure. This paper shows, and expresses formally, that Hume’s approach provides alternative conditions which explain time-consistency on the one hand, and dynamic time-inconsistency on the other, when the link between contiguity and the ’violence’ of the passions is taken into account. The possibility of time-inconsistency is acknowledged by Hume as giving rise to general aversion, therefore constitutes a key argument in explaining the origin of government.     

A Humean theory of choice of which rationality may be one consequence

For the reader who considers economic theory of choice as a special case of a more general theory of action, Hume's discussion of the determinants of action in the Treatise of Human Nature (1739?–?40), in the Enquiry on Human Understanding (1748) and in the Dissertation on Passions (1757) deserves attention. However, according to some modern commentators, Hume does not seem to have given any evidence that would favour what nowadays we would consider as the kind of rationality involved in modern theories of rational choice. On the contrary, this paper arrives at the conclusion that consistency between preferences and choice, like the usual properties of completeness and transitivity, may be considered as outcomes of a mental process, described by means of a decision algorithm that aims to represent Hume's theory of choice.     

Critical Realism as a Basis for Economic Methodology: A critique

This paper considers the claim that critical realism provides a convincing critique of mainstream economics and offers a sound methodological basis for an alternative approach. It argues that critical realism presents a tendentious definition of positivism and a characterisation of mainstream economics that is misleading, and that it misrepresents the nature and purpose of the work of Hume and modern Humean philosophers. It also argues that critical realism's bold ontological claims lack epistemological support. The paper concludes that critical realism does not provide a compelling basis for economic methodology.     

David Hume's model of man: Classical political economy as “inspired” political economy

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyse David Hume's model of man. We show that three major elements characterize his representation of man: first the weaknesses and limitations of human rationality; second, the psychological foundations of human behaviour, with a particular focus on the role of association in human cognition; and third, the collective dimension of individual learning through a process of communication based on sympathy. Therefore, we show that the theory of human nature and human cognition Hume proposes is different from the narrow view of man as homo ?conomicus that is used by mainstream economists.     

The sceptic as an economist's philosopher? Humean utility as a positive principle

Whereas in philosophy David Hume was long regarded as a negative thinker to be criticized rather than read, many thinkers interested in social and economic theory from Adam Smith onwards found key concepts, distinctions and problems as developed by Hume useful and inspiring. This applies not only to his seminal contributions to technical problems in economics. It is argued that the way in which Hume employed ‘utility as a positive principle’ (most notably in his ‘experimental’ moral theory) is of pivotal importance in this context. It allows for:

a. distinguishing between internal motifs and external circumstances and constraints; and for

b. making explicit the abstract logic of social interaction structures, mechanisms and processes.

Both are necessary conditions for employing the logic of social situations and mechanisms in the explanation of social institutions and economic processes. It moreover prepares the ground for the use of simplified or cartoon-like models of individual agency in economic and social theory, but also for its critique. On this basis, Hume's influence on various strands of social and economic thought, but also the specific differences with regard to more ‘rationalistic’ approaches (such as Hobbesianism or important versions of neoclassical economics) can be assessed more clearly.     

Defending free trade after physiocracy: On Dugald Stewart's architectonic of passions,reason and Providence

Abstract

Dugald Stewart (1753–1828) defended free trade in light of a providential account of Nature, according to which there would be an “identity of interests” (Halévy 1901–1904). He thereby tried to rid economic thought of references to conflicts and thus pursued the physiocrats’ programme rather than Adam Smith's. In fact, Stewart claimed that (i) self-love depends on an accommodation to Providence, by which individuals restrain their passions; (ii) self-love fosters actions that lead to a direct increase of public happiness; (iii) the perfectibility of mind allows to dismiss “legal despotism”, which can be replaced by religious education.     

The relevance of irrelevant information

This paper experimentally investigates the effect of introducing unavailable alternatives and irrelevant information regarding the alternatives on the optimality of decisions in choice problems. We find that the presence of unavailable alternatives and irrelevant information generates suboptimal decisions with the interaction between the two amplifying this effect. Irrelevant information in any dimension increases the time costs of decisions. We also identify a “preference for simplicity” beyond the desire to make optimal decisions or minimize time spent on a decision problem.

     

Adding links,adding persons,and adding structures: Using Sen's frameworks

Abstract

This essay is a comment on “Sen on Freedom and Gender Justice,” by Mozaffar Qizilbash, which appeared in Feminist Economics Volume 11, Number 3, November 2005.

Building on the 2003 double special issue of Feminist Economics entitled “Amartya Sen's Work and Ideas,” this paper responds to the review essay by Mozaffar Qizilbash. It identifies and illustrates various possible evaluations of a theoretical system, including that it has acknowledged strengths, unrecognized strengths, remediable gaps or failings, or structural faults. The paper then looks at Sen's system as a theoretical basis for “human development”– in particular in relation to personhood, emotions, and psychological interdependence – and argues that it points in directions required for economic and social analysis, including towards theories of care, but is not itself a sufficient treatment. The paper suggests deepening Sen's system by connecting to other important languages of analysis concerning the structuring of attitudes, emotions, felt well-being, public reasoning, and politics.     

How Rousseau read Hume’s Political Discourses: hints of unexpected agreement in their views of money and luxury

Despite mounting scholarship on the Rousseau–Smith connection, the possibility of overlap between the Humean and Rousseauian views of commercial society has not been explored. This is due to opposing views held by these two thinkers on this issue. However, Rousseau in the Confessions recorded a brief, but shrewd impressions on Hume’s Political Discourses, which he held before meeting Hume. In these comments, Rousseau, unlike his other French contemporaries, noted some republican aspects lurking in Hume’s political and economic essays. Moreover, after his two Discourses, Rousseau composed several other important works in which he revealed his more ‘mature’ economic arguments. Careful readings of these textual clues indicate that, in striking parallel with Hume, Rousseau conducts a thought experiment on the drastic change in the quantity of money and elaborates on the significance of industry and a certain type of luxury. Our purpose here is not to prove that Hume’s Political Discourses directly influenced Rousseau’s later writings, but to measure the extent to which Rousseau could share the Scot’s economic ideas by considering that the former may well have read the latter.     

Competition and Public Policy in the Nursing Home Industry

A theory of property needs to give an account of the whole lifecycle of a property right: How it is initiated, transferred, and terminated. Economics has focused on the transfers in the market and almost completely neglected the question of initiation and termination of property in normal production and consumption (not in some original state or in the transition from common to private property). The institutional mechanism for the normal initiation and termination of property is an invisible hand function of the market — the market mechanism of appropriation. Does this mechanism satisfy an appropriate normative principle? The standard normative juridical principle is to assign or impute legal responsibility according to de facto responsibility. It is given a historical tag of being "Lockean," but the basis is contemporary jurisprudence, not historical exegesis. Then, the fundamental theorem of the property mechanism is proven, which shows that if "Hume's conditions" (no transfers without consent and all contracts fulfilled) are satisfied, then the market automatically satisfies the Lockean responsibility principle — i.e., "Hume implies Locke." As a major application, the results in their contrapositive form, "Not Locke implies Not Hume," are applied to a market economy based on the employment contract. I show that the production based on the employment contract violates the Lockean principle (all who work in an employment enterprise are de facto responsible for the positive and negative results), and thus Hume's conditions must also be violated in the marketplace (de facto responsible human action cannot be transferred from one person to another — as is readily recognized when an employer and employee together commit a crime).¹     

The Work Ethic in Industrial America, 1850–1920

Clarence Ayres wished to avoid moral relativism or agnosticism in the social sciences, yet he also rejected what he called the “transcendental” epistemology of classical philosophy, an epistemology grounded in the desire to know absolute or ultimate truths. He wanted to find a middle ground between absolutism and relativism by separating “technology” from “ceremony,” and by replacing the ends/means dichotomy with an ends/means continuum. This paper examines his articulation of the issues, and in this context also examines the work of two more recent theorists, Gary Becker and Richard Posner. We conclude that Ayres' epistemological middle ground remains elusive.     

Identitarian passions: the overwhelming power of the human recognition need

According to Plato, thymòs—a notion denoting the human need for recognition—triggers off the most powerful and overwhelming human passions. Indeed, any action originated and nurtured by thymòtic passions places its own raison d’être in itself. The acts motivated by thymòs can either improve or (even) worsen someone’s wellness: they do not entail any pay-off in the present or future, and their nature is not influenced nor mitigated by monetary incentives. Moreover, it follows that since identity is based on the others’ recognition (both individuals and social groups), then indulging with thymòtic passions and building up someone’s own identity are exactly the same process. Indeed, thymòtic passions are identitarian passions. This paper argues the relevance of the thymòtic approach. We do propose a conceptual framework that we reckon is useful and innovative in order to study and interpret these peculiar forms of human action. We also point out the social and “environmental” conditions that stimulate their appearance.     

EU Banks Rating Assignments: Is There Heterogeneity between New and Old Member Countries?

We model EU countries' bank ratings using financial variables and allowing for intercept and slope heterogeneity. Our aim is to assess whether “old” and “new” EU countries are rated differently and to determine whether “new” ones are assigned lower ratings, ceteris paribus, than “old” ones. We find that country‐specific factors (in the form of heterogeneous intercepts) are a crucial determinant of ratings. Whilst “new” EU countries typically have lower ratings than “old” ones, after controlling for financial variables we also discover that all countries have significantly different intercepts, confirming our prior belief. This intercept heterogeneity suggests that each country's rating is assigned uniquely, after controlling for differences in financial factors, which may reflect differences in country risk and the legal and regulatory framework that banks face (such as foreclosure laws). In addition, we find that ratings may respond differently to the liquidity and operating expenses to operating income variables across countries. Typically ratings are more responsive to the former and less sensitive to the latter for “new” EU countries compared with “old” EU countries.     

Nonparametric learning rules from bandit experiments: The eyes have it!

How do people learn? We assess, in a model-free manner, subjectsʼ belief dynamics in a two-armed bandit learning experiment. A novel feature of our approach is to supplement the choice and reward data with subjectsʼ eye movements during the experiment to pin down estimates of subjectsʼ beliefs. Estimates show that subjects are more reluctant to “update down” following unsuccessful choices, than “update up” following successful choices. The profits from following the estimated learning and decision rules are smaller (by about 25% of average earnings by subjects in this experiment) than what would be obtained from a fully-rational Bayesian learning model, but comparable to the profits from alternative non-Bayesian learning models, including reinforcement learning and a simple “win-stay” choice heuristic.     

Liberal Jansenists and interest-bearing loans in eighteenth-century France: a reappraisal

Abstract

This article is an attempt to prove that although the liberal Jansenists – Jansenism being the most powerful Christian protest movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – were not the first and the only ones to address the prohibition of interest-bearing loans, their writings on the issue shifted and fuelled the debate during the French Enlightenment, especially among the Encyclopédistes and the economists. By refuting the very logic of “extrinsic titles” of the Scholastics and their extension later on by the Jesuits, the liberals Jansenists redefined “interest” as the price to be paid for the use of money.     

Nicolas Baudeau,an anti-physiocrat? Éphémérides du citoyen prior to “conversion” (1765–1766)

Abstract

Éphémérides du citoyen is often considered to be an anti-physiocratic periodical, up until Baudeau's adherence to Quesnay's theories in 1766. An analysis of the journal's main economic themes between 1765 and 1766 however shows that this interpretation is inaccurate. It is true that the theme of rurality, the issue of the colonies and Baudeau's needs analyses indicate an original line of thinking, in which the public powers played the role of primary investor via a “land clearing company” or a “threefold royal messengers service”. However, these contain no radical opposition to the liberal ideas developed by Quesnay.     

“From warfare to welfare”: Contextualising Arrow and Schelling's models of racial inequalities (1968–1972)*

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on Arrow and Schelling's contributions to the study of racial inequality in the late 1960s. We start from the authors’ account of the origin of their work. Then, we locate the “material origin” of the models at the RAND Corporation in the late 1960s and show how it relates to the transfer of the RAND tool-box to the study of welfare issues. Finally, we describe how Arrow's and Schelling's modelling strategies relate to their conception of “science for action,” inherited from their “warfare” work.     

The “Treasury View”: An (un-)expected return?

Abstract

By examining the rhetorical use of an old piece of economic theory by some contemporary economists, this paper intends to report on “how today's economists conduct a public policy debate”. This paper is neither a scholarly history of the interwar debate nor a sophisticated critique of current economic policy. It is an attempt to link the policy and theoretical arguments of two similar debates separated by nearly 80 years. The second part of the paper demonstrates that the (un-)expected return of the Treasury View is a case study illustrating two very different modelling strategies.     

Turgot: a critic of physiocracy? An analysis of the debates in Éphémérides du Citoyen and in correspondence with Dupont

Abstract

Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1727–1781) is one of the few French economic theorists who led a political career and held ministerial office. He continues to intrigue both historians and historians of economic thought where his relationship with the physiocrats is concerned. Does Turgot fully share their belief system, or does he only borrow a few elements from it? Is he a critical author of this school of thought? To date, no agreement has been reached on this subject. This paper attempts to answer some of these questions in an objective manner, drawing on the evidence provided by texts and therefore minimising the interpretations. The sources we will primarily refer to are the Éphémérides du citoyen and Turgot's correspondence with Dupont. We will revisit the economic themes of large- and small-scale farming, as well as savings, and discuss Turgot's views on slavery and the “sectarian spirit” of the physiocrats.