借鉴外军采办改革经验推进我军采办改革

近年来，外军在装备采办工作的过程中采取了加强集中管理、增强透明度以及提高竞争程度等一系列改革措施，提高了装备采办工作的效率和经费的使用效益，针对我军在装备采办中存在的问题，借鉴外军装备采办改革的做法，我军应从加强集中统管、完善政策法规和加强竞争等方面进行采办的改革。     

美军国防采办项目管理成效及借鉴

装备项目管理是当代管理理论与实践的重大突破，其对提高重大型号装备系统的采办效益发挥了重大作用。采用比较的研究方法，分析了美军国防采办项目管理的经验和做法，探讨了完善我军装备项目管理制度的主要措施。     

在装备价格管理中建立和完善“四个机制”

在装备价格管理工作中引入竞争机制、完善评价机制、健全监督机制、实施激励机制，不但可以节省装备采办费用，而且可以调动军工厂商的积极性，让承包商在追求利润最大化的同时，军队的利益即武器装备采办效益也实现最大化，使装备采办价格与武器装备的性能要求与进度要求基本平衡，真正达到武器装备采办的最佳效益。     

企业激励机制的五大误区

激励机制在现实中步入了一些误区，主要表现在：重短期激励轻长期激励；重经济激励轻精神激励；重表层激励轻内隐激励；重普遍激励轻特殊激励；重激励机制轻约束机制或重约束机制轻激励机制。本针对这些误区，提出了辨证施治的对策。     

关于我军装备采办实行招标制的思考

借鉴外军装备采办的招标经验,对我军招标的必要性、目前已具备的条件、招标过程中应注意的问题等进行了理性思考。     

组织内人工设计激励机制的不完备性、激励偏差与激励强度

与其他契约一样,作为一种契约的激励机制是不完备的.行动与结果间关系的不确定性、量化和质量确认问题、多种活动或产品的加总、团队产品的分解、被激励者目标的多重性以及激励机制执行中的问题,都会造成组织内人工设计的激励机制不完备.激励机制越不完备,由激励机制产生的行动偏差就越大.在激励机制不完备的情况下,激励强度与激励偏差正相关:激励强度越大,则产生的激励偏差越大.因此,在设计和执行激励机制时,应谨慎从事,尤其要慎用较强的激励机制,在组织内一般应采取较弱的激励机制.     

关于我军装备采办实行招标制的思考

借鉴外军装备采办的招标经验，对我军招标的必要性、目前已具备的条件、招标过程中应注意的问题等进行了理性思考。     

沟通:一种有效的非薪酬激励手段

文章对沟通激励的优势、效果和成本进行了分析 ,提出基于企业远景、目标、执行过程和绩效评价的沟通激励基本形式 ,指出了沟通激励的基本要点。认为企业在构建激励机制时 ,要重视非薪酬激励机制的建设 ,注意沟通激励等非薪酬激励手段的运用。     

建立适应大学英语教学改革的教师激励机制

大学英语教学改革的进一步推进,突出了目前的教师激励机制与改革新环境的不相适应的矛盾,因此教师激励机制必须适应大学英语教改对英语教师提出的新要求,必须建立物质激励与精神激励有机结合的高效激励机制。     

铁路企业员工激励机制存在的问题及模式分析

本文通过对铁路部门内部员工激励机制中存在的问题进行分析，提出了运用激励机制理论对铁路员工进行的激励模式的分析。     

员工股权激励对中小企业创新会产生补充的促进效应吗？

高管与核心技术员工作用于创新的不同过程,同时也是股权激励计划的主要激励对象,两者股权激励的互动效应对创新的影响值得探讨。选取2009—2015年成功实施股权激励的深A上市中小板与创业板公司为研究对象,考察员工股权激励对高管股权激励在中小企业创新中的影响及其作用机制。研究结果表明：实施股权激励计划能够显著增加企业研发投入与创新产出;相较于高管,核心技术员工股权激励强度越大,企业创新数量越多、质量越高;高管股权激励降低了创新转化效率。进一步地,融资支持效应和人才激励效应是员工股权激励补充促进创新的重要机制;代理成本在高管股权激励与研发投入关系中起遮掩作用。     

Changing rewards in contests: Has the three-point rule brought more offense to soccer?

In the mid-nineties FIFA decided to increase from two to three the number of points assigned to the winning team of a soccer match played under traditional round-robin national leagues. Since a game of soccer can be regarded as a contest, FIFA's measure provides an interesting case-study for analysing how a change in the system of rewards (from a zero to a non-zero sum rule) may affect the contestants' equilibrium behaviour. In this paper we try to assess, both theoretically and empirically, whether FIFA's new point rule has changed soccer towards a more offensive game, in which teams adopt more risky strategies. In particular, we evaluate the “na?ve hypothesis” according to which the measure would induce every team to play always more offensively, and we explore the extent to which the change in teams' behaviour may be affected by quality differentials between teams. Our most important hypothesis is that when the asymmetry between opposing teams is large enough, an increase in the reward for victory induces the weaker team to play more defensively, rather than the opposite. By looking at a subset of matches held in the Portuguese first division league, which approximate the conditions of our model, we find support for this hypothesis. First version received: July 1999/Final version received: May 2001     

Cartels and the Incentive to Cheat: Evidence from the Classroom

Several points about cartel behavior are illustrated, using the curve on an exam.     

The Risk and Incentives Trade-off in the Presence of Heterogeneous Managers

Agency theory predicts a negative relationship between risk and incentives, yet recent empirical evidence has not consistently found such a relationship. In fact, some researchers have found a positive relationship. By introducing competition for heterogeneous managers, who differ in their degrees of risk aversion, into a standard agency model, this paper demonstrates that a negative or positive relationship is theoretically possible. Which arises depends on the relative risk aversion parameters of the managers and the absolute and relative riskiness of the environments.Acknowledgement I thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Microfinance Beyond Group Lending

Microlending is growing in Eastern Europe, Russia and China as a flexible means of widening access to financial services, both to help alleviate poverty and to encourage private-sector activity. We describe mechanisms that allow these programmes to successfully penetrate new segments of credit markets. These features include direct monitoring, regular repayment schedules, and the use of non-refinancing threats. These mechanisms allow the programmes to generate high repayment rates from low-income borrowers without requiring collateral and without using group lending contracts that feature joint liability.     

Team production,endogenous learning about abilities and career concerns

This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on fellow team members׳ efforts and abilities. In this setting, by exerting effort and providing support, a worker can influence her own and her teammates׳ project outputs in order to bias the learning process in her favor. To manipulate the market׳s assessment, we argue that in equilibrium, a worker has incentives to help or even sabotage her colleagues in order to signal that she is of higher ability. In a multiperiod stationary framework, we show that the stationary level of work effort is above and help effort is below their efficient levels.     

Delegation in Oligopoly: Managerial Schemes and Loan Commitments

This paper examines an industry in which firms must arrange financing for the production levels they plan to undertake in equilibrium. Financing can rely on the spot, or it can be obtained from options in the form of loan commitments. In that context, we analyze whether the owners of the firms centralize financing and output decisions or delegate these decisions to managers. We show a multiplicity of equilibria from a number of organizational modes under delegation. An organizational form where the owner decides on short-term financing but delegates production with a long-term managerial scheme is not an equilibrium organizational form. Received November 26, 2001; revised version received June 10, 2002 Published online: February 17, 2003 We thank María-Paz Espinosa and two referees for their helpful comments. We also acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education under projects SEC99-0820 (CICYT) and SEC2002-00266. The usual disclaimer applies.     

管理层监督对激励与风险关系影响的实证研究

经典代理理论认为,激励和风险之间存在权衡关系,经深入分析发现事实并非总是如此。由于企业所有者控制企业管理层存在监督和激励两项基本措施,随着风险的加大,监督成本和激励成本都会加大,所有者控制措施的选择取决于两种成本的比较。激励与风险之间的关系曲线,由于受到监督的制约,两者并非负线性关系。基于我国上市公司样本的实证研究结果表明,我国上市公司管理层补偿与风险之间存在倒“U”形关系,管理层补偿绩效弹性与风险之间存在倒“U”形关系。同时,监督对我国上市公司管理层补偿存在负向影响,这种负向影响随着风险的逐步增大而加强。     

双重激励下地方政府发展新兴产业的动机与策略研究

本文建立了政策执行的双重激励模型,探索政治激励、经济激励与地方政府政策执行方式的相互关系。通过考察新能源汽车产业政策在地方层面的执行情况,笔者发现,地方政府执行中央政府产业政策的实质动机是经济激励。由于新兴产业的市场回报无法现时兑现,且其发展前景与本地的资源禀赋情况密切相关,因此对地方政府的经济激励呈现很大的不确定性和差异性。地方政府故而在平衡经济发展和政治晋升的情况下作出实动、暗动、伪动、缓动等不同选择。本文进一步提出了新兴产业政策制定和执行的启示。     

Merger Profitability and Trade Policy

We study the profitability incentives for merger and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing, even though it would not be profitable in a laissez‐faire economy. A key element is a change in the governments’ incentives to give subsidies to their local firms. National merger induces more strategic trade policy, whereas international merger does not.