大型公共建筑空调系统节能优化分析

作为建筑中的主要耗能设备,大型公共建筑空调系统消耗了建筑物能源总量的30-60%.本文从空调系统组成特点入手,对其节能原则和方法进行了分析,以期对大型公共建筑空调系统的节能优化提供理论依据和科学的认识,同时为改善大型公共建筑的空调能耗现状提供有效帮助.     

浅析大型公共建筑管理节能的措施

人类对能源的需求越来越大,大型公共建筑是单位建筑面积能耗高的建筑物,其节能的潜力较大.大型公共建筑的能耗水平取决于高效节能技术和设备的应用和实际运行阶段是否采取了节能运行管理.政府、业主、物业公司和建筑使用者作为大型公共建筑的参与者通过共同协作,形成一套完整的、系统的、动态的管理方法和激励政策体系,才能有效降低大型公共建筑的能耗.     

大型公共建筑节能改造的实践和探索

如今,随着社会的进步和发展,人们的节能环保意识的不断增强,科学发展的观念已经成为人们的普遍共识,对大型公共建筑的节能标准和要求也在不断提高。然而,我国大型公共建筑普遍面临着节能设备落后、资源消耗大的困境。本文分析了我国大型公共建筑的现状,并且针对性的提出了改造的措施,供业内人士参考。     

既有大型公建节能改造中的进化博弈论分析

运用进化稳定策略为核心的进化博弈方法,对目前我国既有大型公共建筑节能改造工作进行研究,分析得出政府与产权方之间在节能改造问题中的进化博弈解。     

浅谈大型公共建筑的节能管理

本文详细地介绍了大型公共建筑空调系统运行节能措施、遮阳节能管理、照明节能措施以及办公设备节能措施等内容。希望本文的研究能够为建筑节能事业的发展提供一些帮助和借鉴。     

节能激励机制的国际比较及借鉴

节能的关键在于激励机制的有效性。通过节能激励机制的国际比较可发现,发达国家在节能激励机制的制定、运行等方面有三个特征,即:政府主导、多方参与的激励机制;以法规为核心的激励规则;基于市场、辅以调控的激励措施。研究发达国家的节能激励机制,对我国节能工作有重要启示。     

大型公共建筑精装修的质量监控重点

随着的经济的快速发展,?大型公共建筑逐渐增多。如何加强大型公共建筑精装修的质量管控,成为当前工作中的重要任务,也是在装饰工程中要重视的焦点问题。因为,大型公共建筑精装修的质量好坏直接关系到整个工程的效果、施工企业的公司形象和企业的信誉。特别是在建筑装饰设计风格迥异、装饰施工水平参差不齐的今天,?大型公共建筑精装修的质量监控显得至关重要。本文就大型公共建筑精装修的质量监控重点进行简单的分析和探讨。     

如何发挥地方政府在节能减排中的作用

中央政府的节能减排目标与地方政府短期利益的矛盾,导致地方政府在推进节能减排工作中缺乏内在动力。现有的财税制度和政绩考核体系形成的对地方政府的激励机制不利于节能减排目标的实现。鉴于此,本文提出了构建有利于地方政府推进节能减排的激励机制。     

大型公共建筑的能源审计研究

以大型公共建筑能源审计为研究对象,分析了建筑能源审计的内容和组织架构,建立了建筑能源审计的评价指标体系和方法。最后,针对我国大型公共建筑能源审计情况提出了相关的对策和建议。此研究有助于推动大型公共建筑能源审计工作,为客观、有效地开展大型公共建筑物的能源审计提供了理论依据和现实指导。     

新政策新法规

我国将建机关办公和大型公共建筑节能监管体系；淘汰造纸等落后产能时间表确定；国家发改委下发通知严禁落后产能转移流动；告别国外标准我国绿色建筑评价标识启动。     

基于外部经济性的绿色建筑激励政策分析

外部经济性的存在是绿色建筑向市场推广的一个重要影响因素,如何制定相关激励政策实现外部性内部化,对绿色建筑的推广具有十分重要的意义。基于经济学原理中关于外部性的分析,分析绿色建筑的外部经济性问题,并指出当前中国绿色建筑发展主要制约性因素,针对绿色建筑的外部经济性问题提出相关的激励政策。     

塞尔维亚科技创新与技术转移激励政策评析

塞尔维亚是中东欧近几年来科技创新发展速度较快、技术转移成果较多的国家之一,其科技创新和技术转移相关的激励政策也随着科技水平的发展而不断完善和健全。塞尔维亚科技创新和技术转移激励政策在经费筹措和资助、科研成果商业化等诸多方面可圈可点,但仍存在民众信任度不高、资金分配制度不完善、对国际化创新合作的重视不足等问题。本文从科技创新和技术转移两个方面介绍了塞尔维亚科技创新和技术转移激励政策的现状、进展,并分析了其相关优势和亮点,同时也指出激励政策存在的一些漏洞,并作为对照,提出了对完善我国科技创新和技术转移激励政策的建议。     

RENT SEEKING CAN PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS*

Public officials often have little incentive to spend time and effort proposing policies that benefit others. When, however, some public policies generate rents to these officials, rent seeking in politics can motivate them to provide public goods. We consider the motivational effects of rent seeking on (i) policy, (ii) the the role of agenda-setting in social choice theory, (iii) the effects of graft and corruption in government, and (iv) the validity of cost-benefit analysis.     

Lack of commitment to future privatization policies may lead to worst welfare outcome

We investigate the welfare consequences of a lack of commitment to future privatization policies. The government implements a privatization policy after the competition structure is determined by the entry of private firms. We find that in an equilibrium, the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) a public firm if private firms expect that the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) the public firm. This is because an increase in the number of firms entering a market increases the government's incentive to privatize the public firm, which mitigates future competition and stimulates entries. The full-privatization equilibrium is the worst privatization policy among all possible (either equilibrium or non-equilibrium) privatization policies for welfare because it causes excessive market entry of private firms. Partial commitment of a minimal public ownership share may mitigate this problem.     

Resource‐driven victory

The vast popularity of distributive policies in many resource‐rich countries coincided with the oil and gas price hike of 2004. However, following the sharp decline of price in the late 2014, this popularity started waning and the tendency toward more productive policies gained traction. Using a theoretical model, this paper studies the optimal composition of public spending and demonstrates that, for a sufficiently low amount of any exogenous revenue, for example, resource revenue, investing revenue in productive public good is preferable. The representative agent prefers more distributive policies as resource revenue increases. A key determinant of the optimal composition of public spending is the inherited level of productivity. Countries with too low or too high productivity both find distributive policies more appealing even for a small amount of resource revenue. Yet, they have an essential difference. Resource revenue eradicates individuals' incentive to work in countries with low initial productivity while individuals always prefer to work in highly productive countries.     

企业研发投资财税激励检验的实证分析

本文基于企业投资行为的理论框架,运用企业R&D投资行为模型分析财税政策对企业研发投资行为的影响机理,同时对我国2000—2009年财政税收激励政策以及大中型工业企业的研发投入情况进行实证检验,目的在于对我国激励企业研发活动财税政策的实施效果进行理论与实证的对比性分析。研究结果表明,我国税收优惠政策和政府采购政策对企业的研发投入有明显的激励效应,此项政策需要继续加强,而我国的财政科技投入政策在规模和方式等方面需要进一步完善。     

中日绿色建筑发展的对比研究

日本的绿色建筑建设先于我国,有许多可借鉴之处。本文首先对比了中日经济发展、建筑业发展、建筑能耗等与建筑相关的基本国情。分析得知：两国经济处在不同的发展阶段,国情不同;1996-2008年,中国各类建筑面积增长了74.5%,而日本减少了56.2%;2007年与1996年相比,中国的单位面积公共建筑能耗增加了20%,而日本减少4.41%。进而,重点分析了中日绿色建筑发展的历程、绿色建筑的定义及内涵、评价标准等方面的异同。认为：日本绿色建筑的建设起步较早,但我国的发展速度很快;两国绿色建筑的定义描述虽有些不同,但内涵基本一致;评价标准的种类存在差异,评价内容相近,评分方法、定级方式、表示方式有所不同。最后,根据中国国情,提出了加强宣传普及工作、提高全民意识和公众认知度、加大激励政策力度等借鉴日本成功经验的几点建议,以期对我国推进绿色建筑的发展有所帮助。     

财政发展与建设社会主义新农村:挑战与策略

建设社会主义新农村是我国现代化进程中的重大历史任务,是促进农村发展,实现共同富裕的现实举措.我国的财政支农政策经历了不同的发展时期,对农业生产、农民生活和农村发展的重视程度和支持模式大不相同,效果也有所差异.现阶段,在科学发展观的统领下,公共财政体系在解决"三农"问题上扮演的角色越来越重大,公共支出政策应坚持"多予、少取、放活"的方针,将公共财政的阳光普照到农村大地,为构建社会主义和谐社会提供坚实的保障.     

Asymmetric Decentralization,Intergovernmental Transfers,and Expenditure Policies of Local Governments

Although China’s asymmetric fiscal decentralization system has been criticized for many years, there have been few studies giving direct evidence of its negative incentives on local government spending policies. By introducing the mechanism of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers to the objective function of local government, this paper studies the incentive effects of asymmetric decentralization and fiscal transfers on spending policies of local governments, and uses the provincial panel data to carry out an empirical test. The conclusion shows that the asymmetric decentralization significantly weakens the incentives of local government to increase social expenditure, and as a solution to asymmetric decentralization, fiscal transfers fail to play a good role. Due to the relatively large income effect, the financing mechanism of fiscal transfers not only significantly reduces the incentives of local government to provide social public goods, but also weakens the constraint effect of fiscal competition on expenditure policies of local governments because of the increase in the relative cost. Although the distribution mechanism of fiscal transfers has a significant positive incentive to local government in regions where the net inflow of fiscal resources is more than zero, because of common pooling effects, the comprehensive effects of fiscal transfers in the distribution of incentives of local governments to provide social public goods are negative in all regions.     

CONDITIONING AID ON SOCIAL EXPENDITURES

Aid conditionality forces countries to adopt policies that they would not otherwise choose. We examine how government discretion should be so constrained when the donor cannot fully control public expenditures, but instead can influence a less disaggregated indicator of public policy, namely the allocation of public spending between the social sectors (e.g. education, health, etc.) on the one hand and more traditional public goods (e.g. infrastructure) on the other. We first show how budget allocations will be altered when recipient government preferences are known – i.e. we characterize what policies the donor should "buy"– and how a given aid budget should be allocated between different types of countries. When recipient government preferences are not known by the donor, the permitted policies are distorted due to incentive constraints, and the extent to which aid flows are optimally differentiated between different countries is reduced.