浅谈金融竞争与强化金融监管

一、金融监管的必要性 寻租行为的大量存在产生了金融监管的要求。在金融交易中，金融机构的腐败体现为利用资金配置权进行两类寻租行为。一是通过对企业配置信贷资金获得第一类寻租收入。这在金融监管当局的现场检查中体现为直接从信贷额度中扣除部分金额作为好处费；二是信贷配置上的定价权收入，这实际上是企业在获得贷款后为了维持长期信贷关系交易而支付的持续性成本。银行的寻租程度取决于改革进程中中央银行和财政对银行的转移支付和内控制度的相对力度比较，企业借款行为是在自筹资金和银行借款问进行的相对成本比较。     

论规范非正规民间金融的制度安排

一、非正规民间金融概述1．非正规民间金融的定义。非正规民间金融，即民间融资，指非金融机构的自然人、企业及其他经济主体（财政除外）之间以货币资金为标的的价值转移及本息支付，是游离于国家正规金融机构之外的以资金筹措为主的融资活动。目前它主要服务于民营经济，有家庭融资（家庭消费、个体户等）和企业融资。     

我国农户借款难的成因及对策

在我国广大的农村地区，普遍存在着农户借款难的问题。由于农户的资金需求不能通过正规金融机构完全满足，农户只得求助于民间借贷，但却出现了民间高利贷这一不良现象。解决这一问题应采取以下政策：努力推进农村金融机构的多元化；建立存款保险制度；对农户之间的自由借贷，应该制定相应的法规加以规范；增强正规金融机构的服务功能，充分发挥正规金融的支农作用。     

我国民间借贷“阳光化”发展探析

利用收支差额法估算出近年来我国民间借贷规模呈现攀升迹象。除了宏观因素以外,过度融资和信贷投向结构性偏差也是民间借贷规模膨胀的重要推手。对民间借贷必须实行"疏堵结合"的策略,即一方面需严厉打击高利贷,限制非法民间借贷活动的过快膨胀;另一方面需要引导民间资金和正规金融体系之间资金合理互补、共同发展,以此构建更加完善的社会融资体系。近期小额贷款公司改制方向,或是民间资本与正规金融的接轨方式具体体现。     

我国金融监管问题讨论综述

一、金融监管的必要性 寻租行为的大量存在产生了金融监管的要求。谢平等人对改革进程中的非规范融资交易的研究表明:在金融交易中,金融机构的腐败体现为利用资金配置权进行两类寻租行为,一是通过对企业配置信贷资金获得第一类寻租收入,这在金融监管当局的现场检查中体现为直接从信贷额度中扣除部分金额作为好处费;另一类是信贷配置上的定价权收入,这实际上是企业在获得贷款后为了维持长期信贷关系交易而支付的持续性成本。     

绍兴民间融资现状调查与发展路径选择

民间融资是指出资人与受资人之间,在国家法定金融机构之外,以取得高额利息与取得资金使用权并支付约定利息为目的,而采用民间借贷、民间票据融资、民间有价证券融资和社会集资等形式,暂时改变资金使用权的金融行为。与正规金融机构融资相比,民间融资在地方经济、支持地方企业发展方面发挥了重要作用。绍兴地区民间资金活跃但却存在着诸如风险高、缺乏有效监管等问题。文章通过对绍兴市当前民间融资调查和分析,将现实与理论相结合,对民间融资未来发展提出的意见和建议。     

我国民间金融规范发展的对策研究

我国民间金融在拓宽中小企业融资渠道、推动金融机构创新、填补正规金融的资金缺口、提高社会资金配置效率等方面具有一定的积极作用。但民间金融发展存在相关立法滞后、民间借贷利率易失控、信贷风险高、监管难度大等问题。应完善对民间金融的法律规制、规范民间融资的操作行为、加强对民间金融的分类监管、加快利率市场化进程等,引导我国民间金融规范发展。     

我国农村民间借贷研究综述

近年来,随着我国农村经济的快速发展,农户对资金的需求越来越大。由于我国农村正规金融组织的缺失,使农村资金的供给困难进一步加剧,这为农村民间借贷的发展提供了一定空间。在这一背景下,学者对我国农村民间借贷问题进行了深入研究。现将主要观点综述如下。一、农村民间借贷的概念宋磊认为,农村民间借贷有广义、狭义之分。广义的民间借贷是各种民间金融的总称,泛指不通过官方正式金融机构的一切民间金融活动。通常包括社会集资、居民间的借贷、民间典当业、农村合作基金会等融资活动(宋磊,2005)。康正平认为,民间借贷是游离于正规金融机构…     

资源配置和产出效应:金融腐败的宏观经济成本

本文根据对Solow Swan模型和Ramsey模型的修订 ,把金融腐败引入生产函数和效用函数 ,研究金融腐败的宏观经济后果 ,提出四个基本结论。第一 ,金融机构通过寻租制造稀缺 ,从而扭曲了资源价格 ,导致了资源错误配置 ,由此造成金融资源使用效率的低下 ;第二 ,腐败程度与产出水平存在拉弗曲线关系 ,或者说 ,产出水平与融资腐败程度存在多重均衡 (multipleequilibria) ,融资腐败取决于经济发展中的资金需求程度和资金的稀缺性 ;第三 ,融资腐败是一种转移支付 ,是金融机构或监管部门直接或间接攫取实体经济部门的产出收益 ,这似乎是一个零和博弈 ,但是实际情况远较此复杂。由于这种转移支付的存在 ,资金市场面临进一步的短缺 ,出现“利率偏离实体经济需求的反常抬升”。因此 ,金融腐败是制造稀缺的行为 ;第四 ,我们证明了这样一个事实———由于金融腐败的存在 ,一般宏观经济学假定的从储蓄到投资的瞬间平滑过程是不符合实际情况的 ,由此才可以解释我国金融领域一个怪异而又为大家习以为常的现象 :一方面是储蓄存款余额的迅速攀升 ,另一方面是从城镇到农村持续存在的贷款难问题。     

我国民间金融监管价值取向的法律实证研究

民间金融是指未经法定程序登记注册,游离于国家金融监管体系之外的民间自发进行的金融交易活动.民间借贷等民间金融的基础法律关系是借款合同关系,国家对民间金融的监管主要是注重合同双方的主体资格和权利义务的平衡.     

Vertical Links Between Formal and Informal Financial Institutions

The paper investigates vertical linkages between formal and informal financial institutions. Specifically, it studies a policy that expands formal credit to informal lenders, in the hope that this will improve loan terms for borrowers who are shut out of the formal sector. Special attention is paid to the Philippines. It is argued that the effects of stronger vertical links depend on the form of lender competition. In particular, if the relationship between lenders is one of strategic cooperation (sustained by threats of reprisal in a repeated setting), an expansion of formal credit may worsen the terms faced by informal borrowers.     

农业补贴对农村金融市场的“挤出效应”——理论分析与实证检验

针对我国农村金融机构年贷款增长率远低于政府农业年度补贴增长率的现实,本文构建一个理论分析框架,并基于农户调研数据进行实证分析。研究发现,农业补贴依次对非正规金融市场和正规金融市场形成挤出效应;政府提高贷款利息虽可压缩非正规金融市场的生存空间,但却会引致农户福利流失;非挂钩性农业补贴会强化(弱化)非正规金融市场(正规金融市场)的挤出效应。因而,政府不应单一地寄希望于制度创新,而应更多地关注农业补贴对农户借贷决策行为的影响。     

Lending policies of informal, formal and semiformal lenders

This paper compares lending policies of formal, informal and semiformal lenders with respect to household lending in Vietnam. The analysis suggests that the probability of using formal or semiformal credit increases if borrowers provide collateral, a guarantor and/or borrow for business‐related activities. The probability of using informal credit increases for female borrowers. It also appears that the probability of using formal credit increases in household welfare up to a certain threshold, but at a decreasing rate. In addition, the paper discerns the determinants of probability of default across lender types. Default risk of formal credit appears to be strongly affected by formal loan contract terms, e.g., loan interest rate and form of loan repayment, whereas default risk on informal loans is significantly related to the presence of propinquity and other internal characteristics of the borrowing household. Overall, the study raises several important implications for the screening, monitoring and enforcement instruments that may be employed by different types of lenders.     

Interaction of formal and informal financial markets in quasi-emerging market economies

The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the interaction of formal and informal financial markets and their impact on economic activity in quasi-emerging market economies. Using a four-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric information in the formal financial sector, we come up with three fundamental findings. First, we demonstrate that formal and informal financial sector loans are complementary in the aggregate, suggesting that an increase in the use of formal financial sector credit creates additional productive capacity that requires more informal financial sector credit to maintain equilibrium. Second, it is shown that interest rates in the formal and informal financial sectors do not always change together in the same direction. We demonstrate that in some instances, interest rates in the two sectors change in diametrically opposed directions with the implication that the informal financial sector may frustrate monetary policy, the extent of which depends on the size of the informal financial sector. Thus, the larger the size of the informal financial sector the lower the likely impact of monetary policy on economic activity. Third, the model shows that the risk factor (probability of success) for both high and low risk borrowers plays an important role in determining the magnitude by which macroeconomic indicators respond to shocks.     

Resilience and Dynamism of Embedded Financial Transactions in Cameroon

Following the recent financial crisis, institutional economists have issued a “call” for institutionalist research on alternative financial systems. While suggestions have been forthcoming, (for example, in Volume 48, Issue 4 of the Journal of Economic Issues), most have centered on national-level innovations in advanced capitalist countries, prompting further calls for “community” and individual level anti-capitalist financial relations. With this article, we respond to such calls. We show how networks of finance in Cameroon bridge the formal/informal dualisms in lending/savings activities. We demonstrate that any debates about whether to formalize informal financial institutions or leave them alone weaken in Cameroon because, through networks, people access both formal and informal financial institutions for different purposes and at various stages in the life of these institutions. This dynamism explains why, in spite of the growth of money markets in Cameroon, informal financial institutions have not disappeared, nor declined. In fact, they have expanded, contrary to predictions in existing new institutional economics research. While informal institutions have evolved, they have not necessarily become formal banks, microfinance, or stock markets. Rather, the informal financial institutions have adopted and adapted in terms of both lending and saving practices in a country where growing formal financialization has become the norm. Our findings challenge neoclassical and new institutional economics theories about money, credit, and the actors in the money market.     

Regulating Exclusion from Financial Markets

We study optimal enforcement in credit markets in which the only threat facing a defaulting borrower is restricted access to financial markets. We solve for the optimal level of exclusion, and link it to observed institutional arrangements. Regulation in this environment must accomplish two objectives. First, it must prevent borrowers from defaulting on one bank and transferring their resources to another bank. Second, and less obviously, it must give banks the incentive to make sizeable loans, and to honour their promises of future credit. We establish that the optimal regulation resembles observed laws governing default on debt. Moreover, if debtors have the right to a "fresh start" after bankruptcy then this must be balanced by enforceable provisions against fraudulent conveyance. Our optimal regulation is robust, in that it can be implemented in a way that does not require the regulator to have information about either the borrower or lender. Our results isolate the way in which specific institutions surrounding bankruptcy–namely rules governing asset garnishment and fraudulent conveyances–support loan markets in which borrowers have no collateral.     

Does formal financial development crowd in informal financing? Evidence from Chinese private enterprises

The relationship between formal and informal finance is uncertain. They serve as substitute for high-quality borrowers but are complement for low-quality borrowers. As formal financial institutions expand, they may concentrate on high-quality borrowers or diversify among borrowers of different qualities. Using unique survey data from Chinese private firms, we are allowed to investigate the relationship for a group of borrowers who were considered as low-quality. We find that formal financial development imposes a crowd-in effect for private firms’ informal financing, especially in East China. There is heterogeneity between East and West China. We document that the crowd-in effect is greater for private firms with bank access or of large size.     

信息、非正规金融与中小企业融资

各种形式的非正规金融在发展中国家和地区广泛存在。本文认为,由于中小企业信息不透明,且常常不能提供充分的担保或抵押,正规金融机构难以有效克服信息不对称造成的逆向选择问题,而非正规金融则在收集关于中小企业的“软信息”方面具有优势。这种信息优势是非正规金融广泛存在的根本性原因,金融抑制只是一个强化因素,同时非正规金融市场的各种特征也都源于其存在的根本逻辑。本文构建了一个包括异质的中小企业借款者和异质的贷款者(具有不同信息结构的非正规金融和正规金融部门)的金融市场模型,证明非正规金融的存在能够改进整个信贷市场的资金配置效率。     

Capacity-constrained Collusive Price Discrimination in the Informal Rural Credit Markets of Nepal

The author tests two alternative models of price determination in informal rural credit markets, using LSMS data from Nepal. Strong support is found for a capacity-constrained collusive oligopoly model, where lenders have full information about actual borrowers and charge heterogeneous interest rates. Only marginal support is found for a competitive cost-pricing model with imperfect information. Interest rates vary with the observable characteristics of caste, installment period, and geographical region; and they decrease as village lending capacity increases up to a certain level. Interest rates do not depend on risk related variables such as land value and loan size.     

Information, Informal Finance, and SME Financing

Informal finance exists extensively and has been playing an important role in small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing in developing economies. This paper tries to rationalize the extensiveness of informal finance. SME financing suffers more serious information asymmetry to the extent that most SMEs are more opaque and can only provide less collateral. Informal lenders have an advantage over formal financial institutions in collecting “soft information” about SME borrowers. This paper establishes a model including formal and informal lenders and high- and low-risk borrowers with or without sufficient collateral and shows that the credit market in which informal finance is eliminated will allocate funds in some inefficient way, and the efficiency of allocating credit funds can be improved once informal finance is allowed to coexist with formal finance. Translated from Economic Research Journal, 2005, 7 (in Chinese)