Judges and Taxes: Judicial Review,Judicial Independence and the Size of Government

The study investigates how judicial review of policy and judicial independence affect the relative size of government. Judicial oversight of policy is the authority of courts to check the legality of policy measures and annul measures which are incompatible with the constitution or are enacted without following the procedures laid down by the law. Using a model of constitutional political economy, where policy making is subject to judicial oversight, it is predicted that the relative size of the public sector decreases as judicial review and judicial independence increase. The theoretical predictions are tested in an international cross section sample of 52 countries. Controlling for the effects of real income, age dependency, openness of the economy, the legal origins of a country and other socio-political variables the results show that the checks and balances provided by the judiciary lead to a smaller relative size of taxes in the economy.JEL Classifications: D70, D72, D74, D78, H30, K41.     

审判独立与市场繁荣——以高院院长异地交流为实验的研究

司法部门享有独立的审判权不仅有助于约束和监督政府行为,避免政府对市场的过度管制和干预,而且有助于约束市场主体在事后的机会主义行为,进而有益于市场经济的成长和繁荣。本文以2008年中国各省高院院长异地交流作为刻画地方法院审判独立性提升的一次自然实验,倍差法估计发现高院院长异地交流显著促进了经济的市场化进程,一系列安慰剂及稳健性检验都支持这一发现。进一步的检验表明,显著降低了政府对市场的管制和干预,可能是地方法院审判独立显著促进经济市场化进程的主要机制。这意味着,确保司法部门享有独立的审判权,将有助于促进市场在资源配置中起决定性作用,进而有益于提高资源配置效率以及经济增长绩效。     

The time-varying independence of Italian peak judicial institutions

The paper investigates the stability of the degree of independence of the judiciary vis à vis both the classical political branches and other independent institutions, such as regulatory agencies, using evidence about the Italian Constitutional Court and the Council of State. Both peak judicial courts feature time varying factors of independence that affect their jurisprudence, especially in the case of the legitimacy review by the Constitutional Court. The less conclusive evidence found in the Council of State related to decisions of independent regulatory authorities might be due to the more complex set of interactions in which the Council operates.     

司法者激励对司法公正影响的模型分析

司法公正与法官激励是当前司法领域中所面临的最为紧迫而关键的问题.本研究运用博弈论来模拟现实的审判过程.通过分析基于个人效用最大化的法官最优选择的基础上来研究法官的法律遵从度、工作勤勉程度、工资收入、外部干预(如贿赂)、司法权的有效配置等重要因素对法官裁判的影响,进而解决社会所获得的公正执法水平.对于不同法律遵从度的法官而言,贿赂、工资等因素的影响是不同的.提高法官法律遵从度并调整法官与社会之间的效用关系,从制度上实现司法权的有效配置,对于实现司法公正至关重要.这为解决当前司法领域所存在的问题提供了理论依据和方法.     

Economic growth and judicial independence,a dozen years on: Cross-country evidence using an updated Set of indicators

Over 10 years ago, Feld and Voigt (2003) introduced an indicator for objectively measuring the actual independence of the judiciary and demonstrated its utility in a large cross-section of countries. The indicator has been widely used, but also criticized. Many new indicators for judicial independence have been developed since. Yet, all of them are based on subjective evaluations by experts or confined to measuring the legally prescribed level of independence. This paper presents more recent objective data on de jure and de facto judicial independence (JI) and strongly confirms previous results that de jure JI is not systematically related to economic growth, whereas de facto JI is highly significantly and robustly correlated with growth. In addition, we show that the effect of de facto JI depends on the institutional environment, but not on a country’s initial per capita income.     

Judicial independence and economic freedom in the US states

This article addresses the extent to which differences in judicial independence across US states influence economic freedom by using the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of North America Index. Overall, the results suggest that, as judicial independence increases within a state’s court of last resort, so does a state’s overall economic freedom score, along with each of the subcomponent index scores. These findings add important nuances to the literature and provide opportunities for future research.     

Can judicial efficiency improve territorial attractiveness to FDI? The Italian experience

This paper explores the role that judicial efficiency may play as a determinant of inward FDI at sub-national level. Italy is an ideal case to deal with this still unexplored issue since the same law apply in all the national territory, but the degree of law enforcement varies considerably across different courts. We found that judicial efficiency affects positively FDI inflows. This result, though heterogeneous across different economic sectors, is robust to different specifications and sample selections. Our results have interesting policy implications, since they highlight the importance of non-targeted FDI policies as factors driving inward flows.     

Judicial Branch, Checks and Balances and Political Accountability

This paper attempts to combine the political economics models on separation of powers between the legislature and the executive with public choice theories on the behavior of the judicial branch. We obtain a model of political accountability and checks and balances with up to three government branches: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. We conclude that an independent judiciary improves the political accountability of democratic systems relative to the political economics models with two government branches. An accommodating judiciary, however, changes the distribution of political rents without improving accountability.     

The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision‐Making Process

Empirical work on the relationship between political corruption and the design of public institutions suggests that the structure of judiciaries is an important determinant of corruption. This study develops a simple political economic model to investigate the role of judicial oversight in the policy‐making process for corruption deterrence, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. Our analysis explicitly accounts for the possibility that, while being independent of the political authority, the judiciary itself may be vulnerable to pressure from special interests. We study endogenous policy‐making under complete information and provide general conditions for the existence of deterrence (zero‐bribe) equilibria. In particular we show that preserving the independence of judiciaries in corrupt societies proves crucial to the existence of corruption‐deterrence effects.     

Resurrecting Lochner: A Defense of Unprincipled Judicial Activism

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), stands as one of theSupreme Court's most reviled decisions. We challenge the criticalconsensus against Lochner and provide a defense, albeit a contingentdefense, of "unprincipled" judicial activism. To do so, we developa game-theoretic model of judicial–legislative interaction.We use the model to compare outcomes generated in a system oflegislative supremacy to outcomes generated in a system in whichjudicial review is provided by a legally unprincipled, activistjudiciary. We show that judicial review, even when providedby an activist, politicized judiciary, can promote importantconstitutional values and improve legislative quality relativeto a deferential judiciary. In doing so, we identify an important"passive" component to the effect that judicial review has onlegislatures and on legislation. Finally, we demonstrate thatthe addition of other institutions and constraints on judicialbehavior amplify the beneficial effects that judicial reviewprovides to the legislative process.     

Managing judges mathematically: an empirical study of the medical malpractice litigations in Shanghai

The post-Mao China has been increasingly managed mathematically, not the least in its judicial system. In this paper, I looked into some of the mathematical indicators used to judge the performance of judges in this nation, and ascertained their effects on the judicial decisions on medical malpractices in Shanghai. The findings of this paper support the previous study that qualitatively identified the judicial responses to such a quantified evaluation system. Underlying the effect of performance indicators is the Chinese judiciary’s bending toward populist pressure. Essentially, therefore, this paper serves to place in perspective the judicial populism well documented in the latest literature on Chinese judiciary. At the same time, however, my study also endorses the theory on courts’ reluctance to exercise discretion in a hierarchical judicial system. Thus, as hinted by the data, the actual behaviors of Chinese judges might be complex under a combination of institutional constraints embodying policy preferences of political leaders as well as structural characteristics of the judiciary.     

Debt Collection and Bankruptcies in Slovakia: A Study of Institutional Development

The independence granted to the judiciary in 1991 and the facilities for enforcing judgements made available in 1995 have greatly contributed to the success of Slovak transition. These reforms initiated an institutional evolution which proved remarkably robust. One of the consequences was that the enforceability of credit contracts has increased. Unfortunately, this progress has been compromised by a variety of measures taken to cope with a persistent fiscal crisis. These makeshift measures have often been detrimental to the flow of credit. Government also took numerous steps to soften budget constraints of ailing companies. Usually, this postponed their collapse but did not prevent it. The capacity of the judicial system has remained grossly inadequate, yet evident opportunities for capacity enlargement have not been exploited.     

Judicial review and the power of the executive and legislative branches

The legal system can affect what policies a government can implement. In particular, when there is separation of powers, the strength of the judiciary to review and overturn actions of the executive and legislative branches can affect such things as how much redistribution these policy-making branches can do. Surprisingly, having judicial review helps the policy-making branches—the stronger is the judiciary, the more redistribution they are able to do. This occurs because the policy-making branches must make promises on and off the equilibrium path to individuals in order to make redistribution possible. However, in many circumstances, the government wants to renege on these promises, either to do more redistribution than promised or to not carry out severe threats against any individuals who lied. Judicial review can prevent reneging on these promises, thus making them credible.We develop this in the context of an optimal income tax model with a finite number of individuals where the government knows the exact distribution of types but not which individual is of which type. In this finite model, the government can detect misrevelation by even a single individual so that an individual׳s taxes can depend not just on one׳s own actions but also on others’ actions. Piketty (JET, 1993) showed that the government could implement any full-information Pareto optimal allocation if the government could commit to its announcements, even to infeasible allocations in circumstances after some individuals misreveal. We derive the sequential equilibrium allocations when individuals reveal their types by simple announcements when feasibility on and off the equilibrium path is imposed. Increasing the degree of judicial review expands the set of achievable allocations on the full-information utility possibility frontier. We also relate the different possible legal rules to different solution concepts in game theory.     

Crowding out and crowding in: When does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?

When the risk of default constrains financial contracts, public insurance policies can significantly affect private risk-sharing. This is because by changing income expectations and volatility, redistribution changes the attractiveness of default and thus endogenous borrowing constraints. Extending results by Krueger and Perri (2011) [8], this paper analyses the conditions under which redistribution can improve private insurance by making default less attractive to the income-rich, whose income it reduces. I first explain why public redistribution typically crowds out private insurance in the two-income economy, and identify the role of income persistence and saving after default. Second, I show how, in endowment economies with three income states or more and in economies with capital, redistributive taxes can improve, or “crowd in”, private consumption insurance. Finally, in a quantitative exercise using a realistic income process calibrated to US micro-data, moderate redistribution crowds in private insurance with production but not in an endowment economy.     

Persistent gaps and default traps

We show how vicious circles in countries' credit histories arise in a model where output persistence is coupled with asymmetric information about output shocks. In such an environment, default signals the borrower's vulnerability to adverse shocks and creates a pessimistic growth outlook. This translates into higher interest spreads and debt servicing costs relative to income, raising the cost of future repayments, thereby creating “default traps”. We build a long and broad cross-country dataset to show the existence of a history-dependent “default premium” and of significant effects of output persistence on sovereign creditworthiness, consistent with the model's predictions.     

A form of government organization from the perspective of transaction cost economics

Taking the approach of the superfirm, we characterize government organization through six different features. First, citizens are viewed as sovereign owners of a superfirm; elected officials are employees of the sovereign citizens. Second, in analogy to the economic principle of the division of labor and specialization, a division of labor between five independent branches of government is advocated: the legislative, the budgetary, the executive, the law enforcement, and the judiciary branch. Third, we do not suggest a mechanism of checks and balances between government branches but deal with the threat of tyranny using the principle of separation of decision control and decision management developed by Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen. Fourth, with election as a decision control device, we demarcate the constituency of the budgetary branch by age groups to provide an explicit control mechanism for intertemporal and intergenerational trades. Fifth, to strengthen sovereign citizens' decision control, the powers to recall elected chief public servants, to declare emergency and war, to sign into international treaties, and to amend the constitution are vested with a national assembly. Sixth, there is no head of state.     

界限与勾连:"司法"视野下的中国司法会计

当前对司法会计的研究主要集中于会计学领域，较少从法学的角度去探讨司法会计的有关理论，因而显得司法会计研究方法单调。从法学的角度探讨司法与会计的界限和勾连，比较分析司法会计的“司法”意义，认为司法会计是一种诉讼活动，是会计在诉讼法领域的具体应用，其作用是为了实现对诉讼程序的保障功能。     

The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the Executive Branch – A Conceptual Framework

Criminal investigation and prosecution of politicians, top civil servants and other public figures are topics frequently discussed in the media. The nature of the investigating or prosecuting authority varies between countries – from the general public prosecutor, through magistrates to independent counsels or parliamentary investigation commissions. This paper analyzes the role and status of public prosecutors within the separation of powers-concept. Prosecutors are usually part of the executive and not the judicial branch, which implies that they do not enjoy the same degree of independence as judges, and are ultimately subordinated to the directives of the minister of justice or the government. Conflicts of interest may hence arise if members of government can use the criminal process for their own or partisan interests. The incentives of public prosecutors in different jurisdictions are compared.     

Domestic institutions and the ratification of international agreements in a panel of democracies

A recent literature explores how domestic institutions affect politicians’ incentives to enter into international agreements (IAs). We contribute to this field by systematically testing the impact of a broad set of domestic institutional design features. This allows us to compare new and established political economy explanations of IA entry. For this purpose, 99 democracies are analyzed over the period 1975–2010. We find that domestic institutions determine countries’ disposition to enter into IAs, as predicted by political economic theory. For example, democracies with majoritarian electoral institutions are less likely to conclude IAs than other democracies. Countries also conclude more IAs when their democratic institutions are long-lived and they lack an independent judiciary. However, programmatic parties and the number of domestic veto players are not associated with IA-making. The key take-away of this study is that specific domestic institutions matter for how frequently states make formal deals with each other.