Thomas Piketty's Historical Macroeconomics: A Critical Analysis

There has been a great deal of interest in the data on income and wealth inequality collected by Thomas Piketty. This paper does not question that data; rather, it questions the framework of Piketty's analysis, both theoretically and empirically—namely the alleged upward tendency of the ratio of wealth to national income and the rise of wealth inequality. First, in the mechanism put forward, wealth can only grow as a result of savings, thus ruling out any form of price effect (as in urban land). Second, Piketty’s second law defines an asymptotical trajectory, in which variables grow in parallel, something incompatible with the rise of the ratio between two variables. In addition, Piketty’s model does not match data for the USA. The historical profile of the ratio of wealth/national income is actually the inverted image of the productivity of capital (the ratio of output/firms’ fixed capital). Doubts are also expressed concerning the dramatic fall of the ratio of wealth/national income in Europe around World War I.     

The National Wealth–Income Ratio in Greece, 1974–2013

Can the rise of wealth–income ratios observed in rich economies be found in the case of Greece as well? This paper uses a generalization of a two‐good wealth accumulation equation to estimate the evolution of the national wealth–income ratio, and finds that, similarly to the European evidence, the ratio rises from about 280 percent in the 1970s to about 500 percent on the eve of the current financial crisis. On average, during 1974–96, the saving‐induced wealth growth cancels out the capital losses, whereas in the subsequent decade, 1997–2007, the balance changes considerably when the saving effect vanishes and the prolonged capital gains result in a rising wealth–income ratio. During the recession, income falls faster than wealth. The results remain robust to several alterations of the benchmark framework.     

A Post-Keynesian Response to Piketty's ‘Fundamental Contradiction of Capitalism’

In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty presents a rich set of data that deals with income and wealth distribution, output-wealth dynamics and rates of return. He also proposes some ‘laws of capitalism’. At the core of his argument lies the ‘fundamental inequality of capitalism’, an empirical regularity stating that the rate of return on wealth is greater than the growth rate of the economy. This simple construct allows him to conclude that increasing wealth (and income) inequality is an inevitable outcome of capitalism. While we share some of his conclusions, we will highlight some shortcomings of his approach based on a Cambridge post-Keynesian growth-and-distribution model. The paper makes four points. First, r?>?g is not necessarily associated with increasing inequality in functional distribution. Second, Piketty succumbs to a fallacy of composition when he claims that a necessary condition for r?>?g is that capitalists save a large share of their capital income. Third, post-Keynesians can learn from Piketty's insights about personal income distribution and incorporate them into their models. Fourth, we reiterate the post-Keynesian argument that a well-behaved aggregate production function does not exist and cannot explain income distribution.     

COSTLY INTERMEDIATION AND THE POVERTY OF NATIONS*

This article has two goals: (i) to reduce the 7‐fold productivity differential required to explain the observed 33‐fold income difference between the richest and poorest countries of the world; and (ii) to explain cross‐country differences in the capital‐output ratio. To achieve the first goal we modify the production function of the standard neoclassical growth model to include public capital whose provision is subject to intermediation costs. For the second goal we distort private investment by introducing credit frictions. The model, quantified using cross‐country data, generates an income gap of 33 with productivity differences of only 3 under the measured variations in public and private capital. The required productivity gap declines even further, to 2.1, when we introduce a home‐production sector. On the second goal, however, credit frictions do a poor job of explaining cross‐country variations in the capital‐output ratio.     

Is an increasing capital share under capitalism inevitable?

Piketty's influential book Capital in the Twenty-First Century and its prominent review by Milanovic in the Journal of Economic Literature both assert the inevitability of an increasing share of capital in total income, given a higher rate of return to capital than the rate of growth in income. This paper shows by a specific example, a logical argument and its intuition that the alleged inevitability is not valid. Even just for capital to grow faster than income, we need an additional requirement that saving of non-capital income is larger than consumption of capital income. Even if this is satisfied, the capital share may not increase as the rate of return may fall and non-capital incomes may increase with capital accumulation.     

Capital markets and capital allocation: Implications for economies in transition*

Recent work showing that a sounder financial system is associated with faster economic growth has important implications for transition economies. Stock prices in developed economies move in highly firm‐specific ways that convey information about changes in firms’ marginal value of investment. This information facilitates the rapid flow of capital to its highest value uses. In contrast, stock prices in low‐income countries tend to move up and down en masse, and thus are of scant use for microeconomic capital allocation. Some transition economy markets are coming to resemble those of developed economies, others those of low‐income countries. Stock return asynchronicity is highly correlated with the strength of private property rights in general and public shareholders’ rights in particular. Other recent work suggests that small entrenched elites in low‐income countries preserve their sweeping control over the corporate sectors of their economies by using political influence to undermine the financial system and deprive entrants of capital. The lack of cross‐sectional independence in some transition economies’ stock returns may be a warning of such economic entrenchment. Sound property rights, solid shareholder rights, stock market transparency, and capital account openness appear to check this, and thus contribute to efficient capital allocation and economic growth.     

Median‐voter Equilibria in the Neoclassical Growth Model under Aggregation*

We study a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard's median‐voter model where agents differ in wealth. Taxes are proportional to income and are redistributed as equal lump‐sum transfers. Voting occurs every period and each consumer votes for the tax that maximizes his welfare. We characterize time‐consistent Markov‐perfect equilibria twofold. First, restricting utility classes, we show that the economy's aggregate state is mean and median wealth. Second, we derive the median‐voter's first‐order condition interpreting it as a tradeoff between distortions and net wealth transfers. Our method for solving the steady state relies on a polynomial expansion around the steady state.     

Public policy,dynamic status preferences,and wealth inequality

This paper studies the effect of productive government spending (taxation) on aggregate savings behavior and its consequences for the dynamics of wealth inequality, taking into consideration key behavioral changes that occur during the process of economic development. Substantial empirical evidence suggests that during this process agents' preferences toward status (positional consumption) evolves according to the average wealth of the society. The sources of wealth include private capital and productive public capital, the latter financed by a distortionary income tax. This dynamic status effect impacts peoples' responses to tax policy in ways which contrast with those of the standard neoclassical model. Specifically, we find that in response to an increase in the income tax, in economies with a strong (weak) enough dynamic status effect, savings and inequality increase (decrease). Incorporating the behavioral changes to fiscal policy expands the set of mechanisms available to explain the observed variations of savings and wealth distribution dynamics that cannot be attributed to technological or other structural factors.     

FIRST‐BEST FISCAL POLICY WITH SOCIAL STATUS*

This paper examines the first‐best fiscal policy in a stochastic, infinite‐horizon representative agent model that exhibits consumption‐enhanced as well as wealth‐enhanced social status in the household utility. We show that the first‐best labour tax rate is a positive constant that is used to correct negative consumption externalities. The first‐best tax rate on capital income is also positive in order to overturn agents' status‐seeking capital over‐accumulation. Moreover, we find that in sharp contrast to a conventional automatic stabilizer, the first‐best capital tax rate moves in the opposite direction with shocks to firms' production technology, thus exacerbating the business cycle.     

ENDOGENOUS FLUCTUATIONS IN TWO‐COUNTRY MODELS*

This paper investigates the interlinkage in the business cycles of large‐country economies in a free‐trade equilibrium. We consider a two‐country, two‐good, two‐factor general equilibrium model with Cobb‐Douglas technologies and linear preferences. We also assume decreasing returns to scale in the consumption good sector. We first identify the determinants of each country's global accumulation pattern in autarky equilibrium, and secondly we show how a country's business cycles may spread throughout the world once trade opens. We thus give capital intensity conditions for local and global stability of competitive equilibrium paths.     

The composition of foreign capital stocks in South Africa: The role of institutions,domestic risk and neighbourhood effects

Foreign capital inflows are an important source of funds to finance investment in developing economies. International finance literature is therefore concerned with how institutional factors like property rights and corruption affect foreign capital inflows. We investigate the determinants of the absolute volumes and composition of foreign capital stocks in South Africa, focusing on the role played by institutional quality (property rights), domestic default risk and neighbourhood effects as potential determinants. The empirical results show that secure property rights and low default risk in the host country positively affect the absolute volumes of both long-term foreign capital and short-term foreign capital, but tilt the composition in favour of long-term foreign capital. Empirical results also demonstrate the existence of neighbourhood effects where the institutional environment in Zimbabwe significantly impacts on South Africa's foreign capital inflows. In this regard, weak property rights in Zimbabwe lead to an increase in South Africa's foreign direct investment (FDI), but a reduction in South Africa's portfolio investment. This suggests that Zimbabwe and South Africa compete for foreign direct investment in similar sectors, and present two alternative investment destinations to foreign investors. By contrast, weak property rights in Zimbabwe appear to raise the perceived risk for portfolio investment in South Africa.     

Crowding out and crowding in: When does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?

When the risk of default constrains financial contracts, public insurance policies can significantly affect private risk-sharing. This is because by changing income expectations and volatility, redistribution changes the attractiveness of default and thus endogenous borrowing constraints. Extending results by Krueger and Perri (2011) [8], this paper analyses the conditions under which redistribution can improve private insurance by making default less attractive to the income-rich, whose income it reduces. I first explain why public redistribution typically crowds out private insurance in the two-income economy, and identify the role of income persistence and saving after default. Second, I show how, in endowment economies with three income states or more and in economies with capital, redistributive taxes can improve, or “crowd in”, private consumption insurance. Finally, in a quantitative exercise using a realistic income process calibrated to US micro-data, moderate redistribution crowds in private insurance with production but not in an endowment economy.     

Capital markets integration, growth and income distribution

The paper considers a two-country model of overlapping generation heterogenous economies with intergenerational transfers carried out in the form of bequest and investment in human capital. We examine in competitive equilibrium the transitory and long-run effects of capital markets integration. First, we explore how the regime of public education affects the dynamics of the integrated economy. Second, we study the effects of capital markets integration, in equilibrium, on the intragenerational income distribution in both the host and investing country.     

Does public‐sector employment fully crowd out private‐sector employment?

Employment matters for development because it can raise household income, lower inequality, promote economic growth, and contribute to political stability. Many countries have high rates of public employment, but what effect does this have on overall employment and unemployment rates? This paper investigates if and to what extent public‐sector employment crowds out (reduces) private‐sector employment. In particular, we estimate regressions of unemployment or private‐sector employment on two measures of public‐sector employment. The study uses an especially assembled dataset, which is novel for its coverage of a large sample of developing countries as part of a panel of rich and poor countries. Our results point to full or just about full crowding‐out for the entire sample. Unlike previous cross‐country studies, which were restricted to advanced economies, we are able to show that these results also apply to developing countries, although crowding‐out may not be quite as high as in advanced economies. The results mean that high rates of public employment have an offsetting large negative impact on private employment rates and do not reduce overall unemployment rates. With the qualifier that government activities may help the economy in other ways, our results imply that, rather than creating public‐sector jobs, scarce fiscal resources could be better spent on other developmental needs.     

China's regional income disparityAn alternative way to think of the sources and causes1

Using data on China's provincial economies for the period 1978–2005, we decomposed the causes and factors that have contributed to inter‐regional per capita income disparity. Variance in capital per employee and variance in capital elasticity are found to be the two main sources of income disparity while the employment–labour force ratio is shown to be an important factor in containing the rise of income disparity. An analysis on inter‐regional factor reallocation effects reveals their relatively small and insignificant contributions to overall growth performance. It is also discovered that capital has in most years flowed in the right direction to pursue higher marginal productivity across provincial economies. Inter‐provincial labour movement, on the other hand, had not displayed significant equilibrating effects until institutional reforms started to allow freer inter‐regional labour mobility in later years. Generally, we conclude that market‐oriented factor mobility has played a crucial role in equalizing factor returns as well as enhancing growth efficiency across regions.     

Inequality: The original economic sin of capitalism? An Evaluation of Thomas Piketty's "Capital in the twenty-first century"

This is a review article of Thomas Piketty's book “Capital in the twenty-first century”. Piketty promotes the old theme that, under capitalism, the rich tend to become richer and the poor become poorer, at least in relative terms. We consider whether the data really shows that wealth and income are becoming more concentrated; the role of income transfers (Piketty's data is for pre-tax and pre-transfer income) and other influences on inequality such as real estate prices; the implications of social and economic mobility; the role of the state in fostering inequality; and the determination of socially acceptable inequality. We conclude that Piketty has not succeeded in showing that the inequality r > g (the rate of return is greater than the rate of growth) is the principal determinant of inequality. Piketty offers neither an accompanying theory of social justice nor a theoretical framework to support his case. In particular, lacking is a revealed appreciation of the effects of high marginal tax rates on growth and efficiency.     

Fragmentation, Engel's Law, and Learning

This paper outlines the conditions under which trade is beneficial for a developing country's growth. A developing country suffers from two disadvantages: low income and a comparative disadvantage in the production of modern manufactured goods—goods which allow a high rate of human capital accumulation through learning by doing. Low income together with Engel's law imply that developing countries consume and produce very few modern goods in autarky and hence grow slowly. With international fragmentation of production, a developing country may find comparative advantage in the production of some stages of modern goods despite an absence of comparative advantage in the production of modern goods under “100% local content.” More resources can then be allocated to the modern goods sector leading to greater learning externalities and hence growth under free trade than in autarky.     

Capital Trading,Stock Trading,and the Inflation Tax on Equity

A market for used capital goods, or financial instruments that represent the ownership of the used capital goods, induces inflation taxes on wealth and on the nominal income flows that they provide. This paper explicitly introduces trading in either used capital goods or financial instruments into the standard stochastic growth model with money and production. These two monetary economies are equivalent. The value of the firm is equal to the firm's capital stock divided by inflation. The resulting asset-pricing conditions indicate that the effect of inflation on asset returns differs from the effects found in the literature by the addition of a significant wealth tax. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E0, E4, E5.     

Taxation of capital income in overlapping generations economies

Whether capital income should be taxed in overlapping generations economies is vividly discussed. It is shown that intergenerational lump‐sum taxes cannot implement the Golden Rule allocation when agents have private information on their earnings potential. Hence, the seminal Atkinson–Stiglitz result that optimal income taxation pre‐empts any role for indirect taxation cannot be interpreted to imply that capital income taxation (affecting intertemporal relative prices) should not be taxed. Specifically, capital income should unambiguously be taxed in small open economies, and the optimal tax rate depends inversely on the elasticity of total savings to disposable income and the after‐tax rate of return.     

Feldstein–Horioka puzzles

The high correlation between national saving and investment rates in advanced economies—the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle—has been referred to as the “mother of all puzzles.” Perhaps more puzzling is that for emerging economies saving–investment correlations tend to be significantly lower, though still positive. This deepens the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle because the mobility of capital is generally believed to be much lower in emerging economies than in advanced economies, and a country with less mobile capital should have a tighter relationship between local saving and investment rates. This paper develops a DSGE model that, without resorting to any real or financial friction, simultaneously explains these two aspects of the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle: positive saving–investment correlations in both advanced and emerging economies and significantly lower saving–investment correlations in emerging economies than in advanced economies. The main features of the model include long-run risk, an endogenous world interest rate, and cross-correlations of national and global shocks. The findings hold for both quarterly time series and long-run averages.