隐性存保、“顺周期”杠杆与银行风险承担

本文从我国存款利率上限仍未完全开放的背景出发,在D-L-M模型(2010)基础上通过引入隐性存保异质性、资本充足率约束和市场纪律约束,考察了货币环境改变作用于银行风险承担行为的理论传导机制。研究表明:在非完全垄断的市场结构下,当银行资本高于临界水平时,低利率的货币环境可以通过银行杠杆的"顺周期"调整效应增加银行的风险承担,隐性存保的存在会进一步放大银行杠杆的"顺周期"调整,隐性存保对银行风险承担的净效应取决于"特许权价值"效应与"顺周期"杠杆效应的相对强弱。此外,最低资本监管要求的提高和市场纪律约束的增强有利于在一定程度上抑制银行杠杆的"顺周期"调整,市场纪律对银行风险承担的净效应则取决于"顺周期"杠杆调整效应与"风险转嫁"效应的相对强弱。为了支持理论机制的合理性,本文以我国2006—2012年商业银行面板数据为样本对此进行了实证检验,实证分析的结果与理论模型的预测基本吻合。     

"结构性"去杠杆与企业资产配置:"脱实向虚"还是"脱虚向实"

以我国2012-2019年A股非金融类国有上市公司为样本,通过双重差分析方法实证研究了"结构化"去杠杆政策对企业资产配置的影响.结果 发现:去杠杆政策会显著降低企业的金融资产配置,并能抑制过度负债企业的固定资产投资,但对企业研发投资没有显著影响;去杠杆政策还会促进正常负债企业的实体投资,财政政策与"结构化"去杠杆的政策叠加能强化企业的实体投资,且高新技术企业税收减免的政策叠加效应要优于政府补助的政策叠加效应.     

技术创新推动企业去杠杆了吗?—— 影响机理与加速机制

创新驱动已成为新常态下培育经济增长新动能 、优化经济结构的关键.然而,技术创新通过怎样的路径影响微观结构调整,至今未得到系统性解答.文章研究了技术创新对企业去杠杆的作用.从影响机理看,技术创新通过强化企业市场竞争能力和调整成本对冲能力来调节企业杠杆水平,且该调节作用对过度杠杆企业表现为去杠杆效应,对杠杆不足企业表现为补杠杆效应.从加速机制看,一方面,政府补贴与税收优惠对技术创新产生激励作用,从而对杠杆率调整具有"加速"效应,且加速程度对不同所有制性质和不同成长能力的企业具有异质性;另一方面,行业整体的探索性创新和开发性创新水平越高,知识溢出效应越强,越有助于推动企业技术创新,因此行业创新水平能够显著加速企业去杠杆进程,且探索性创新的加速效应更强.文章证明了技术创新在去杠杆进程中的作用,揭示了政策激励 、行业溢出等创新驱动因素对去杠杆的加速作用,丰富了创新驱动战略的微观财务学内涵.     

“J”型经济复苏袭来

<正>新兴经济体下半年摆脱通胀魔咒,政策放松空间重新到来。外部环境的改善将给国内实体经济复苏带来产业链的突破。全球经济处在金融去杠杆和金融再杠杆的切换期。经历了"次贷"危机后政府杠杆对民间杠杆的替代,金融伸缩对全球金融体系资产负债表修复及对实体经济的支撑效应逐步由负转正。欧债危机最紧张时刻——偿债能力危机——2011年四季度已过,欧债风险将以时间换空间方式逐步缓释,欧债对全球金融体系的负冲击效应下半年将极大减弱。美国经济继续延续复苏,消费和投资有望在低通胀、低利率刺激下,三、四季度继续发力,房地产复苏将带动     

基于财务杠杆效应的财务风险分析

财务杠杆是一把"双刃剑",有时会给企业带来正的财务杠杆效应,提高企业自有资金利润率,有时也会给企业带来额外损失,造成财务风险。本文介绍了财务杠杆与财务风险的含义及两者的关系,然后介绍了财务杠杆的影响因素,在此基础上得出结论:企业应合理利用财务杠杆,规避财务风险。     

深圳股票市场杠杆效应研究

本文应用EGARCH-M模型对深圳股票市场的杠杆效应进行了实证分析,结果表明,深圳市场的收益率有效测度了风险因素,并发现当市场面临信息冲击时,坏消息对市场的冲击大于好消息,即存在显著负的杠杆效应。在进行分段回归后,显示杠杆效应随时间变化,由初期的负的杠杆效应变化为正的杠杆效应。最后结合我国股票市场特征进行了理论解释。     

基于GARCH模型族的上海股市波动性分析

以上证综合指数为研究对象,采用GARCH模型族对2000—2006年中国上海股票市场的波动情况进行了实证分析.研究表明,上海股市具有明显的ARCH效应,股指收益率具有显著的"尖峰厚尾"特点,存在波动的集群性,市场"杠杆效应"显著,期望收益与期望风险之间存在正相关关系.     

居民加杠杆影响消费的异质性效应分析——基于融合机器学习的因果推断方法

居民加杠杆是否能有效促进消费,已有研究从总量层面难以达成共识,这主要源于不同群体加杠杆对消费的影响存在差异。本文采用融合机器学习模型的GML(generic machine learning inference)因果推断方法,客观量化评估了居民加杠杆的异质性效应,并使用机器学习解释性方法识别了导致异质性效应产生的核心因素。主要得到以下结论：第一,居民加杠杆对消费的促进作用存在显著的异质性,最高效应组的处理效应约是最低效应组的2倍。第二,家庭人均可支配收入是导致居民加杠杆效应存在异质性的最核心因素,中等收入群体加杠杆对消费的促进作用显著低于低收入群体。家庭人均可支配收入因素的贡献率达到30%,明显高于其他特征因素。第三,影响不同收入群体加杠杆效应的核心因素不同。对中等收入群体而言,杠杆对消费促进作用偏弱的主要原因在于房贷压力;对低收入群体而言,杠杆对消费促进效果更为显著主要源于养老育儿等方面的刚性支出压力较大,需要依靠借贷弥补收支缺口。本文系统地分析了居民加杠杆效应的异质性及其产生根源,可为政策制定提供更多参考。     

绿色发展与治理转型的“波特假说之谜”——基于碳风险下企业降杠杆的证据北大核心CSSCI

环境规制能否发挥绿色发展的导向作用,有效引导企业治理转型升级?已有研究发现,碳排放收紧引致较高的碳风险会抑制利息税盾的使用,降低财务杠杆,这与经典的环境规制有助于引导企业向资本市场开拓,从而增加财务杠杆的观点并不一致,被称之为绿色发展与治理转型的"波特假说之谜"。本文以2016年我国签署具有历史性意义的全球气候变化新协议——《巴黎协定》为背景,以2010—2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本,采用双重差分模型检验碳风险对企业财务杠杆的影响。研究发现:碳密集型企业在该协定签署后显著降低了财务杠杆,且财务困境风险是影响碳风险降杠杆效应的作用机制;进一步研究表明,对于国有企业和融资约束水平较高的公司,上述效应更加显著;同时,碳排放收紧情境下碳风险的增加会显著降低债务期限结构、企业投资,并抑制"短贷长投"现象。以上研究结论表明,为应对绿色发展带来的机遇与挑战,企业应主动寻求治理转型,通过降杠杆来保障可持续发展。本文不仅丰富了环境规制与资本结构的相关研究,还为深化双碳目标下企业绿色转型、推动高质量发展提供理论依据与政策参考。     

管理者过度自信与信用融资效应的实证研究

本文从行为公司金融视角出发，以沪深两市2002—2007年期间A股上市公司为样本，考察了过度自信管理者在利用供应商提供的信用融资后经营负债杠杆对公司创值能力与成长性的影响。研究结果发现，随着管理者过度自信程度的增强，公司的经营负债杠杆效应显著降低，即管理者过度自信公司运用信用融资发挥经营负债杠杆的创值效应与成长效应均显著低于一般管理者公司。     

财务杠杆对公司成长性影响的实证研究

本文认为财务杠杆对公司成长性具有积极、消极双重影响.鉴于现有文献中财务杠杆对公司成长性的消极作用,本文选取1998-2001年深沪两市2798个混合样本作为研究对象,研究上市公司在不同经营业绩条件下财务杠杆对成长性的影响.研究结果表明,与国内外已有的研究结果不同,不同经营业绩下公司财务杠杆对成长性的影响作用存在差异.对于业绩优良的公司,财务杠杆具有积极作用,举债经营可以促进公司的成长,而且,随着公司业绩的增强,财务杠杆所起的积极作用更为显著;对于业绩较差的公司,财务杠杆具有消极作用,财务杠杆对成长性有一定的抑制作用.     

企业创新与杠杆率动态调整关系实证研究——创新效率视角

基于沪、深证券市场2008-2017年上市公司非平衡面板数据，从研发效率和专利产出两个维度综合分析企业创新效率与杠杆率调整的动态关系。结果表明：在调整效应上，高研发效率与高专利产出有利于企业向下调整杠杆率，企业所有权异质性不会改变这种杠杆调整效应，但具有明显的非对称性，即国有企业调整效应更为显著；在加速效应上，随着研发效率提高、专利产出增加，杠杆率下降速度加快，国有企业对研发效率加速效应更敏感，而非国有企业对专利产出加速效应更敏感。     

创新型科技企业杠杆率的研发强度效应研究

企业研发有助于驱动科技型企业建立创新机制,实现企业持续稳健发展。从杠杆率角度,运用两阶段最小二乘法,结合我国科技型上市公司2010 -2015年创新投入数据,探讨杠杆率如何影响企业研发强度效应,进而影响企业价值。研究发现,杠杆率削弱了研发强度效应,对于高杠杆率企业,增长机会对研发强度效应的积极影响转变为消极影响;研发强度提高,则企业价值呈递减趋势。     

Financial leverage and market volatility with diverse beliefs

We study a general equilibrium model of asset trading with financial leverage, where the investors can engage in speculative trading with diverse beliefs about the asset??s fundamental value. We show that an increase in the leverage ratio causes the stock price to rise in the current period through a ??leverage effect??, and will result in more borrowing and more stock purchase that pumps the stock price higher in the subsequent period, known as the ??pyramiding effect??. There can also be a ??depyramiding effect?? when the price falls because lenders issue margin calls and force stock sales, contributing to further stock price plummeting. Price changes from depyramiding effect, however, may not take effect when margin calls are not triggered. We demonstrate that, under certain conditions, decreasing leverage ratios leads to lower stock price volatility, measured by the variation of prices caused by an exogenous shock, when the shock is unanticipated. The influences of dispersion of beliefs and available investment funds on the relation between financial leverage and market volatility are also examined. When the shock is anticipated, we demonstrate that reducing leverage ratios may not lower stock price volatility, which poses an important challenge to future studies on this issue.     

Asymmetry and leverage in GARCH models: a News Impact Curve perspective

Models for conditional heteroskedasticity belonging to the GARCH class are now common tools in many economics and finance applications. Among the many possible competing univariate GARCH models, one of the most interesting groups allows for the presence of the so-called asymmetry or leverage effect. In our view, asymmetry and leverage are two distinct phenomena, both inspired by the seminal work of Black in 1976. We propose definitions of leverage and asymmetry that build on the News Impact Curve, allowing to easily and coherently verify if they are both present. We show that several GARCH models are asymmetric but none is allowing for a proper leverage effect. Finally, we extend the leverage definition to a local leverage effect and show that the AGARCH model is coherent with the presence of local leverage. An empirical analysis completes the paper.     

Was there a Portfolio Effect of the Micro-economic Leverage ？ Some Empirical Evidence from the Chinese Stock Market

The study is on a linear model of the relationship between the systematic risk and the micro-economic leverage and analyzed the data from the steel, energy source and chemical fibre industry listed companies in the Chinese stock market in 2002 and 2001. Using the linear regression method, empirical equations were found. The portfolio effect was shown so that some empirical evidence had been found to support the micro-economic leverage portfolio effect theory, which was that the listed companies balanced the operating and financial leverage to minimize the systematic risk.     

Corruption and corporate leverage in an emerging economy: The role of economic freedom

This study investigated the effects of corruption and economic freedom on corporate leverage. We also evaluated how economic freedom shapes the effect of corruption on corporate leverage. Using a sample of Vietnamese firms covering a nine-year period from 2010 to 2018, we find evidence that increased control of corruption has a significant positive impact on firm leverage, whereas the opposite is true for economic freedom. This effect is robust to alternative measures of control of corruption as well as advanced estimation methods, such as firm-fixed effects and quantile regressions. Our results also reveal that the positive impact of corruption controls on corporate leverage is more pronounced for firms with high economic freedom. Econometrically, our findings indicate that firms with better control over corruption prefer debt financing, as demonstrated by their higher leverage ratio.     

中美股市杠杆效应与波动溢出效应——基于GARCH模型的实证分析

本文基于极大似然函数值准则和赤池信息准则,从众多非对称GARCH模型中选择最优模型来研究中美股市杠杆效应和波动溢出效应。结果表明:沪市和深市都表现出显著的杠杆效应,与美国股市相比沪市和深市杠杆效应较弱;沪市和深市之间存在显著的双向波动溢出效应,且沪市对深市的波动溢出效应更显著;美国股市与中国股市之间不存在显著的波动溢出效应。     

Impact of Leverage on Investment by Major Shareholders: Evidence from Listed Firms in China

In this paper, we analyze whether leverage had impacts on investment in the period 1999–2009, and whether these impacts, if they exist, differed among companies with different investment opportunities and with different major shareholders. In order to identify governance with different major shareholders, we grouped China’s listed firms into central government owned firms (CSOEs), local government owned firms (LSOEs) and non-state-owned firms (NONSOEs). Our results are as follows. First, our analysis reveals that leverage does have significantly negative impacts on CSOE, LSOE and NONSOE investments. Secondly, in LSOEs and NONSOEs, negative leverage impacts on low-growth firms are stronger than average firms, implying that a disciplinary effect of leverage over investment can be found in LSOEs and NONSOEs. Finally, however, no such effect can be observed in CSOEs. We have provided a first finding that the effect of leverage varies according to a firm’s major shareholders.     

Modelling and predicting the competitive effects of vertical mergers: The bargaining leverage over rivals effect

A new competitive effect of vertical mergers, based on the Nash bargaining model, has begun to play an important role in antitrust authorities’ evaluations of vertical mergers in the United States, Canada and abroad. The key idea is that a vertical merger will increase the bargaining leverage of the merged firm over its downstream rivals. Its bargaining leverage increases because it now takes into account the additional profit that its own downstream division will earn if it withholds inputs from downstream rivals, which changes its threat point in the bargaining game with downstream rivals. Consequently, the merged firm can increase the price that it charges rival downstream firms for inputs. One strong appeal of this theory is that it provides a simple and very intuitive formula to measure the upward pricing pressure caused by a vertical merger due to changes in bargaining leverage, based on variables whose values can generally be estimated using available data. This article describes this new competitive effect, which will be called the bargaining leverage over rivals (BLR) effect, and derives the upward pricing pressure formula. It also explains why this new competitive effect is distinct from the older raising rivals’ costs (RRC) effect that has been widely discussed in the economics literature, and discusses the relationship between the two different effects.