Do the ECB's introductory statements help predict monetary policy? Evidence from a tone analysis

In this paper, we examine whether a tone shock derived from European Central Bank communication helps predict ECB monetary policy decisions. To this purpose, we first use a bag-of-words approach and several dictionaries on the ECB's Introductory Statements to derive a measure of tone. Next, we orthogonalise the tone measure on the latest data available to market participants to compute the tone shock. Finally, we relate the tone shock to future ECB monetary policy decisions. We find that the tone shock is significantly and positively related to future ECB monetary policy decisions, even when controlling for market expectations of monetary policy and the Governing Council's inter-meeting communication. Further extensions show that the predictive ability of the tone shock is robust to (i) the normalization of the tone measure, (ii) alternative market expectations of monetary policy, and (iii) the horizon of macroeconomic variables used in the Taylor-type monetary policy rule. These findings highlight an additional channel through which ECB communication improves monetary policy predictability, suggesting that the ECB may have private information that it communicates through its Introductory Statements.     

The effectiveness of monetary policy in steering money market rates during the financial crisis

The financial crisis has deeply affected money markets and thus, potentially, the proper functioning of the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission. Therefore, we analyze the effectiveness of monetary policy in steering euro area money market rates by looking at (i) the predictability of money market rates on the basis of monetary policy expectations and (ii) the impact of extraordinary central bank measures on money market rates. We find that during the crisis money market rates up to 12 months still respond to revisions in the expected path of future rates, even though to a lesser extent than before August 2007. We attribute part of the loss in monetary policy effectiveness to money market rates being driven by higher liquidity premia and increased uncertainty about future interest rates. Our results also indicate that the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures as of October 2008 were effective in addressing the disruptions in the euro area money market. In fact, our estimates suggest that non-standard monetary policy measures helped to lower Euribor rates by more than 80 basis points. These findings show that central banks have effective tools at hand to conduct monetary policy in times of crises.     

What is on the ECB’s mind? Monetary policy before and after the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) both before and after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008. In the literature, researchers typically select one Taylor rule-based model to analyze monetary policy of central banks and to derive determinants for the interest rate setting. However, uncertainty about the choice of this respective model is typically neglected. In contrast, we apply a Bayesian model averaging (BMA) approach to extend the Taylor rule to account for model uncertainty driven by heterogeneity in the ECB’s decision-making body, the Governing Council. Our results suggest the following: First, the ECB focuses on the inflation rate when setting interest rates. Second, economic activity indicators were in the focus of the ECB before the financial crisis. Third, over the last decade, the role of economic activity decreased, indicating that inflation is the main driver of monetary policy decisions in the post-crisis period. Fourth, when setting interest rates, central bankers appear to consider more than one model.     

Are monetary policy shocks causal to bank health? Evidence from the euro area

Despite considerable efforts of the European Central Bank (ECB) to support bank intermediation after the 2008 financial crisis, the recovery of euro area banks remained incomplete. Although many studies indicate that central banks can influence the stock prices of firms through their policy actions and communication, a knowledge gap exists as to whether the ECB's monetary policy can influence bank health. Through a high-frequency identification approach, this study reveals that the causal effect of conventional monetary policy action and communication by the ECB on bank stock prices differed over time, whereas its influence on bank financing costs was robust. This study provides new evidence showing that information effects related to policy easing surprises in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis hampered the ECB efforts to improve bank health and that its Odyssean communication signals (related to forward-looking announcements of policy easing) supported bank health during this phase. Local projections suggest that the response of banks to monetary policy shocks displayed some persistence, where ECB policy surprises and communications that shifted up (down) the yield curve were normally positive (negative) for bank health. The findings solicit a new perspective when assessing the influence of the ECB's monetary policy measures on euro area banks.     

The natural rate of interest and the output gap in the euro area: a joint estimation

The notion of a natural real rate of interest, due to Wicksell (Interest and prices. Macmillan, London Translation of 1898 edition, 1936), is widely used in current central bank research. The idea is that there exists a level at which the real interest rate would be compatible with output at its potential level and stationary inflation. Such a concept is of primary concern for monetary policy because it provides a benchmark for the monetary policy stance. This paper applies the method suggested by Laubach and Williams (Rev Econ Stat 85(4):1063–1070, 2003) to jointly estimate the natural real interest rate and the output gap in the euro area using data from 1960 onwards. Our results suggest that the natural real rate of interest has declined gradually over the past 40 years. They also indicate that monetary policy in the euro area was on average stimulative during the 1960s and the 1970s, while it contributed to dampen the output gap and inflation in the 1980s and 1990s. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the institutions to which they are affiliated. We are grateful to Siem Jan Koopman for very helpful suggestions and comments. We also thank P. Cour-Thimann, V. Curdia, F. Drudi, S. McCaw, D. Rodriguez-Palenzuela, R. Pilegaard, H. Pill, L. Stracca, T. Laubach, J. C. Williams and the participants of an ECB workshop on natural interest rates.     

Lessons from the ECB Experience: Frankfurt Still Matters!

This paper compares the European Central Bank's (ECB) conduct of monetary policy (1999–2005) with that of the Bundesbank (after the German Unification: 1990–1998) in order to test the hypothesis of an ECB with 'Bundesbank's preferences' put forward in the theoretical literature ( Alesina and Grilli, 1993 ; Fatum, 2006 ). Econometric tests and simulations based on monetary policy reaction functions show that the continuation of the former Bundesbank regime is supported by the data. Given this empirical evidence we discuss the lessons for future Monetary Unions stemming from the ECB experience.     

Do asymmetries matter for European monetary policy?

In this paper we analyze the impact of economic and institutional (ECB decision rules) asymmetries on the effectiveness of monetary policy in Euroland. We consider a model where asymmetric shocks and divergent propagation of shocks in output and inflation are potential causes of tensions within the ECB concerning the conduct of common monetary (interest rate) policy. Welfare implications of the alternative decision procedures are discussed.     

Bashing and supporting central banks: the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank

In this paper, we analyse the influences leading to external pressure on or public support for German and European monetary policy. Based upon the findings for the Deutsche Bundesbank, lessons are drawn for the European Central Bank (ECB). We show that external pressure on the ECB stems mainly from politicians or from international organisations (such as the IMF). In contrast with evidence for the Bundesbank, interest groups (such as commercial banks) hardly attempt to influence European monetary policy. German data show that factors leading to external pressure on the central bank are rising unemployment and the threat that governments will lose their majority in the next election. Evidence for the latter is, however, weak, and we show that in any case this source of pressure is likely to be of minor importance for the ECB.     

The effect of ECB monetary policies on interest rates and volumes

This article assesses the transmission of ECB monetary policies, conventional and unconventional, to both interest rates and lending volumes or bond issuance for three types of different economic agents through five different markets: sovereign bonds at 6-month, 5-year and 10-year horizons, loans to nonfinancial corporations and housing loans to households, during the financial crisis, and for the four largest economies of the euro area. We look at three different unconventional tools: excess liquidity, longer-term refinancing operations and securities held for monetary policy purposes following the decomposition of the ECB’s Weekly Financial Statements. We first identify series of ECB policy shocks at the euro area aggregate level by removing the systematic component of each series and controlling for announcement effects. We second include these exogenous shocks in country-specific structural VAR, in which we control for credit demand. The main result is that only the pass-through from the ECB rate to interest rates has been effective. Unconventional policies have had uneven effects and primarily on interest rates.     

‘Talking down monetary policy’ – a note

There is a recent debate about whether ultra-expansionary monetary policy is no longer effective in stimulating demand, a concern often voiced in the euro area in light of persistently low and even negative inflation. As a response, the European Central Bank (ECB) warns against ‘talking down monetary policy’ (ECB Vice-President Vítor Constâncio, 2016). This note uses a textbook model of optimal monetary policy to study a situation in which the public misperceives the interest rate elasticity of aggregate demand, which reflects policy effectiveness. We show that as a result of underestimating policy effectiveness demand shocks can no longer be stabilized perfectly, thus resulting in inefficient inflation and output dynamics. In the presence of misperceptions, a negative demand shock leads to a prolonged period of negative inflation rates.     

International spillovers of ECB’s unconventional monetary policy: the effect on Central Europe

We examine how unconventional monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) influences macroeconomic stability in three Central European economies. We estimate various panel vector autoregressions (PVARs) using monthly data from 2008 to 2014. Using the shadow policy rate and central bank assets as measures of unconventional policies, we find that output growth and inflation in Central Europe temporarily increase following an expansionary unconventional monetary policy shock by the ECB. Using both impulse responses and variance decompositions, we find that the effect of unconventional policies on output growth is much stronger than the effect on inflation.     

What's in a second opinion? Shadowing the ECB and the Bank of England

One way of evaluating how well monetary authorities perform is to provide the public with a regular and independent second opinion. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE) are shadowed by professional and academic economists who provide a separate policy rate recommendation in advance of the central bank announcement. In this paper, we systematically evaluate this second opinion and find that, first, the shadow committee of the ECB tends to be relatively less inflation averse than the ECB. In contrast, the shadow committee of the BoE proposes a more hawkish monetary policy stance than the BoE. Second, consensus within a shadow committee is far easier to reach when there is no pressure to change the policy rate. Third, the ECB's shadow committee is more activist than the ECB's Governing Council and a larger degree of consensus within the former brings about a greater likelihood that the two committees will agree.     

Making EMU Work: Some lessons from the 1990s

This paper investigates what lessons may be learned from Europe's convergence process of the 1990s. The paper challenges the conventional focus on labour market institutions and 'structural rigidities' as the root cause behind Europe's poor employment record. Instead, it is argued that macro demand management played the key role, particularly monetary policy. Concentrating on Germany, the analysis shows that fiscal consolidation was accompanied by monetary tightness of an extraordinary degree and duration. This finding is of interest regarding the past as well as the future. For the Maastricht regime much resembles the one that produced the unsound policy mix of the 1990s: a constrained fiscal authority paired with an independent monetary authority free to impose its will on the overall outcome. The analysis thus highlights a key asymmetry in the Maastricht regime that is likely to continue to inflict a deflationary bias on the system. It is argued that this policy bias may be overcome only if the ECB deliberately assumed its real role of generating domestic demand-led growth, thereby resolving Euroland's key structural problem: asymmetric monetary policy. As regards the conventional structuralist theme, the analysis debunks the 'Dutch myth' of supply-led growth through structural reform. Depicting a popular fallacy of composition, we stress that the peculiar Dutch strategy of demand-led growth does not present itself as an option for Euroland.     

Market‐Based Measures of Monetary Policy Expectations and Their Evolution Since the Introduction of the Euro

The paper considers the relation between monetary policy expectations and financial markets in the case of Europe. A number of money market instruments are compared, with the result that the 1‐month forward interest rates extracted from the Libor yield curve has the best prediction power of the future monetary policy path. These forward rates have been used to study the evolution of market expectations regarding the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). The sharp increases and the following decreases in interest rates during 2000–2001 have reduced the predictive power of money market instruments, but smoother management of interest rates and better communication from the ECB has helped to improve the forecasting power of money market instruments.     

Money growth,uncertainty and macroeconomic activity: a multivariate GARCH analysis

The impact uncertainty has on money growth has received much attention in recent years and is an issue of critical importance to central banks, particularly for those, such as the European Central Bank (ECB), which place a strong emphasis on monetary analysis in monetary policy formulation. Some recent papers examining this issue use ad hoc estimates and measure variability rather than uncertainty. We employ a multivariate GARCH model, which measures uncertainty by the conditional variance of the data series, to investigate whether macroeconomic uncertainty and monetary uncertainty Granger-cause changes in real money. The estimated model also allows us to investigate how monetary uncertainty impacts economic activity. We find that macroeconomic uncertainty impacts positively on US real M2 growth over a two-year horizon but that monetary uncertainty does not cause changes in real M2. Instead, our results indicate that real money growth causes monetary uncertainty. Monetary uncertainty is found to have a negative effect on real economic activity and on macroeconomic uncertainty. We conclude by discussing the implications of these results and the methodological approach used for institutions such as the ECB that give monetary analysis a prominent role in their monetary policy strategy.     

The role of the exchange rate in Canadian monetary policy: evidence from a TVP-BVAR model

A time-varying parameters Bayesian structural vector autoregression (TVP-BVAR) model with stochastic volatility is employed to characterize the monetary policy stance of the Bank of Canada (BoC) in terms of an interest rate rule linking the policy rate to the output gap, inflation and the exchange rate. Using quarterly bilateral Canadian–US data, we find such an interest rate rule to have little explanatory power for the early part of our sample starting in the mid-1980s, but to become more suitable to explain interest rate dynamics from the mid-1990s onwards. Whereas the exchange rate turns out to be the major determinant of the policy rate in the 1980s, its importance declines throughout the 1990s and 2000s, although it continues to be influential even towards the end of the sample period ending in 2015Q2. We also find interest rate shocks to have become more effective in influencing the macroeconomy over time, indicating that the BoC has continually gained monetary policy credibility. We associate this development with the BoC successively de-emphasizing the role of the exchange rate in informing interest rate decisions, thereby alleviating the potential monetary policy conflict between targeting the exchange rate and maintaining the price stability goal.     

Asymmetric effects of monetary policy shocks on economic performance: empirical evidence from Turkey

This study investigates the asymmetric effects of monetary policy shocks on the macroeconomic variables of exchange rate, output and inflation for an emerging economy ? Turkey ? by using monthly data between 1990 and 2014. We employ the innovative nonlinear vector autoregressive model of Kilian and Vigfusson (2011), which allows us to observe the effect of different stances (tight or loose) and different sizes (small or large) of monetary policy actions. Our empirical evidence reveals that tight monetary policy, which, in this case, is captured with a positive shock to interest rate, decreases exchange rate, output and prices, as economic theory suggests. Loose monetary policy, which is captured with a negative shock to interest rate, has the opposite effect on these variables. However, the effects of loose monetary policy are weaker than the effects of tight monetary policy because loose monetary policy shocks are less effective than tight monetary policy shocks. Moreover, as the magnitude of a shock increases, the difference between the effects of tight and loose monetary policy policies also increases.     

Volatility spillovers of unconventional monetary policy to emerging market economies

Emerging market economies (EMEs) have experienced waves of market volatility since the global financial crisis, with some commentators ascribing this at least partly related to monetary policy decisions in advanced economies. This paper examines volatility spillovers from changes in the size of the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve (FED) and European Central Bank (ECB) to EMEs from 2003 to 2018. We find that volatility spillovers to EME currency markets are greater in magnitude from the FED, while EME stock and bond markets are also vulnerable to volatility spillovers in a similar magnitude from both the ECB and the FED. We find only limited evidence of volatility transmission to the real economy of EMEs following the monetary policy actions of the FED and ECB. Finally, we show that the proportion of the volatility in EMEs that is accounted for by changes in FED and ECB balance sheets shifts over time. Our paper has important policy implications for EMEs, notably in respect of volatility transmission channels.     

Have money and credit data releases helped markets to predict the interest rate decisions of the European Central Bank?

This paper examines whether money and credit data releases by the European Central Bank (ECB) have provided markets with additional clues about the future course of its monetary policy. It conducts a novel econometric approach, as suggested by El‐Shagi and Jung (Eur J Polit Econ 39:222–234, 2015), based on a combination of an Ordered Probit model explaining future policy rate changes (sample 2000–2014) and the Vuong test for model selection. Overall, our empirical results support the view that information contained in money and credit aggregates is used by markets when assessing forthcoming interest changes of the ECB.