商业养老保险的保障水平研究

一般认为商业性养老保险具有较高的养老保障水平,有其他养老保障体系所不具备的优势。但站在投保者个人理财的角度来看,我国现行商业养老保险的投入产出比较低,相对养老保障水平较低,投保者缴纳的养老保险费及其按银行定期存款利率计算的投资收益不足一半被用于被保险人的养老,这与保险公司支付给保险销售人员的佣金有着重要关系。     

养老保险参保行为理论及实证研究

依据中国最新的基本养老保险政策,采用养老保险精算方法构建基本养老保险参保模型分析参保人的行为模式,研究不同个体特征对参保人行为的可能影响后发现,在现行政策条件下,基本养老保险制度吸引力十分有限.结果显示,随着年龄的增加,参保人参保的积极性也提高;而收入水平与参保率之间存在显著的正相关.另外,居民教育水平、用工形式、单位性质、制度透明度等因素也是影响参保率的重要因素;而参保人性别与参保概率没有显著相关性.     

The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests.     

环境污染责任保险与企业创新:促进还是抑制

在绿色发展背景下,基于环保部公布的投保环境污染责任保险企业名录,实证检验环责险对企业创新的影响及其作用机制。结果显示：投保环责险能促进企业创新能力提升,其在企业创新治理方面发挥着积极作用;环责险通过缓解融资约束提高企业创新能力;环责险对非国有企业创新水平促进效果更显著;环责险与环境规制不能发挥协同作用。结论丰富了企业创新影响因素以及环责险经济后果的理论研究,对深化绿色保险改革、实现创新驱动发展具有重要现实意义。     

Health insurance and labor market outcomes: Joint decision-making within households

Most Americans obtain access to health insurance through an employer. In this paper, we ask how the link between health insurance and employment affects labor market choices such as whether to work full-time. To understand the effect of the incentives embedded in the employer-based insurance system, we study the joint decision-making of husbands and wives that determines the household's access to health insurance. We estimate the effect on a wife's (husband's) labor market outcomes of husband's (wife's) health insurance, allowing the health insurance of both spouses to be endogenous. Obtaining unbiased estimates of such effects is complicated by the likelihood that positive assortative mating creates correlations between a couple's characteristics and the possibility that there are important unobservable household income effects. Our innovation is to measure these biases by examining a second fringe benefit, paid sick leave, in addition to health insurance. We find that, as predicted, spouse's insurance has statistically significant negative effects on being offered own employer insurance as well as on the probability of working full-time with health insurance.     

高新技术企业科技保险购买意愿影响因素研究——基于广州市274家高新技术企业的调查

基于有限理性假说，构建高新技术企业科技保险购买意愿影响因素分析框架，运用Probit模型对广州市274家高新技术企业调查问卷数据进行回归分析。实证结果表明，管理者受教育程度、风险态度，企业类型、注册资金、信用，企业风险认知、对科技保险政策的了解程度、对保险保障水平的认知，以及行业竞争程度、政府支持本行业的满意度、是否参加行业协会等因素对企业科技保险购买意愿具有显著影响。此外，对当前高新技术企业科技保险参保率低的原因作出解释，为相关部门制定政策提供依据。政府应从增强企业风险识别和评估能力、提高保险保障水平、丰富保险产品品种和发挥保险融资功能等方面入手，进一步推动科技保险发展。     

高新技术企业科技保险购买意愿影响因素研究——基于广州市274家高新技术企业的调查

基于有限理性假说，构建高新技术企业科技保险购买意愿影响因素分析框架，运用Probit模型对广州市274家高新技术企业调查问卷数据进行回归分析。实证结果表明，管理者受教育程度、风险态度，企业类型、注册资金、信用，企业风险认知、对科技保险政策的了解程度、对保险保障水平的认知，以及行业竞争程度、政府支持本行业的满意度、是否参加行业协会等因素对企业科技保险购买意愿具有显著影响。此外，对当前高新技术企业科技保险参保率低的原因作出解释，为相关部门制定政策提供依据。政府应从增强企业风险识别和评估能力、提高保险保障水平、丰富保险产品品种和发挥保险融资功能等方面入手，进一步推动科技保险发展。     

财政补贴对我国农户农业保险参保决策影响的实证研究——以浙江省为例

2004年,中国开始政策性农业保险试点工作,各级政府通过财政补贴激励农户购买农业保险。本文以浙江省为例,采用Logistic模型,对影响农户农业保险参保决策的因素进行实证分析。研究结果表明：农户对保费补贴政策的了解程度对其参保决策具有统计上的显著影响;保费补贴激励和风险厌恶激励成为推动农户参保的主要因素。据此本文指出,提高农户对政策性农业保险的认知程度和设计符合农户需求的保险险种,能够推动政策性农业保险的深入发展。     

医疗保险与消费:来自新型农村合作医疗的证据

本文利用农村引入新型农村合作医疗这一政策变化来研究医疗保险的获得对农村居民消费的影响。结果表明,新农合使得非医疗支出类的家庭消费增加了约5.6个百分点。这一正向作用随医疗保险保障水平的提高而增强,而且在没有医疗支出的家庭中仍然存在。同时,新农合对消费的正向影响在收入较低或健康状况较差的家庭中更强。这些结果都与医疗保险减少了预防性储蓄的假说相一致。另外本文发现,新农合的效果随农户在这个项目中的经历而变化。实际上只有在那些有村民获得保险补偿的村子,保险对消费的正向影响才显著,而且在这些村子中,新农合对新加入农户的消费的影响明显小于对参合一年以上农户的消费的影响。     

我国农业保险信息不对称问题研究

农业保险是现代农业发展的有力保障,也是强农惠农的重要政策之一,但信息不对称问题严重阻碍了我国农业保险的发展。研究发现,投保农户与保险公司的逆选择、心里风险和道德风险是农业保险信息不对称的主要表现形式,而农业生产的特殊性、农业风险的多样化,以及农业保险的利益外溢性和我国农民保险知识匮乏、诚信意识较差等等是导致我国农业保险信息不对称问题产生的主要原因。因此,本文提出建立适合我国国情的农业保险经营模式,积极发展由政府支持、商业保险公司参与的农业保险合作社模式经营农业保险;并根据农业保险信息不对称的不同表现形式,建立相应的博弈模型从而优化保单设计、制定合理价格策略;最后,加大科技投入建立信息甄别机制和险情评估系统、宣传农业保险以及建立农业保险监管体系等也是防范信息不对称的重要举措。     

Health insurance and consumption: Evidence from China’s New Cooperative Medical Scheme

We exploit a quasi-natural experiment arising from the introduction of a health insurance program in rural China to examine how the insurance coverage affects household consumption. Results show that, on average, the health insurance coverage increases nonmedical-related consumption by more than 5%. This insurance effect is observed even in households with no out-of-pocket medical spending. In addition, the insurance effect is stronger in households with worse self-reported health status. These results are consistent with the precautionary savings argument. The insurance effect also varies by household experience with the program. In particular, the effect is significant only in villages where some households have actually obtained reimbursement from the insurance program. The program within these villages stimulates less consumption among new participants than among households that have participated in the program for more than a year.     

“政府-社会合作型”失业保障体系探究

中国现行失业保障面临重重困境,迫切要求探索失业保障的制度创新。针对实践中出现的新型失业保障模式,对政府—社会合作型失业保障体系的构建进行初步探讨,对于建立以政府主导的失业保险为基础,非营利组织失业救助为补充,政府、企业和非营利组织合作促进再就业,以社区作为政府—社会合作的结合部的失业保障体系具有一定的现实意义。     

Decision theories and probabilistic insurance: an experimental test

This paper reports the results of an experiment in which probabilistic insurance, as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), is compared both with full insurance and no insurance. The experimental results conform to the intuitive prediction that risk-averse agents who are indifferent between full insurance and no insurance, will prefer full insurance to probabilistic insurance and probabilistic insurance to no insurance. The first conclusion is incompatible with the predictions of expected utility theory, and the second with Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory. We also show that Loomes and Sudgen's regret theory can easily accommodate these intuitive results. JEL Classification: C91, D81. We are most grateful to Graham Loomes and two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments. Financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, under project BEC2001-0535, and from the Generalitat Valenciana under project GRUPOS03/086, is gratefully acknowledeged.     

Public versus private risk sharing

Can public income insurance through progressive income taxation improve the allocation of risk in an economy where private risk sharing is incomplete? The answer depends crucially on the fundamental friction that limits private risk sharing in the first place. If risk sharing is limited because insurance markets are missing for model-exogenous reasons (as in Bewley (1986) [8]) publicly provided risk sharing improves on the allocation of risk. If instead private insurance markets exist but their use is limited by limited enforcement (as in Kehoe and Levine (1993) [23]) then the provision of public insurance interacts with equilibrium private insurance, as, by providing risk sharing, the government affects the value of exclusion from private insurance markets and thus the enforcement mechanism of these contracts. We characterize consumption allocations in an economy with limited enforcement and a continuum of agents facing plausible income risk and tax systems with various degrees of progressivity (public risk sharing). We provide conditions under which more publicly provided insurance actually reduces total insurance for agents (excess crowding-out), or under which more public insurance increases total insurance (partial crowding-out).     

Taxation,insurance, and precautionary labor

We examine optimal taxation and social insurance with adverse selection in competitive insurance markets. In a previous literature, it has been shown that, with perfect insurance markets, social insurance improves welfare since it is able to redistribute without creating distortions. This result has been taken as robust to the introduction of adverse selection as this would only provide additional justifications for social insurance. We show, however, that adverse selection can weaken the case for social insurance compared to a situation with perfect markets. Whenever social insurance mitigates private underinsurance, it also causes welfare-reducing effects by decreasing precautionary labor supply and hence tax revenue. In addition, adverse selection may reduce the redistributive potential of social insurance. We illustrate our general results using different equilibrium concepts for the insurance market. Notably, we derive conditions under which a complete renunciation of social insurance is optimal and the government only relies on income taxation to achieve its redistributive objectives.     

存款保险制度的核心问题探讨——存款保险公司的组建

存款保险公司的组建事关存款保险的制度功效能否得以有效发挥。对于我国而言,借鉴国际上存款保险制度运行较为成功国家的经验,根据存款保险制度的自身要求,采取政府出资组建、以公司制作为组织形式应是最优选择。这样有利于发挥保险的互助性特点,通过市场化运作方式维持存款保险公司的运营,以实现维护银行业的稳定与安全。同时基于存款保险公司的公共性特征,必须构造激励相容的公司治理结构。     

Capital asset pricing models with default risk: Theory and application in insurance

The Capital Asset Pricing Model has been used frequently to derive a fair price of insurance. But the use of this model overestimates insurance premiums because it does not account for the insolvency risk of insurers. This paper examines how the insurance price should be fairly adjusted when insurers' default risk is considered. It develops a model which shows that fair insurance premiums are lower when insurance firms have a positive probability of being insolvent. Using data of property liability insurers during the period from 1943–99, the paper further estimates the effects of the insolvency risk on insurers' underwriting profit rate. It shows that the incorporation of the default risk of insurers in the model, by significantly reducing the required price for insurance, would lead to lower profit potentials. Some writers argue that including the insolvency risk when calculating insurance premiums is not so necessary because of the existence of states' guaranty insurance funds which protect consumers. However, as shown in the paper, these funds have provided inadequate protection to consumers. Therefore, because of the increase in the number of insolvencies in recent years, and because of the limited coverage provided by states' guaranty funds, it seems that considering the insolvency risk in insurance pricing has become very necessary.     

Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision

This paper analyzes a model of private unemployment insurance under limited commitment and a model of public unemployment insurance subject to moral hazard in an economy with a continuum of agents and an infinite time horizon. The dynamic and steady‐state properties of the optimum private unemployment insurance scheme are established. The interaction between public and private unemployment insurance schemes is examined. Examples are constructed to show that for some parameter values increased public insurance can reduce welfare by crowding out private insurance more than one‐to‐one and that for other parameter values a mix of both public and private insurance can be welfare maximizing.     

金融共生理论对银行与保险关系的研究

我国现阶段的银行与保险之间是一种共生关系，金融混业经营是必然趋势，银行保险、保险银行或金融控股公司是银保共生发展的优化方向。不合理的制度安排制约了银保关系的深化发展。加快金融体制改革步伐，健全完善法律法规才是解决问题的关键所在。     

基于委托代理视角的寿险转保行为分析

寿险转保已成为保险市场上一种普遍的现象,由于信息和专业知识的缺乏,保单持有人进行寿险转保交易必须通过保险代理人,而保险代理人和保单持有人的行为目的不一致,导致诱导转保时有发生。本文通过建立委托代理模型分析后发现目前的代理人佣金支付制度鼓励代理人诱导转保,而引入奖惩机制则能对代理人形成激励,本文运用比较静态分析方法,考察不同制度设计对代理人行为的影响,提出了初步的制度设计构想,从而为监管机构出台相应的政策法规提供思路。