New evidence on wages and employment in worker cooperatives compared with capitalist firms

This article presents new econometric evidence on the comparative behavior of worker cooperatives and capitalist firms, highlighting the differences in wages and employment responses. We use a comprehensive panel data set that covers the entire population of cooperatives and their capitalist counterparts registered in the social security records in Uruguay from April 1996 to December 2005. We analyze the data to study the employment and wage decisions in both types of enterprises, the results of which suggests that their adjustment mechanisms to idiosyncratic price changes and macroeconomic shocks may differ greatly. The data set also allows us to estimate wage and employment variations for members and non-members of cooperatives separately, and provides an empirical test for the so-called degeneration hypothesis. Our findings are broadly consistent with previous studies for Italian cooperatives and plywood cooperatives in the United States. As studies of this kind are so few, our research provides a significant contribution to the empirical literature on labor managed firms. Moreover, comparing worker cooperatives and capitalist firms offers an exceptional opportunity to determine how control by workers may lead to different organizational behavior.     

A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications

This paper helps close the gap between theory and empirical evidence in the literature on asymmetric employer learning. If an employer's private learning is reflected in a worker's wage and one employer's private information is transmitted to the next when the worker makes a job-to-job transition, then asymmetric employer learning will appear in wage regressions as learning over an employment spell. Extending previous work that assumes all learning takes place publicly, this paper develops wage regressions that test for both asymmetric employer learning and public learning. The empirical results, including tests of alternative explanations, are consistent with asymmetric employer learning's having at least as much of an effect on wages during an employment spell as does public learning. The model developed in this paper illustrates how the story suggested by the empirical work might unfold. It shows that outside firms can profitably compete with a better-informed employer through bidding wars, even when the worker is equally productive in all firms. Furthermore, this competition results in different wages for workers with the same publicly observable characteristics, a result that previous models of asymmetric learning have not produced.     

Collective Action,Marx’s Class Theory,and the Union Movement

Research on establishment size-wage effects has consistently shown a positive relationship between the number of employees and workers' wages. While several theories have been offered to explain these outcomes, the use of data with limited employer characteristics make for a dubious connection between theory and results. This study examines the firm size-wage effect using a dataset that captures typical worker demographics, but also contains employer information not typically captured in larger datasets. The results provide strong evidence that these wage effects are the result of several forces, including worker sorting/matching, efficiency wages, internal labor markets, and, to a lesser degree, working conditions.     

Evolution of the Interindustry Wage Structure in China Since the 1980s

Industry mean wages in China have exhibited sharply increased dispersion since the early1990s. Researchers have attributed this rising inequality within the industrial wage structure to: (i) increasingly competitive labour markets leading to better matches between worker pay, worker skills and employer demands; or (ii) residual government control in some industrial sectors that has generated high wages through monopoly rent sharing. We argue that the rise in China's industrial wage dispersion is primarily attributable to increasingly competitive labour markets, which have led to greater returns to schooling and to efficient redistribution of workers across major industry groups. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the level or changes in government monopoly power has had negligible impact on China's rising industrial wage dispersion.     

WAGE SIGNALING: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTRAFIRM BARGAINING AND ASYMMETRIC LEARNING*

The article analyzes the effect of employer–worker bargaining on wage dynamics in the presence of asymmetric information between current and potential employers. A failure to reach an agreement leads to output loss. Because the disagreement points depend upon the worker's productivity, productive workers separate themselves from less productive workers and signal their ability through wages. In existing models of asymmetric learning, wages are attached to publicly observable characteristics and wage growth occurs only when there is a change in observable characteristics. This model, in contrast, generates an increase in earnings dispersion in cohorts of workers with similar observable characteristics.     

Worker flows, job flows and firm wage policies

Like many transition economies, Slovenia is undergoing profound changes in the workings of the labour market with potentially greater flexibility in terms of both wage and employment adjustment. To investigate the impact of these changes, we use unique longitudinal matched employer‐employee data that permits measurement of employment transitions and wages for workers and enables links of the workers to the firms in which they are employed. We can thus measure worker flows and job flows in a comprehensive and integrated manner. We find a high pace of job flows in Slovenia especially for young, small, private and foreign‐owned firms and for young, less educated workers. While job flows have approached the rates observed in developed market economies, the excess of worker flows above job flows is lower than that observed in market economies. A key factor in the patterns of the worker and job flows is the determination of wages in Slovenia. A base wage schedule provides strict guidelines for minimum wages for different skill categories. However, firms are permitted to offer higher wages to an individual based upon the success of the worker and/or the firm. Our analysis shows that firms deviate from the base wage schedule significantly and that the idiosyncratic wage policies of firms are closely related to the observed pattern of worker and job flows at the firm. Firms with more flexible wages (measured as less compression of wages within the firm) have less employment instability and are also able to improve the match quality of their workers. JEL Classifications: J23, J31, J41, J61, P23, P31.     

EMPLOYMENT STABILIZATION INSIDE FIRMS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF WORKER COOPERATIVES

There is evidence that worker cooperatives provide a greater stabilization of employment compared to capital‐managed firms. While the reasons of this behaviour can be ascribed to their property and governance structure, less is known of the tools to put it into practice. I discuss two possible ways to guarantee employment insurance: by letting wages fluctuate, or by accumulating reinvested profits into an income stabilizing fund that copes with downturns without firing and without reducing wages. In this second case, I find out that asset locks play a wage smoothing role. This may explain the large share of profits that are reinvested in this indivisible and not appropriable fund. I provide evidence for this mechanism by means of original data at the firm level and of first‐hand collected survey data at the individual level on risk perception in a sample of Italian cooperatives.     

Trade Liberalization and Gender Wage Inequality in Mexico

Abstract

After twenty years of trade liberalization in Mexico, the relationship between gender wage inequality and trade remains insufficiently studied, in spite of evidence of increasing numbers of women in industrial employment. This study aims to analyze the effects of export orientation and other characteristics that represent the industrial underpinnings of restructuring on gender wage inequality for 2001–5. There is consistent evidence of the negative impact of export orientation on men's and women's wages and the gender wage ratio, signifying that women lose in both absolute and relative terms. This result holds after controlling for women's share of employment and the skills of both genders, contrary to the expected effect from trade on equality. There is also a negative relation between a rise in the proportion of unskilled workers and the gender wage ratio, which suggests that the trade-induced skill hypothesis cannot be considered an adequate explanation for gender inequality.     

Explaining Eastern Germany's Wage Gap: The Impact of Structural Change

Since Eastern Germany's conversion to a market economy wages have remained considerably below the West German wage level. This article looks at the role of establishment-specific factors—such as sectoral affiliation and size of the labour force—in this process. A non-parametric decomposition that has played a prominent role in the gender wage gap literature is applied to breakdown the East–West wage gap into its constituent components. Using establishment data from German employment statistics, the article demonstrates that the catching-up process of Eastern Germany's wage level is hindered by the shift in its economic structure towards lower-paying types of companies, which has caused the lagging behind in the adjustment of wages.     

最低工资对中国就业和工资水平的影响

本文以1998—2007年全国各市(地区、自治州、盟)最低工资标准随时间变化的外生差异来识别最低工资上涨与企业平均工资、企业雇佣人数的关系。利用1998—2007年规模以上制造业企业报表数据进行的分析显示,最低工资每上涨10%,制造业企业平均工资将整体上涨0.4%—0.5%。借助2006—2007年福建省最低工资上涨的"准自然实验"本文也证实了该结论。对于不同行业、不同人均资本水平的企业,最低工资上涨的影响也存在异质性。最低工资将更多地增加劳动密集型或人均资本较低企业的平均工资。研究还发现,最低工资每增加10%,制造业企业雇佣人数将显著减少0.6%左右。政府在制定最低工资时应权衡其在收入分配上的积极效果以及其对就业的负面影响。     

The labor market effects of employer recruitment choice

I analyze employer recruitment decisions using a dynamic, discrete-choice structural model that I estimate on a sample of clerical workers from the MCSUI, a large cross section of establishments in four metropolitan areas of the US. In the model, employers choose either informal recruitment methods (which generate a small but select applicant pool from which the employer can hire quickly) or formal methods (which create a large but less select applicant pool which the employer must screen intensively, delaying hiring times). I study the effects of three counterfactual simulations on recruitment strategies, starting wages, and vacancy durations: A wage subsidy, a policy designed to improve information about prospective matches, and an increase in the heterogeneity of prospective matches. I show that the effects of exogenous policy or environmental changes can be decomposed into “pure wage effects” that affect the wage offers employers post, holding constant their recruitment strategies, and “recruitment-wage effects” that involve changes in recruitment methods. The results show that changes in recruitment strategies represent an important channel through which changes in the economic environment affect the starting wages and vacancy duration for new hires.     

Does Price Stability Exacerbate Labour Market Rigidities in the EMU?

How will the commitment to price stability affect labour market rigidities in the European Monetary Union? I explore a model where firms choose between fixed wage contracts (where the employer cannot lay off the worker, and the wage can only be changed by mutual consent), or contracts where employment is at will, so that either party may terminate employment (with strong similarities to temporary jobs). A fixed wage contract provides better incentives for investment and training, while employment at will facilitates efficient mobility. Inflation erodes the real value of a fixed contract wage over time, and badly matched workers are more likely to quit for other jobs. Disinflation has opposing effects on labour market rigidity: fixed wage contracts become more rigid in real terms, but fewer firms will choose fixed wage contracts.     

WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE U.S. APPAREL INDUSTRY

This article uses individual-level data from the U.S. Census, Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), to examine wages and employment in the U.S. apparel industry. Total employment in this sector has been falling since 1970, and its overall average wage is the lowest of 25 industry aggregates. But disaggregation by gender, education, and nativity reveals that groups of highly educated male native workers earn higher average wages in apparel than in other industries. Moreover, after adjusting for observed individual differences in human capital (in addition to the three characteristics used to form worker subsets), highly educated male natives earn positive wage premiums in this sector. In contrast, most categories of immigrants and female natives earn relatively low average wages and experience negative wage premiums in apparel. This variation in the adjusted industry wage premiums across worker groups may be related to apparel's relative exposure to imports and immigrant workers.     

Its Bark is Worse Than its Bite: The Wage and Employment Effects of the Minimum Wage in the US

This study examines the effect of changes in the US minimum wage on wages and employment in 32 industries selected for their presumed sensitivity to the minimum wage. Applying time series techniques commonly used in macroeconomics and finance to changes in the minimum wage occurring from 1967 and 1991, we initially test for a wage response; only where one is found do we test for an employment response. Twenty-five per cent of the industry/minimum-wage-increase pairs show evidence of an appropriate wage response. Eight of these 54 show a statistically significant negative employment response, while six show significant, positive employment responses. Positive effects may be due to either a high variance distribution centred on zero or markets with 'lemons' problems concerning worker quality. Limiting analysis to industries in which the minimum wage binds provides no evidence of a consistent negative relationship between the historical minimum wage and employment.     

International Trade and Unemployment—the Worker‐selection Effect

This paper investigates the labor market effects of trade liberalization. We incorporate trade unions and heterogeneous workers into the Melitz framework. Workers differ with respect to their abilities. Our main findings are: (i) trade liberalization harms low‐ability workers, they lose their job and switch to long‐term unemployment (worker‐selection effect); (ii) high‐ability workers are better off in terms of both higher wages and higher employment; (iii) if a country is endowed with a large fraction of low‐ability workers, trade liberalization leads to a rise in aggregate unemployment—in this case, trade liberalization may harm a country's welfare; (iv) the overall employment and welfare effect crucially hinges on the characteristics of the wage bargain.     

On the stability of the cooperative type of organization

The stability of producer cooperatives in market economies is analyzed in a dynamic context. It is shown that, when permitted to hire wage laborers, a producer cooperative, even if its labor productivity is higher than in an otherwise equivalent capitalist firm, is likely to lose its cooperative character because members' personal income will be maximized when “expensive” members are replaced by “inexpensive” wage-laborers. Producer cooperatives will maintain their organizational character best when they operate in a marginal industry where cooperation enhances members' productivity so that their earnings exceed their opportunity wages. In general, competitive markets for membership are not a sufficient condition to prevent the transformation of cooperatives into capitalist firms.     

AN EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL WHEN FIRMS OBSERVE WORKERS' EMPLOYMENT STATUS*

This article considers an equilibrium search model, where firms post wages using information on workers' employment status. Earnings differentials between workers of different employment statuses are driven by firms' ability to discriminate workers' reservation wages. I study how these wage policies depend on firms' and workers' characteristics, and how these policies affect the wage distribution. The model delivers new predictions for the amount of wage dispersion that can be generated with search models and provides a better representation of the left tail of the wage distribution in the presence of a legal minimum wage than standard equilibrium search models.     

Intermediate good sourcing,wages and inequality: From theory to evidence

This paper examines the consequences of offshoring and outsourcing on domestic wages and wage inequality. I highlight the role of labor market frictions in impacting firms’ outsourcing and offshoring decisions; specifically, how differential costs of matching with workers affect the location of production (onshore or offshore) and how differential costs of assessing worker quality affect the ownership of intermediate production (intra‐firm or inter‐firm). I demonstrate how firm sourcing decisions can depend crucially on the industry skill intensity, which reflects the importance of worker–firm match quality, and as a result, the effect of offshoring on domestic labor depends on occupation and industry characteristics, as well as the ownership regime of trade. Bringing the theory to the data I rely on plausibly exogenous variation in the cost of inter‐ and intra‐firm offshoring to identify the effects of a change in each type of offshoring on domestic wages. I find strong evidence that the effect of offshoring on domestic wages—both on the average and on the wage distribution—is governed by the type of offshoring (inter‐ vs. intra‐firm), the skill intensity of the industry, and the offshorability of the occupation.     

Dismissal conflicts and unemployment

We analyse the institutional sources of dismissal conflicts when workers’ effort is not perfectly observable. We build an efficiency wage model with firing costs to capture their effect on employment through wages. In this context, whenever there is a dismissal, a double moral hazard problem can arise. Resolution of this problem by a third party will be imperfect due to asymmetric information. In turn, disciplinary dismissals will not be costless and firing costs will have a negative effect on aggregate employment. The solution to this problem does not necessarily imply the elimination of firing costs.     

A Quantile Regression Analysis of Wages in Panama

Differences in the effects of worker characteristics on wages in Panama at different points of the conditional wage distribution are investigated. Public sector employment increases wages relatively more at lower quantiles. Within the public sector, employment in that sector increases wages of the median worker and reduces wage inequality. Presence of a labor union increases relatively more private sector wages at lower quantiles. Unions reduce wage inequality within the union private sector and increase average wages within that sector. In the public sector, the presence of a labor union increases wages of men at lower quantiles at a lower rate than in the private sector. Self-employment decreases wages at lower quantiles and increases wages at higher quantiles. Urban location affects wages in a U-shaped pattern as one moves from lower to higher quantiles. Rates of return to experience are higher for men at higher quantiles. Experience increases men's wage inequality.