Domestic technology,consumption economies of scale and poverty: evidence from Sri Lanka

While it is well known that new technologies enhance consumer welfare, the manner in which these technologies impact the ability to realize economies of scale in consumption is not well understood. We use Sri Lankan household data to examine how the adoption of new technologies by households positively impacts their ability to achieve household economies of scale. This suggests that new technologies not only deliver a greater variety of consumption goods to consumers, but they may also play an important role in enabling large households to escape poverty by lowering the per-capita costs of maintaining a given standard of living. Given the importance of consumption economies of scale in the measurement of poverty, this study provides some insights on the extent to which the number of poor households changes when food consumption scale economies due to technology adoption in the domestic sphere are incorporated.     

Land Use in the 21st Century: Contributing to the Global Public Good

This paper focuses on the evolution of global public goods related to the world's land resources over the course of the 21st century, their potential impacts on the world's poorest households, as well as prospects for policy interventions aimed at enhancing these outcomes. It begins with global scale projections to 2100 of land use and associated goods and services, including food, fuel, timber, greenhouse gas emissions, carbon sequestration and biodiversity. This is followed by in‐depth discussion of each of these services and the challenges of providing these public goods in sufficient quantities to advance societal welfare—especially that of the world's poorest households. The paper concludes with a discussion of policies aimed at promoting the provision of land‐based public goods and how they could be altered to be more pro‐poor. Within this context, the paper argues that access to geospatial analysis tools and information on climate, land use and tenure, poverty and environmental indicators will become increasingly valuable to both public and private decision makers.     

Environmental Policies, Comparative Advantage and the Gains/Losses from International Trade

A multihousehold economy with multilateral nondepletable externalities, environmental (output) taxation and governmental production of pure, nonexclusive and nonrivalrous public goods is assumed. Modelling many different households the "almost perfect" isomorphism between the normative analysis of public goods and environmental policies is highlighted. Globally valid necessary and sufficient conditions for gains from international trade are derived and interpreted. A simple yet general environmental policy rule ensuring trade gains is put forward. The law of comparative advantage is generalized to economies with multilateral nondepletable externalities and over or underproduced pure public goods.     

Demand for different types of public goods: evidence from Nigeria

Preferences of Nigerian households vary across different types of public goods. For example, some prefer roads while others favor education even after controlling for the existing supply of these goods. What explains this variation? We argue that the perceived distributional consequences of specific public goods differ conditional on the personal characteristics of households. In particular, households demand the type of public good that (a) increases the utility of assets they already own and (b) resonates with their past experiences involving the lack of particular public goods. We test our argument with data on 123,000 Nigerian households. We find strong evidence for our argument across six types of public goods.     

Relative standing and temporary migration: Empirical evidence from the South Caucasus

This paper empirically investigates the relationship between households’ relative deprivation and the intentions of their members to temporarily migrate abroad in three transition economies of the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. To capture respondents’ relative deprivation, we use self‐reported information on respondents’ perception of the relative standing of their household in comparison to those of their neighbors. Controlling for households’ absolute income and other relevant subjective dimensions, we illustrate that households’ relative position vis‐à‐vis their reference groups plays an important role in determining the intentions of their members to migrate abroad. In particular, individuals are more willing to engage in temporary emigration if they perceive themselves to be poorer than the reference group. Our results may have important policy implications. A conjectural suggestion of our empirical exercise is that if migration has to be curbed, reducing absolute poverty alone may not be sufficient. In addition, policy‐makers may need to decrease relative income differentials within the country.     

Growth and Income Distributions in Four EU Economies

Dynamic multi-sectoral and multi-household general equilibrium models are constructed to show how the economies of Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom will evolve from 2006 to 2090. These models generate dynamic paths of investment and capital accumulations, demand and supply across production sectors, consumption and welfare of households, relative prices of goods and services, revenue and expenditure of governments, exports, imports, and trade balance consistent with the dynamic general equilibrium in these economies. The models show that inequalities in income distribution among households will not decrease but widen if the current mix of direct and indirect taxes continues in all four countries. Growing inequalities in these economies justify further investments in education and skills.     

Optimal Redistribution with Productive Social Services

Publicly‐provided private goods are conventionally considered consumer goods. Departing from this perspective, we analyze the public provision of inputs that improve household productivity (e.g., education and childcare). In a two‐class economy with distorting taxation, public provision is always welfare improving with respect to pure taxation, given that the public input directly affects household productivity. Moreover, the case for public provision strengthens as households' heterogeneity in input demand fades out, contrary to consolidated results in the literature. The features of optimal provision schemes depend on the nature of publicly provided input, namely, if it substitutes household productive capacity or just helps households to exploit it.     

Public goods,voting, and growth

We study a parametric politico‐economic model of economic growth with productive public goods and public consumption goods. The provision of public goods is funded by a proportional tax. Agents are heterogeneous in their initial capital endowments, discount factors, and the relative weights of public consumption in overall private utility. They vote on the shares of public goods in gross domestic products (GDP). We propose a definition of voting equilibrium, prove the existence and provide a characterization of voting equilibria, and obtain a closed‐form solution for the voting outcomes. Also we introduce a “fictitious” representative agent and interpret the outcome of voting as a choice made by a central planner for his benefit. Finally, we undertake comparative static analysis of the shares of public goods in GDP and of the rate of balanced growth with respect to the discount factors and the preferences for public consumption. The results of this analysis suggest that the representative‐agent version of our model is capable of capturing the interaction between many voting heterogeneous agents only if the heterogeneity is one‐dimensional.     

The Voluntary (Private) Production of Public Goods,the Gains From Trade,and Comparative Advantage*

Any (finite) number of privately produced public goods are incorporated into a general trade-theory model of private goods and factors. Postulating Cournot-Nash behavior, a necessary condition for gainful trade is derived. Potential trade gains are related to the law of comparative advantage in private goods and the change in the underproduction of public goods. A sufficient condition is also proven. Trade gains/losses are compared for more or less populous economies. All the results have analogues in the literature on imperfect competition and/or increasing returns to scale.     

STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING UNDER ECONOMIES OF SCALE

We show that economies of scale in upstream production can lead both the disintegrated downstream firm as well as its vertically integrated rival to outsource offshore for intermediate goods, even if offshore production has a moderate cost disadvantage compared to in‐house production of the vertically integrated firm.     

Offshoring and Trade Balance in Developed and Emerging Economies

This paper analyzes the effects of off‐shore outsourcing for international trade, especially for the emerging and poor economies, in a two‐sector specific factor model, with a nontraded good being one of the sectors. The phenomenon of offshoring is modeled by incorporating the reduced use of domestic labor in the production function. This is regarded as a characteristic feature of offshoring in the literature. We find that increased offshoring leads to an increase in the relative price of the nontraded good. Given that this relative price can be interpreted as the real exchange rate, increased offshoring leads to exchange rate appreciation. This suggests that offshoring actually makes the goods and services from the emerging economies more competitive in the world market, and thus can be a contributory factor in the positive trade balance experienced by many emerging economies since early 2000s.     

Leadership in Public Good Provision: A Timing Game Perspective

We address in this paper the issue of leadership when two governments provide public goods to their constituencies with cross‐border externalities as both public goods are valued by consumers in both countries. We study a timing game between two different countries: before providing public goods, the two policymakers non‐cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves. We establish conditions under which a first‐ or second‐mover advantage emerges for each country, highlighting the role of spillovers and the complementarity or substitutability of public goods. As a result, we are able to prove that there is no leader when, for both countries, public goods are substitutable. When public goods are complements for both countries, each of them may emerge as the leader in the game. Hence a coordination issue arises. We use the notion of risk‐dominance to select the leading government. Finally, in the mixed case, the government for whom public goods are substitutable becomes the leader.     

HOUSEHOLDS, GOODS, AND WELL-BEING

Household economies translate goods into well-being through production, co-operation, and distribution. Between market goods to households and well-being to persons, value is added. Income is a measure of goods, consumption well-being is measured by equivalent income. An absolute interpretation of equivalent income is argued as the value to persons of consumption well-being after household economies. Guidance is suggested on the choice of equivalence scales, and for the measurement of well-being and inequality.     

Managerial versus Production Wages: Offshoring,Country Size,and Endowments

We explore the role of trade in differentiated final goods as well as offshoring of tasks for inequality both within and between countries, emphasizing the distinction between managerial and production labour. We extend Grossman and Rossi‐Hansberg (2012), where task trade is driven by external economies of scale, by considering asymmetric endowments. Identifying possible equilibrium patterns of task trade, we find little scope for two‐way trade if endowments are asymmetric. Our numerical simulations identify non‐monotonicities between the level of offshoring and measures of within‐country as well as between‐country inequality.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Economies of Scale and Product Variety*

It is well known that laissez faire may not be the ‘first-best’ policy in a closed economy where economies of scale are present. Corden has shown that this conclusion can carry over into an open economy, though under his assumption that imported goods are perfect substitutes for home-produced goods, interference with international trade could not raise real income. We have shown that where there are economies of scale, and imported goods are not identical to the home produced goods, interference with trade could raise real national income, though such a form of intervention would not normally be optimal. Further, it could even be desirable to support home production of more than one ‘variety’. Measurements of ‘costs of protection’ that aggregate several varieties into one may mislead not only regarding the size of the cost but even regarding its sign.     

Risk insurance in a transition economy

The hypothesis of Pareto‐optimal risk‐sharing is tested in a transition economy using a new dataset of a representative sample of 364 rural households from Romania. Income shocks are identified as instances of adverse weather, crop failure, animal diseases, illness, and unemployment spells. Despite limited participation of Romanian rural households in formal insurance and credit markets, we fail to reject the hypothesis of full insurance of total non‐durable consumption and its components. Survey responses indicate that the main channels of consumption smoothing are self‐insurance (for adverse weather, crop failure and animal diseases), public transfers (for unemployment spells, maternity and childcare), and to a lesser extent, family ties. We find that adverse weather is associated with higher growth rates of non‐food expenditures. Furthermore, richer households are better able to cope with crop failure than poorer households. An alternative explanation to our not rejecting the hypothesis of full insurance is that some shocks to consumption (such as illness) play the role of preference shifters of the utility function.     

INCENTIVE ISSUES IN R&D CONSORTIA: INSIGHTS FROM APPLIED GAME THEORY

This article sketches how insights from applied game theory can be applied to Research and Development (R&D) consortia using a case study on an international plant breeding consortium. The insights jointly comprise a new “logic of collective action in R&D,” which is inspired by Olson’s Logic of Collective Action but goes beyond it. We analyze R&D consortia as institutions that respond to a variety of incentive problems which are obstacles to realizing the benefits of cooperation that arise due to the public goods nature of outputs, complementarities of inputs, and economies of scale and scope. Additionally, we sketch a “big‐picture” consortium game, which abstracts from specific incentive issues. (JEL B41, D02, H41, O31, O32)     

Land rents,optimal taxation and local fiscal independence in an economy with local public goods

A general equilibrium model of an economy with cities, farms and free migration of population is constructed. The cities produce internationally traded goods via production functions subject to economies of scale. They also produce housing and a local public good. Two areas are defined to be disjoint if households performing an economic activity in one area are not operating in the other. An area is exclusive if it is disjoint to its complement. The economic surplus of an area is then defined to be the value of the area's net export of goods and resources. Local efficiency of an area is defined to be a state in which its economic surplus attains its maximum value. This state is proved to be a necessary condition for Pareto optimality of the economy. It is then proved that beside Piguvian corrective taxes the only taxes necessary and sufficient to finance local government activities efficiently, are taxes on land rents. Furthermore, if jurisdiction of a local government is over an exclusive area no intervention of central government is necessary, and local authorities can be fully autonomous. If the economy can be divided into pairwise disjointed exclusive areas, those areas are optimal jurisdictions in the sense that efficiency in the economy can be achieved with local authorities only.