Political and Regulatory Risk: Beta Sensitivity in U.K. Electricity Distribution*

To establish price caps, regulators must determine appropriate returns for utilities capital employed. This paper uses the techniques of the Kalman Filter to estimate daily betas for the U.K.s regional electricity companies in the period from privatization to end-1998. The paper demonstrates that utilities risk is time-variant, and establishes significant political and regulatory influences in the systematic risk faced by shareholders. It finds beta to be mean reverting, with little evidence of cyclical variation across the regulatory review cycle. The paper confirms the prevalence of significant excess returns in U.K. privatized electricity distribution and suggests that over-estimation of the systematic risk faced by investors may imply further excess returns in the next regulatory review period.     

Assessing impact of regulatory risk on shareholders’ wealth

Research indicates that regulatory risk increases required return on investment by investors and causes underinvestment in industries with high sunk costs. The effects of regulatory changes may be measured by estimating the abnormal returns associated with the event. The results may suggest to regulators what should be encouraged or avoided. This article utilizes a fixed effects regression to examine abnormal returns from changes in Philippine nationalization regulations. The results are consistent with extant literature. Supreme Court decisions, which increased uncertainty and regulatory risk, produced negative abnormal returns. The initial release of draft implementing rules did not produce statistically significant effects, but a succeeding draft favouring liberalization, produced positive abnormal returns.     

电力行业管制改革与市场风险防范

为了提高电力行业的生产效率，许多国家对电力行业进行管制改革和重组，以引入市场和竞争机制，然而由于电力生产的特殊性，电力市场化改革蕴藏着巨大的风险。本文以2000-2001年加州电力危机为例，对电力管制改革所引发的市场风险进行分析，并就我国的电力改革提出了风险防范建议。     

Regulation Effects on Company Beta Components*

This paper introduces a general model to analyse the effects of regulation on company risk. In particular, we consider two determinants of systematic risk: the company's overall risk and the correlation between the regulated company's value and the market. Theoretical findings indicate that, as regulation gets stricter, the company's abnormal returns will turn negative whereas the two systematic risk components will increase, and vice versa. We use event analysis elements and a time‐varying beta estimation to verify the regulation impact on risk and returns in the English electricity distribution industry. We find that systematic risk varies significantly during the period considered in our analysis. Furthermore, the analysis points to negative relationships between abnormal returns and both market correlation and overall risk variations.     

Economic Significance of the Predictable Movements in Futures Returns

This paper tests whether the variation in expected futures returns reflects rational pricing in an efficient market or weak-form market inefficiency. The issue is investigated by looking at the abnormal performance of a trading rule based on available information. Once one allows for time-varying risk and time-varying risk premia, the investment strategy can be used consistently to generate abnormal returns in seven out of 26 markets. With relatively few exceptions therefore, the predictable movements in futures returns reflect weak-form market efficiency. The paper also shows that wrongly assuming constant expected returns may lead to incorrect inferences regarding market efficiency.
(J.E.L.: G14, G12).     

Politics,institutions, and outcomes: Electricity regulation in Argentina and Chile

Risk, whether market or political, is an important determinant of private investment decisions. One important risk, subject to control by the government, is the risk associated with the hold-up problem: governments can force utilities to shoulder burdensome taxes, to use input factors ineffectively, or to charge unprofitable rates for their service. To attract private investment governments must be able to make commitments to policies that are nonexpropriative (either to contracts that guarantee very high rates of return or to favorable regulatory policies). These commitments, of course, must be credible.

Judgments about the credibility of commitments to regulatoty policies are based upon two political factors: regulatory predictability and regime stability. Regulatory predictability implies that the regulatory process, in which prices and levels of service are set, is not arbitrary. If the condition of regulatory predictability holds, then investors can forecast their returns over time and hence can calculate the value of their investment. If there is regime stability, then there is minimal risk of wholesale changes in the way the government regulates the industry—the most extreme type of change being the denial of property rights, or expropriation. We argue that three characteristics of the regulatory process are, in turn, important determinants of regulatory predictability: agenda control, reversionary regulatory policy, and veto gates. Moreover, regime stability is also, in part, a function of these three characteristics. We examine our theory of political risk and regulatoty commitment by comparing the cases of Argentine and Chilean electricity investment and regulation.     

The winner-loser anomaly: recent evidence from Greece

This article finds evidence of significant reversals in returns over the medium term in Greek stocks. In contrast with previous research, return reversals are more pronounced for past winners, suggesting that the market overreacts to a greater extent to good news. These contrarian returns are particularly elevated when portfolios are formed using quartiles and during tranquil and bull markets. The optimum contrarian strategy involves skipping the first 6 months of the holding period and implementing the contrarian strategy for a period of 18 months, as returns exhibit continuation followed by reversal. The profitability of the contrarian investment strategy is robust to adjustments for risk and seasonalities. It is the tranquil times and not the crisis/volatile times that generates a significant and profitable contrarian strategy. The recent credit crisis and resulting stock market falls, resulted in extreme movements in some Greek stocks and testing of the contrarian strategy problematic, especially when portfolios are decile ordered. Our findings also highlight the importance of survivorship bias and also suggest that contrarian strategies that just use market beta may be ill-equipped to take into consider extreme market movements, illiquidity and short-sales constraints.     

THE EFFECTS OF FIRM BOUNDARY AND FINANCING CONSTRAINTS ON UTILITY COSTS: THE CASE OF MUNICIPALLY OWNED ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION UTILITIES

ABSTRACT: A number of studies have examined costs and potential for scale and scope economies in electricity distribution; however, few if any, have examined this area in terms of the unique constraints associated with municipal ownership or historical and regulatory constraints associated with former municipal ownership. This paper focuses on 19 distribution‐only municipally owned utilities for a ten‐year period (1988–97). Distortions from variable outputs but largely fixed inputs are minimized. The data used were collected specifically to assess productivity, cost, and efficiency performance and include value‐based capital inputs and service prices. Outputs include energy conveyed and number of connections; inputs include capital, system losses, labour, and materials. We examine the effect of using third‐party financing (e.g., connection charges), with its inherent principal‐agent problems, on utility costs, as well as the effect of shared services and multi‐utility output (e.g., electricity and water). A translog total cost function is estimated. Our findings suggest significant returns to scope but also significant increases in costs associated with the use of third‐party financing. The results also suggest scale diseconomies. Shared outputs, which have been greatly restricted or eliminated under restructuring, may have provided larger, and now lost, economies than the scale returns blindly pursued by some through restructuring or incented/forced mergers or divestitures. Finally, it is clear that third‐party financing can raise costs; such financing is widely used among utilities providing electricity, gas, water, and telecommunications, and should be closely scrutinized.     

Balancing multiple interests in regulation: An event study of the English and Welsh water industry

In this paper, an event study methodology is used to identify and analyze the key regulatory initiatives taken by the economic regulator of the English and Welsh water industry during the period 1989–1994. An analysis of the movements of water company share returns relative to aggregate stock market returns suggests that regulatory interventions did affect investor expectations. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the regulator's actions balanced the often conflicting interests of the water industry's stakeholders, and that this balance reflected the regulator's statutory duties.The author would like to thank Hector Williams for his computing assistance and Dr. Keith Bender for valuable comments on an earlier draft.     

Determinants of the systematic risk of electric utilities: theory and estimation

Investors' perceptions of the risk of holding the common stocks of electric utilities are analysed on the assumption that risk depends on the covariance of shareholder returns with the market. The analysis explicitly relates risk to the sales and cost structures, growth, and regulatory environment of each electric utility. The model accounts for the effects of regulatory lag during periods of cost inflation. The model is estimated using a pooled cross-section, time-series sample of 95 electric utilities for the period 1965 to 1977. Estimates indicate that sales,cost structure and growth dominate investors' assessment of the systematic risk of individual firms. Surprisingly, differences in regulatory treatment experienced by firms have a relatively small effect on perceived systematic risk.     

Innovation and stock market performance: A model with ambiguity-averse agents

Empirical evidence on stock prices shows that firms investing successfully in radical innovation experience higher stock returns. This paper provides a model that sheds light on the relationship between the degree of firm innovativeness and stock returns, the movements of which capture expectations on firm’s profitability and growth. The model is grounding on Neo-Schumpeterian growth models and relies on the crucial assumption of radical innovation, characterized by “ambiguity” or Knightian uncertainty: due to its uniqueness and originality, no distribution of probability can be reasonably associated with radical innovation success or failure. Different preferences (α-maxmin, Choquet) are here compared. Results show that the assumption of ambiguity-aversion is crucial in determining higher returns in the presence of radical innovation and that the specific definition of expected utility shapes the extent of the returns. This result holds also in the case of endogenous innovation; risk attitude plays no role.     

IS TECHNICAL ANALYSIS USEFUL FOR STOCK TRADERS IN CHINA? EVIDENCE FROM THE SZSE COMPONENT A‐SHARE INDEX

Abstract.  This paper uses daily stock prices and the trading volume of 39 constituent companies in the SZSE Component A-Share Index on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to examine the usefulness of technical analysis. It finds very weak evidence to support the view that traders and/or technical analysts can learn more about the future pattern of returns by actively using volume in conjunction with returns than those who only watch price movements.     

REGULATION AND RISK: A CROSS‐COUNTRY SURVEY OF REGULATED COMPANIES

This paper tests empirically whether regulation characterized by high incentives implies more risk to firms than regulation characterized by low incentives. Using a worldwide panel of 170 regulated companies operating in electricity, gas, water, telecommunication and transportation sectors during the period 1995–2004, I find that different regulatory regimes do not result in different levels of risk to their regulated firms. This result could be driven by a higher level of development of financial markets combined with a sophisticated diversifying behaviour of regulated firms.     

A role for preferred stock in the financing decision of a public utility

Summary We have shown that preferred stock has a unique role in the financing of public utility capital expenditures, particulary when returns allowed by regulatory commissions are perceived to be inadequate. From the firm's perspective there is no tax advantage for debt because the commission effectively passes the tax savings through the consumers. If allowed returns on common stock are inadequate and the firm has exhausted its perceived debt capacity, then preferred stock becomes the optimal financing instrument. The regulatory commissions compute the costs of debt and preferred stock so that companies can expect returns to cover payments on debt and preferred stock if the assets being financed are necessary and will be included in the rate base. During extremely bad years when revenues are much less than expected, the companies can delay or miss preferred stock dividends without running the risk of default. The data on new capital sources for the electric and gas utilities indicate that these companies made adjustments which are consistent with the implications of our model, but they did not follow the extreme policy of using only debt and preferred stock when market-to-book ratios for common stock were below one. Regulators have, on occasions, used capital structures for rate-making that differ from actual capital structures, and a utility might be penalized for using an extreme capital structure policy. The main emphasis of regulatory review of capital structure, however, has been on the debt component. One strategy would be to use a debt level that satisfies the regulatory commission and then adjust equity between preferred stock and common stock to maximize value for common stockholders.     

The sources of momentum in international government bond returns

This study aims to offer a new explanation for the momentum effect in international government bonds. Using cross-sectional and time-series tests, we examine a sample of bonds from 22 countries for the years 1980 through 2018. We document significant momentum profits that are not attributable to bond-specific risk factors, such as volatility or credit risk. The global bond momentum is driven by the returns on underlying foreign exchange rates. Controlling for currency movements fully explains the abnormal returns on momentum strategies in international government bonds. The results are robust to many considerations including alternative sorting periods, portfolio construction methods, as well as subperiod and subsample analysis.     

Dynamic probability of informed trading and price movements: evidence from the CSI300 index futures market

This article first uses dynamic probability of informed trading (DPIN) for measuring the probability of informed trading in the CSI300 index futures market and proves its validity for predicting future price movements. Instead of using the original Lee–Ready algorithm, this study uses bulk volume classification (BVC) for classifying volume. BVC could effectively improve the predictive power of DPIN for future price movements. The relationship between DPIN and returns indicates that informed buying raises the futures price while informed selling moves the futures price downward. DPIN could effectively capture price information in the index future markets in China.     

Regulating the United States Railroads: The Effects of Sunk Costs and Asymmetric Risk

The Surface Transportation Board (STB) applies the theory of contestable markets to regulate dominant railroad freight movements. The STB bases its determination whether railroad revenues are excessive if they would be more than sufficient to support investment in a hypothetical stand-alone railroad designed to handle the at-issue traffic efficiently. The STB regulatory approach does not take correct account of the importance of sunk costs and irreversible investments in the railroad industry. We estimate how large the mistakes can be by applying a real options approach that takes into account the effect of sunk costs, irreversible investment, and asymmetric returns.     

Linkages between property asset returns and interest rates: evidence for the UK

This paper considers the effect of short- and long-term interest rates, and interest rate spreads upon real estate index returns in the UK. Using Johansen's vector autoregressive framework, it is found that the real estate index cointegrates with the term spread, but not with the short or long rates themselves. Granger causality tests indicate that movements in short term interest rates and the spread cause movements in the returns series. However, decomposition of the forecast error variances from VAR models indicate that changes in these variables can only explain a small proportion of the overall variability of the returns, and that the effect has fully worked through after two months. The results suggest that these financial variables could potentially be used as leading indicators for real estate markets, with corresponding implications for return predictability.     

The Regulation of the United Kingdom Electricity Industry: An Event Study of Price-Capping Measures

The privatization of United Kingdom utilities after 1979 established a regulatory regime based around price capping rather than return capping. This innovation was intended to provide a predictable framework that encouraged efficiency. An event methodology was used to examine stock market reaction to the main regulatory announcements affecting 12 Regional Electric Companies from flotation to 1995. The results indicate that the regulatory announcements were only a minor contributor to the persistent abnormal returns observed. The low connection between regulatory events, efficiency changes and abnormal returns at company level lead to a conclusion that the initial structural and control frameworks dominated the regulatory framework.     

Price Discrimination, Regulation and Entry in the UK Residential Electricity Market

The residential electricity market in Great Britain has recently been opened to competition and is served by 14 regional incumbents, and up to 15 entrants in each area. This study finds that the incumbents' regulated prices are discriminatory between consumers using different payment methods, and that firms are practising third‐degree price discrimination between areas. The authors discuss the implications for regulatory policy both in the UK and in other countries where electricity markets are being deregulated.