Social Costs and the Automobile Industry: A Challenge to National Planning

Neoinstitutional thought is based on an integration of Thorstein Veblen's evolutionary theory of institutional change and John Dewey's theory of instrumental valuation. It offers a coherent methodology that guides both economic analysis and policy formation. Neoinstitutionalist methodology differs from mainstream economic methodology in its rejection of the normative-positive dualism. It denies that "objectivity" requires that science be wertfrie, arguing instead that normative propositions based on instrumental valuation are the foundation of scientific objectivity. The analytical focus of neoinstitutional economics is the process of institutional change which it treats as a change in the value structure of the institution.     

制度变迁是自然无序的还是历史必然?——论演化思潮的复兴对马克思主义经济学发展的意义

马克思主义经济学与现代演化经济学具有相同的研究传统,都强调用历史和演化的观点来分析经济问题,都强调技术进步在制度变迁中的意义,但两者的制度演化观有着本质区别。前者强调生产力在社会发展中的决定意义,并认为社会由低级向高级的发展是历史的必然。后者强调创造性的个人心智在制度变迁中的源泉作用,并强调演化的无目的性、无方向性和多样性。因此前者贯彻的是唯物哲学观,后者渗透的是唯心观。霍奇逊的演化标准从侧面印证现代演化论者决不是马克思主义者。     

经济地理学与经济学关系的历史考察

经济地理学发展不仅与人文地理的其他分支交互发展,并从包括经济学在内的社会科学内吸收营养。文章通过历史性地考察经济地理学与经济学关系,尝试探索经济地理学未来的发展趋势。通过考察发现:古典经济地理学时期,经济地理学与经济学相互交织、彼此影响;1930、1940时代到1970、1980年代,经济学引领经济地理发展,而经济地理学者没有对主流经济学产生重大影响;1980年代末和1990年代初期,经济地理学吸收经济学相关理论,实现了文化、制度和关系的转向,同时主流经济学则出现了地理化趋势,出现了新经济地理学运动。1980年代以来,演化思想在经济学界逐渐兴盛起来,演化经济学理论已得到越来越多的经济学家的重视,在20世纪90年代,经济地理学家接受了演化经济学的基本概念,开始尝试构建演化经济地理学理论框架。演化经济地理学是经济地理和经济学的下一个交叉点。     

Political Learning: The Neglected Precondition of Constitutional Reform

This paper analyses the claim of constitutional economics that liberal economic policy requires far-reaching constitutional reform. The paper starts with a restatement of this claim and reinforces the rationale of the currently most influential variants of constitutional economics as represented by contractarian constitutional economics (Brennan, Buchanan), on the one hand, and Hayek s evolutionary theory, on the other. However, these constitutional proposals have shortcomings because the institutional preconditions of constitutional reform are not sufficiently reflected. Instead, I argue that, in face of economic crisis, a revision of in-period politics requires no more collective rationality than constitutional reform does. As a consequence, the introduction of new constitutional rules depends on political learning. The article concludes that constitutional rules in the sense of CPE can stabilise political learning but they cannot replace it.     

Contributions of the Galbraith “Technostructure” to the Growing Crisis of the U.S. Economy

This paper lays the methodological foundations of an analytical framework that may help shed some new light on the issue of territorial inequalities in the digital economy. It opposes the recent tendency to build up an evolutionary economic geography as an alternative not only to the so-called "New Economic Geography" (namely "geographical mainstream economics") but also to the institutional economic geography. The paper advocates the development of an evolutionary and institutional approach in economic geography, which would be meso-focused. Finally, it presents some insights that highlight the heuristic potential of this approach in reappraising the territorial features of the digital economy.     

Thomas DeGregori’s “Back to the Future”: A Comment

A fundamental principle of Karl Polanyi's institutional outlook is that any economic system has to be considered as a whole and as a historically specific social organization. This principle implies a comparative method and a critique of conventional economics. Besides, the problem of the interrelation between the economic system and other aspects of social life cannot be avoided. On this basis, Polanyi points out the peculiar "economic" nature of the market-capitalist society and explains the institutional transformations characterizing its history. The opposition "embedded/disembedded," used by Polanyi to distinguish pre-modern economies from the market economy, has been widely adopted in recent times, particularly by economic sociologists, as a key for understanding current complex economic phenomena. However, the reference to Polanyi often presupposes a distorted interpretation of his theory, and a different kind of institutional approach.     

Property and Economic Power as Issues in Institutional Economics

In the first part of this two-part paper, I presented an "irenic" reconciliation of the three apparently contradictory definitions of "institution" within original institutional economics (OIE), employing the methodology of critical institutionalism. The critical institutionalist reconciliation of these definitions conceptualizes institutions as an emergent process by which the internal and necessary relations of social structure as collective action, mediated through agency, results in the control, expansion, and liberation of the individual action of social actors in transactions. In short, an institution is the emergent process of social structure actualized in transactions (social action). Institutions, therefore, not only have a structural existence, but also an actual existence as they are the process of the emergence of the actual (in transactions) from the structural. Institutions are multi-level processes and cannot be reduced to structures, actions, behaviors, or patterns of behaviors. In this part, I demonstrate the significance of this reconciliation in two areas. The first is its ability to further differentiate the institutional definition of economics as "the science of social provisioning" from the mainstream definition of economics as "a relationship between ends and scarce means" by decomposing the institutional definition into its productive and distributive processes. The second is its usefulness in modeling the interaction of non-economic social institutions with economic institutions at varying levels of detail. I also introduce critical institutional analysis, and use as a method, for model-building and use it to build models of communal, feudal, and industrial capitalist economies.     

Towards a non-Darwinian Theory of Institutional Change

The paper emphasizes two flaws in mainstream economics: the failure to understand actual human behavior in many real contexts and the failure to take account of transaction costs. By emphasizing the role of knowledge, institutions, transaction costs and path dependence, new institutional economics has provided a powerful answer to these shortcomings. Nevertheless, a number of questions remain open. In particular, path dependence is far from being a continuous process. Its dynamics and its irregularities are by and large unexplained. Hence, a strong need for a convincing evolutionary theory of environmental change. This article does not deny the validity of the Darwinian view applied to the theory of the firm and of competition in a free-market economy. The paper, however, maintains that the natural-selection process that characterizes the Darwinian approach is ill suited to describe economic evolutionary processes. It is shown that a combination of functional analysis and natural selection may indeed be a better solution, for it solves some of the puzzles raised by public choice theory without violating the fundamental tenets of the new institutional economics approach. Still, although this combined view may well explain why the institutional features are retained by the system, it does not clarify why they are introduced in the first place. A third possibility is put forward in the second part of the paper, where a new evolutionary theory is suggested. Within this framework, agents are assumed to behave according to their preferences within the existing rules of the game. At the same time, new ideas and sometimes new ideologies may influence their behavioral patterns. The combination between needs and ideologies generates environmental change, especially if so-called ideological entrepreneurs are able to transform latent and shared beliefs into an institutional project and enforce it.     

Bringing institutions into evolutionary growth theory

Classical economics was both evolutionary and institutional. With the rise of neoclassical economics, both the evolutionary and the institutional aspects were squeezed out of main line economic theory. The last quarter century has seen a rebirth of both traditions, but as minority intellectual positions, and to a considerable extent separate ones. This essay argues the need for a rejoining of evolutionary and institutional economics, and suggests a way to bring the two strands together in a coherent way.     

Hayek and Keynes: From a common critique of economic method to different theories of expectations

The methodological positions of Hayek and Keynes contain striking similarities. Both authors opposed empiricist approaches to economics that assign priority to mere observation as the source of knowledge. Both emphasised intentionality, motivation and human agency. Notwithstanding this common ground, they had different conceptions of how beliefs are formed and had different explanations of thought and action in economics. Hayek grounded his explanation on an evolutionary theory of the mind, i.e. on psychological premises, whereas Keynes based his view of belief formation on probable reasoning, where probability is a logical concept. Starting from psychological premises Hayek maintained that individuals act rationally only by following rules. As a consequence, he considered conventional expectations to be the primary guide for agents in economic life. Keynes agreed that conventional expectations actually guide economic behaviour, but he maintained that they are justified only in situations of total ignorance. In conditions of limited knowledge, agents can base their action on reasonable expectations, independently of conventions. Moreover, agents?particularly those institutions responsible for economic policy?ought to shun conventional behaviour in order to counteract its negative social consequences. We argue that Keynes's theory of expectations is well grounded upon his theory of logical probability. Hence his advocacy of discretionary policy is rationally justified.     

解读演化经济学的兴起——兼论演化经济学的现状与未来发展

演化经济学的兴起主要有三个原因:西方主流经济学的范式危机;自然科学的发展;社会科学领域演化思想的积累与发展.演化经济学最近的前沿研究集中于进行演化建模,对复杂性进行测量,讨论技术与制度的协同演化等几个方面.拓展对多时期动态过程的研究,将演化经济学与制度经济学、马克思主义经济学、博弈理论等进行创造性综合,更多关注学科语言的凝炼和理论建模工作是演化经济学的未来发展方向.     

Why Meso? On “Aggregation” and “Emergence”, and Why and How the Meso Level is Essential in Social Economics

Simplistic aggregation in idealized “markets” versus structural emergence in complex and path-dependent processes have always marked a “continental divide” between neoclassical mainstream economics and all kinds of evolutionary and institutional social economics. This paper deals with institutional, or structural, emergence and argues that the meso level (to be specific) is the proper aggregate level for social economic analyses of complex systems and processes. Also, neo-Schumpeterian economists have stressed recently the issue of an “institutional trajectory” taking place on the meso economic level. This paper argues that the creative ideas of a Schumpeterian entrepreneur are not a sufficient explanation in this case. Using an evolutionary interpretation of a simple game-theoretic formalism (the Folk Theorem), the paper strives to demonstrate that the meso level, as the proper level of institutional emergence, must and can be endogenously explained from a process of interactive problem-solving of interdependent agents, in their struggle for coordination under strong uncertainty. It will be illustrated that a meso-sized socio-economic group co-evolves, and is constituted, together with the institution that in turn serves as the solution to the coordination problem. The practical and policy implications of the argument are discussed.

What If There Are No Conventional Price Mechanisms?

Inspired by Frederic (“Fred”) S. Lee’s theoretical contribution to institutional-heterodox economics, I make the case that the neoclassical price mechanism is not only flawed, but also irrelevant for the study of actual coordination mechanisms, hence the price mechanism — as a theory as well as a way of thinking — should be discarded. While this position was addressed by early institutionalists, starting with Thorstein Veblen, later institutionalists have not completely rejected the price mechanism. The sympathy for the price mechanism has prevented institutionalists (and other heterodox economists) from fully developing an alternative theoretical framework concerning how actual economic activities are organized. I, therefore, provide an institutionalist-heterodox framework of the provisioning process focusing on business enterprise activities. This framework shows how institutional economics becomes more refined and useful when it is married to other traditions in heterodox economics, in particular, Marxian, social, and post-Keynesian economics. Such an integrative approach is what Fred Lee showed through his work toward producing a better theory and policy for the underlying population.     

Schumpeter’s Split Between “Pure” Economics and Institutional Economics: Why Methodological Individualism Was Not Fully Considered

While Joseph A. Schumpeter is classified as a pioneer of evolutionary economics in a wide sense and of entrepreneurship and innovation management in a narrower sense, Schumpeter is less known for his contributions in the area of scientific methodology and history of science. The paper deals with methodological premises in Schumpeter’s scientific positioning. In 1908, in his Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie, Schumpeter developed and pioneered his methodological individualism which is very much acknowledged. However, comparing these early positions with methodological writings in his History of Economic Analysis (1954) shows that he has not really shifted from methodological individualism to an institutional perspective that addresses the academic interplay and sees economic action rooted in historical predispositions, paths and social constraints.     

Institutionalist Labor Market Theory and the Veblenian Dichotomy

This paper contributes to an institutional theory of crime. More specifically, it focuses on the problem of the mafia and the infiltration of legitimate businesses. In legal markets, the mafia resorts to artificial scarcity as a functioning principle. Although scarcity and its consequences for market economies are key aspects of mainstream economics, they have been insufficiently analyzed because the emphasis is only on "natural" scarcity. The mafia phenomenon reveals that scarcity can also be institutionally created. This type of scarcity encourages the process of market collectivization and empowers those generating it. The mafia's legal activities establish a system of "waiting lines" and monitored access to goods. Instead of being merely coercive and openly violent, the mafia builds a new lasting order, producing its own rules, and even breeding social legitimacy.     

西方可持续性经济学研究的主要理论问题及其评价

可持续性经济学是20世纪60年代以来在西方经济学界逐渐形成并发展起来的一门新兴的、交叉型和应用型经济学科。尽管西方经济学界对可持续性经济学从概念、特征、研究范畴、研究方法和制度背景等诸多方面并没有形成一个统一而明确的认识,但可持续性经济学的有关理论已成为可持续发展实践的基础和重要指导。通过对西方可持续性经济学研究的主要理论问题进行梳理与评价,一方面可以揭示西方在该学科领域一些关键理论问题上的研究进展,另一方面也为我国构建具有中国特色、适合中国国情的可持续性经济学的理论和实践提供借鉴。     

The Complementary Relationship Between Institutional and Complexity Economics: The Example of Deep Mechanismic Explanations

Analyzing economic systems from an evolutionary-institutional or a complexity perspective are two complementary approaches to economic inquiry. I discuss three arguments in favor of this hypothesis: (i) eminent institutional economists have examined the economy as what today could be considered a complex system; (ii) complexity economists lack meta-theoretical foundations which could be provided by institutionalist theory; and (iii) institutional economists could benefit from using methods of complexity economics. In this context, I argue that scholars considering the economy to be complex should seek to explain it by discovering social mechanisms instead of focusing on prediction. In order to distinguish between alternative explanations, scholars should refer to the deepness of an explanation, rather than to Occam’s razor.     

Toward an Evolutionary and Moral Science

Thorstein Veblen asked in 1898 why economics is not an evolutionary science; he also proposed a Darwinian paradigm shift for economics. Among the implications reviewed here was his claim that Darwinian principles applied to social entities as well as to biological phenomena. It is also argued that economists have additional reasons for taking Darwinian evolution seriously. Recent work on the evolution of altruism, cooperation and morality show that we are on the brink of developing an evolutionary-grounded theory of human motivation that breaks from the selfish utility-maximizer lambasted by Veblen. This new theory accepts a biological as well as a cultural foundation for moral dispositions. As noted here, the neglected British institutional economist John A. Hobson — who was an acquaintance of Veblen — foreshadowed this approach.     

西方经济学与马克思主义经济学关于生产理论的比较——一个方法论的视角

西方经济学与马克思主义经济学的生产理论研究方法上存在三个方面本质区别:西方经济学的生产理论是以"经济人"假设为出发点,把劳动者仅仅作为生产要素研究;而马克思主义经济学的生产理论是以"历史的、现实的人"为出发点,把劳动者既看作生产要素,又作为生产主体来研究.西方经济学的生产理论只研究生产一般,因而使用价值(即效用)范畴是其研究的核心;而马克思主义经济学则不仅研究生产一般,更注重研究生产的具体社会形式,因而把价值范畴作为研究的核心.西方经济学用个体主义方法,把生产理论仅仅置于微观领域来研究,致使其理论体系在微观与宏观上形成脱节;而马克思主义经济学则运用唯物辩证法,在宏观和微观的有机联系中研究资本主义的生产和再生产问题.