Joining a Queue or Staying Out: Effects of Information Structure and Service Time on Arrival and Staying Out Decisions

We study a class of single-server queueing systems with a finite population size, FIFO queue discipline, and no balking or reneging. In contrast to the predominant assumptions of queueing theory of exogenously determined arrivals and steady state behavior, we investigate queueing systems with endogenously determined arrival times and focus on transient rather than steady state behavior. When arrival times are endogenous, the resulting interactive decision process is modeled as a non-cooperative n-person game with complete information. Assuming discrete strategy spaces, the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution for groups of n = 20 agents is computed using a Markov chain method. Using a 2 × 2 between-subject design (private vs. public information by short vs. long service time), arrival and staying out decisions are presented and compared to the equilibrium predictions. The results indicate that players generate replicable patterns of behavior that are accounted for remarkably well on the aggregate, but not individual, level by the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution unless congestion is unavoidable and information about group behavior is not provided.JEL Classification: C71, C92, D81     

Habit,aggregation and long memory: evidence from television audience data

Many economic outcomes appear to be influenced by habit or commitment, giving rise to persistence. In cases where the decision is binary and persistent, the aggregation of individual time series can result in a fractionally integrated process for the aggregate data. Certain television programmes appear to engender commitment on the part of viewers and the decision to watch or not is clearly binary. We report an empirical analysis of television audience data and show that these series can be modelled as I(d) processes. We also investigate the proposition that temporal aggregation of a fractionally-integrated series leaves the value of d unchanged.     

Adjusting the model to adjust the world: constructive mechanisms in postwar general equilibrium theory

Economic methodologists most often study the relations between models and reality while focusing on the issues of the model's epistemic relevance in terms of its relation to the ‘real world’ and representing the real world in a model. We complement the discussion by bringing the model's constructive mechanisms or self-implementing technologies in play. By this, we mean the elements of the economic model that are aimed at ‘implementing’ it by envisaging the ways to change the reality in order to bring it more in line with the model. We are thus concerned mainly not with the ways to change the model to ‘fit’ the reality, but rather with the model's own armature that is supposed to transform the world along theoretical lines. The case we study is Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie general equilibrium model. In particular, we show the following: gradient methods and stability could be regarded as constructive mechanisms of general equilibrium modeling in the context of market socialism debates; the obsession of general equilibrium theorists with these concepts can be partly explained by the fact that they hoped not to be faithful to reality, but rather to adjust it to fit the theoretical model; mechanism design theory initiated by the stability theorist Leonid Hurwicz could be seen as a successor of this position. We conclude by showing the relevance of this analysis for epistemic culture of much of contemporary economics and hence, claim that it is an important complement to the traditional philosophy of economic modeling.     

Equilibrium without prices: A central issue in pareto’smanuale

Pareto in hisManuale asserts that the price concept is inessential for the notion of equilibrium. This view deeply contrasts with the Arrow-Debreu’s dominant approach of Walrasian derivation. This identifies general equilibrium with a system of prices at which the decentralized choices of economic agents match. In this paper the author justifies and gives substance to the Paretian point of view. The differential merit of the Paretian approach is its independence of assumptions of price taking and of convexity in preferences and in production possibility sets. These assumptions are necessary, in the walrasian framework, only to maintain the centrality of prices, but they clash against the request of realism. (JEL:BOO, D51, D60)     

Unfolding Social Hierarchies

Consider a large population of finitely-lived agents organized into n different hierarchical levels. Every period, all those placed at each level are randomly matched to play a given symmetric game. Based on the resulting outcome, a ρ-fraction of agents who (within their own level) attain the highest payoffs are promoted upwards. On the other hand, newcomers replacing those who die every period enter at the lowest level and choose irreversibly the strategy to be played for the rest of their life. This choice is made, with some noise, by imitating one of the strategies adopted at the highest level.  In this setup, the unique long-run behavior of the system is fully characterized for the whole class of 2×2 coordination games and two alternative variations of the model. The results crucially depend on the key “institutional” parameters ρ and n. In particular, it is shown that inefficient behavior prevails in the long run (even when risk-dominated) if promotion is only mildly selective—high ρ—and the social system is quite hierarchical—large n. In a stylized manner, these parameter conditions may be viewed as reflecting a sort of institutional deficiency that impairs economic performance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C73, D72.     

Petty corruption

This paper analyzes a petty corruption model in which the entrepreneur’s type is drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F over [0, 1], and perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept for a one-stage game. In the one-stage game, if there is more than one bureaucrat, no project is approved with a strictly positive probability. For an infinitely repeated game, I show that the single window policy strictly increases the social benefits in a socially optimal equilibrium. I would like to thank Mukul Majumdar for valuable guidance and encouragement. I am also grateful to Kaushik Basu, Fernando Vega-Redondo, an anonymous referee, seminar participants at the international meeting for public economic theory (PET07) and especially Ani Guerdjikova and Roy Radner for helpful comments. Thanks are due to Hideaki Goto and Eunkyeong Lee for useful conversation.     

An Arrears Crisis and Stabilization Failure in a Transition Economy

The paper addresses the problem of the arrears crises in transition economies using a war-of-attrition type dynamic game of incomplete information. Analysis of the sequential equilibrium of the game reveals how a representative firm's perception of the government's ability to enforce adjustment to the announced stabilization program affects the firm's decision whether to adjust or to postpone adjustment and fall into arrears. An extension of the basic model is used to explore the opportunity for the government to signal its commitment to a tight monetary policy by applying for an IMF loan.J. Comp. Econom., December 2000, 28(4), pp. 665–699. University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4, Canada.     

The complete removal of individual uncertainty: multiple optimal choices and random exchange economies

Summary. The aim of this paper is to develop some measure-theoretic methods for the study of large economic systems with individual-specific randomness and multiple optimal actions. In particular, for a suitably formulated continuum of correspondences, an exact version of the law of large numbers in distribution is characterized in terms of almost independence, which leads to several other versions of the law of large numbers in terms of integration of correspondences. Widespread correlation due to multiple optimal actions is also shown to be removable via a redistribution. These results allow the complete removal of individual risks or uncertainty in economic models where non-unique best choices are inevitable. Applications are illustrated through establishing stochastic consistency in general equilibrium models with idiosyncratic shocks in endowments and preferences. In particular, the existence of “global” solutions preserving microscopic independence structure is shown in terms of competitive equilibria for the cases of divisible and indivisible goods as well as in terms of core for a case with indivisible goods where a competitive equilibrium may not exist. An important feature of the idealized equilibrium models considered here is that standard results on measure-theoretic economies are now directly applicable to the case of random economies. Some asymptotic interpretation of the results are also discussed. It is also pointed out that the usual unit interval [0,1] can be used as an index set in our setting, provided that it is endowed together with some sample space a suitable larger measure structure. Received: September 14, 1998; revised version: January 6, 1999     

Random belief equilibrium in normal form games

In defining random belief equilibrium (RBE) in finite, normal form games we assume a player's beliefs about others' strategy choices are randomly drawn from a belief distribution that is dispersed around a central strategy profile, the focus. At an RBE: (1) Each chooses a best response relative to her beliefs. (2) Each player's expected choice coincides with the focus of the other players' belief distributions. RBE provides a statistical framework for estimation which we apply to data from three experimental games. We also characterize the limit-RBE as players' beliefs converge to certainty. When atoms in the belief distributions vanish in the limit, not all limit-RBE (called robust equilibria) are trembling hand perfect Nash equilibria and not all perfect equilibria are robust.     

Implementation in Economic Environments with Incomplete Information: The Use of Multi-Stage Games

This paper shows that, in economic environments with incomplete information, incentive compatibility and a preference reversal condition are sufficient for implementation in sequential equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D71, D82.