Spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union: Why do fiscal instruments matter?

Using a two‐country DSGE model, we analyse the spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union. Based on a non‐Walrasian labour market with a labour force participation decision and involuntary unemployment and a detailed fiscal sector, we focus on the relative cross‐border effects of different kinds of fiscal shocks (government expenditure and tax shocks). Among the major lessons from this analysis, five general and striking results are worth highlighting : (1) spillover effects differ widely according to the fiscal instrument, (2) all fiscal instruments produce positive spillover effects on foreign GDP except a rise in government consumption, (3) the response of unemployment is not always negatively correlated with the response of output (4) the different fiscal shocks trigger different effects on foreign inflation and the term of trade, which implies heterogeneous interest‐rate and trade channels, and (5) a more accommodative monetary policy and a scenario of ‘fiscal dominance’ alter greatly the effects of fiscal policy shocks.     

Wage–Setting Institutions, Unemployment, and Voters' Demand for Redistribution Policy

This paper examines unemployment, wages, and voters' demand for redistribution policy under three different labour market structures: laissez–faire, wage–setting by company or industrial unions, and wage–setting by a central union. Decisions on the level of taxes and benefits are made by majority rule. Taxes, wages, and unemployment are lowest under competitive wage–setting and highest with decentralised unions. A higher degree of centralisation of union wage–setting implies lower unemployment and taxes because a fiscal externality is internalised. Under some conditions about the composition of the population, the political–economic equilibrium can further be improved upon by cooperation between the government and the central union. This seems to have happened in the Netherlands where the unions and the government agreed to cut taxes and restrain wages, which has led to the 'Dutch Miracle'.     

United we stand: on the macroeconomics of a Fiscal union

In this paper, we apply dynamic tracking games to macroeconomic policy making in a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear two-country macroeconomic model of a monetary union for analyzing the interactions between two fiscal (governments: “core” and “periphery”) and one monetary (central bank) policy makers, assuming different objective functions of these decision makers. Using the OPTGAME algorithm, we calculate numerical solutions for cooperative (Pareto optimal) and non-cooperative games (feedback Nash). We show how the policy makers react to adverse demand shocks. We investigate the consequences of three scenarios: decentralized fiscal policies controlled by independent governments (the present situation), centralized fiscal policy (a fiscal union) with an independent central bank (pure fiscal union), and a fully centralized monetary and fiscal union. For the latter two scenarios, we demonstrate the importance of different assumptions about the joint objective function corresponding to different weights for the two governments in the design of the common fiscal policy. We show that a fiscal union with weights corresponding to the number of states in each of the blocs gives better results than non-cooperative policy making. When one bloc dominates the fiscal union, decentralized policies yield lower overall losses than the pure fiscal union and the monetary and fiscal union.     

The dynamic effects of monetary policy and government spending shocks on unemployment in the peripheral Euro area countries

In this paper we study the response of unemployment to monetary policy and government spending shocks in the peripheral Euro-area countries. By applying the structural near-VAR methodology, we jointly model area-wide and national variables. Our main finding is that fiscal multipliers vary across countries and the results are consistent with the prediction of the standard New Keynesian model only in Italy and Greece. Instead, in Ireland, Portugal and Spain increases in government spending are recessionary. Thus we find that Keynesian results of fiscal policy seem to prevail in high public-debt countries, whereas non-Keynesian outcomes seem to characterize high private-debt countries. As for the monetary policy shock, we find that it plays an important role, jointly with the other area-wide shocks, as a long-term driver of national unemployment.     

Fiscal risk in a monetary union

We present a dynamic and quantitative model of a fiscal solvency crisis in a monetary union. Diverse fiscal policies, which are subject to fiscal limits and stochastic shocks, can threaten a monetary union. The fiscal limits arise due to distortionary taxation and political will. Stochastic shocks are random and could push a fiscally sound policy towards its limit. In equilibrium agents refuse to lend along a path which violates the fiscal limits, creating a fiscal solvency crisis. The dynamics leading to the crisis depend on the policy response to restore lending. We focus on two responses, default and policy switching. We simulate our model to quantify the probability of a fiscal solvency crisis in the European Monetary Union with fiscal variables at end of 2009 values. Our model predicts the Greek crisis which occurred and warns of an Italian one.     

Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union

Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell (1961) : a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective. If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable.
This paper explores this argument in a setting with both monetary and fiscal policies. In an economy with monetary policy alone, we confirm the presence of the trade-off and find that indeed a monetary union will not be welfare improving if the correlation of national shocks is too low. However, fiscal interventions by national governments, combined with a central bank that has the ability to commit to monetary policy, overturn these results. In equilibrium, such a monetary union will be welfare improving for any correlation of shocks.     

Financial frictions and optimal stabilization policy in a monetary union

Financial frictions differ across countries and thus cause international differences in the transmission of shocks. This paper shows how the optimal mix of monetary and fiscal policy depends on these country-specific financial frictions. To this end, we build a two-country DSGE-model of a monetary union. Financial frictions are captured by the cost channel approach. We show that the traditional solution to the assignment problem – the common central bank stabilizes the inflation rate at the union level and the national fiscal authorities stabilize the national economies – does not hold in a world with financial frictions. The cost channel decreases the efficiency of monetary policy and increases the need for fiscal stabilization even at the union level. Moreover, the more heterogeneous the union, the more important is fiscal policy in stabilizing shocks. Finally, we evaluate the scenarios in terms of welfare of the representative household.     

FiMod — A DSGE model for fiscal policy simulations

This paper develops a medium-scale dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) model for fiscal policy simulations. Relative to existing models of this type, our model incorporates two important features. First, we consider a two-country monetary union structure, which makes it well suited to simulate fiscal measures by relatively large countries in a currency area. Second, we provide a notable degree of disaggregation on the government expenditures side, by explicitly distinguishing between (productivity-enhancing) public investment, public purchases and the public sector wage bill. In addition, we consider a labor market characterized by search and matching frictions, which allows to analyze the response of equilibrium unemployment to fiscal measures. In order to illustrate some of its applications, and motivated by recent policy debate in the Euro Area, we calibrate the model to Spain and the rest of the area and simulate a number of fiscal consolidation scenarios. We find that, in terms of output and employment losses, fiscal consolidation is the least damaging when achieved by reducing the public sector wage bill, whereas it is most damaging when carried out by cutting public investment.     

Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.     

Budget uncertainty in a monetary union

Governments in a monetary union fear spending disturbances. We distinguish them according to their ability to hedge against these disturbances and assume that they derive their optimal fiscal decisions by using a robust control approach. Results show that governments being highly vulnerable to spending disturbances set excessive tax rates, thereby exacerbating the fiscal pressure detrimental to output and obliging the central bank to conduct an expansionary monetary policy. Countries whose governments have higher ability to hedge against spending disturbances then suffer from the inflationary consequences of this monetary policy.     

Growth,unemployment and public capital

Abstract. Existing literature has studied the growth effects of fiscal policy in models with full-employment. The aim of this paper is to study these growth effects in an endogenous growth model with unemployment and compare them with the effects obtained when there is full-employment. To this end, we assume that unemployment arises due to the existence of unions. We also assume that the government finances, by means of income taxes, both public capital and an unemployment benefit. Public capital increases total factor productivity and modifies the elasticity of the labor demand. We show that the effects of fiscal policy on both employment and growth crucially depend on the relation between this elasticity and public capital. We would like to thank Jordi Caballé, Fernando Sánchez, Manuel Santos and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. Sorolla is grateful for financial support to Spanish Ministry of Education through DGICYT grant SEC2000-0684 and to Generalitat de Catalunya through grant SGR2001-164. Raurich is grateful to Universitat de Girona for financial support through grant 9100075.     

Growth and Convergence in a Two-Region Model of Unified Germany

The paper sets up a two-region endogenous growth model to discuss growth and regional convergence of unified Germany. It emphasizes the role of private and public capital accumulation during the developing process. The theoretical part derives fiscal policy rules which establish convergence of regional output per capita and convergence of regional human wealth. To assess the speed of convergence the model is calibrated with German data. Given a fiscal policy rule that is consistent with the data on government spending in East and West Germany after unification the model suggests that East Germany will reach 80 per cent of West Germany's income per capita between 20 and 30 years after unification and that actual transfers are approximately sufficient to equalize regional human wealth. The results are compared with an extension of the model that includes wage-setting behaviour and unemployment in the eastern region.     

State-dependent fiscal multipliers in NORA - A DSGE model for fiscal policy analysis in Norway

We develop a novel medium-scale DSGE model, called NORA, for fiscal policy analysis in Norway. NORA contains a sheltered and exposed sector allowing us to model wage bargaining between a labor union and the exposed sector, reflecting Scandinavian wage formation institutions. Wages are subject to a downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR). Inspired by many countries' fiscal policy responses to the Great Recession and the coronavirus pandemic, we investigate the model's ability to generate state-dependent fiscal multipliers. We find, that both the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and DNWR individually can account for higher fiscal multipliers during recessions. In joint presence, however, the existence of DNWR reduces the multiplier at the ZLB. Moreover, the DNWR significantly relaxes the paradox of toil at the ZLB. We show that the state-dependency is robust to alternative assumptions about the origin of the recession, the nature of the fiscal stimulus and its financing source.     

Thoughts on a Fiscal Union in EMU

Using an estimated large‐scale New Keynesian model, we assess the consequences of introducing a fiscal union within EMU. We differentiate between three different scenarios: public revenue equalisation, tax harmonisation and a centralised fiscal authority. Our results indicate that no country would significantly benefit from introducing any form of fiscal union. Comparing long‐term, that is, steady state, effects we have winners and losers depending on the scenario. Differences in terms of business cycle statistics as well as in terms of risk sharing of asymmetric shocks are minor. This also explains why welfare differences are small across the fiscal union scenarios. A counterfactual exercise indicates that with a fiscal union regime already installed at the start of EMU, key macroeconomic variables would have reacted very similarly while debt dynamics would have changed notably.     

Income inequality and economic growth in an open economy

Income inequality has a strong impact on fiscal policy when majority voting enables those individuals with less-than-average income to decide on tax rates. This study analyzes the impact on economic growth of income inequality in an open economy where tax revenues are partially used for international transfers. In any case, income inequality is harmful for growth. In an economic union, positive effects of international integration raise the growth rate as long as net transfers do not grow proportionally. In a political union, unionwide voting makes distributive politics depending on the union's median voter. In this case, additional output growth on aggregate level is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a majority of voters to accept union membership.     

When does financial integration matter for fiscal policy in a currency union? A welfare-based approach

We use a two-country new open economy macroeconomics model describing a currency union with imperfect financial integration. We assume that household preferences are biased towards the goods produced within the country. We use this setup to show how the degree of financial integration and the home bias affect the welfare efficiency of fiscal policy. This is particularly important for the implications of a fiscal policy launched by a member of the euro zone where the home bias is in a decreasing trend due to higher goods market integration and where there are explicit efforts to enhance financial integration. The results show in particular how the effects of an increasing financial integration on the impact of a fiscal policy can be mitigated or amplified by a decreasing home-product bias. Moreover, under certain conditions, the degree of financial integration has no effect on the welfare efficiency of fiscal policy despite its non-negligible effects on the components of welfare.     

Deficits,full employment and the use of fiscal policy

According to orthodox economic wisdom, fiscal policy is incapable of solving the unemployment problem because government deficits crowd out consumer spending, business investment and net exports. This paper argues that neither theoretical nor empirical support exists for such claims. In addition, misplaced and mistaken fears about government deficits have kept national governments from employing fiscal policy when necessary. By abandoning fiscal policy, national governments have contributed to rising unemployment in the developed world.     

Fiscal policy,growth, income distribution and sociopolitical instability

This paper identifies the fiscal instruments that governments can use to promote economic growth when sociopolitical instability (SPI) is present. We show that fiscal policy that takes into account income distribution and SPI transforms a neoclassical growth model into one with both endogenous growth and a poverty trap. Under these circumstances, the growth rate of the economy depends upon SPI, fiscal policy and income distribution. The baseline level of SPI determines an economy's ability to grow. If SPI is high, the economy remains in a poverty trap even if fiscal policy instruments are set appropriately.     

REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT DISPARITIES: AN EVALUATION OF POLICY MEASURES*

This paper analyses the efficacy of regional and federal government policies in reducing inter‐regional unemployment disparities. We use as our framework a two‐region general equilibrium model with a given freely‐mobile supply of labour. We assume inter‐regional migration to occur in response to inter‐regional utility differentials. Each region has households, firms and a regional government. In addition to regional governments, there is a federal government. The firms in a region use a single factor, labour, to produce a single good which we assume to be different to that produced in the other region. It is supplied to households and to the regional government in the form of payroll taxes. Households consume some, trade some with households in the other region and give some up to the federal government as income tax. Firms and households bargain over wages and firms then choose employment to maximise profits. The resulting equilibrium will generally not be a full‐employment one. We simulate a linearised numerical version of the model. We examine seven alternative policies, six carried out by a regional government and one by the federal government. In the first group there are traditional tax/expenditure polices as well as policies which might be seen as attacking the natural rate of unemployment: changes in unemployment benefits, changes in union power, changes in the labour force and changes in labour productivity. The federal government policy is a regionally‐differentiated fiscal policy. Contrary to expectations, many policies which have traditionally been recommended to alleviate unemployment are found, in fact, to exacerbate the unemployment problem.