企业腐败文化与逃税行为

本文基于2008—2018年沪深两市A股上市公司的样本数据,采用面板双向固定效应模型与工具变量法实证研究企业腐败文化对其逃税行为的影响。研究结果表明,腐败文化对企业逃税行为具有显著的影响：企业腐败文化越浓厚,企业逃税行为越严重。相较国有企业,腐败文化对民营企业逃税行为的影响更明显;市场化程度较高的地区,企业腐败文化对其逃税行为的影响也越显著。机制研究显示,在腐败文化的驱使下,公司会通过向税务征管人员行贿形成征纳合谋,以实施逃税活动。最后,金税三期工程自然实验的结果表明,强化税收征管总体上可以有效减少企业逃税行为,但对于腐败文化严重的企业则收效不大。     

僵尸企此的负外部性:税负竞争与正常企业逃税

本文从税负竞争与正常企业逃税行为的角度探讨僵尸企业的负外部性。实证结果发现,给定企业的核算利润,僵尸企业占比越高,正常企业报告利润越低,即僵尸企业的存在显著增加了正常企业通过低报或瞒报利润的方式逃避所得税的行为。其作用机制为:无纳税能力且需要财政补贴的僵尸企业使地方财政收入更多依赖于向有纳税能力的正常企业征税,提高了正常企业的税率,高税率增加了正常企业逃税的边际收益。税率提高造成的正向逃税激励超过了征管加强造成的负向逃税激励。本文为理解企业逃税行为识别出新的动因和机制,丰富了对僵尸企业危害的认识。     

纳税筹划及其风险规避的理论思考

由于涉税交易或行为的复杂性和税收征管的严肃性,使得企业纳税筹划的具体操作存在较大难度,而且与偷税、逃税等违法行为常常难以区别,税务风险很大。企业财税人员非常渴求理论支持和技术指导。因此,对纳税筹划及其风险规避进行理论分析,探讨规避纳税筹划风险的对策是非常必要的。     

个人所得税逃税理论模型的演进及对我国的启示

个人所得税的逃税问题是我国当前税收征管的一大难题。纳税人的逃税决策受到税率、未申报所得或未纳税额、查处概率、罚款力度、以及纳税人的风险厌恶程度和税收隐瞒技术等因素的影响。早期的个人所得税逃税模型主要着重于纳税人与政府强制征税能力的博弈分析，最近的文献则主要对包括税收隐瞒技术在内的更一般的模型进行了分析。本文的目的在于综合述评西方个人所得税逃税理论模型的演进和最新发展，并籍此提出该理论在中国的应用。     

纳税人与征税人的博弈——逃税行为的经济学分析

逃税是纳税人的一般行为倾向,逃税行为发生的概率取决于税务稽查成本,应纳税额和罚款金额,提高罚款税可有效降低逃税行为的发生。     

我国个人所得税自行申报决策行为分析

本文先分析影响纳税人个人所得税申报行为的各个因素。再以国外分析逃税行为的经典理论（Allingham—Sandmo—Yatzhaki模型）为基础，将逃税心理成本、社会影响成本、税制与税收支出公平程度以及纳税经济成本也一并纳入模型，建立预期效用最大化模型，使偷逃税影响因素的理论分析得到了较全面和系统的阐述。通过数学分析，列出纳税人的决策条件，并且分析模型中的各个变量与纳税人中报决策之间的关系。基于模型结论，探讨提出完善我国个人所得税税制、改进个人收入自行申报管理、减少偷逃税的可行建议。     

国际洗税行为分析

近年来 ,在中国境内 ,跨国纳税人从事国际逃税、国际避税活动屡见不鲜 ,出口骗税十分猖獗。阿林汉姆 -桑德姆预期效用最大模型、本杰米尼 -梅塔尔逃税决策相互依赖模型等理论对此不能作出恰当的解释。本文首次揭示了国际洗税行为 ,并发现上述跨国纳税人纳税不服从行为与国际洗税密切相关。本文还通过建立一个博弈模型对国际洗税内在动机进行了剖析 ,并在此基础上提出了政策建议。     

我国逃税行为的经济学分析

逃税作为一种信息不对称状态下的机会主义行为,在各个国家普遍存在。在转轨经济背景下,我国逃税现象更为严重,它给我们的资源配置及收入分配均带来负面影响。本文在介绍评价A-S经典模型的基础上,结合我国国情,从逃税心理成本的角度拓展了A-S模型的内容,从而更好地解释了我国的逃税现象并据此提出治理逃税行为的政策建议。     

基于利益相关者视角的重大决策社会风险评估研究

经过对三门峡水库决策和上海杨浦大桥收费决策两个案例进行分析,借鉴利益相关者理论构建重大决策相关利益群体图,认为重大决策的社会风险评估应通过对决策过程中的重要利益相关者行为进行分析来识别。通过研究发现,在决策问题的识别阶段,决策制定者和媒体容易导致决策的社会风险;拟定决策方案阶段,决策制定者和企业投资者容易导致决策社会风险;决策方案选择阶段,各利益主体的博弈容易导致决策的社会风险。     

个人税收中的后悔理论分析

后悔理论是在期望效用理论的基础上发展而来的,它的出现较好地解释了很多系统性违反期望效用理论行为的现象,为决策理论提供了新的研究方法和研究方向.本文通过对后悔理论模型的研究,把模型代入到逃税具体行为中分析,为偷逃税的解决提供有效的方案.     

Corporate tax evasion with agency costs

This paper examines corporate tax evasion in the context of the contractual relationship between the shareholders of a firm and a tax manager who possesses private information regarding the extent of legally permissible reductions in taxable income, and who may also undertake illegal tax evasion. Using a costly state falsification framework, we characterize formally the optimal incentive compensation contract for the tax manager and, in particular, how the form of that contract changes in response to alternative enforcement policies imposed by the taxing authority. The optimal contract may adjust to offset, at least partially, the effect of sanctions against illegal evasion, and we find a new and policy-relevant non-equivalence result: penalties imposed on the tax manager are more effective in reducing evasion than are those imposed on shareholders.     

African Women: A Modern History,by Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch

Abstract

Recently, a considerable amount of research has focused on the evidence of gender differences in corruption. Research conducted on another predatory activity, tax evasion, similarly shows strong differences between women's and men's behaviors. This paper tests this finding in a transition country using a unique data set collected from a field survey of households in Tirana, Albania in 2000. Acknowledging that scholars generally explain gender differences in economic behavior either as biological or by social/psychological role theory, this paper examines a broader range of explanations for gender differences in tax evasion. Taking new institutional theory as a starting point to explain the differences in men's and women's tax behaviors, this paper discusses the relative importance of education, income, age, and number of children, among other factors. Finally, it explores the explanations provided by feminist theory and to what extent these can be integrated into the new institutional theoretical framework.     

Tax evasion by tax deferment: Sham litigation with an informal credit market

We show theoretically how tax evasion is facilitated by informal credit market through tax deferment. Our model is empirically based. Using sham litigation, tax evaders earn a higher rate of return than the stipulated penalty rate for tax evasion while the government loses tax revenue. We propose an upfront part–payment of the disputed amount of tax as a solution to the form of tax evasion we describe.     

我国个人逃税现象的调查:一种新的方法

通过电话调查并结合邮寄问卷的调查方式,本文比较了“随机化回答”和“直接回答”两种不同的调查技术的优劣,然后通过使用“随机化回答”技术估计出几种主要类型的逃税现象在我国现阶段发生的比例。发现逃税类型与几种社会或经济影响因素之间存在着密切的关系———在大多数情况下,同样的逃税类型在不同的社会或经济影响因素下所对应的被调查者逃税比例间的差距大到足以表现出统计显著性的地步,从而揭示出现阶段逃税现象在我国的严重程度。     

Why Pay Taxes When No One Else Does?

In this paper we try to understand the phenomenon whereby a large proportion of the population evades tax payments. We present a model which incorporates elements from the theory of information cascades with the standard model of tax evasion and analyze the connection between the decision of a potential tax evader, the number of tax evaders, and the number caught in previous periods. General conditions exist under which any expected utility maximizing potential tax evaders will decide to emulate other tax evaders.     

The co-evolution of tax evasion,social capital and policy responses: a theoretical approach

The dynamic model presented in this paper intends to account for the evidence, which appears to be particularly significant for Italy, of the incidence of tax evasion in a certain region being negatively correlated with the level of social capital existing in that region. Besides including social capital among the determinants of tax evasion, we extend the model so as to incorporate a mechanism whereby the existing volume of opportunistic behavior—which is proxied by the level of tax evasion—has negative effects on the formation of new social capital, thus helping to explain how regional differences in the endowment of social capital and in the incidence of tax evasion co-evolve and why they tend to be highly persistent. The model seeks also to capture the fact that in a democracy the political determination necessary to effectively repress tax evasion depends on the voters’ propensity toward the phenomenon. Hence, one should expect that–in areas where a relatively large (small) number of citizens are tax cheaters—the consensus in favor of tough policies against tax evasion tends to be weak (strong) and short (long) lasting. Consistently with this intuition, the model shows that regions where social capital is relatively low and tax evasion is relatively high can do better in the long run (i.e., they can reach a steady state characterized by a higher level of social capital and a lower level of tax evasion) when tax-enforcement policies are determined at the national level rather than at the regional level. The opposite holds for regions where social capital is relatively high and tax evasion is relatively low.     

Tax evasion in Kenya and Tanzania: Evidence from missing imports

In this paper we estimate the amount of tax evasion in customs authorities in both Kenya and Tanzania by calculating measurement errors in reported trade flows between the two countries and correlate those errors with tax rates. We find that the measurement error is correlated with the tax rates in Tanzania. We also introduced a third country into our analysis, the United Kingdom, and tax evasion seems to be more severe in trade flows between Kenya and Tanzania compared to trade flows between the United Kingdom and Kenya/Tanzania. Finally we also find that the tax evasion coefficient is lower in the Kenya–United Kingdom case compared to the Tanzanian–United Kingdom case which suggests that tax evasion is more severe in the Tanzanian customs authority.     

Tax evasion,social norms,and economic growth

We propose a theoretical model to account for the negative relationship between tax evasion and economic development. More precisely, we integrate tax morale into a dynamic OLG model of tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as a social norm for tax compliance. We show that accounting for such nonpecuniary costs of evasion may explain (a) why the share of evaded taxes over GDP decreases when countries grow and (b) that tax morale is positively correlated with the level of GDP per capita. Finally, a higher tax rate increases aggregate evasion and the number of evaders when taxpayers decisions are interdependent.     

The excess burden of tax evasion—An experimental detection-concealment contest

Tax evasion may cause social welfare losses due to the incentives of taxpayers to invest in the concealment and of tax authorities to invest in the detection of tax evasion. Reducing the investment of both parties at the same time would then lead to a Pareto improvement. Given that concealment and detection costs are hardly measurable in reality, we show in a controlled laboratory experiment that the welfare losses from a concealment-detection contest depend positively on the prevailing tax rate, but not on the penalty which is imposed in case of detected tax evasion. Hence, policy makers who are concerned about socially inefficient concealment and enforcement costs should focus on tax rates rather than penalty rates.     

Tax Evasion,Corruption and Market Entry

We analyze the impact of tax policy on the market entry of firms in the presence of corruption and tax evasion. In a world with corruption, firms must bribe corrupt officials to enter the market. For a given level of bribes, higher tax rates and stricter enforcement of taxation decrease tax evasion but typically reduce market entry. However, when the level of bribes reacts to tax policy, higher taxes and stricter enforcement of taxation can have a double benefit. Up to a certain threshold, for which we develop a simple rule, stricter enforcement increases market entry and reduces tax evasion.