Government debt spillovers and creditworthiness in a federation

Estimates are presented for the impact of debt accumulation by the central and subcentral governments of a federation on the creditworthiness of other federation member governments. The estimates, calculated using an ordered probit model and Canadian provincial data, indicate that debt accumulation by the central government has reduced the creditworthiness of indebted provincial governments. Interprovincial debt accumulation effects are negative but relatively small, except for the debt of the largest province, which has a strong positive effect on the creditworthiness of the other provinces. These findings may have implications for other federations and associated jurisdictions, such as the European Union. JEL Classification: H63, F36
Les effets de retombée de la dette gouvernementale et la cote de crédit dans une fédération. On calcule l'impact de l'accumulation de la dette par les gouvernements fédéral et sub-fédéraux dans une fédération sur la cote de crédit des autres gouvernements de la fédération. Ces calibrations, à l'aide d'un modèle probit en utilisant les données provinciales canadiennes, montrent que l'accumulation de la dette par le gouvernement central a réduit la cote de crédit des gouvernements provinciaux endettés. Les effets trans-provinciaux de l'accumulation de la dette sont négatifs mais relativement faibles, sauf dans le cas de la province la plus grande, laquelle a un fort effet sur la cote de crédit des autres provinces. Ces résultats peuvent avoir des implications pour d'autres fédérations comme l'Union Européenne.     

Political bargaining in a federation: Buchanan meets Coase

In recent decades, the issues of federalism and political integration have gained prominence in public debate as well as in the academic realm. A frequently made point is that allowing free secession may protect the minority's interests, thus providing it with an incentive to enter the federation. This paper explicitly considers the political process in the federation arguing that the option to secede may distort the political choices made by the individual regions to improve their bargaining positions. As a result, the allocation of resources in the federation could well end up being inefficient and unattractive for the minority region. In contrast, limiting the secession possibilities by requiring the consent of a majority of voters through a regional referendum, rather than leaving it to the discretion of the legislature, restores efficiency.     

Can regional policy in a federation improve economic efficiency?

In the European Union and in many federal and non-federal countries, the central government pays subsidies to poor regions. These subsidies are often seen as a redistributive measure which comes at the cost of an efficiency loss. This paper develops an economic rationale for regional policy based on economic efficiency. We consider a model of a federation consisting of a rich and a poor region. The economy is characterized by imperfect competition in goods markets and unemployment. Firms initially produce in the rich region but may relocate their production to the poor region. We show that a subsidy on investment in the poor region unambiguously increases welfare if labour markets are competitive. If there is unemployment in both regions, the case for regional subsidies is weaker.     

Regional burden sharing of GHG mitigation policies in a decentralized federation

The distribution of the burden of cost of GHG mitigation policies is a contentious issue. This is particularly true among regional jurisdictions within a federal country with decentralized power. The regional allocation of emissions permits could hinder the political feasibility of national GHG mitigation policies. We build a multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess the implications of different burden sharing rules in a hypothetical national GHG abatement policy with a market-based instrument. In addition to assessing the impacts of regional permit allocation rules that entail inter-regional transfers of wealth, we consider a particular emissions allocation scheme, called ‘no prior entitlement’ (NPE), that avoids such transfers. The insights derived from the simulations suggest that the NPE policy avoids the politically contentious issues of inter-regional transfers of scarcity rents. Its welfare impact lies between those in the entitlement-based permit allocation schemes.     

Risk sharing in a federation with population mobility and long horizons

In this paper risk sharing among individuals within and across regions in a federation with population mobility and infinite horizons is considered. It is shown that the regional authorities will not fully exploit gains from interregional risk sharing when population mobility is imperfect. In the Nash equilibrium there is complete risk sharing among the individuals within each region, however, which corresponds to the policies of the central authority. Regional authorities who care about their reputation may be able to commit to an efficient allocation. It is possible that improvements in the degree of mobility will make such commitments less likely. JEL Classification: H77, E61, and F36.
Le partage du risque dans une fédération où la population est mobile et l'horizon temporel long. Ce mémoire examine le partage du risque entre personnes à l'intérieur des régions et entre régions dans une fédération où il y a mobilité de la population et horizon temporel infini. On montre que les autorités régionales n'exploiteront pas pleinement les gains en provenance d'un partage inter-régional du risque quand la mobilité de la population est imparfaite. Cependant, dans un équilibre à la Nash, il y a partage complet du risque entre les individus de chaque région, ce qui correspond aux politiques des autorités centrales. Les autorités régionales qui tiennent à leur réputation peuvent être capables de s'engager à une allocation efficace. Il est possible que les améliorations dans le degré de mobilité rendent ces engagements moins probables.     

Blame-game politics in a coalition government

Delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics. This paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision-making process, nor politicians' preferences for a reform. We show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption (thus delaying it until after the next election) and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non-adoption. We refer to this strategy as blame-game politics. We then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame-game. One is to make an issue salient in the next election. A second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate, which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue. A third reason is to enhance ‘bargaining power’ during the formation of the next government.     

The deductibility of provincial business taxes in a federation with vertical fiscal externalities

Should provincial business taxes be deductible under a federal profit tax? We show that the ‘optimal deductible,’ which neutralizes the vertical fiscal externality between the federal and provincial government, is the change in the federal tax base per dollar of tax revenue collected by the provincial government. The optimal payroll tax deductibility rate depends on the extent to which it is shifted to workers and on the difference between the federal tax rates on profits and on labour income. Two apparently contradictory positions – full deductibility of a payroll tax and non‐deductibility – are special cases of our model. La déductibilité des taxes provinciales imposées aux entreprises dans une fédération où il y a des externalités fiscales verticales. Est‐ce que les taxes provinciales imposées aux entreprises devraient être déductibles de l'impôt fédéral sur les profits? Les auteurs montrent que l'optimum de déductibilité qui neutralise les externalités fiscales verticales entre le fédéral et les provinces est le changement dans la base d'imposition fédérale par dollar de revenu fiscal collecté par le gouvernement provincial. Le taux de déductibilité optimal d'un impôt sur les salaires dépend de la portion du fardeau fiscal qui est déportée vers les travailleurs et de la différence entre les taux d'imposition du fédéral sur les profits et sur le revenu du travail. Deux positions apparemment contradictoires – pleine déductibilité d'un impôt sur les salaires et déductibilité nulle – sont des cas spéciaux du modèle général.     

Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics

Summary. We consider a model in which parties that differ in perceived valence choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party perceived to be less valent has a greater incentive to “sell out” to a favored minority and completely expropriate a fraction of the electorate. By reducing the difference in perceived valence, campaign-finance regulations may reduce the extent of the expropriation and achieve a more equitable political outcome. We analyze various instruments of campaign-finance regulation from this perspective.Received: 20 Februay 2003, Revised: 25 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D72, H2.Nicolas Sahuguet: Correspondence toWe thank Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, and Andrew Postlewaite for their comments. We also thank the editor Dan Kovenock and an anonymous referee. The second author is grateful to the National Science Foundation for financial support under grant SES-0078870.     

Interest rate determination in a high inflation economy

This study examines the importance of the liquidity effect, inflation uncertainty, and supply shocks in determining interest rates in a high inflation economy (Israel). The results show that a significant liquidity effect exists when it is measured by a broad definition of money. The vanishing liquidity effect, found in studies of the U.S., may be the result of the use of M, to measure it. There is some support for the hypothesis that the strength of the liquidity effect is negatively related to the level of inflation. Interest rates are negatively (and significantly) affected by inflation uncertainty, and positively affected by supply shocks.     

中国的利率管制与利率市场化

中国政府的金融约束政策在维系金融体系稳定、促进经济发展和金融深化等方面曾取得令世人瞩目的成就 ,但利率管制的金融约束政策也付出了一定的代价。随着中国加入WTO的临近和中国金融市场的开放 ,利率市场化已经成为历史的必然 ,然而目前实施利率市场化仍然存在着众多的约束。只有解除这些约束 ,中国利率市场化改革方可稳健地进行     

Military in politics and budgetary allocations

This paper investigates the effect of military involvement in politics on budgetary allocations for defence. We employ a variety of econometric models, including pooled OLS and panel data with fixed effects and control for other known determinants of military spending. To deal with endogeneity issues, we also use an IV methodology and find that a higher degree of military involvement in policy-making increases the probability that the military obtain a larger share of output.     

Expressive behavior in economics and politics

Expressive behavior is the self-interested quest for utility through acts and declarations that confirm a person's identity. Expressive voting is an example of expressive behavior. I introduce expressive behavior in the forms of expressive rhetoric and expressive generosity. The questions for society and for public policy are whether expressive behavior affects others, and if so whether beneficially or disadvantageously. In experiments, expressive behavior often benefits others. There are adverse social consequences when, in real-life decisions, expressive behavior results in unwanted public policies of expressive-policy traps. I consider the prospects for avoiding or exiting expressive-policy traps.     

Finance and politics: the wealth effects of special interest group influence during the nationalisation and privatisation of Conrail

Conrail, nationalised in 1976 and privatised in 1987, was themost significant nationalisation and privatisation by the USgovernment in recent years. It was created from six bankruptrailroads under the pressure of interest groups, formed by customers,existing claimants, employees and related companies. We documentthe gains and losses to these special interest groups at keypoints in the nationalised and privatised time periods. Overthis period, the US government had outlays of $6.59 billion,and cash inflow of $6.15 billion, and internal return of –6.4%.The paper provides evidence that a state-owned firm with goodgovernance could deliver superior performance.     

我国利率市场化的基准利率选择

在全面推行利率市场化的进程中必须要选择一个合适的基准利率。本以我国的利率市场化改革为背景,以英国和美国的基准利率选择和运用为经验,分析研究了适合我国利率全面市场化的过程中基准刘率的选择及应注意的问题,并探讨了解决问题的途径。     

技术创新中的利益抉择——关于风险投资的思考

在技术创新的全过程中,利益抉择无处不在,风险投资作为扶持技术创新成功的关键因素是其主导力量。风险投资通过对技术创新项目的甄别与评价,推动了技术创新事业的发展。     

Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation

This paper proposes a first step towards a positive theory of tax instruments. We present a model of redistributive politics that extends those of Myerson [R. Myerson, Incentives to cultivate minorities under alternative electoral systems, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 87 (1993) 856-869] and Lizzeri and Persico [A. Lizzeri, N. Persico, The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives, Amer. Econ. Rev. 91 (2001) 225-239]. Two politicians compete in terms of targeted redistributive promises financed through distortionary taxes. We solve for the case of both targetable and non-targetable taxes. We prove that there is an imperfect efficiency-targetability trade off on the tax side. Politicians prefer targetable taxes over non-targetable ones, especially when the latter are less efficient. Yet, targetable taxation is always used even when it is very inefficient compared to non-targetable taxes.