上市公司第一大股东性质、股权比例与公司绩效关系的实证研究

第一大股东性质以及股权集中度与企业绩效的关系是国内外公司治理研究中关注的焦点之一。本文利用2002年在深沪两地上市交易的1181家上市公司的02~04连续三年数据,分析了第一大股东性质、股权比例与公司绩效之间的关系,结果发现:第一大股东为国有股(包括国家股和国家法人股)的上市公司的绩效显著高于第一大股东为非国有法人股的上市公司;国有股比例与公司绩效显著正相关,流通股比例与公司绩效显著负相关,而非国有法人股比例则与公司绩效关系不显著。     

基于股权协议转让的第一大股东变更披露的实证研究

本文选取2000～2003年间我国上市公司基于股权有偿协议转让发生第一大股东变更的79起事件，运用事件研究法从价格行为和交易量两个角度．对该类事件信息披露前后的市场反应进行实证研究．验证了我国股市普遍存在内幕交易和股价操纵的现象。本文还从持股比例、股权的所有权性质和股权变更的程度等角度，发现对于市场尤为关注的信息，内幕交易和股价操纵的情况更为严重。     

中国上市公司第一大股东变更的实证研究

本文利用实际数据研究1999年至2001年中国上市公司第一大股东变更的发展趋势,分析第一大股东变更对促进非流通股份的流通、改进上市公司绩效以及降低第一大股东持股比例的效应.本文证明中国上市公司第一大股东变更逐年增长,这种增长增加了非流通股份的流通性,有限地降低了第一大股东持股比例,但没有带来上市公司绩效的提高.另外,国家股股权变更和法人股股权变更、横向变更与投资型变更及实业型变更、ST公司股权变更与总体变更公司的效应之间存在一定差异.     

上市公司自愿性信息披露的影响因素研究

本文以2002年170家中国制造业上市公司为研究样本，借鉴Meek的研究方法，构建了我国上市公司自愿性信息披露指标体系，在此基础上着重分析公司规模、财务杠杆、盈余业绩、公司所在地和第一大股东所有权性质等5大因素对我国上市公司自愿性信息披露的影响。研究发现，公司规模、盈余业绩和公司所在地显著影响我国上市公司自愿性信息披露行为，而财务杠杆和第一大股东所有权性质与自愿性信息披露之间的相关关系在本文的研究中没有得到验证与支持。研究结论还表明，中国上市公司自愿性信息披露的影响因素与世界其他国家如美国、英国、新西兰、新加坡等国存在差异。     

多重委托-代理关系、公司控制机制与大股东通过关联交易掠夺

本文研究了大股东掠夺在公司治理与企业价值关系中的传导作用。在理论上我们明确了小股东、大股东与董事会之间的三重委托代理关系,并将掠夺概念化为小股东补偿大股东的代理功能而支付给大股东的租,建立了所有权高度集中体制下公司治理的外部控制机制和内部控制机制的理论框架。通过以关联交易作为对大股东掠夺的直接测量,本文用事件研究法证实了我国上市公司关联交易的负价值效应,并发现控股股东控制上市公司的能力、大股东之间的相互制衡、上市公司实际控制人的类型、对上市公司董事的股权激励以及上市公司股权分置情况是影响我国上市公司大股东掠夺的主要因素。本文还发现上市公司股权分置情况与控股股东的控制能力对大股东掠夺具有显著的交互效应。     

公共治理、公司治理与大股东的内部市场——基于我国上市公司的实证研究

我国20多年来的市场化改革虽然整体上大大提高了各地的市场化程度，但上市公司与其大股东的内部市场运作依然普遍。本文从内部市场的公共治理和公司治理功能双重视角分析这一现象背后的根本原因。对我国2000-2005年6271家上市公司样本的实证研究发现：内部市场运作与其所在地区市场环境的不发达程度、大股东的集团控制和一股独大等特征及其与对地方政府的重要程度显著正相关。效率促进、大股东掏空以及地方政府公共治理是大股东内部市场形成和发展的重要因素，这说明，大股东的内部市场同时具有公司治理和公共治理功能，进一步发现，公共治理功能在内部市场中是第一位的，公司治理从属于公共治理。     

公司内部治理结构与会计信息透明度关系的实证研究

本文选取2004-2007年总计4257家上市公司作为研究样本,对公司内部治理与会计信息透明度的关系进行实证研究.结果表明:第一大股东持股比例的增加以及第一大股东性质为国有股降低了会计信息的透明度.而董事会规模、审计委员会的设立、审计意见的类型等公司内部治理机制有利于提高会计信息的透明度.独立董事对于提高会计信息透明度的作用尚未充分发挥作用.     

股权结构与财务困境变化趋势关系分析——来自制造行业上市公司的实证研究

本文以制造行业2007年陷入财务困境的戴星公司和摆脱困境的摘星(帽)公司为研究样本.研究发现:改善第一大股东持股比例,第二大股东对第一大股东适度制衡有利于上市公司摘星(帽)走出困境;大股东持股较为稳定的财务困境上市公司更容易摆脱困境,摘星(帽)变为正常公司.     

企业的契约性质、所有权理论及公司治理结构述评

公司治理结构是一个企业所有权安排的契约,而企业所有权的制度设置是由企业的本质决定的,对企业本质的不同认识必然导致不同性质的公司治理结构.本文通过文献综述,旨在勾勒出企业的契约性质--企业所有权理论--公司治理结构三者的演进脉络和之间的对应关系,发现企业家人力资本产权与企业所有权之间的复杂联系是未来公司治理问题研究的焦点.     

公司治理结构对审计师变更行为影响的实证研究

近年来,在我国的上市公司中,变更审计师的行为呈现逐年递增的趋势,对“被出具非标准审计意见的公司在下一年度中变更审计师的可能性更大”的观点已达成共识.本文选取2004-2008年被出具非标准无保留审计意见的所有A股上市公司为样本,研究公司治理结构对变更审计师行为的影响.结果发现:第一大股东的持股比例与审计师变更行为呈倒U型关系,其他股东对第一大股东的制衡力越强,审计师变更的概率越低,而董事会、监事会和审计委员会对审计师变更行为并未有显著的影响.     

股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护

公司治理的核心是对投资者利益的保护 ,公司治理、股权结构与企业绩效之间存在非常密切的内在联系。本文对深交所 1 996— 1 999年除金融性行业以外的上市公司股权结构与企业绩效之间的关系所进行的经验研究表明 ,在公司治理对外部投资人利益缺乏保护的情况下 ,流通股比例与企业业绩之间负相关 ;在非保护性行业第一大股东持股比例与企业业绩正相关 ;国有股比例、① 法人股比例与企业业绩之间的相关关系不显著。本文的研究结果表明 ,国有股减持和民营化必须建立在保护投资者利益的基础上 ,否则将不利于公司治理的优化和企业绩效的提高。     

基于科学的企业内部治理问题：文献综述与研究展望

迄今为止,基于科学的企业研究已经取得重大进展。尝试对基于科学的企业内部治理研究成果进行梳理,以基于科学的企业内涵、创业者角色、科学家团队治理、董事会治理、股东治理、高管治理为逻辑框架,对基于科学的企业内部治理研究现状进行总结归纳。在此基础上,从基于科学的企业治理机制视角提出未来研究方向,包括企业权力配置、激励机制设计、人员配置等系列研究问题。提出的未来研究方向可丰富和拓展基于科学的企业治理理论框架,为理解和指导中国情境下基于科学的企业治理实践带来启示。     

Control–ownership wedge,board of directors,and the value of excess cash

This study investigates the effects of the separation of control and ownership on the value of cash holdings in publicly listed French firms. It also sheds light on the role of board independence in such a relation. Theory suggests that investors are more likely to discount the value of excess cash held by firms with low corporate governance. Using the valuation regression of Fama and French (1998), empirical results show that the value of excess cash holdings decreases dramatically with the separation of control and cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder. This value discount is, however, less pronounced in firms with more independent boards (i.e., boards with more independent directors and separate chief executive officer and chair positions). Our empirical findings support the argument that excess cash contributes less to firm value when minority shareholders are more likely to be expropriated by controlling shareholders. Independent boards seem to be effective in mitigating investors' concerns about the use of excess cash. Overall, the results provide compelling evidence that cash valuation is largely influenced by corporate governance quality in a concentrated ownership setting.     

Corporate governance and game theoretic analyses of shareholder power: the case of Spain

The definition and implementation of control is at the heart of the corporate governance debate. The paper approaches the issue by using power indices derived from the theory of cooperative games. An application to Spanish listed firms shows that incentives for large shareholders to form controlling blocs are high. In the Spanish system of corporate governance ownership concentration is therefore the main mechanism to mitigate agency problems between shareholders and managers. Moreover, these results suggest that the Shapley–Shubik index is not an appropriate measure of shareholder power.     

Codes of Best Practice in competitive markets for managers

We study the corporate governance of firms in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for better management control, but makes it hard for managers to react quickly when market conditions change. Codes tend to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in environments where managers obtain low levels of benefits. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt a Code when managers are not too heterogeneous, while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce hiring the best managers; instead, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.     

Corporate governance and investment-cash flow sensitivity: Evidence from Russian unlisted firms

This paper investigates how corporate governance of unlisted firms in an emerging market economy affects financing constraints, measured by the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. In order to evaluate the quality of corporate governance, we develop two corporate governance indices based on a large-scale survey of Russian enterprises – one for shareholder protection and one for transparency. We estimate standard investment regressions where the cash flow variable is interacted with our corporate governance indices and variables capturing the ownership structure. The central result is that better shareholder protection diminishes the cash flow sensitivity of investment, particularly in firms with an outside controlling owner. In contrast, we do not find such an effect for transparency, which can be partially explained by the threat of hostile takeovers. We address the problem of the endogeneity of corporate governance by using fixed-effects regressions and a novel instrumental variable based on particular legal provisions for corporate governance in Russia depending on the number of shareholders.     

Hybrid Corporate Governance and its Effects on Innovation: A Case Study of AstraZeneca

This case study looks at the relationship between the UK/Swedish pharmaceutical firm, AstraZeneca, and its shareholders from the point of view of its effects on innovation. It uses a theoretical framework on corporate governance and innovation that differentiates sectors according to the novelty, visibility and appropriability of technological change. High novelty requires a corporate governance system with strong industry-specific expertise; low visibility requires good firm-specific perceptiveness. High appropriability favours shareholder supremacy as against stakeholder inclusion. The pharmaceutical industry appears to be high in all three, and this (according to accepted stereotypes) should favour the outsider-dominated corporate governance system of the UK as against the insider-dominated Swedish system. It is found that the corporate governance that resulted from the merger could indeed be described as hybrid, but that (following the building up of one major US shareholding) it was a UK/Swedish/US hybrid. In spite of the apparent similarity of the UK and US 'outsider-dominated' systems, the US element made a crucial difference, in giving engagement by a strong and well-informed shareholder who had some influence on other shareholders. This in turn helped to protect the firm to a significant extent from short-term pressures within the UK stock market, and thus to allow it to maintain its emphasis on long-term innovation.     

Board effectiveness in Chinese fund management companies

With a generally weak investor protection environment and no governance voice in the fund management companies (FMC) to which their investment is entrusted, fund investors in China are left with the internal governance mechanisms to safeguard their interest. Using a panel data of 288 firm‐year observations covering more than 98% of FMC in China from the period between 2006 and 2010, the present paper examines the corporate governance challenges confronting the fledging Chinese fund management industry by analysing how key governance settings affect the performance of the board of directors in protecting the interest of fund investors. The results show that board effectiveness can be enhanced if a listed company is the controlling shareholder. In addition, having a female CEO or board chairperson and a small‐sized board may help to reduce investors’ fees. Other internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as shareholder concentration, having state‐owned financial companies as controlling shareholders and board independence, are found to exhibit no significant impact on the effectiveness of FMC boards.     

Hybrid Corporate Governance and its Effects on Innovation: A Case Study of AstraZeneca

This case study looks at the relationship between the UK/Swedish pharmaceutical firm, AstraZeneca, and its shareholders from the point of view of its effects on innovation. It uses a theoretical framework on corporate governance and innovation that differentiates sectors according to the novelty, visibility and appropriability of technological change. High novelty requires a corporate governance system with strong industry-specific expertise; low visibility requires good firm-specific perceptiveness. High appropriability favours shareholder supremacy as against stakeholder inclusion. The pharmaceutical industry appears to be high in all three, and this (according to accepted stereotypes) should favour the outsider-dominated corporate governance system of the UK as against the insider-dominated Swedish system. It is found that the corporate governance that resulted from the merger could indeed be described as hybrid, but that (following the building up of one major US shareholding) it was a UK/Swedish/US hybrid. In spite of the apparent similarity of the UK and US ‘outsider-dominated’ systems, the US element made a crucial difference, in giving engagement by a strong and well-informed shareholder who had some influence on other shareholders. This in turn helped to protect the firm to a significant extent from short-term pressures within the UK stock market, and thus to allow it to maintain its emphasis on long-term innovation.     

Corporate governance following mass privatization

Using vouchers to privatize state-owned firms was an innovative but controversial aspect of transition. In the Czech Republic, voucher privatization created a large group of minority shareholders who coexisted with large shareholder–managers who controlled firms. Critics allege that the structure of shareholdings and regulatory failures allowed pervasive theft of corporate assets, much of it financed by irresponsible bank lending, and led to a financial crisis and an economic downturn. I argue that neither anecdotal evidence of managerial malfeasance nor the theories of tunneling and looting provide strong evidence for this view of corporate governance in the Czech Republic. A lack of small shareholder protection seems to have imposed small costs on the economy, and it may have facilitated rather than hampered the restructuring of firms.